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*The*  
STORY OF THE  
GREAT WAR

ITALY ENTERS WAR  
GORIZIA · UNITED  
STATES AND THE WAR



V O L U M E V I

P. F. COLLIER & SON, NEW YORK

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## PART I—ITALY ENTERS THE WAR

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### CHAPTER I

#### SPIRIT OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE—CRISIS OF THE GOVERNMENT

THE crystallization of popular opinion in favor of intervention kept pace with the trend of diplomatic negotiations. Italy, especially the northern provinces, was a great beehive, humming with patriotic fervor. Evenings in almost any northern town might be seen companies of young men in civilian dress marching in companies and maneuvering with military precision. At first the organizers of these "training walks," as they were called, maintained reticence regarding their purpose. The youths, they said, were merely undergoing voluntary training to be ready "in case they should be needed." But the purpose of these volunteer drills was unmistakable. At times, when the drill grounds were rather isolated, the marchers would burst into patriotic songs—the hymn of the Garibaldians, or, perhaps, "Trieste of My Heart." Soon the neutralists began to organize counterpreparations. Encounters between bands of the rival factions became increasingly frequent, in fact daily occurrences. From jeers they passed to scuffles, in which missiles and clubs were the weapons. As a rule these encounters took place far enough from the city limits to avoid interference by the police, and only vague reports of them reached the main body of home-loving citizens.

Milan was the center of these demonstrations. During April, 1915, the Socialists proclaimed a "general strike," which left a large part of the working population idle to attend gatherings

addressed by the neutralist orator. These meetings generally wound up with a parade, and perhaps a hostile demonstration in front of the office of some interventionist newspaper, or cheers outside the German Consulate. The next day the Piazza would be thronged with a gathering of interventionists wearing the national colors entwined with the flag of Trieste, and, perhaps, with the "honorable red shirt" of the Garibaldians. During the period just before the entrance of Italy into the war these rival processions were held on different days by order of the police, who ruthlessly broke up any attempt to interfere with assemblies entitled to the right of way. As the war party began to gain, their opponents adopted the custom of attacking the demonstrators after they had disbanded.

As it was, a mob attacked the Milan branch of the Siemens-Schuckert works, the great Berlin electrical machinery factory, battered in the main entrance, and exchanged shots with some young German employees left in charge. The timely arrival of the armed police stopped this riot, and removed the Germans to safe quarters.

At this juncture, or before, the influence of the "Garibaldi" movement became widely apparent. Early in the war the Garibaldians had launched a movement to recognize the aid received from France by Italy during her War of Independence. A special corps of Garibaldi volunteers was enrolled in France, and its valiant service in the Alsace campaign, where one of the members of the Garibaldi family fell, had a telling effect in Italy. Volunteers for this corps at once sprang up from all parts of the country.

On May 10, 1915, Germans and Austrians throughout Italy were advised by their consulates to leave the country. The exodus proceeded rapidly, and during the next ten days nearly all the citizens of the two Central Powers who were able to leave had taken refuge in Switzerland. Italy seemed ripe for war; but still the Government delayed. There was now no doubt of the popular mind; but events outside the country were not encouraging. Perhaps the weightiest of these deterring factors was news of the Russian retirement in the north and informa-

tion reaching the Italian Minister of War that the Entente Allies were short of ammunition.

Then came the crisis in the Government. Baron Sonnino's denunciation of the Alliance caused a change in the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. Prince von Bülow and the Austrian Ambassador, Baron von Macchio, were authorized to conclude a new agreement on the basis of further Austrian concessions. Sonnino refused to accept the new terms and the German and Austrian representatives played their last trump. Baron von Macchio telegraphed to Vienna accusing the Italian Foreign Minister of concealing information of the Austrian concessions both from the king and the majority of the cabinet. The concessions were printed and circulated widely among the people. Signor Giolitti, Salandra's predecessor, and at one time all but dictator of Italy, hurried to Rome and rallied his followers. The neutralists hailed him as the man to save Italy from a ruinous war.

Parliament was to meet on May 20, 1915. It was clear that the supporters of Giolitti, in majority both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, could, if they chose, overthrow the Government. Popular anxiety was intense.

On the evening of May 13, 1915, came the announcement that the Salandra ministry had resigned. If there had been any doubt of the state of things throughout Italy up to that point, this news cleared the situation. The whole country burst into a flame of indignation. The next day Italy learned for the first time that the Triple Alliance had been denounced early in the month.

It became clear that whatever the fate of Salandra and his cabinet, his foreign policy was bound to be continued.

On May 15, 1915, announcement that the king had declined to accept Salandra's resignation caused a great popular outburst of joy. In Rome an immense gathering called to protest against the Giolittians and German influence was transformed into a demonstration of triumph; more than 150,000 persons took part in a procession a mile long that moved from the Piazza del Popolo to the Quirinal.



The next morning, May 16, 1915, there was nobody in Rome who doubted what Italy would do. That day Giolitti left Rome, and his departure marked the end of his active influence during the opening months of the war. His party crumpled.

When Parliament met on May 20, 1915, Salandra received an overwhelming vote of confidence in the passage of a bill conferring extraordinary powers upon the Government in the event of war. Miles north of Rome, word came to the Austrian commanders, working feverishly to strengthen their forts in the fastnesses of the Alps, to brace themselves for the assault.

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## CHAPTER II

### THE DECISION MADE—ITALIAN STRATEGIC PLAN

ON the night of May 24, 1915, little groups of the Alpini, Italy's famous mountain troops, moved silently. They passed from San Giorgio, Cividale and Palmanova on the eastern frontier, from Paluzza and San Stefano and Pieve on the north, from Agordo, Feltre and Asiago, from Brentino and Malcesine toward Lake Garda, from Garganano the western shore of the lake and from other positions all along the mountain frontier up to the Stelvio Pass.

Marching silently and in single file, by three o'clock in the morning of May 25, 1915, one detachment reached a deep trench. "Our frontiers," said their officers. "We advance to make new ones." Then began a long, steep climb up narrow mountain paths, through snow lying in patches knee-deep, and through a storm of sleet and rain that broke along the Trentino boundary before dawn. As dawn broke they hurled themselves upon an Austrian shelter trench excavated the autumn before on the plateau. It was empty. The enemy had retired only a few hours before. The camp-fire ashes were still warm. As the sun began to throw the long shadows of the Alpine peaks to the west Aus-

trian guns crashed out their first salute from the rocky fortresses beyond. Italy and Austria-Hungary were at war.

To comprehend the task before the Italian army it is necessary to examine the Italian-Austrian frontier. Austria's problem was one only of defense. Her warning had been ample and when war was declared she was prepared to the last detail. Being the challenged party hers was the choice of weapons, and she had equipped herself with an almost impregnable line of fortifications. The grievance was Italy's, and hers the duty of assault. Every advantage of position lay with Austria.

The strategic plan of the Italian generals was determined by hard geographical facts. The Italo-Austrian frontier is about 480 miles long, divided naturally into three sections. On the west the Austrian province of Trentino indents Italian territory like a wedge; next comes the great wall of the Dolomites and the Carnic and Julian Alps; then, on the east, a boundary line running north and south between the main Alpine chain and the Adriatic Sea. Steep mountain heights dominated by Austrian troops guarded the first two parts of this frontier. Only on the eastern border, from Pontebba to the Adriatic was Italian offensive on a large scale at all feasible; but before offensive operations could be started here it was necessary for the Italians to close the open gates to the north.

Here in the north lay Italy's problem at the opening of the war; and here her armies confronted an almost impossible task. In a word, they had to fight uphill. A salient, such as that formed by the Trentino, may offer dangers for the side that holds it—an example of which is the Russian position in Poland at the opening of the war; but the Trentino situation was quite unlike that in Poland. The sides of the Trentino were buttressed with mountains. The most tempting avenue of invasion was the valley of the Adige River. An enemy advancing by this route would find himself confronted with the strongly fortified town of Trent, which long resisted attacks from Venice in the Middle Ages. Having forced his way past Trent the enemy would be in a wilderness of lateral valleys with the main ridge of the Alpine chain, at the Brenner, still before him.



On the western side of the Trentino is the lofty Stelvio Pass, leading from the Upper Adige to the valley of Adda. This pass is 9,000 feet high and its narrow defiles were easily defended. To the south lies the pass of Tonale over which runs the road from Noce to the Oglio, but this offers similar difficulties. The road pass of Cornelle, close to Lake Garda, is too narrow for any considerable force. On the eastern side of the salient conditions for invasion are still worse. The railway from Venice to Innsbruck crosses the Valsugana at Tezze, but the Brenta valley through which it runs is a difficult road to Trent. Summed up, the salient of the Trentino was an ideal position for those who held it, both offensive and defensive. The few breaches by which invasion could come were a source of strength rather than weakness, because they compelled attack from the Italian plain to be made on divergent lines from different bases.

The second part of the frontier is the ramparts of the Dolomite and Carnic ranges through which an important offensive was possible for neither belligerent. The main pass, at Ampezzo, 5,000 feet high, makes a sharp detour toward the west to circumvent the mass of Cristallo, and here the road is a narrow defile commanded by a hundred points of danger. The adjacent passes of Misurina and the Monte Croce are no better, and the defiles to the east contain little more than bridle paths. The lowest pass, which leads from the valley of the Fella by Pontebba to the upper streams of the Drave and carries the railway from Venice to Vienna is only 2,615 feet high at its greatest elevation. Although this is the easiest of the great routes through the mountain barrier, it is still narrow and difficult. A modern army given the advantages of time and preparation should be able to close and hold it with ease.

Although the maps show few natural difficulties on the third section of the frontier to compare with those farther west, it is not the obvious avenue of attack a hasty survey would seem to suggest. It is only twenty miles wide and behind it is the line of the River Isonzo with hills along its eastern bank. The upper part of this stream, above Salcana, is a ravine; then comes six miles of comparatively level ground in front of Gorizia; then

the hills begin again and sweep round to the seacoast by Monfalcone. What this front lacks in natural defenses had been amply supplied before the war opened by Austria with artillery and men. Toward this narrow twenty-mile stretch, and especially toward the plain before Gorizia, tended, in a sense, however, all the operations of the Italian strategists. The engagements fought during the first of the Italo-Austrian struggle all had their bearing upon the great offensive launched later against Gorizia.

But the natural lay of the land was by no means the only consideration with which the rival generals had to deal. In respect to lateral communications Italy had the advantage. Behind her invading armies stretched an elaborate system of railways through her northern provinces. Austria had a railway running through the whole curve of the frontier, but owing to the difficulty of breaking through from the hill valleys this system had few feeders. This lack of branch lines meant that Austria had to concentrate any offensive at certain definite places—Trent, Tarvis, and Gorizia. Italy aimed at these points and one more, Franzensfeste, the junction of the Pusterthal line with the railway from Innsbruck to Trent. If she could take this point she could cut Austria's communications in the whole Trentino salient. But Franzensfeste was the most difficult of any of these local points for Italy to reach, for south and east of it lay the bristling system of the Dolomites.

The successive revelations of Italian strategy during the first months of the war brought few surprises. Austria had her hands full in the Carpathians just then and was unable to take advantage of the opportunities for swift offensive which her frontier positions offered. It was a foregone conclusion that the first advance would come from the Italian side and the direction of that movement was not long in doubt. Its objective was Trieste, the Austrian peninsula, and the hills of Styria which sweep to Vienna. There lay the country where modern armies could maneuver. At the same time the whole northern boundary must be watched to prevent Austrian forces from the Trentino cutting the communications of the invader and attacking him

in the rear. Therefore General Cadorna, the Italian commander in chief, resolved to attack at all the salient points. Such a plan led to a series of movements—toward Trent, across the Dolomite passes against the Pusterthal railway, at the Pontebba Pass, and across the Julian Alps to threaten the line between Tarvis and Gorizia. Meanwhile the main Italian army was to strike at the Isonzo and the road to Trieste.

The same conditions which made the Austrian frontier lines easy to defend also would have given the Central Power a big advantage in offensive operations, but for excellent reasons the Austrian staff did not attack. In the first place, Austria lacked men. The Teutonic war councils concluded that Austro-Hungarian troops were of more value in the great drive then in progress against the Russians than they would have been in offensive operations against the cities of the northern Italian plains. Had the Austrians debouched from their mountain strongholds and forced the Italians to concentrate against them in Italian territory, as they undoubtedly could have done, the benefits of such an enterprise from the standpoint of the alliance powers would have been small in proportion to the risks. Only a combined drive by both Austria and Germany, it is believed, could have gained any telling advantage in northern Italy; and Italy, it must be remembered, had not declared war on Germany. Ensconced in their mountain fastnesses, the Austrians believed they could maintain a successful defensive indefinitely. Then, after the Italian armies had exhausted themselves beating against the mountain barrier, an opportunity might arise for Austrian reprisals. At the time few believed that Italy would long be able to maintain her attitude of neutrality regarding Germany—an opinion, by the way, which was not supported by the developments of the first year of the war.

The Austrians had months in which to prepare, and they had made good use of their time. The natural difficulties confronting an Italian assault had been enormously increased by trenches of steel and concrete. The Austrian engineers had connected their elaborate systems of wire entanglements with high-power electric stations, and dug mines at all vulnerable points. Heavy



guns had been moved, at great expenditure of labor, to the frontier forts and rails laid on which to move them from place to place. The broken nature of the ground afforded ideal opportunities for the concealment of artillery positions. It is safe to say that nowhere in the whole theatre of the Great War was there a line better adapted by nature and equipped by man for purposes of defensive warfare. The Austrian Archduke Eugene, who was in charge of the Italian operations, revealed his plan of campaign during the first few days after the beginning of hostilities. His aim was to risk nothing until Field Marshal von Mackensen had finished his operations in Galicia, where Austria's best troops were fighting with their German allies. To meet the Italians he had only the Landsturm and a few reserve divisions, but these were considered enough. The archduke resolved to hold the crests of the passes along the Trentino frontier and the line of the Carnic Alps, withdrawing his outposts before the enemy's advance. On the Isonzo he would abandon the country west of the river line and make his stand on a fortified line to the east which touched the Isonzo only at Gorizia, where the Austrians held the bridgehead on the western bank.

It has been pointed out in preceding pages that not a little of Italy's delay in entering the war, and of the tortuous diplomatic negotiations which for several months kept the outside in doubt as to her ultimate intentions, was due to the state of military unpreparedness confronting the country in the summer of 1914. But by May, 1915, the country had had nine months in which to get ready. Moreover, she had been able to profit by the lessons of the war. When Italy started to get ready there was no waste motion, although the task to be accomplished entailed enormous labor and expense.

## CHAPTER III

STRENGTH OF ITALIAN ARMY AND  
NAVY

AT the head of the Italian army and navy was the king, Victor Emmanuel, a monarch whose gallantry and simplicity had made him a popular idol. Popularity with the people meant also popularity with the army. The chief of the General Staff was General Count Luigi Cadorna. At the outbreak of the war General Cadorna was sixty-five years old. As a young man he had seen service under his father, Rafaele Cadorna, who, in September 1870, led an army into papal territory and blew in the Porta Pia. He had been a corps commander at Genoa. In 1914 he had succeeded General Pollio as chief of the General Staff.

Cadorna was the Von Hindenburg of Italy. As the German commander had studied the bogs of East Prussia, so he had devoted a large part of his life to becoming familiar with the broken line of Italy's northern frontier. He was known throughout Europe for his writings on military science.

The beginning of the war found the Italian navy far better equipped than the army. For the task of holding Austria in the Adriatic, which Italy now took over from France, she possessed four dreadnoughts and two more almost ready. She possessed also ten battleships of the predreadnought class and a number of older vessels. Compared with those of Great Britain and Germany, her armored cruisers were slow, none of them being capable of a speed exceeding twenty-two knots; but she had twenty submarines, forty destroyers and a large number of torpedo boats. Compared with the Austro-Hungarian fleet, the Italian navy showed on paper a distinct superiority. Its admiral in chief, the Duke of the Abruzzi, ranked among the most brilliant men of his time, not only as a naval man, but as a scientist, explorer, and man of affairs. He was first cousin of the king.



By May, 1915, General Cadorna, virtually had remade the Italian army. Nine months earlier Italy's military forces were anything but prepared. There was a shortage in every kind of munitions, stores, and equipment. This was plainly evidenced when General Porro had refused an offer of the portfolio of Minister of War in the spring of 1914 because he was unable to obtain a pledge for the adoption of a program of reequipment that demanded a great expenditure of money. The late Government had not made good the expenditure of material caused by the Lybian War, and great quantities of stores had been allowed to deteriorate until they were almost valueless. There was a certain number of guns of medium caliber, but no heavy artillery of the modern type which the Teutonic allies soon showed they possessed in abundance. Of machine guns Italy had a lower proportion than any other of the great powers. All this had been realized, but the money to repair these deficiencies was not forthcoming until the Italian statesmen knew that they were on the brink of war.

Filling the gaps in the army, raising it from a peace to a war footing, was an easier matter. The Italian military law provided automatically for this increase. Every Italian citizen able to bear arms is liable to military service. Recruits are called in the year during which they become twenty years old, although volunteers are accepted as young as eighteen. The last Italian census, in 1911, gave Italy a population of 34,686,683 and the levy lists of that year totaled 487,570. By the close of the year 1914, when the mobilization began, it is reasonable to suppose that the population had grown to something like thirty-six or thirty-seven million, with a corresponding increase in the number available for military service. The peace strength of the army was 14,000 officers and 271,000 men. Mobilization added to each of the twelve corps a division of Mobile Militia bringing its strength up to 37,000 men and 134 guns. The army's war strength was about 700,000 in the first line—from the two classes of the regular army—and 320,000 in the Mobile Militia with a reserve of more than 2,000,000 in the Territorial Militia. The force of trained men that Italy put into the field

at the beginning of hostilities, therefore, numbered something over 1,000,000 men. The reservoir of the Territorial Militia contained twice as many more untrained men who for some reason or other were exempt from military service in times of peace, although physically fit to be soldiers. This class was designed primarily for garrison duty, guarding railways and bridges, but in war time was liable to any service. When the mobilization began the men of this class immediately went into training. Each of the twelve army corps consisted of two divisions of line infantry, a regiment of Bersaglieri (light infantry corresponding to the French Chasseurs and the German Jaegers), a regiment of cavalry, a section of Carabinieri (military police), thirty-six field guns and from two to three heavy howitzer batteries. In addition there was the ammunition column, telegraph and engineer parks, ambulance and supply sections, reserve store and supply sections, and a section of field bakery.

The famous Alpine troops ("Alpini") and the mountain artillery were not within the organization of the twelve permanent army corps. These numbered seventy-eight companies, each of 256 officers and men on a war footing. The rest of the Italian infantry units at normal war strength were as follows: Company, 255 officers and men; Battalion, 1,043 officers and men; Regiment, 3,194 officers and men. Five of the cavalry regiments contained six squadrons, the rest five. The war strength of a squadron was 142 officers and men.

The infantry were armed with a magazine rifle of very small caliber, 256-inch. The magazine held six rounds and was loaded with a clip. The length of this piece was 4 feet  $2\frac{3}{4}$  inches, with bayonet 5 feet  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inches. It weighed without bayonet 8 pounds 6 ounces, and was sighted up to 2,200 yards. The outbreak of the war found a process of rearmament going on in the artillery. Italy at that time had no adequate siege train and her heaviest mobile weapons were 210-millimeter howitzers and 149-millimeter guns. While the details of the final artillery equipment were not made public by the War Department, events showed that the Italians were well supplied with modern guns of both

medium and heavy caliber. The mountain artillery, of which there were thirty-nine batteries, was especially efficient, not only in guns, but in men and transport animals. It was said that the Italian artillery mules could drag a gun wherever there was room for its emplacement.

Italy was one of the first countries to use aeroplanes in war, and her aviation corps had had experience in Tripoli. Although handicapped by lack of money, the Italian military aviators were well abreast of their opponents, at least in the theoretical and mechanical development of the science. During the winter of 1914 a considerable increase was made in the personnel of the corps and in the number of machines.

There is reason to believe that at the beginning of the war the Italian soldier was not highly regarded by Austrian and German military authorities. As a whole the army's reputation had been injured by the Adowa disaster and by the slowness of the campaign in Tripoli. But the developments of actual warfare in the spring and summer of 1915 proved that Italian apologists were correct in their claim that in the former war the army was handicapped by political causes. Physically the Italian troops were equal to any in Europe. The Alpini were perhaps the best mountain soldiers in the world. The Italian soldier is not impressive as to stature, but he is tough and enduring. He is cheerful and obedient under discipline and hardship, and the relations between officers and men were such as to produce the best results in a hard campaign.

All these qualities were requisite for the difficult task to which General Cadorna now turned his first line troops, numbering about 700,000 men. To oppose this advance the Austrians mustered on the frontier about half that number. General von Hofer was chief of staff under Archduke Eugene and General Dankl was in command in the Tyrol.

Two reasons have been advanced to explain the succession of small victories with which the Italians opened their campaign. The first, already mentioned, is that it was part of the Austrian plan to yield their outpost positions with slight resistance and protect their numerically inferior forces in the main strongholds



of the mountains. The other is that the archduke and his generals made the mistake of underestimating the enemy. For centuries Italy had supplied the Austrian Court with its poets and musicians, until in the Dual Monarchy the Italians were regarded as an effete race, fit only for the politer pursuits of art, literature and song. Italy's successful War of Independence in the latter half of the nineteenth century had not altogether destroyed this impression. This idea, it may be said, was not shared by the Germans, whose military men had made a closer study of world conditions and had learned to respect the virility of the men of modern Italy.

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## CHAPTER IV

### FIRST ENGAGEMENTS

OWING to the nature of the scene of hostilities the first days of the Austro-Italian campaign brought a series of engagements between small groups of combatants. Artillery played a large part, and here the Austrians, with their big guns already in carefully studied positions, had a decided advantage. Viewed as a whole only does the campaign at this stage take on an importance and dignity that ranks with the great battles on other fronts of the Great War. Never before had two great powers fought in territory so absolutely ill adapted to the movement of large bodies of troops. For the same reason the story attains a picturesqueness absent from the dreary plains of Galicia and Poland and Flanders. Austrians, Hungarians and Italians fought in a land known throughout the world to tourists for its grandeur of scenery, its towering, snow-clad peaks, and idyllic lakes and valleys. It was warfare where the best soldier was the man most able to surmount the natural difficulties and take advantage of the natural protection of the ground. The official statements of the Italian and Austrian war offices told of feats of mountaineering, and of hand-to-hand struggles, of dripping

bayonets and of combatants locked in last embrace with hands clutching each other's throats.

On both sides of the boundary were thousands of men who had spent their lives exploring the trackless mountainsides, climbing with ropes and ice axes and staves. Both nations had encouraged the formation of Alpine clubs.

Soon after midnight on May 23, 1915, the Alpini and Bersaglieri of the Italian army, supported by a few battalions of first line troops and gendarmes, crossed the mountain frontier. Soon the peaks resounded with the popping of rifle fire and the louder detonations of the Austrian mountain guns. Along the whole Trentino front that night a hundred skirmishes drove back the Austrian outpost. Only a few thousand men in all were engaged. The Italian cyclist sharpshooters advanced swiftly up the steep mountain roads until greeted by musketry fire. Then they sought shelter, pushing forward from rock to rock and from tree to tree. Often the light infantry and Alpini foot soldiers were able to skirt the enemy's posts and catch them in the rear.


By May 26, 1915, all Italy was thrilled by the news that all the lower passes of the Dolomites were won and breaches made at Tonale Pass along the northwest and in the Carnic and Julian Alps along the northeast front. Among the points occupied were the Montozzo Pass, 9,585 feet high, Ponte Caffaro, running into southwestern Trentino, the ridge of Monte Baldo, extending northward fifteen miles toward Arco and Roverto in southern Trentino, some of the heights looking westward toward Trento, all the valleys in the labyrinth of the Dolomites, and several footholds in the Alps of Carinthia. The eastern army was well inside Austrian territory, its left at Caporetto on the Isonzo just under Monte Nero, its center looking down on Gorizia from the heights between Indria and the Isonzo, and its right between Cormons and Terzo. Losses on both sides were surprisingly small considering the extent of territory covered by the fighting. The Austrians, after slight resistance, withdrew into their fortresses and waited behind their guns, grimly conscious that the real struggle was still before them.



Then, through the holes pierced by the mountain troops, the Italian engineers began to move forward their artillery and building emplacements and constructing trenches. Skirmishing on the mountain frontier continued until the end of May, 1915. By that time Italian forces attacking Trentino had crossed the Lessini Mountains north of Verona, captured the Austrian town of Ala on the Adige, and penetrated nearly ten miles into Austrian territory. They held high ground on the south commanding the forts of Roverto, and had begun to bring up their heavy guns against this important stronghold. Roverto is one of a number of strongly fortified places girdling Trent and commanding the converging routes to this center of the Austrian defensive. Other lesser fortresses in this girdle are Laredo on the Chiese, Levico on the Brenta, and Riva at the head of Lake Garda. Upon these the Italians closed in, and there they consolidated their positions awaiting the support of the first-line troops advancing in heavy detachments, and of their artillery.

While Italy struck the first blow on land, the first offensive operation of the Italo-Austrian conflict by sea came from Austria. This was an extensive raid on Italy's Adriatic coast. Its object was to delay the Italian concentration by attacking vital points on the littoral railway from Brindisi to the north.

The Austrian fleet began its attack early on the morning of Monday, May 24, 1915. The ships engaged were a squadron from Pola, consisting of two battleships, four cruisers, and eighteen destroyers, strongly supported by aircraft. The assault extended from Brindisi to Venice, and covered a large extent of coast territory hard to defend. At Venice the Austrian air raiders dropped bombs into the arsenal and the oil tanks and balloon sheds on the Lido. The priceless relics of art and architecture, all that remained to recall the city's proud position as ruler of the Adriatic, were uninjured, but the attack from the air caused an outcry from the nations of the Entente almost equal to that which rang through the world when the Germans shelled the cathedral at Rheims and destroyed Louvain. The Austrians replied that the attack was a serious military operation, and by



THE COASTS OF ITALY AND AUSTRIA, SHOWING THE NAVAL RAID  
IN MAY, 1915

no means the wanton outrage their enemies had tried to make it appear.

The Austrian naval raid lasted barely two hours, but in that time the cruiser *Novara* and several destroyers attacked Porto Corsini, north of Ravenna, in a vain effort to destroy the Italian torpedo base; the cruiser *St. Georg* shelled the railway station and bridges at Rimini; the battleship *Zrinyi* attacked Sinigaglia, and wrecked the railway station and bridge; south of Ancona the battleship *Radetzky* destroyed a bridge over the River Potenza. In the south the cruisers *Helgoland* and *Admiral Spaun* with destroyers shelled a railway bridge and station and several signal stations in the neighborhood of Manfredonia and Viesti, and caused some damage in small coast towns. The raid was well planned and swiftly executed, and it accomplished much of its purpose. The Italian fleet was taken by surprise, and the marauders were back in safety at Pola by six o'clock in the morning, unharmed.

While Italian Alpine troops were driving in the Austrian outposts on the frontiers of Trentino and the Tyrol, General Cadorna advanced his main infantry force, the Third Army, across the Friuli Plain through Udine, Palmanova, and St. Georgio toward the Isonzo. Here the covering troops on May 24 and 25 had captured nearly all the small towns and villages between the frontier and the river from Caporetto in the north just below Monte Nero to Belvedere in the south on the Gulf of Trieste. Cadorna feared lest his opponent, General von Hofer, would launch his main attack from Gorizia against the Italian city of Palmanova, fourteen miles to the west. But Von Hofer, so it developed, had a subtler plan of campaign than a direct attack through Gorizia. What he did was to place a strong force on the mountain of Korada between the Isonzo and the Judrio. This height commanded the middle course of the Isonzo, and it had been transformed into a network of permanent trenches, protected by strong wire entanglements.

The Austrian general believed that by the time the Italians could bring up their heavy artillery and begin to smash the entanglements with their field guns, supports could be pushed across



the river. Realizing that Korada must be captured, if at all, by dash and surprise, the Italian brigadier in charge of the attack gathered a herd of fierce bulls, which are numerous in that part of Venetia, and penned them in a hollow out of sight of the enemy, while his artillery began to bombard the hostile trenches. When the animals were wrought to a frenzy of rage and fear by the noise of the guns, they were let loose and driven up the mountain against the Austrian positions. Their charge broke through many strands of the wire entanglements, and before the last of them fell dead under the Austrian rifle fire, Italian troops with fixed bayonets had crowded through the gaps in the wires and captured the position.

By the end of May, 1915, the Third Army had reached the Isonzo River, but had not crossed. Its advance was slow and cautious. Operations were hampered by the heavy rains, which caused the river to overflow its banks and added greatly to the difficulties put in the path of the advancing army by the Austrians, who, as they withdrew, left not a bridge behind them.

Grado, a fishing town of about 5,000 inhabitants, but important on account of its strategic situation, was occupied by the Italians with no great difficulty. Grado lies at the head of the Adriatic, and is twelve miles from Trieste and sixty from Pola. The waters of the lagoons in this neighborhood were valuable to the Italians as a safe shelter for submarines and other small war-craft, and as a base for a prospective attack later upon Pola itself. The inhabitants, most of whom preserved their Italian traits and sympathies, although the town had been under Austrian rule since 1809, hailed the conquerors enthusiastically. Cannon and military carriages were decorated with flowers. Thousands of Italian flags appeared as if by magic. The entering troops were greeted with shouts of "All our lives we have been waiting for this moment when we can cry 'Viva Italia!'" The possession of Grado gave the Third Army virtual control of the mouth of the Isonzo, but the main Austrian position of defense at Gorizia remained apparently unweakened.

Scenes like those at Grado were witnessed at Ala, the first Austrian town of any size and the first railroad center captured by

the Italians in the Trentino. Ala was occupied May 27, 1915. Three days before this the Italian light infantry had massed behind the boundary line, and when they began their advance along the main highway their first act was to pull down the yellow and black pole that marked the frontier.

The next day, May 28, 1915, the commanding general with his chief of staff and two guards motored to the spot, cut a passageway through the barricade, and, encountering no opposition, kept on until they reached Ala, seven miles beyond.

The Italian troops were ordered to advance next day, May 29, 1915, and as they marched into the town, officers shouted: "Open your windows. Long live Italy!" The Mayor of Ala called out his townsmen and set them at work removing the barricades on the main road.

In the midst of these rejoicings the sharp rattle of musketry was heard, and the Italians rushed to cover. A reconnoitering party reported that the Austrians were intrenched in a large villa beyond a stream outside the town. The Italian troops began an attack upon this position, and a skirmish party sought to take a position in a house on a near-by hill commanding the villa held by the enemy. Although the way to this house was exposed to the Austrian fire, the Italian officer decided to risk an attempt to reach it. But as he raised his sword to signal an advance, a young girl ran to his side and told him of a path sheltered from the Austrian fire. This girl, Signorina Abriani, whose name will go down in Italian history as one of the first heroines of the war, guided the detachment safely. The Austrians holding the villa were strongly intrenched, and they held out against superior forces until late in the afternoon, when four shells crashed into the building, bringing it down about their ears. The Italians had brought up a battery on the opposite side of the Adige River and opened fire at long range. The Austrians made good their retreat, leaving all their ammunition and three dead. Later fifty-seven Austrians were taken prisoners.

That night the Italian general took the precautions, usual on entering a newly occupied town, of ordering that all the windows in town be kept open and illuminated, and kept patrols about the



town. The mayor was reconfirmed, and his first act was to announce to the citizens that "the royal military authorities, knowing the needs of the inhabitants, have with affectionate solicitude and great generosity placed 5,000 rations of bread and 2,000 of rice at the disposal of the poor." Thus Ala became Italian.

The incidents of these first advances into Austrian territory were reported in detail in Italy, and are set down here as typical of events that accompanied the irruption of Italian troops over the border into the country which once had been Italian and where, despite more than a century of Austrian occupation, a large proportion of the inhabitants in spirit was Italian still. Such reports spread through Italy naturally increased enthusiasm for the restoration of the "unredeemed" provinces.

Although, as a rule, the Austrians retired before the first Italian advance into Trentino, they did not depart until they had left every possible obstacle. Roads were barricaded, bridges destroyed, and mines were laid, cleverly concealed on hillsides where it was intended their explosion would overwhelm the Italians under masses of rock and earth. But this was just what the Alpini and Bersaglieri had been trained to anticipate. According to the official Italian accounts, their scouting was so excellent that the wires connecting these mines with Austrian hiding places were discovered and cut, and hardly a mine was exploded. All this took place while the Austrians were drawing in their outposts and consolidating their forces in the great strongholds where later they held the Italians in absolute check. The Italians advanced cautiously in small groups, and the Austrians abandoned the frontier villages soon enough to avoid serious encounters, but not a minute sooner.

In the Alps in these days of May, 1915, the Great War was fought much as wars have been fought in times we are accustomed to regard as the age of true romance. The Italian King visited the Alpine troops and surprised his men and redoubled their devotion by showing his skill as a mountain climber. "You forget," he told an officer who remonstrated with him as he was about to scale a particularly difficult position to examine a gun, "chamois hunting is my favorite sport."

If certain portions of the Italian population seemed lukewarm toward the war during the period of diplomatic negotiations, there was no doubt of the temper of the nation after hostilities actually began. The chord of national feeling was struck by King Victor Emmanuel in an order issued upon taking supreme command of the army and navy.

"Soldiers on land and sea," said the order, "the solemn hour of the nation's claims has struck. Following the example of my grandfather, I take to-day supreme command of Italy's forces on land and sea, with the assurance of victory which your bravery, self-abnegation, and discipline will obtain.

"The enemy you are preparing to fight is hardened to war and worthy of you. Favored by the nature of the ground and skillful works, he will resist tenaciously, but your unsubdued ardor will surely vanquish him.

"Soldiers, to you has come the glory of unfurling Italy's colors on the sacred lands which nature has given as the frontiers of our country. To you has come the glory of finally accomplishing the work undertaken with so much heroism by our fathers."

The stormy scenes which followed the resignation of the Salandra cabinet gave way to a confident calm. From his seclusion in the Vatican the pope addressed a letter to Cardinal Vanutelli, breathing a spirit of resignation and faith, but carefully refraining from any expression of partisanship in the great struggle.

"The hour which we are traversing is painful," he said, "but our prayers will go out more frequently and more fervently than ever to those who have in their hands the fate of nations." The pope recalled that in his first Encyclical issued at the beginning of the war he exhorted the belligerent nations to make peace, but his voice was unheeded and the war continued "until the terrible conflagration has extended to our beloved Italy. While our hearts bleed at the sight of so much misery," he wrote, "we have not neglected to continue our work for relief and the diminution of the deplorable consequences of war. I wish that the echo of our voice might reach to all our children affected by the great scourge of war, and persuade all of them of our participation in their

troubles and sorrows. There is little of the grief of the child that is not reflected in the soul of the father."

The greatest enthusiasm, naturally, was manifested in the cities of the north nearest the scene of war. The Master Workers' Guild of Milan voted unanimously to give up one day's pay each month to be devoted to the relief of the families of men at the front. Many business houses carried soldiers' names on their payrolls and remitted their wages to their families.

In all cities within range of the enemy's aircraft precautions were taken to guard public buildings, and especially the famous objects which for centuries had made Italy the Mecca of lovers of art. In Venice the bronze horses of St. Mark's were taken down from their pedestals and hidden in the subterranean caverns of the cathedral. The gilded statue of the Virgin surmounting the celebrated white marble cathedral at Milan was covered with cloth, so that it might not serve as a guide to Austrian raiders. The stained glass windows of the edifice were removed as a precaution against possible bombardment. After the first Austrian sea and air raid along the Adriatic coast orders were issued that lights should be darkened in all Adriatic ports. This order was extended also to certain inland cities, such as Milan, Bologna, Verona, Brescia, and Udine. A special watch for aeroplanes was kept at Bologna on account of the location there of an important factory for the manufacture of explosives. Watches were set on the crests of the Appenines ready to notify Rome of approaching danger from the air.

The attitude of Germany toward Italy at this period of the war is best indicated by the speech delivered at the session of the Reichstag by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor. He imputed the Italian declaration of war to a combination of mob dictation, bad faith on the part of the cabinet of Premier Salandra, and, to a certain degree, to the money of the powers of the Entente. The greater part of the Italian people, the chancellor asserted, and a majority in the Italian Parliament had not wanted war, and were even kept in ignorance of the extent of the concessions which Austria-Hungary was willing to make for the sake of peace. The Salandra cabinet, he declared,



long before the Triple Alliance had ceased to exist, aligned itself with the Triple Entente and "unchained the mob spirit and intimidated the advocates of peace."

On the eve of leaving Rome, Prince von Bülow gave out a statement in which he declared that Italy was led into the war by a "noisy minority," and that even if in the end she obtained what she asked she would not get much more than what Austria already had offered. "It should be understood," he explained, "that it was impossible to deprive the central empires of Trieste, their only outlet to the Adriatic in the Mediterranean."

Turkey regarded the entrance of Italy into the war on the side of the Entente with apparent equanimity. "We will not declare war on Italy," announced Talaat Bey, the Turkish Minister of the Interior. "We can wait. What can Italy do to us?"

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## CHAPTER V

### FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS

WHILE the world hears little about strategic plans that fail to work out, it is believed that the Austrians in May, 1915, had in mind to let the enemy obtain a good start in his advance against Trieste. Then, when the Italian operations were well under way, and the two railroads from Venice were choked with their supplies, the Austrians probably intended to launch a swift attack upon Verona and the rich cities of Lombardy, thus cutting off the chief centers of Italian industry. At the same time, they undoubtedly meant to send an invading army through the passes of the Carnic and Julian Alps from their base at Tarvis, and by a sudden swoop southward take the Italian forces on the Isonzo in the flank. At least this is what the Italian staff believed was their plan, and they arranged their own forces accordingly.

This was the reason for the extensive Italian drive during the third week of May, 1915, at all the mountain passes of the long



frontier. For almost any of these passes might prove to be the gateway of invasion, whereas, once captured, they could be held by a few battalions. But behind each force that occupied the passes won in the first Italian dash was a large reserve ready to lend support wherever the enemy tried to break through. The Italians were not kept long in suspense as to where this thrust from the north first would come.

On May 29, 1915, under cover of a heavy fog, the Austrians concentrated a strong force from Villach, brought them to Mauthen, and from that point launched five successive attacks in an effort to win back the pass of Monte Croce in the Carnic Alps. The Alpini met the attacks with musketry and machine-gun fire, then, after the last attempt had failed, leaped from their trenches and drove the Austrians down the valley.

Thus began the battle of Monte Croce, an engagement described in the official bulletins of both countries in a way that gave the world its first intimation of the peculiar features of this mountain warfare. Each side had large reserves, and the struggle for the pass continued day and night, the Italians pushing over the neighboring passes and gathering their strength for a counterattack when the Austrians were exhausted.

On June 8, 1915, the Italians stormed Freikofel, a height commanding the Plocken Plateau, and took the Pass of Valentina and the Pass of Oregione, 7,500 feet high, and overlooking the wooded valley of Gail. The Alpini won Oregione by climbing through ice and snow over Paralba Mountain and fighting their way downward. Undaunted, General Dankl called up a fresh corps.

On the night of June 14, 1915, the Austrians made a supreme effort to break through the Italian line and put into effect his plan of pouring an army through the Carnic Alps to attack the flank of the main Italian army. Although 100,000 men were engaged in this battle, the ground permitted no massed movements. For miles the saddle of Oregione, the snow-clad sides of Paralba, and every smaller peak and ravine extending to Monte Croce and Freikofel were speckled with fighting men. After the two sides came to grips, the big guns held their fire, and it was man to man and bayonet against bayonet. At one point only did the Austrian

thrust reach Italian soil. For a short time the Austrians were on Paralba at an elevation of 8,840 feet, but threatened both in the flank and in the rear they were forced to retreat and take refuge in their prepared positions on Steinwand, a huge limestone mountain overlooking the Gail Valley.

The strategic idea of General Cadorna is more easily understood when one studies the railway map of the Austrian territory north of the Carnic border. Here their railway line through the Drave Valley passed closer to the boundary line than did the Italian system on the south, and they could bring up fresh troops with more speed. In the Gail Valley they had a wide region in which they could mass hidden from the enemy, and they had a good road up the mountains from Mauthen, while the Italians had to depend upon rough tracks through the valley. Although Cadorna had the hard task of keeping the doorway to Venice closed while he attacked the enemy on both flanks, he accomplished his purpose.

The Italian army operating in the province of Cadore won its next success in an attack upon the village of Cortina, situated in a salient of the frontier, 4,000 feet high, amid some of the most beautiful scenery in the world. Cortina was taken on May 30. The Austrians had barricaded the famous road winding up through the Dolomites, and dug elaborate trenches; but the Italians, by superhuman efforts, moved up their mountain guns, while the Alpini scrambled over the mountains by the glaciers of Serapis and the tarns of Croda da Lago, and descended into Cortina on either side. Then, holding the enemy on the east, they advanced into the Tyrol westward to Falzarego.

In this region they had an experience which illustrated the foresight of the Austrians in preparing for the attack they believed would come. Some years before an Austrian had built a hotel in a deep ravine shut in by walls of limestone and very difficult of approach. Tourists had commented upon the lack of practicability of the man who placed a hostelry in so inaccessible a spot. But when the war came it developed that the hotel builder probably had a subsidy from the Government. For sandbags, machine guns, and quick-firers quickly converted the hotel into

an excellent fort, which dominated the famous ravine. Thanks to the hardiness and ingenuity of their picked Alpine troops, the Italians, after a week of hard fighting, cleared the mountains above the ravine and dropped upon the hotel fort.

By June 9, 1915, the Italians had won the Falzarego Pass. At times the fighting raged on summits 10,000 feet high, where the thin air exhausted the combatants far quicker than their physical exertions. In the last battle of this engagement the Italians obtained a footing upon a point of great strategical importance three miles beyond the pass on the Sasso d'Istria, close to where the Dolomite road bends southward through the ravine and penetrated the mountains in two tunnels.

This victory gave the Austrians cause for anxiety regarding the western defenses of Tyrol, for by a double flanking movement along the Cordevole River and the Dolomite road the Italians in Cadore had extended like two arms around one of the principal systems of defense. General Dankl hurried reinforcements to the Cadore front to check the thrust up the Cordevole Valley. At the end of this valley was the focal point of the system of railways that carried food and munitions to both the Trentino forces and those in southern Tyrol. If the Italians had succeeded in cutting the railway at this point the enemy would have had great difficulty in maintaining his armies on the Trentino and Tyrol fronts. The Italian effort was not pushed to success; but it at least had the effect of discouraging any plans General Dankl might have formed of invading the plains of northern Italy at the foot of the frontier mountains.

Only twenty miles south of the Austrian outposts was the important city of Verona, famed for its memories of Romeo and Juliet. Nearer still was Brescia with the fertile lands of Lombardy surrounding it. But by his maneuvers at the opening of the war, General Cadorna effectively protected Italian territory and forced the enemy to devote all his attention to resisting the attacks of active light infantry and mountain artillery. The great 12-inch Skoda howitzers, upon which Austria depended to batter down the defenses of these Italian cities, were needed elsewhere, behind the Julian and Carnic Alps, and especially in



the corner of the frontier near Predil Pass, by which Napoleon invaded Italy, and on the Isonzo front between Tolmino and the Adriatic.

Thus with his infantry, Cadorna overcame the artillery handicap under which Italy labored during all the first months of the war. The Skoda gun was reputed to be the best in the world. It had proved its worth in Belgium and Russia, and the fact that the Austrians were able to lend guns to their ally proved their wealth of big-gun power. Now, even after ten months of war, when thousands of the great howitzers were busy in Galicia and along the Danube, the Skoda works could still produce an armament superior to that of Italy. Much of the effectiveness of the Skoda gun lay in the fact that it could be separated into two parts for easier transportation. In addition to these 12-inch mortars, Austria had a 6-inch steel Skoda, designed in the summer of 1914, for use in the Carpathians and well adapted to fighting in the Alps. Due in part to their realization of this superiority of Austria in big guns, the Italians remained neutral for ten months, but meanwhile they had created a new armament for their own armies at full speed. For the attack on the Austrian infantry in the field they adapted the French 75-millimeter quick-firer, and for siege work they manufactured 6- and 12-inch howitzers. But it takes time to build heavy artillery, and at this time every armament firm in the world was pushed to its full capacity, while the Italians, being without coal fields, were handicapped in the development of armament resources at home. For political reasons also General Cadorna would not risk sacrificing his men to overcome this artillery handicap. His problem was to conserve his forces as much as possible in readiness for a defensive campaign against combined Teutonic armies, winning what small victories he could, and meanwhile keeping down his casualty lists, while fighting heavy howitzers with light mountain guns and 3-inch quick-firers.

After the Italians had established their hold upon the frontier points there was an apparent relaxation of effort while the infantry of the line waited for the heavy siege artillery to issue from the armament factories and come into action. This move-



ment of artillery was slow, especially on the Isonzo front where engineering operations were delayed by the summer floods caused by the melting snows from the mountain tops. To transport heavy pieces of ordnance across the floods the Italian engineers had to build strong bridges, often under heavy fire from the enemy, who, even after their retirement from the east bank of the river, continually harassed the Italian advance guard holding the bridgeheads. The Austrians aided the work of the mountain floods by breaking down the high embankment used to carry off the snow water, and thereby inundated the plain. Working under a plunging fire from the enemy's batteries on the foothills, the Italian sappers built light pontoon bridges over the floods upon which the first Italian contingent crossed at night and occupied the first line of Austrian trenches near the river.

This much the Italians accomplished by the first week in June, 1915; but there they were forced to pause for the reasons already described. Active hostilities during the first part of June on the Isonzo front centered around Monfalcone, a seaport just below the dominating Carso headlands. Taken from Venice by the Austrians during the Napoleonic era, Monfalcone had become the third most important port in the empire. In its yards warships were being constructed.

On June 9, 1915, the Italians made their swift stroke in a southwesterly direction from their Isonzo line. The port was bombarded on June 7, 1915, by a light Italian cruiser squadron, and the Castle of Duino, standing at the sea edge near Trieste and defended by three artillery batteries, was shattered and set afire apparently to prepare for the operations against Monfalcone from the southwestern side of the Gulf of Panzano. Archduke Eugene hastily collected a strong force above Duino ready to resist an attempt by the Italians to land, but the attempt never was made. It developed that the bombardment of Duino was a feint.

The real movement against Monfalcone was launched from another quarter straight across the Isonzo. The Bersaglieri cyclist corps and grenadiers broke through the Austrian line at the river, and since the Austrians had neglected to prepare a reserve line, the Italians advanced by a swift, running fight through the

villages around the Isonzo delta. Near the historic town of Aquileia, now a mere hamlet, the Italians forced a passage of the river at the point of the bayonet and flowed in two streams around the enemy's positions, depending for their rapid movements upon their cyclists with machine guns and their fast-marching light infantry. The Austrians set fire to the pine-clad mountain slopes, but were unable to stem the rush of the Italians who, under the flare of the forest fires, broke into the open town of Monfalcone after storming the promontory of Rocca.

Here, however, the Italian advance guard was in a dangerous position, for the Austrian batteries posted on the limestone bluffs rising 1,000 feet on the northern side of the town still dominated the streets occupied by the Italians near the water's edge. The situation was critical, not only because the troops in the lower town were in danger of annihilation if they held their ground, but because the Italians were anxious to save the town from bombardment, and preserve the warships under construction in the shipyards. So a brigade of light troops scaled the limestone cliffs dragging their mobile 3-inch guns, and forced the Austrians to retire, taking their heavy howitzers with them. Monfalcone now rested securely in Italian possession. The Italians in all this engagement lost only about 100 killed and wounded, while the enemy's casualties were estimated at 2,000. The loss stung the Austro-Hungarian Government deeply.

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## CHAPTER VI

### ATTACKS IN GORIZIA

**A**FTER the Italian success in June, 1915, certain readjustments were manifest in the Austrian forces in the Italian theatre. Although there was no declaration of war between Italy and Germany, it was reported that German officers were sent to aid the Austrians, and that the forces of Archduke Eugene were progressively strengthened from this time on. German soldiers


who joined the Austrian detachments were supposed to have volunteered in an irregular individual manner. In this manner Germany preserved the appearance of neutrality.

The latter part of June, 1915, found Austria occupied with the siege of Lemberg, and the archduke, apparently, was content to hold his own on the Italian front until a decision had been obtained in the more important operations against the Russians. Satisfied with their initial successes, General Cadorna on land and the Duke of Abruzzi at sea settled down to a slow, patient chess play, not unlike that worked out by General Joffre in France. Cadorna issued a statement to the Italian people in which he warned them that the preliminary successes which, he said, had made good the strategical defects of their frontier, would be followed by a long stage of gradual approaches against the enemy's second line.

The attrition of the Austro-Hungarian forces would be carried on by long-range artillery and sappers and local trench warfare with hand grenades. The Italian commander in chief resolutely refused to divert any part of his forces to the Dardanelles. Possible danger to Italian dominion in Tripoli, pointed out by the leaders of the Entente Powers, did not change his purpose to maintain a single concentrated front and not diffuse his efforts. The war with Austria, he believed, would be won or lost on the Italian frontier. His theory as to the best way to meet advances by the Teutonic allies in new fields was to increase pressure on their home frontiers where their interests were most vital. The Italian army in the field was increased to a million men, and, after the fall of Lemberg, Austria gradually moved more and more troops to the Alpine passes and the Isonzo, until by August she had 600,000 men facing the Italians, double the number arrayed on this front when Italy declared war. Had the Russians been able to hold out longer in Galicia, there is little doubt that Cadorna would have had something to show for the month of July besides a few local victories which did not vitally affect the main campaign.

On June 9, 1915, the capture of Gradisca completed the Italian control of the lower Isonzo, and Cadorna prepared for a general





ITALIAN ATTACK ON AUSTRIA



attack on all the strongholds guarding Trieste. Of these the most important were the Carso tableland on the south, Gorizia barring the river-valley of the Vipacco between the Carso and the foothills of the Julian Alps, the fortified system of heights north of Gorizia surrounding the town of Tolmino, and the great intrenched camp of Tarvis above Tolmino extending to Malborghetto and the other Alps of Carinthia. These fortified points had to be attacked generally or not at all. Any attempt to mass an army against any one of them would have spelled disaster, for the Italians would have been flanked by Austrian forces from the north or south. A properly defined advance against Trieste called for a simultaneous thrust at Tolmino and the Tarvis fortress commanding the road to Vienna. The Austrians had been strengthening Tarvis ever since 1859, after Napoleon III overthrew the Austrians in the battles that freed Lombardy. The Austrian fortresses were again strengthened after the siege of Port Arthur had demonstrated the power of high-explosive shells, and again in 1910 when the Teutonic allies made their great discovery that their new giant howitzers laughed at modern defense works of steel and concrete. In remodeling her Alpine strongholds Austria selected positions on the plateau for systems of earthworks containing mobile siege guns.

The key to this immensely strong Austrian line of defense was the railway town of Plava on the eastern bank of the Isonzo under the wooded heights of the Ternovane Forest. Plava was in a salient occupying about the middle of the Austrian line.

Here, on the night of June 17, 1915, the Italians began their general offensive by an attack from Mount Korada on the opposite side of the river. Under cover of darkness the Italian sappers built a pontoon bridge, and the Bersaglieri crossed and carried the town and the surrounding heights at the point of the bayonet. The Austrians realized the importance of the position and quickly returned to a violent counterattack. The Italians threw all their available men into the gap, and a great battle raged on the edge of the highlands east of the river. The Austrians had the advantage of position, for their forces could be massed in the woodland out of sight of the Italian aviators. But, on the other hand,

the Italian batteries on Mount Korada were able to pour a plunging fire into the lower tableland; and due mainly to the aid of their artillery the Italian troops drove back the enemy and maintained the ground won by the first dash.

General Cadorna was now in a position to begin a direct attack upon Gorizia. He assailed the Hill of Podgora, forming the barbican of the city's system of defenses and advanced a reconnoitering force toward Mount Fortin. Meanwhile he massed 500 pieces of artillery on the heights commanding the city. But the defenses of Gorizia had been well planned, and they proved their completeness by a long resistance covering a period that brought successive reports that the fortress had fallen. All these reports proved false. South of the city the Austrian intrenchments covered a front of more than ten miles, from the Mount of San Gabriele below Plava to Mount San Michele on the Carso tableland. The trenches were built in the most modern style, of concrete more than a yard thick covered with steel armor, against which ordinary shrapnel had no more effect than so much hail, and even high-explosive shells of medium power did little damage. The Italian weapons of attack were hand grenades and short knives, in the use of which the infantry were expert. Four army corps operating under the Duke of Aosta between Gorizia and the sea were beaten back by the Austrians with heavy losses. This victory so encouraged the archduke and chief lieutenant, General Boroevics, that they decided upon a counter-offensive in force. Therefore, as soon as the Italian attack slackened, the main Austrian army advanced across the Carso Plateau.

The series of battles that now followed were the first engagements of any size between the Italians and the Austro-Hungarians in the open field. They began June 22, 1915, and lasted until the close of July, with a short let-up at the end of the first week in July. The theatre included the whole Carso front, the Vipacco Valley, and the southern part of the Ternovane Forest. After his first repulse General Boroevics brought up fresh corps and renewed the attack, but in the end he was driven back to his main line with shattered forces.

In the Carso tableland the Austrians had as nearly perfect a position of natural defense as a general could choose. On the east of the Isonzo plain the broken, rocky wall rises in places to 1,000 feet, seamed with gullies and ravines, and bristling with forest growth which afforded ideal cover. The action of the rain has pitted the limestone with funnel-shaped holes which form natural redoubts for machine guns; and there are larger depressions and caves where heavier pieces of artillery may be placed in excellent shelter.

But while the Italians were unable to capture this position, when General Boroevics took his troops out of their defenses and sent them charging across the open ground, he found that the enemy had made good use of his precarious hold on the edges of the tableland. Although they occupied barely more than the rim of the plateau, with the flooded Isonzo a third of a mile broad beneath them, the Italians had strengthened their positions with sandbag intrenchments and hauled up a few pieces of light artillery.

The chief support of the infantry holding these sandbag defenses was the heavy guns across the river, which searched out the Austrian columns whenever they left cover. In weight of artillery the Italians had the advantage, for most of the Austrian 12-inch howitzers were busy in the Alps, and they had to depend mainly upon 6-inch pieces.

By the second week in July, 1915, the Austrians relaxed their efforts, and the Italians began a slow advance, working up the hills overlooking Gorizia by a variety of methods. In the places, comparatively few, where there was cultivated ground, they practiced the siege method of sapping forward, but generally their advance was over bare rock, where trenches could be excavated only by the use of dynamite, and when a charge was made the troops had to carry sandbags to build temporary cover from machine-gun fire. This method of warfare, in fact, was general throughout the whole mountain front, where the hard rock carried a mere veneer of earth, and sandbags had to serve for defense until the engineers could blast trenches and galleries in the flintlike face of the slopes.



The repulse of the Austrian counterattack in the middle of July, 1915, ended the first phase of the battle of Gorizia. On July 18th, 19th and 20th, General Cadorna delivered a fierce assault aided by knowledge gained in the first stage of the battle, which, for the Italians, was little more than a reconnaissance in force. For three days and nights he drove the troops of his combined Second and Third Armies against the enemy's lines all along the Isonzo. His system was to attack by day and then at night resist the enemy's counterassaults on his newly won positions. The Italians retained all the ground they won during these days of terrific fighting, and captured 3,500 prisoners.

By the 20th of July their confidence had increased to such an extent that they determined upon a night assault. But next morning Cadorna received word from his aeroplane scouts and his spies that the enemy was massing for a supreme effort. The Italian advance was stayed and every man was set at work helping the engineers strengthen the trenches.

On July 21, 1915, there came a complete lull. The next day the Austrians opened their attack with a concentrated bombardment. During the period of Italian advance the railways had been piling up the Austrian shells and German gunners had been sent by the Crown Prince of Bavaria to help serve the heavy howitzers rushed to the Carso from the Julian Alps and the Tyrol and Trentino salients. With the design to cut the Italian line of communication, the main Austrian infantry attack was delivered toward Gradisca where the Italians had constructed their principal bridges across the Isonzo. The infantry massed behind the neighboring hills and under cover of a tremendous artillery bombardment advanced in close formation. The first line of Italian troops seemed about to be swept away when the gunners on the heights across the river got the range and poured into the advancing Austrians a massed fire from all their 500 pieces. General Borojevics's advance was pounded to pieces; the Italians brought up reinforcements and charged and captured the lines from which the Austrians had delivered their assault, taking 2,000 prisoners.



On July 23, 1915, the archduke ordered another attack upon the Italian positions near the sea on the edge of the Carso table-land. This was really an effort to recapture Monfalcone; but it failed, although the Italians did not dare risk pursuit over the rough ground. Later two Austrian divisions, advancing from San Michele and San Martino against Sagrado were repulsed with heavy losses.

By July 25, 1915, the Italians were able to attack and capture some of the intrenchments on the slopes of San Martino and to storm Sei Busi. This hill of Sei Busi witnessed some of the most sanguinary fighting of the whole series of engagements. On a single day it was won, lost and won again by the Italians, both sides bringing up strong reenforcements and concentrating against the summit all the artillery within range. Over the crest of San Michele which dominated a large part of the table-land the battle surged for many days.

On July 27, 1915, the Italians, attacking with bombs and bayonets were able to occupy the summit, but could not establish themselves there in the face of the enemy's bombardment. The lower slopes they were able to hold behind their sandbag intrenchments, but the crest, swept by the enemy's heavy artillery and offering no shelter, was absolutely untenable. In all this fighting artillery played the major rôle. The Italians charged that Archduke Eugene, realizing that any infantry advance against this terrific gunfire was a certain sacrifice of men, placed in his van regiments of men from the Italian-speaking provinces and from Old Serbia and Croatia. In this position these troops were exposed to fire from their own batteries with the knowledge that any attempt at treachery meant annihilation by their own guns in the rear. No figures as to the number of men from the "unredeemed" provinces forced to fight against their kinsmen on the frontier are obtainable. Italian writers, however, maintain that during the first months of the war Austrian infantrymen of Latin and Slav origin were sacrificed by the hundred thousand around Gorizia and Trento.

Like other great drives of the Allies on the French front, the Italian offensive on the chain of forts guarding Gorizia failed

to break the enemy's resistance. The fighting, however, seasoned the untried troops of General Cadorna and won them praise even from the veterans of General Boroevics and from Boroevics himself. "I cannot refrain from saying," declared the Austrian General in an interview published in a Hungarian newspaper, "that the bravery of the Italian regiments was almost incredible, for even if certain regiments lost all their officers, this did not deter them from advancing with the greatest contempt for death."

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## CHAPTER VII

### FIGHTING IN THE ALPS—ITALIAN SUCCESSES

LEAVING the situation on the Isonzo where it rested at the close of July, 1915, in a condition virtually of stalemate, we return to the still more picturesque struggle in the Alps. While the Italian Third Army in massed assault was making its unsuccessful fight for possession of Gorizia with Trieste as its ultimate objective, warfare was in progress in a hundred places in the Julian, Carnic, Dolomite, Trentino and Tyrolean mountains. Although along this part of the frontier the Italians inflicted no vital harm upon the enemy during the first two months of the war, they were successful in a multitude of minor enterprises, each of which furnishes its stirring tale of hand-to-hand fighting, individual heroism and novel expedients in a country singularly adapted to some of the methods of primeval warfare. Being on the defensive, the Austrians frequently made use of the primitive ambush of mountain tribes. Loose, heavy bowlders were lashed to the edge of a precipice and masked with pine branches. Then when the enemy passed along the mountain path beneath, the wires holding the rocks in place were cut, releasing a deadly avalanche upon the advancing foe.

Any description of the fighting on this Alpine front becomes by necessity a catalogue of apparently isolated operations, for

the nature of the ground negatived any great battle in force such as that along the Isonzo River. In the Julian Alps the Italian mountaineers gained a lucky success early in June. General Rohr, the Austrian commander, had set two companies to guard a rampart of rock between Tolmino and Monte Nero. The position was so strong that a few hundred men with Maxims and quick-firers could have held it against an army corps. Its strength, in fact, was so apparent that the Austrians took their duties too lightly. Leaving only a few sentries on watch, both companies enjoyed plenty of sleep at night. But one night the Italian Alpinists climbed silently over the mountain, killed the enemy's sentries with knives before they could make an outcry and coming upon the two companies from the rear captured them with scarcely a struggle.

The peak of Monte Nero, a stump-shaped mountain 7,370 feet high at the headwaters of the Isonzo, proved important to the Italians, for it gave them a fire-control station from which 12-inch shells were dropped into the forts of Tolmino and the southern forts of Tarvis. North of Monte Nero, where the boundary turns to the west, is the important pass of Predil, the gateway to Tarvis, guarded on the southeast by the fortress of Flitsch and on the west by Malborghetto. These two positions were the strongest points in a great ring of fortified heights protecting the pass and the highway and railroad running through an angle of the Julian Alps into the heart of Austria. The forts of Malborghetto projected into Italian territory and its chief works, Fort Hensel, a great white oblong of armored concrete, was visible miles away in the Italian mountains. Against this system of fortifications the Italians brought their heaviest howitzers and demonstrated, as satisfactorily as the Germans had shown months earlier at Liege, that the strongest forts were no match for modern artillery. Fort Hensel and the other permanent forts were shattered and the ground around them was pitted with great craters from explosions of the 12-inch shells.

The final ruin of Fort Hensel was accomplished by a shell which penetrated through the thickest of its steel and concrete



layers and exploded in its ammunition magazine. This bombardment of Malborghetto necessitated firing mortar shells at a high angle completely over mountains which hid the target from the Italian gunners. The work of destruction was slow owing to the fact that mists often curtained the mountain tops and forced the gunners to cease operations, because to fire while the observers were unable to watch every shot and telephone the results would have been only a waste of ammunition.

But the Austrians already knew that their forts were no match for 12-inch howitzers, once these great guns could get into position, and they had prepared another method of defense which they put into use as soon as the forts were destroyed. Batteries of Skodas, hidden in a stretch of pasture land below the summit of the mountain, were brought up and placed in pits concealed by tufts of grass and brush from reconnoitering airmen, while at a safe distance dummy guns were displayed to draw the Italians' fire. Thus one of the greatest artillery duels of the whole front continued day after day, neither side being able to see the enemy and relying for information upon observers posted on mountain tops and in aeroplanes. These 12-inch guns were not intended for such work. They had been laboriously hauled to their lofty emplacements five and six thousand feet above sea level to destroy 6-inch batteries, as these 6-inch guns had been brought up to overpower the lighter 3-inch mountain guns, some of which the Italians worked from peaks as high as 10,000 feet. When both sides got these monster howitzers into position the natural sequence was a deadlock. The most the infantry could do was to drive the enemy's troops from summits valuable as observation points in the service of the heavy artillery.

Thus the official reports issued by the Austrian and Italian staff headquarters reiterated the names of peaks hitherto unknown to the traveler and tourist mountaineer, peaks which became of immense importance now, not so much on account of their height as because they commanded the best views of the surrounding territory. One of these was Freikofel. The Alpini captured it early in the war with scarcely a struggle and then

for weeks the Austrians sacrificed regiments and even brigades in vain attempts to recover it.

The loss of Freikofel by the Austrians was followed, on June 24, 1915, by the loss of Cresta Verde, and then in the first week of July the Italians captured the important observation peak of Zellenkofel. This mountain was held by the Austrians with a force of only forty men, but in view of its extraordinary position this squad was considered sufficient. The slopes below them were swept by a battery of their mountain guns, in telephonic communication with the more distant howitzer battery upon which it could call for assistance if necessity arose, and a large infantry reserve was stationed in the wooded valley below. But one night twenty-nine Alpini crept up the almost sheer precipice a thousand feet high that separated them from the Austrian defenders. They carried ropes and a machine gun and just as the moon rose they attained the summit, set up their Maxim and opened fire. Every man in the observation station was shot down.

Then followed a desperate fight with the Austrian mountain battery on the reverse slope. But thanks to their machine gun the Italians were able to break up the enemy's charge and as day broke they captured the Austrians' guns and drove the men who served them down the mountain. When the Austrian reserves arrived the Italians had intrenched themselves on the southern slope and were able to make use of the captured guns. The attacks of the reserves were repulsed and the Italians held the mountain.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### MORE MOUNTAIN FIGHTING—RESULTS OF FIRST CAMPAIGN

AT the western end of the rugged battle front, the Italian mountain troops, after the first advance, were less successful than the troops of Cadorna in the Carnic and Julian Alps. Here the fighting mountaineers of Tyrol redeemed their reputation by

a daring stroke. The scene of this brilliant operation was close above the Tonale Pass, the site of one of the greatest glaciers in Europe. From Presanella to Care the ice extends in a gleaming crescent for more than twenty miles. Its broadest part stretches for six miles to Monte Adamello, 11,640 feet high. The paths over or by these glaciers had been seized and fortified by the Italians and their line along this front lay mostly within Italian territory. In mid-July a force of Tyroleans found a new track through the ice and before the Italians, engrossed with operations elsewhere, knew what they were doing they had penetrated several miles into Italian lands. The Italians met the invaders at the famous Garibaldi Hut owned by the Italian Alpine Club just beneath Mount Adamello and checked the advance, although the Austrians retained some of the peaks commanding the Hut.

Just north of the Adamello group of peaks in the upper part of the Giudicari Valley extending to Lake Garda the Italians took one of the northern passes by surprise and advanced toward the forts defending Riva and Arco. Eventually they won all the country south of the Ledro Valley with a series of fierce artillery duels. A similar advance was made east of Lake Garda and down the Lagarina Valley. The forward movement was signalized by engineering feats comparable, in their mastery of the human hand over the forces of nature, only to the building of the Pyramids. The great siege guns weighing many tons were hoisted to the top of cloud-piercing summits solely by man power. Every bit of ammunition and supplies had to be brought up by the same laborious method. At Col di Lana the Austrians had an intricate series of works excavated deep in the solid rock. High explosive shells and hand bombs were useless against this defense, but Colonel Garibaldi, a grandson of the great Italian Liberator, found a way to drive the Austrians out of their position. He mustered a corps of engineers who had helped drill the great railway tunnels on the Swiss frontier and under his direction they tunneled right through the mountain into the Austrian galleries on the reverse slope. When the fumes of the last charge of blasting dynamite cleared away a



detachment of bomb carriers leaped through the jagged hole, drove the enemy from their galleries, and, constantly fed by supporting troops, cleared their way up and down the mountain.

The first of August, 1915, found the Italians holding the Austrian outpost positions they had taken during June and July; but the Austrian main defenses from one end of the frontier to the other, a distance of more than 300 miles, were virtually intact. It must be borne in mind, however, that the Italian General Staff at this period of the war never contemplated any general offensive except on the Isonzo River. Although their attack along the Isonzo did not attain its object of reducing the main defenses of Trieste and Gorizia, proved too hard a nut to crack, the Italians here won a series of minor victories against great odds and, to the Italian mind at least, demonstrated the valor of the army and the effectiveness of the new artillery which boded well for the future.

It has been pointed out that in these operations General Cadorna had to consider other things besides the immediate problems facing his troops. The Italo-Austrian warfare was but a small factor in the great plan of the Entente allies, who as the war progressed, realized more and more the importance of cooperative action. All that happened in Galicia, Poland, Lithuania and Courland had a direct influence upon Cadorna's plans. Russian reverses and the failure of all attempts by the French and British to break the German line in France and Belgium made the Italian commander cautious. The series of Teutonic victories made it possible that at any time he might have to face an overwhelming host of Austrians and Germans equipped with artillery which he could not hope to equal and backed by an apparently limitless supply of ammunition. For political reasons, also, he could not risk, even in the hope of reaching Trieste, sacrificing his men in an offensive costing anything like the quantities of human material being used up each day in other theatres. His preponderance of troops at the opening of operations in May was gradually reduced. But the enemy's positions and his superior artillery offset the Italian's greater numbers. On the whole it may be said that the Italians

accomplished quite as much as any of their allies. They penetrated farther into the Alps and the rugged tableland west of Trieste than the British and French with their colonials did into the hills of Gallipoli or into the ridge of the Lille region, and the length of their thrusts was greater than the French advances in Artois and Champagne.

The Italians were more successful in concealing the extent of their losses than most of the other belligerents. A conservative estimate places their total casualty list between the last week in May and the first of August, 1915, at 25,000. The Austrians in the same period on the same front lost about 15,000 dead, 50,000 wounded and 15,000 prisoners. The slight Italian losses compared with their enemy's is remarkable in view of the fact that they were almost constantly on the offensive. By far the greater portion of the casualties were suffered in the east, during the two assaults on the defenses of Gorizia.

Measuring the territory gained during these two months and comparing it with the concessions offered by Austria as the price of Italy's neutrality—on this basis the Italians had no cause to regret their decision. On the Venetian Plain by the lower Isonzo a few thousand men in two days with comparatively small loss conquered all the territory which the Italian nation had been offered for keeping out of war. This conquered territory, however, was far less than the prize the Italian King and his Cabinet set before the eyes of the people when they declared war.

## PART II—THE DARDANELLES AND TURKEY

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### CHAPTER IX

#### BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS

**D**URING the month of January, 1915, the British and French naval authorities came to a decision to attempt a naval attack upon the Dardanelles. It was decided, too, to lose no time in the matter, but to push the campaign with all speed. Undoubtedly, behind this decision there were many political factors of a grave kind because, on the face of it, there were many reasons why the attack should have been delayed until fine weather. Once having come to a decision, no time was lost. The Island of Tenedos was seized, and under an agreement with Venizelos, the Greek Premier, the island of Lemnos was occupied. In the latter the large harbor of Mudros offered an ideal naval and military base for operations against the Dardanelles, overcoming one of the chief original handicaps of the allied command, distance of base from scene of operations. Lemnos was less than fifty miles from the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, while Tenedos was but twenty-two miles away, lying close to the Turkish coast. At these two depots a considerable Anglo-French naval squadron was rapidly collected. They came from all parts of the world.

The elimination of the German commerce raiders from the high seas, and the obvious intentions of the main German and Austrian fleets to avoid a general action against overwhelming odds, freed a large number of allied, and especially British, warships of secondary fighting value.



By the middle of February, 1915, the rendezvous was complete. Besides the ships belonging to the British and French Mediterranean fleets, there had arrived, fresh from the battle of the Falkland Islands, the *Inflexible*, a dreadnought battle cruiser. The *Queen Elizabeth*, too, arrived, the newest and strongest of the ships of the whole British navy. It is evident that great reliance had been placed on the enormous gun power of this vessel, it being hoped that her great 15-inch pieces would blow the Dardanelles defenses to pieces, somewhat in the way the gigantic German land guns had blown the Belgian forts into fragments. In no other way is it possible to explain the risking of this capital ship in the highly dangerous operations in the Ægean sea.

In addition to the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Inflexible*, the British force included the *Agamemnon*, the *Irresistible*, the *Vengeance*, the *Triumph*, the *Albion*, the *Lord Nelson*, the *Ocean* and the *Majestic*. The French ships numbered the *Charlemagne*, the *Gaulois*, the *Suffern*, and the *Bouvet*.

Early in the morning of February 19, 1915, these vessels, under the supreme command of Vice Admiral Sackville Carden, and with Rear Admiral Guépratte in command of the French division, arrived off the Gallipoli Peninsula. At 8 a. m. they opened an intense bombardment of the several forts. At first they battered away at the Turks at long range but finally, about the middle of the afternoon, the *Vengeance*, *Cornwallis* and *Triumph* of the British forces, and the *Suffern*, *Gaulois* and *Bouvet* of the French fleet, closed in upon the Turkish forts which were still replying. It was not until darkness that all the land batteries had been apparently silenced.

At this time, and throughout the various attempts to reduce the Dardanelles forts by naval bombardment, there was considerable difficulty in making the demolition permanent. On the following morning a detachment of the Naval Flying Corps made a reconnaissance and discovered that the damage was not as great as had been hoped. Accordingly, preparations were made to give the Turks another dose of the 12-inch guns. Before this could be done bad weather intervened.

On February 25, 1915, there was a further bombardment and by five o'clock in the evening all the forts again had been silenced. Mine sweeping operations were then begun. For this work English-Scotch trawlers from the North Sea had been brought down and the crews of these little unprotected boats added many pages of heroism to the book of great deeds of the Dardanelles operations.

The following day a division of the battleship fleet entered the straits for a distance of four miles, the mine sweepers having cleared the channel for that distance. The *Albion*, *Vengeance* and *Majestic* opened fire with their 12-inch guns on Fort Dardanos, a battery mounting nothing but 5.9-inch guns, situated on the Asiatic shore some distance below the Narrows. Fort Dardanos bravely replied, however, until put out of action, as did several concealed batteries, the presence of which the British and French had not suspected.

With the completion of this operation the allied command believed they had not only permanently silenced the forts guarding the entrance to the Dardanelles but had, as well, made both sides of the straits then too warm for the Turkish troops. Accordingly forces of marines were landed to complete the work of demolition. They were successful except at Kum Kale where the Turks proved to have maintained a large force. The British landing party was driven back to its boats in a hurry after suffering a score of casualties.

The apparent success of these naval operations raised high hopes in Great Britain and in the other allied countries. The British Government, which had established a censorship for all news that might tend to depress the British public, saw no reason for interfering to prevent the publication of news that might tend unduly in the other direction. The newspapers and the so-called military experts gave the public what they evidently wanted. The attack upon the Dardanelles, according to the majority of these, was practically over. A few voices of warning were raised, but they were immediately silenced as "croakers" and "pessimists" and even "pro-Germans." Absurd reports of consternation and panic in Constantinople were sent broadcast through-

out Great Britain, and thence to the whole world. Thousands of Turks, in abject fear, were pictured as spending most of their days and nights on the housetops of the sacred city, anxiously awaiting the first glimpse of the victorious allied fleet sailing up the Golden Horn. Hundreds of thousands were said to be fleeing into Asia Minor and preparations were being made by the sultan and his government to follow suit.

Meanwhile, nothing of the kind was happening, either in Gallipoli or in Constantinople. The German and Turkish authorities, confident in their ability to hold the straits against all the forces that could be brought against it, were quietly perfecting their plans. Bad weather again interrupted the Allies' operations, and it was not until March 1, 1915, that the *Triumph*, *Ocean* and *Albion* again entered the straits, and bombarded Fort Dardanos (once more active), and the concealed shore batteries. The same night the mine sweepers, under the protection of destroyers, cleared an additional five miles of the channel, and the waters were safe up to within a mile and a half of the entrance to the Narrows.

About the same time the two French squadrons bombarded the Bulair lines, where the Gallipoli Peninsula connects with the mainland, in an attempt to interrupt the Turks' supply of troops and ammunition.

On the following day, March 2, 1915, the *Canopus*, *Swiftsure* and *Cornwallis* drew close into Fort Dardanos and opened fire. By so doing they got within range of the Turkish batteries in the pine woods just below the Kilid Bahr plateau and all three boats were hit.

For the next few days the bombardment of various Turkish positions and batteries was continued. On the afternoon of March 4, 1915, a large landing party was put ashore at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr to complete the demolition of the works. That on the Asiatic shore again had a hard time and was driven off by a Turkish force after doing only small damage. The force on the European side also found that the Turks had quickly returned to the tip of the peninsula as soon as the fire of the warships had ceased.



On the following day there occurred at Smyrna an incident that is hard to explain. Even British experts have not made any attempt to solve the puzzle. Vice Admiral Peirse with a British and French fleet, appeared off the city and opened a bombardment. The Turkish command did not reply and, after doing considerable damage, Peirse and his ships sailed away. He made no attempt to land, indeed he is not believed to have had a force for that purpose with him. The only reasonable explanation of the bombardment is that it was in the nature of a diversion intended to keep as many troops as possible from Gallipoli.

In the Dardanelles the operations were rapidly coming to a head. The Anglo-French command believed the time had now arrived for an attack in force upon the forts at the Narrows, the real defenses of the straits. Accordingly, on March 6, 1915, the *Albion*, *Prince George*, the *Vengeance*, the *Majestic* and the *Suffern* steamed well up the straits and opened a direct fire on the big forts. It was not upon the work of these ships, however, that great hopes rested. A new experiment was being tried from the Gulf of Saros on the other side of the Peninsula of Gallipoli, at the same time. With their long range guns the *Queen Elizabeth*, the *Agamemnon*, and the *Ocean* stood well out and, by indirect fire, threw shell after shell over the heights of the peninsula into the land works. All the while circling aeroplanes, under the constant fire of the Turkish antiaircraft guns, watched and corrected the firing, while a captive balloon, sent up from the *Agamemnon*, did additional and valuable service in this respect.

It was found that, because of the angle of fire of the big naval guns, it was not possible to score any hits from the Gulf of Saros on the Turkish forts on the European side of the straits and the attempt was soon abandoned. Modern big gun ammunition was too expensive to be lightly thrown away. Furthermore, the life of one of the big guns of these battleships is strictly limited, especially if full charges are being used. Ultimately, the three battleships in the Gulf shifted their fire to the forts near Chanak, on the Asiatic side, where the works were on low ground, almost at sea level.

It was confidently hoped that, by means of this indirect fire, it would be possible to put the 14-inch guns of these forts out of action, without giving them a chance to reply. The idea of trying to force a way past these great guns, exposing the relatively frail sides of precious battleships to their direct fire, was not relished by the allied command.

But if the Turks could not reply to the fire of the three battleships in the Gulf of Saros with their 14-inch guns, they could and did do effective work with smaller guns concealed on the heights of the peninsula overlooking the gulf, and the *Queen Elizabeth* was hit three times.

On the following day, March 7, the attack was renewed. The four French battleships, the *Charlemagne*, *Gaulois*, the *Bouvet* and the *Suffern* took the post of greatest danger inside the straits and finally again silenced the Dardanos fort. The *Agamemnon* and the *Lord Nelson*, behind them, made a long range attack upon the forts fringing the Narrows. Three of the allied battleships, the *Gaulois*, the *Agamemnon* and the *Lord Nelson* were hit by Turkish shells but, as an offset, it was believed that the great forts at Chanak, as well as the works at Dardanos, had been permanently silenced.

This confidence, as we shall see later on, was not justified. Inside the great forts, it is true, the Turks and their German officers were suffering terribly from the bombardment. That they stood it in some cases for periods of seven hours at a stretch, and continued firing effectively for the whole of that time, is testimony to their courage and devotion to duty. As the great shells of the *Queen Elizabeth* landed in the forts they did frightful havoc. The shrapnel shells contained something like 12,000 separate bullets and it is on record that one of these shells wounded or killed no less than 250 Turkish soldiers. As the high explosive shells struck the works and exploded they threw up tons of earth and cement a hundred feet in the air, plainly visible to the allied observers on the warships in the straits.

But this was not the worst that the defenders had to endure. The exploding shells gave off poisonous gases that filled the un-

derground passages of the redoubts. The heroic Turks worked under such conditions as long as it was humanly possible, but eventually their German officers were compelled to withdraw their men from each fort in turn to allow the gases to clear away. These circumstances undoubtedly account for the fact that almost every one of the forts was reported permanently silenced, only to resume action a few days later, much to the surprise and consternation of the allied command.

Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that the Turks were economizing ammunition, especially big gun shells. They had made up their minds that there would be a direct naval attack upon the forts sooner or later, and their instructions were to reserve their fire "until they saw the whites of the enemy's eyes," so to speak.

From March 6 to March 18, 1915, there was a lull in activity at the straits. Momentous events were transpiring in London and at the island of Lemnos, and upon the outcome of these events depended the future course of the operations at the Dardanelles. While the individual ships of his fleet conducted minor bombardments intended to harass the Turks, Vice Admiral Carden, pleading ill health, had been allowed to relinquish the command of the allied fleet, and Vice Admiral John de Robeck, newly promoted to his rank, succeeded him. Almost immediately the latter steamed away to Mudros to engage in a fateful conference.

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## CHAPTER X

### PREPARATIONS FOR LANDING—COMPOSITION OF FORCES

IT had evidently been the intention of the Allies to force the Narrows by naval power, and then follow up the success by an occupation of Gallipoli by a land force. For this purpose the troops solicited of Venizelos, the Greek Premier, were undoubtedly to be used, but sole reliance was not to be placed upon



them. For one thing, the Allies had no intention of allowing Greece to assume too great an importance in the campaign against Constantinople, well knowing that the Greek people had large ambitions in that part of the world—ambitions that clashed with those of more important powers.

In early March, 1915, the French were busy concentrating an expeditionary force in North Africa, under the command of General d'Amade. By March 15 the French force had been gathered together at Bizerta, in the *Ægean* Sea. At the same time the British Government had been undertaking a similar concentration, and by the third week in March a force estimated at about 120,000 men had arrived in transports at Mudros in the island of Lemnos. This English force consisted of the Twenty-ninth Division, the Royal Naval Division, a special force formed by Winston Churchill, British Secretary to the Admiralty, and used in the attempt to relieve Antwerp, the Australian and New Zealand divisions originally brought to Egypt, a Territorial division, and some Indian forces.

These troops, with the comparatively small French force under General d'Amade, were placed under the command of one of the most popular of British officers—General Sir Ian Hamilton.

Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff were hurried from London by special trains and a fast cruiser steaming upward of 30 knots an hour. By the time he reached Mudros the French troops had also arrived from Bizerta.

The island of Lemnos presented a strange and picturesque spectacle when all these troops, drawn from so many distant parts of the world, were gathered in the sheltering bay. The blue and red of the Frenchmen's uniforms, the khaki of the British, the native costumes of the Indian and North African troops contrasted strangely. Mixing freely with them and driving hard bargains, were the native Greek tradesmen. All over the little town thousands of temporary huts and shops and tents sprang up for the supply of the needs of the troops.

Out in the harbor hundreds of ships of every description were moored. There were battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, sub-

marines, transports, supply boats, barges, picket boats, and dozens of Greek trading vessels. Into all this mess and chaos came the British commander.

Then followed a long conference with General d'Amade, Admiral de Robeck, and Admiral Guépratte. There does not seem to be any reason for doubting that the plan was to launch a land attack upon the Gallipoli defenses immediately. But General Hamilton demurred. He inspected the loading of the transports, and refused to give the order for an attack until grave defects had been remedied. Of this period he wrote subsequently:

"I knew that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success."

The slightest delay in landing, Sir Ian Hamilton realized, would prove terribly costly, if not absolutely fatal. He and his troops were embarking on a campaign opening with a feat of arms for which there was no precedent in history. He did not intend that there should be the slightest chance of failure if forethought and intelligent preparation could prevent it.

The prime obstacle to an immediate descent of the allied land forces upon Gallipoli Sir Ian Hamilton found to be the manner in which the British transports had been loaded. The only consideration that seems to have been present in the minds of the military authorities who superintended the work was the question of getting the material and men aboard the ships. The supplies, artillery, and ammunitions had all been loaded without any consideration as to which was to come off the boats first. Material absolutely necessary for the protection of the troops once they had landed on hostile shores, and vital in any attempt to press home the advantage thus gained, was buried under tents, hut parts, cooking material, etc.

"I cannot go ahead with a transport fleet in this condition," said General Hamilton in substance to his French and English colleagues. "The whole fleet must return to Egypt and be re-loaded."

"But time," urged Admiral de Robeck. "It will take weeks of valuable time."

"Better lose time than run straight to certain disaster," declared General Hamilton.

And back to Alexandria went the whole fleet of transports, with the exception of a few vessels carrying the Australian Infantry Brigade, which, by some miracle, had been properly loaded.

When General Hamilton and his soldiers sailed out of Mudros Harbor, bound for Alexandria, Admiral de Robeck came to a momentous and historic decision. Acting either on his own responsibility or under orders or advice of some superior authority, he decided not to wait for the troops, but to make a determined attack upon the Narrows with his whole fleet. By sheer weight of guns he would try to run past the great forts that lined the 1,500-yard channel, pounding his way through on the theory that "what will not bend must break."

March 18, 1915, was an ideal day for such an heroic attempt. The sailors of the allied fleet were called to quarters as the morning sun, in a perfect sky, arose over the towering hills that lined the straits. Briefly the officers addressed the men, told them of the work ahead, spoke of the glory that awaited them if successful, and ordered each man to his post.

The reader, in order to gain some definite idea of the defenses that were to be attacked, should take up a map showing the Dardanelles. He will find, about ten miles from the entrance, a narrow channel where the shores of Asia and Europe almost touch. There, at the narrowest point of the channel, the Turks had built their chief defenses. On the south slope of the Kalid Bahr were three powerful works. The Rumeli Medjidieh Battery mounted two 11-inch, four 9.4-inch, and five 3.4-inch guns. The Hamidieh II Battery had two 14-inch, while the Namazieh Battery had one 11-inch, one 10.2-inch, eleven 9.4-inch, three 8.2-inch, and three 5.9-inch guns.

On the Asiatic side of the Narrows, near Chanak, was a system of redoubts of equal strength. The Hamidieh I Battery, south of Chanak, consisted of two 14-inch and seven 9.4-inch guns, while the Hamidieh III Battery possessed two 14-inch, one 9.4-inch, one 8.2-inch, and four 5.9-inch guns.



Besides all these formidable defenses there were many minor positions on the very edge of the Narrows. In fact the whole channel, and the way of the allied fleet to the Sea of Marmora, lay through rows upon rows of high-power guns.

The disastrous naval attack upon the big forts at the Narrows, resulting, as it did, in the loss of three battleships and the disabling of others, convinced the British and French naval authorities that it was hopeless to expect success along that line, except at a price that they could ill afford to pay, and that would have a terribly depressing effect upon public opinion at home.

Admiral de Robeck and his British "bulldogs" were called off to await the coming of Sir Ian Hamilton and his mixed expeditionary force. This force, while the 12- and 15-inch guns of the Anglo-French fleet had been vainly battering the Dardanelles forts, had returned to Alexandria, and, under the careful supervision of Sir Ian Hamilton and General d'Amade, had been re-shipped aboard the great transport fleet.

At this point there appears to have arisen a serious misunderstanding between Great Britain and France as to the exact number of troops to be supplied by each. Although the true facts have not yet come to light, it is believed that General Joffre emphatically refused to detach any of the French troops from the western front. The force that France eventually contributed to the allied army at the Dardanelles consisted of units not at that time in view for service in northern France. These numbered a small detachment of Fusiliers Marines, a section of the Armée Coloniale, and the Foreign Legion, a force made up of volunteers from all over the world, enlisted for service anywhere, and generally assigned to a post of unusual danger.

Great Britain was, therefore, under the necessity of providing the bulk of the troops.

The British authorities did not make the mistake of throwing raw troops into the initial struggle at the Dardanelles. The backbone of the force supplied to General Sir Ian Hamilton was the Twenty-ninth Division of Regulars, made up largely of the hardiest of England's youth—the north countrymen. It comprised the Eighty-sixth Brigade of Infantry—Second Royal Fusiliers, First

Lancashire Fusiliers, First Royal Munster Fusiliers, and the First Royal Dublin Fusiliers; the Eighty-seventh Brigade—Second South Wales Borderers, First King's Own Scottish Borderers, First Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and First Border Regiment; the Eighty-eighth Brigade—Second Hampshires, Fourth Worcesters, First Essex, and the Fifth Royal Scots, the latter a Territorial battalion. Attached to this force of infantry was a squadron of the Surrey Yeomanry and two batteries of the Fourth Mountain Brigade, a Highland artillery unit.

To the command of these regular troops, Major General Hunter-Weston was appointed. This officer had been through much of the early fighting in the western theatre, originally commanding the Eleventh Brigade of the Third Corps of General French's army. His appointment to the Dardanelles was in the nature of a promotion, it being recognized that his dash and energy would be useful in the style of warfare that would govern the battle for the straits.

In addition to the regular troops brought out from England, there was the Naval Division. This force had seen a bit of action in the attempt to save Antwerp. It consisted of two Naval Brigades and a Royal Marine Brigade.

Also there was a Territorial Division, known as the East Lancashires, under the command of Major General Douglas. Immediately upon the outbreak of war this division had volunteered for foreign service and had been shipped to Egypt, where it had had six months' training. It comprised the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Lancashire Fusiliers, the Fourth and Fifth East Lancashires, the Ninth and Tenth Manchesters, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Manchesters.

These troops, with the inclusion of the Australian and New Zealand forces brought to Egypt at the beginning of the war, under the command of Lieutenant General Birdwood, and a considerable number of Indian troops, made up the force at the disposal of Sir Ian Hamilton. They numbered in all, with the French troops, about 120,000 men.

What had the Turkish authorities to set against this army, supported by the great fleet of battleships and unlimited number of

transports and subsidiary vessels? Estimates of the potential strength of the Turkish army available for service in and about the Gallipoli Peninsula at this time vary widely. There were those, for instance, who claimed that, if necessary, the Turks could command at least 600,000 troops for the defense of the straits, and that any attempt to capture the positions with the force supplied to Sir Ian Hamilton was doomed to failure. On the other hand were those who claimed that the Turks were short of equipment and ammunition, and had no means of replenishment; that they had no heart in the fight; that they were already in revolt against their German taskmasters; that the Suez and Caucasus defeats had undermined their morale and depleted their numbers, and that the Turkish high command had decided that it was useless to attempt to defend the position. Fortunately, between these two extremists there was a happy mean, and the best evidence points to the conclusion that, for the defense of the Dardanelles, from first to last, the Turks depended upon about 200,000 men with reinforcements brought up from time to time to refill the ranks. Probably when the great landing took place only a small proportion of the Turkish troops were in Gallipoli.

These troops were under the command of the German General Liman von Sanders, although, from time to time in the operations, the picturesque figure of Enver Pasha appeared. Admiral Usedom, a high German naval expert, was placed in command of the purely naval defenses of the straits.

Unfortunately for the allied force the attack upon the Dardanelles lacked the important — and perhaps indispensable — element of surprise. By their early naval attack upon the outer fort, by the gathering of the army at Mudros and its subsequent return to Alexandria, and, finally, by the ill-fated naval attack upon the Narrows' defenses, the Allies had given the Turks ample warning of their intentions. During the many weeks that intervened between the first naval attack upon the outer forts and the approach of Sir Ian Hamilton's army, the Turks, under the supervision of their German mentors, and borrowing largely of the lessons of the trench campaign in Flanders and France, made of



the Peninsula of Gallipoli a network of positions which it proved possible, to borrow an expression used of the German concrete trenches in France, "for a caretaker and his wife to hold." This elaborate system of trenches and redoubts was dominated by the three great heights. Every foot of the sides of these major positions had been prepared with barbed wire, monster pits, mines, concealed machine-gun batteries, and the almost endless variety of traps evolved out of six months' experience with the new style of warfare.

Along the many miles of coast of the Peninsula of Gallipoli there were but few places where, even under the most advantageous of conditions, it was possible to effect a landing in the face of a strongly intrenched enemy. The steep slopes of the hills rose from the very water's edge. Even in cases where there was a low, sandy beach, the nature of the country in the immediate vicinity made it impossible to deploy and maneuver any considerable number of troops.

Furthermore the Turks, well aware of the limited possibilities at the disposal of the allied force, had made terrifically strong defensive positions of the few beaches where successful landings were at all possible. Row upon row of barbed wire had been run along the shores and even out into the sea. Mines had been constructed that could be depended upon to blow the intrepid first landing parties to pieces. The ground had been thoroughly studied and machine-gun batteries placed so that every inch of the beaches could be raked with a devastating fire. And finally the ranges for all the great guns in the hills beyond had been accurately measured so that the ships and the troops would be literally buried under an avalanche of shells.

# ITALY AIDS THE ALLIES

BY MAKING

## WAR ON AUSTRIA

AUSTRO-ITALIAN BATTLE FRONTS IN THE TYROL  
AND ALONG THE ISONZO AND THE ADRIATIC COAST



The anti-aircraft guns of an Austrian vessel repelling an attack by Italian aeroplanes on the Adriatic port of Trieste. The invaders were discovered by searchlights






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Great crowds assembled before the Chamber of Deputies in Rome to make an enthusiastic demonstration in favor of war with Austria





Copyright, Underwood & Underwood

The King of Italy and the Duke of Aosta inspecting the famous Italian 75-millimeter guns,  
which rival the French 75's in effectiveness



Copyright, Medem Photo Service

Italian soldiers intrenched on the Isonzo River front, where the fighting for the possession of strategic points was fierce and incessant





Copyright, Brown & Dawson

The field kitchen of a Bosnian regiment. As the regiment contains both Christians and Mohammedans, the food of each is prepared in a special way





An Italian sentinel sitting behind a windbreak on the crest of an Alpine peak in the Tyrol, the scene of much desperate fighting between the Italians and Austrians

## CHAPTER XI

PLANS OF SIR IAN HAMILTON—FIRST  
LANDING MADE

THE broad outlines of the problem that faced Sir Ian Hamilton and his force were comparatively simple. The assault upon the Gallipoli Peninsula resolved itself into rush attacks upon two major heights, leading up to a grand assault upon the key position to the Narrows.

These three positions formed an irregular triangle. The first was Achi Baba, situated within three and a half miles of the tip of the peninsula. The second was Sari Bair, about eight miles due north of the Narrows. By either taking or isolating these two positions the Allies would be in a position for a grand attack upon the third and most important height, the plateau of Kilid Bahr, or Pasha Dagh. This position not only commanded the Narrows and the adjacent channel but it contained two of the great forts that successfully withstood the grand fleet attack. It was, in the minds of the allied command, the key to the whole situation. With Kilid Bahr in their hands, they believed the way to Constantinople would be open and the elimination of the Turk as a factor in the war and the settlement of the Balkan question or questions in a manner favorable to the allied powers would necessarily follow.

The operations as planned by Sir Ian Hamilton, then, consisted of a number of landings—as many as possible so as to conceal the real objectives of the allied troops and to disperse the Turkish force—and an attempt to rush the position of Achi Baba, and to isolate the position of Sari Bair by advancing through the low country that lay between that position and Kilid Bahr.

On April 7, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton, with his staff, returned to Mudros and held a conference with the naval commands. By the 20th his plans had been perfected and the great landing was fixed to take place on Sunday, April 25, 1915. During the previous week the Allies had been making feints along the shore of



the Gulf of Saros in an attempt to give an element of surprise to the real attack.

As Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently wrote, the question of weather was one of vital importance to the success of the landing. If, after a number of the troops had been thrown upon the beaches, bad weather had intervened, prevented further landings and perhaps driven the fleet and auxiliary vessels to Mudros Harbor, the unfortunate troops ashore would have been wiped out.

Sunday, April 25, 1915, however, was a perfect day. The low mist of the early morning hid the great fleet until it was close to the shore of the peninsula. As the day progressed the mist disappeared, the blue sky presented an unbroken expanse, while no wind disturbed the placid sea. In a setting such as this was enacted one of the greatest battles of all history.

At the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula were five small beaches. They were subsequently named by the Allies, for identification purposes, Beaches S, V, W, X, and Y. Against these points was to be flung the Twenty-ninth Division, supported by some of the naval division. These troops, once having gained the shore and held it against the enemy counterattacks, were to push on in all haste by the road that led to the village of Krithia, northwest of Achi Baba, turn east before reaching that place, and carry Achi Baba with a rush.

At the same time the Australian and New Zealand troops were to effect a landing at Gaba Tepe, about twelve miles up the Ægean coast of the peninsula and about three and a half miles south of Sari Bair. Running southeast from near Gaba Tepe was a good road connecting with the town of Maidos, on the Dardanelles, above the Narrows. The whole way lay through low country and, once in command of this road, the allied troops would not only sever direct communications between Sari Bair and Kilid Bahr but would be in a position to attack the defenses of the latter on the flank.

Meantime the French were to make a landing at Kum Kale on the Asiatic side of the straits. There is some doubt as to the real purpose of this landing. After the French had reembarked—"driven off with terrible losses," according to the Turkish official





account—it was claimed that the landing was merely a diversion. Certainly nothing more than that could be claimed for a feint made by a portion of the Naval Division farther up the Gulf of Saros.

These, then, were the plans of Sir Ian Hamilton: four landing operations in widely separated points, two of serious importance and the other two, probably, intended only to draw the troops and energy of the defenders. How they prospered, what measure of success they obtained, how the Turks, fighting with the valor which has made them famous through ages, how the British Colonial and French troops accomplished almost unbelievable deeds of heroism and skill, make one of the most fascinating stories in the annals of warfare.

While these operations were timed to occur simultaneously, they will appear more clear to the reader if they are taken separately and each followed to its conclusion from the opening day. In this way we will tell the story, first, of the Australian-New Zealand landing northeast of Gaba Tepe; then of the landings on the five beaches at the tip of the peninsula; and, finally, of the French landing on the Asiatic shore and the naval brigade demonstration at Bulair.

By one o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 25, 1915, the allied expeditionary force had arrived within five miles of the Gallipoli shore. Under cover of darkness the final dispositions were made and the ships maneuvered so that the timing of the several landings would be accurately synchronized. Shortly after one o'clock the landing boats were lowered from the transports.

Strung in lines of four and five the boats were slowly towed toward shore by steam pinnaces. Not a sound was heard but the panting of the engines of the little boats. The speed was accurately calculated to bring the parties close in shore with the first break of the dawn.

Accompanying the Australian and New Zealand troops, were a number of destroyers. Just as they reached the shallow water in front of the cliffs of Gaba Tepe, a Turkish lookout spied them in the hazy light of the morning. Instantly he gave the alarm and a flaring searchlight flashed its rays on the little flotilla.

The need for silence had disappeared. With a cheer the British troops leaped from their boats into the shoal water and splashed their way ashore. While many of them were still in their boats, however, the Turks opened fired. The whole ground had been carefully prepared and from every cover on the shore and the cliffs beyond a deadly fire was poured upon the Colonial troops.

Without faltering, however, the Australian and New Zealand troops, supported by a squadron of battleships and destroyers, came on straight at the strongly intrenched Turks. The first of the Australians to reach the shore were the Third Brigade under Colonel Sinclair Maglagan. With a rush they charged the first Turkish lines, bayoneted the defenders, and scrambled up the steep cliffs that rise a hundred feet in the air.

Fortunately for the British troops, as these and subsequent events proved, there had been a slight miscalculation in the landing, and the men had actually gone ashore a mile and a half northeast of Gaba Tepe, instead of at that point. Gaba Tepe is so rugged and uninviting that it was believed that the Turks would not trouble to intrench it. Actually the Turks appeared to have intrenched and prepared every inch of the coast. But at Sari Bair, where the Australian and New Zealand troops actually landed, the character of the ground, although not so advantageous at first, afforded much more protection once the men were ashore. Sir Ian Hamilton, in his graphic account of the operations, subsequently said:

"Owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction, the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation had been much better defiladed from shell fire.

"The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its



southern extremity, a deep ravine with exceedingly deep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a northeasterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is baked by the seaward face of the spur which forms the northwestern side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except near the southern limit of the beach where gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Farther inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Sari Bair separated by deep ravines which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run northwest, west, southwest and south to the coast."

As fresh British troops came ashore they cast aside their heavy packs and followed their comrades across the forty feet of open beach and into the scrub that covered the side of the cliffs. Halfway up the Turks had prepared a second position. Attacking it in open formation the Third Brigade succeeded in clearing it within fifteen minutes of the time they came ashore, despite the desperate and brave defense of the Turks.

Meanwhile some of the landing boats, subjected to the terrible fire of the Turkish guns, were having a bad time. The towing ropes of three of them were cut by the fire and the boats drifted helplessly about under the withering rain of bullets that rapidly wiped out their cargoes of men. But despite these mishaps the First and Second Brigades were hurried ashore to support the Third. Soon, in the face of terrible difficulties including the narrowness of the beach, there were between 3,000 and 4,000 allied troops ashore.

By this time the Turks, by means of the mobile carriages prepared for them by the Germans, had maneuvered some heavy artillery into position on the heights inland. Also some of their warships, moored in the Narrows, began throwing heavy shells across the peninsula into the allied fleet standing close inshore. So dangerous and accurate became this fire that the transports

had to be ordered out to sea and this delayed the operations seriously.

At Gaba Tepe and on the heights to the north of the beach the Turks posted guns and enfiladed the Narrows beach. Thus the troops, as they landed, had to make their way through a rain of shrapnel, machine gun and rifle fire that wiped out hundreds. Despite the success of the Australian Brigades in clearing the beach and the face of the cliff, the Turkish fire never seemed to slacken.

Because of the nature of the country there could be no central control over the advance fighting and no continued communications between the several forces making their way to the top of the cliffs. The battle resolved itself into a series of fights between small parties, or even individual soldiers, whose one object was to kill as many of the enemy as possible and make their way as far inland as possible in the first rush.

By two o'clock about twelve British regiments had been landed and the ground gained consolidated and prepared against counterattack. Thousands of Turkish troops were by this time pouring along the road from Maidos and by the middle of the afternoon it was calculated that there were fully 20,000 of them before the Australian and New Zealand troops. The latter, in the meantime, had been further reenforced by two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery. The pressure of the constantly increasing Turkish force compelled General Birdwood, who came ashore about this time, to contract his lines and to reach a decision that, at that time at least and until the arrival of more troops, no further advance could be made. The Gaba Tepe landing had not been the surprise that was expected and the Turks had proved to be in unexpected strength.

About three o'clock the Turkish counterattacks began. Absolutely regardless of human life, they threw themselves in dense masses against the Second and Third Brigades. The British battleships, the *Queen*, the *London*, the *Prince of Wales*, the *Triumph* and the *Majestic*, posted close inshore, poured a devastating fire on the advancing Turkish troops as they came into the open.

About five o'clock the Turks, after repeated assaults upon the British lines, massed for a final attempt to drive the invaders into the sea. On and on they came, concentrating on the hard-pressed Third Brigade as the weak spot in the British defense. Fighting gamely against heavy odds, this Australian Brigade which had borne the brunt of the landing attack and which had been almost continually counterattacked all afternoon, gave way slowly, selling every inch of ground dearly. Hundreds of the brave Turkish troops were mown down by the machine guns which the Australians had by this time brought ashore. At nightfall, however, General Birdwood, as a consequence of the persistence of the enemy, had to contract his lines further.

As night settled on the battle field on the ridge above Gaba Tepe and Sari Bair, and the two forces rested from sheer exhaustion, the British troops, who once were well inland toward Maidos, their objective, were barely hanging onto the ridge overlooking the shore of the Gulf of Saros. All their water and food and munitions and reenforcements had to be brought ashore across the exposed beach, while the landing of the necessary artillery in the face of the Turkish fire was a feat to appal the bravest. But though their hold on their position was precarious it was tenacious and, in the end, effective. If they had not won all they expected to win they had at least won a foothold in the face of terrific difficulties.

While the Australians and New Zealanders were fighting desperately beyond Gaba Tepe, the other forces of the allied army were accomplishing similar deeds of heroism at the tip of the peninsula.

Coming down the coast of the peninsula from Gaba Tepe, about three miles from the extreme southwestern tip, was what was known as Beach Y. It was almost due west of the important town of Krithia, and the landing was intended primarily to protect the left flank of the British landing forces from attack by the considerable forces believed to be concentrated there.

The actual landing seems to have been somewhat of a surprise to the Turks. Indeed, subsequent events showed that they were correct in their estimate that a landing at the so-called Beach Y



would be a mistake. A narrow strip of sandy beach led to the cliffs, two hundred feet high, that were believed to be almost unscalable. It is easy to be wise after the event, but military writers subsequently declared that if the Turks had been prepared to defend the position, the force that landed at Beach Y would have been wiped out in the preliminary attempt to establish a footing.

The force assigned to this point of attack consisted of the First King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the Plymouth Battalion of the Royal Naval Division, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Koe. The latter was under orders, if the landing proved successful, to work his way south to effect a junction with the force landing at Beach X, some two miles away.

About five o'clock, Koe's force appeared off Beach Y, on the transports *Braemar Castle* and *Southland*, and escorted by the battleship *Goliath*, and the cruisers *Amethyst* and *Sapphire*. The Turks had posted a large force at Beach Y 2, between Beach Y and Beach X, but half of the Scottish Borderers were ashore before the Turkish command had realized what was happening. As a result Colonel Koe's force was partly established on the cliffs before the Turks had begun to arrive.

But if the initial stages were unexpectedly easy for this force, difficulties soon developed. Once on the heights, Colonel Koe ordered an advance to link up with the force at Beach X. The British troops had not gone far when they ran into the Turkish troops from Beach Y. So large was this force and so determined an opposition did it offer to the British troops that Colonel Koe soon decided it would be impossible, with the two battalions at his disposal, to accomplish the task assigned him.

Early in the afternoon the little British force was dismayed by the approach on its left flank of a large force of Turks from Krithia, which threatened to cut it off from the landing beach. Reluctantly Colonel Koe, just before he received a fatal wound, gave the order to intrench.

## CHAPTER XII

THE BRITISH IN DANGER—BITTER  
FIGHTING

THE British troops were now in a critical position. There was a peculiar spoonlike formation of the ground at the end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. From the high cliffs along the shore the ground fell away. Thus it was impossible for the supporting warships lying offshore to give any effective aid to the little British force once it had left the shore and the edge of the heights. The Turks realized to the full their advantage and attacked the Borderers and the marines with fury. Frequent attacks were launched against the dwindling line of the British force. Guns of large caliber were rapidly brought up from Krithia, while the Turks showed extraordinary daring and cleverness in bomb attacks upon the hastily dug trenches of the enemy.

All night long the Turks attacked. By morning the remnants of the British force were in desperate straits. Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently declared that the losses at this time had been "deplorable." Many of the officers, in addition to Lieutenant Colonel Kee, had been killed or wounded, while 50 per cent of the Borderers had been put out of action. They were no longer able to defend properly their trenches. Food, water, and ammunition were running short. A consultation of the remaining officers was held. The question of trying to hold out until reinforcements arrived was considered, but ultimately it was decided to retreat to the shore and to reembark.

At seven o'clock on Monday morning the order was given. The attending fleet had been strengthened by the arrival of the cruisers *Talbot* and *Dublin*, and, supported by the *Goliath*, the *Amethyst*, and the *Sapphire*, they began a terrific bombardment of the tops of the cliffs. Protected by this screen of fire, the few remaining British troops were able to get away in their boats without molestation save for a long distance bombardment by the Turkish artillery.

The landing at Beach X was more successful. The Eighty-seventh Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Marshall, was assigned to this part of the field. It was to work its way as far as possible inland and link up with the troops coming ashore at Beach W. At Beach X the Turks were well prepared. They had constructed bomb-proof shelters and trenches on the heights and were well led by German officers.

Before the actual landing the supporting battleships, led by the *Swiftsure* and the *Implacable*, bombarded the Turkish positions for almost an hour with their heaviest guns. The ground was thoroughly swept by the great 12-inch and smaller guns of the warships. Finally, just before the actual landing, the *Implacable* steamed within 500 yards of the shore, dropped her anchor and smothered the near cliffs and the foreshore with her fire.

Subsequent investigation proved that in this affair of Gallipoli, as in Flanders and elsewhere, the British suffered from their lack of foresight in the provision of proper shells. The battleships used shrapnel, which, it was afterward discovered, did little damage to the deep, protected trenches prepared by the Turks under the supervision of the German officers. If the British had had instead the high-explosive shells that were necessary for the work, the story of the Gallipoli landings under the wing of the great fleet of battleships might have made different reading.

After about a quarter of an hour's final bombardment by the *Implacable*, two companies and a machine-gun section of the First Royal Fusiliers were thrown ashore at Beach X. Under cover of the battleships, the landing was safely accomplished and the Fusiliers advanced almost 1,000 yards without much opposition. Hill 114 on their right, where the Turks proved to be firmly intrenched, then proved a serious obstacle to the advance. While the Royal Fusiliers were considering the best method of attacking this position, a Turkish battery, in position near the town of Krithia, opened fire and tore holes in the left wing of the British force. At the same time they were heavily counter-attacked by a Turkish force coming from the east. Gradually the Royal Fusiliers were compelled to give ground. Two bat-



talions of the Eighty-seventh Division were sent ashore and with these reinforcements the British again advanced, this time clearing Hill 114 of the enemy. There they joined hands with the First Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and although all day long the Turks tried to break the union of the two forces, they did not succeed in doing so.

However, General Marshall's force was hard pressed. Once more the unceasing Turkish counterattacks drove them back to the very edge of the heights overlooking Beach X, where only the intense bombardment of the protecting warships saved them. General Marshall was wounded, but refused to relinquish his command, and a very large proportion of the total force was either killed or wounded in the day's fighting. When night fell the British troops held only half a mile of territory around their original landing place, with their right wing resting on Hill 114, linked up with the force from Beach W.

Here at Beach W, a mile and a half down the coast, midway between Tekke Burna and Hellas Burna, was being enacted a feat of arms which, in the opinion of competent military men, is fit to rank with the great military accomplishments of all time. In speaking of it subsequently Sir Ian Hamilton made use of the following terms:

"So strong, in fact, were the defenses of Beach W that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of April 25."

At Beach W the Turks, fully foreseeing a landing, had prepared as at no other point. The beach is in a wide bay and leads into a gully flanked on one side by the hills extending to Cape Tekke and, on the other side by the steep cliffs extending to Cape Hellas.

Every inch of the ground had been prepared against attack. Sea and land mines had been profusely laid, wire entanglements had been placed along the shore and stretching out into the water. Deep trenches had been dug on the heights and on the

sides of the slopes while strong redoubts had been built at two dominating positions. Every bush and cover contained a sniper while larger covers concealed machine guns trained to sweep the beach and the slopes leading to the Turkish trenches.

As a defensive position Beach W was almost ideal. It had two weak points, however, which in the end turned the scales and made success possible for the attacking force. At either end of the bay were small rock positions from which it was possible to enfilade the elaborate system of defenses.

The landing party at Beach W consisted of the First Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, under command of Major Bishop. "It was," wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, "to the complete lack of the sense of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success." After a preliminary bombardment by the supporting warships the men of the First Battalion, in thirty-two cutters drawn by eight picket boats, approached the shore. The Turks made no move until the men were in shallow water and were leaping out of the boats. Then they opened fire with a murderous torrent from artillery, machine guns, and rifles. The first line of the First Battalion went down to a man. The second never faltered, but came on bravely into the fire, striving desperately to cut the wire entanglements. So quickly did they fall that observers on the warships wondered why they were "resting" on the bullet swept shore instead of running to cover.

Rapidly the men from Lancashire worked. Finally a remnant of the battalion forced its way through the last line of wire and ran for shelter on the bush covered slopes. Almost at the same moment, detachments that had landed on the rocks at Cape Tekke and under Cape Hellas began to have an important effect upon the struggle. At the latter point, the Eighty-eighth Brigade, under Brigadier General Hare, clambered up the steep side of the cliffs, searched out the machine gun positions of the enemy and swept the ground clear with the bayonet. This and the work of the force at Cape Tekke eased the Turkish fire on the beach and, on the slopes of the Cape Tekke side of the ravine, the few remaining officers of the First Battalion were able to re-form the remnants of their force and advance upon Hill 114.

About nine o'clock reinforcements were landed, this time not on the exposed beach but under Cape Tekke, the heights of which were by now largely in the hands of the British troops. With the help of these fresh troops, three lines of Turkish trenches were carried. Brigadier General Hare was seriously wounded and his place was filled by Colonel Wolley-Dod, who was sent ashore with orders to organize a further advance at all speed. At this point the attacking force ran up against the Turkish redoubt at Hill 138.

The afternoon opened with an intense naval bombardment of the ground around Hill 138 and of that redoubt itself. At two o'clock the Fourth Battalion of the Worcesters was ordered to take the position by assault. Under Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Cayley, they advanced a considerable distance under rifle fire and charged up the heights with a cheer. The Turks fought bravely against a stronger force, but by four o'clock Hill 138 was in the hands of the Worcesters.

Less than a mile down the coast, almost to the old fort and village of Sedd-el-Bahr, was what was known as V Beach. There a landing in great force was attempted. Largely because of the scale of the operations, but also because of the difficulties and the accidents of warfare, this landing was made with great losses.

The beach and the shore in the immediate vicinity form a most regular amphitheatre of a radius of about 400 feet. The beach is about 10 yards wide and 350 to 400 feet long and it runs into a slightly concaved, grassy slope that rises gently to a height of a hundred feet. Little or no real cover was to be found on this slope and the defenders were able to sweep it from all angles with a devastating rain of all kinds of shells. Just at the edge of the strip of sand, however, was a continuous escarpment about four feet high, which afforded a cover in which troops once ashore might be re-formed. As a result of the early naval bombardment of the tip of the peninsula, much of the village of Sedd-el-Bahr and the fort and the barracks had been reduced to ruins. The ruins afforded, however, excellent cover for the Turkish troops and proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the British when they reached the shore.



In addition to the natural disadvantages under which the attacking party had to work, the Turks had constructed two lines of barbed wire obstacles—one at the edge of the beach and the second two-thirds of the way up to the top of the ridge. These two lines of barbed wire were more stoutly constructed than were any others with which the British had to contend. Just beyond the second obstacle the Turks had built their first line of trenches and beyond the ground was scored with innumerable covers for the defenders.

The force assigned to the attack upon V Beach was composed of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company and a few minor units. The action opened with a short range bombardment of the enemy's trenches and such parts of the fort, the village and the barracks as were still standing and believed to be affording cover for riflemen and machine-gun batteries. Then three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were towed ashore. At this point one of the great experiments of the Gallipoli landings was put to the test, and, despite the cleverness of its conception, it did not meet with great success.

A large transport vessel, the *River Clyde*, had been loaded with about 2,000 troops. She had been reconstructed inside and great doors had been cut in one of her sides. The troops were ready on long platforms for instant disembarkation. The ships were to be run ashore, as close as possible to the beach, lighters were to be floated in between her and the shore, the side doors were to be flung open, and the troops were to rush ashore and carry the slopes by sheer momentum. In the front of the vessel, protected by sandbags, was a battery of machine guns which, it was hoped, would be especially effective in protecting the landing force from counterattacks.

As at the other landings, the Turks gave no sign of life until the collier had been beached and the other landing force had almost reached the shore in its tows. Indeed, so long did they hesitate in opening fire that at one time the watchers on the warships thought the landing was going to be unopposed. They were soon disabused of such an idea, however, as the first of the towboats

grounded on the sandy beach, the Turks opened fire from a dozen different positions. Many of the Dublin Fusiliers were killed before they were able to get out of their boats. A few scrambled ashore and reached the shelter of the escarpment that rimmed the beach. The Turks concentrated their fire on the boats and their crews. None of them were able to get away, and almost instantly their crews were killed and the boats wrecked.

Meantime the *River Clyde*, had been run ashore. Unfortunately, the operation was not carried out as expeditiously as it was hoped it would be, and the Turks soon became aware of the intentions of the British. They poured a punishing fire on the naval party attempting to get the lighters into position between the ship and the shore. The heavy tide that at this point sweeps around the point of land also seriously interfered with the work. Finally however, by deeds of heroism that received subsequent official acknowledgment, the lighters were got into position and the doors of the *River Clyde* flung open.

At a trot a company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way. It was almost impossible to live for even a short time in the fire that the Turks concentrated upon the lighters, and hardly a man reached the shore. Nothing daunted, a second company of the same battalion followed. As they dropped in scores the lighters began to drift and dozens of the men, in attempting to swim ashore in their heavy kits, were drowned.

Despite the storm of fire, volunteers once more swung the lighters into position. The third company of the Munsters were ordered to attempt to reach the beach. By this time the Turks had been able to concentrate shrapnel fire on the *River Clyde* and her human freight, and the third company suffered even more casualties than had the first two.

There is a limit to human sacrifice, and Brigadier General Napier, in command of the troops, called a halt in the attempt to land. A little later, it was resumed, with General Napier and Captain Costeker and a detachment of the Hampshire Regiment heroically leading the way. When they had reached the lighters the moorings again gave way and they drifted into deep water. In the torrent of bullets that was being poured down upon them by

the Turks it was impossible to do anything but lie flat on the exposed decks and wait for the lighters to be swung into position again. Scores of them were killed, including both Brigadier General Napier and Captain Costeker.

With this major disaster, all attempts to make further landings were abandoned for the day. A few hundred British troops had succeeded in reaching the escarpment on the shore and there they huddled, not daring to lift their heads above the four-foot natural cover. Fortunately for them, the machine-gun battery on the *River Clyde* raked the slope, kept the fire of the Turkish defenders down and prevented any counterattacks, which might have ended disastrously for the British troops. The troops still on board the *River Clyde*, numbering about 1,000 were effectively protected from the fire of the Turks, suffering few casualties, although shrapnel tore four great holes in the side of the collier.

Matters had not gone any better at other sections of the beach. Half a company of the Dublins landed east of Sedd-el-Bahr for the purpose of flanking the Turkish defenses, failed to accomplish its purpose and lost all except twenty-five of its men. In the afternoon the landing at V Beach was definitely accepted as a failure and plans made for the diversion of the troops not yet landed to one of the other beaches. It was first thought that Y Beach would be the best point, but it was decided that it would be too late to effect the issue there and the troops were finally diverted to W Beach, where, despite the heavy cost, the Lancashire landing had led to some real results.

As nightfall approached there was a momentary thrill of hopefulness among those who remained on V Beach because of the fact that some of the Worcestershire and Lancashire Fusiliers succeeded in working their way across country from W Beach and threatened to make untenable the Turkish positions. The few hundred men on V Beach and the thousand or more cooped up in the *River Clyde* could hear the fight coming closer and closer and, cheered by their officers, their spirits rose. But the men from W Beach were stopped finally by the frequent lines of barbed-wire obstructions that had been stretched by the Turk at right



angles to the shore, between the two beaches, in preparation for just such an eventuality as this.

Night came, but with it not much relief from the constant vigilance of the Turks. There was in the perfect sky not a cloud to screen the moon's rays. A successful attempt was made, however, to land the infantry from the *River Clyde*, and subsequently the force then ashore, numbering close upon 1,500 men, tried to clear the ruins of the fort and the outskirts of the village. All these efforts were in vain, however, and finally the troops returned to the protection of the escarpment along the shore. From there the task of removing the wounded to the protection of the *River Clyde* was proceeded with under a heavy fire.

In comparison with the sanguinary affairs at the four other beaches, the landing at S Beach was a minor affair, costing only about fifty casualties. This beach was located at the extreme eastern end of Morto Bay, close by Eski Hissarlik Point, and the work was delegated to the Second South Wales Borderers under Lieutenant Colonel Casson. The chief difficulty of this landing was found in the powerful current which delayed it for several hours beyond the appointed time. However, the men were finally got ashore and easily drove out the small Turkish force that had been posted in the neighborhood.

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## CHAPTER XIII

### FURTHER EFFORTS AT LANDING—FAILURE TO TAKE KRITHIA

MEANWHILE the French were carrying on a disastrous operation at Kum Kale, on the Asiatic shore, directly south of S Beach. About 2,800 men had been landed after a preliminary bombardment by the French fleet. Before they reembarked next morning they had lost more than a quarter of their effectives. After landing they stormed the ruined castle of Kum Kale and then drove inland with the object of clearing the village of

Yeni Shehr. The Turks were in force, however, at that point and held the French midway between Kum Kale and Yeni Shehr. Finally it became apparent that further advance was impossible without reenforcements and the French intrenched for the night. All through the darkness the Turks launched a counterattack upon the landing force and morning found the French preparing to reembark. Under the guns of the French warships this was accomplished without any great further loss.

Thus of the seven landings that had been attempted by the allied forces two, that at Kum Kale and that at Y Beach, had been definitely abandoned. Of the remaining five only two had been successful in linking up—that at Beach X and that at Beach W. Farther up the Gulf of Saros, near the lines known by the name of Bulair, a force of the Royal Naval Reserve made a demonstration but did not effect a landing.

The Australians and the New Zealanders on the cliffs above Gaba Tepe were fighting desperately against the constant Turkish counterattacks, but, assisted by the fleet under Admiral Thursby, successfully resisted all attempts to drive them into the sea. Already the little cove in which the landing had been made had been christened "Anzac Cove," "Anzac," of course, was formed by taking the first letters of the official designation of the colonial forces—Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. The spirits of the men were high, despite the awful experience they had gone through, and they frequently exchanged cheery messages with the gunners of the warships who were pounding away at the Turkish positions, although not accomplishing any great damage in their blind firing.

It had been intended to organize an immediate resumption of the advance from Anzac Cove with daybreak of April 26. But the Turks were constantly bringing up reenforcements. Watchers on the warships could see them creeping over the crest of Sari Bair and although the naval guns were turned on them, their loss was comparatively small because of their open formation and their cleverness in making use of every bit of cover.

During the early morning the Anzacs had hauled heavy field guns up the face of the steep cliffs and had, in many other ways,

strengthened their positions. This was all the more necessary as it became apparent that the Turks were massing for a great attack shortly after nine o'clock. About noon the battle reached its height. The Turks attacked bravely and although they suffered great losses, never wavered. Despite their efforts, however, the Anzacs held fast. By this time reinforcements were beginning to arrive and a more permanent character was given to the trenches. An attempt was made to organize for an advance as headquarters were constantly impressing upon the individual commands the necessity of making good as much ground as possible before the Turks were able to bring into action their undoubted superiority in forces.

The constant attacks of the Turks, however, made any real attempt at advance impossible, although a little ground was gained on the 26th by counterattacks. It soon became apparent, too, that, although the operation at Anzac Cove was part and parcel of the general attack, it had, through its inability to make progress, become a separate affair and had been so conducted for the rest of the campaign—or at least until a much greater advance had been made in all quarters.

At the tip of the peninsula the chief events of the second day of the landing, April 26, 1915, occurred at V Beach, where the *River Clyde* had been run ashore. About 1,500 men were left, composed of the survivors of the Dublins and the Munsters and two companies of the Hampshires, under cover of the escarpment on the beach. There Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford rallied them on the morning of the 26th and covered by a heavy bombardment by the warships set out to clear the village. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting followed and the casualties were appalling. Most of the houses contained squads of riflemen and the more important machine guns. Each had to be carried separately. By noon, however, the town had been cleared. Captain Walford had fallen, bravely leading his troops in a way that earned him the Victoria Cross.

Colonel Doughty-Wylie called a halt and collected the survivors of the attack. Under cover of some empty houses he rallied them, re-formed them as best he could, called upon them



for one last effort and walked out into the open at the head of his troops for the assault upon the old Castle, and Hill 141.

Carrying a light cane, the figure of Colonel Doughty-Wylie was a conspicuous one. Yet he survived almost to the end and to victory. He reached the slope leading up to Hill 141, urging his men forward. He was in the lead when a bullet killed him instantly. Fired by his splendid example which earned him a posthumous Victoria Cross, the Dublins, Munsters, and Hampshires swept on and carried the summit. By two o'clock the commanding position was in the hands of the British.

At the same time the Lancashire Landing force had linked up with the landing at V Beach. Also, the French Expeditionary force, after its hard experience at Kum Kale, was successfully landed at V Beach. Additional troops were landed at S Beach to prevent the South Wales Borderers being wiped out in their isolation.

On the morning of April 27, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton looked over the positions. He found that, although he had several beaches securely in his grasp, he lacked room in which to maneuver. Also his force was beginning to suffer from lack of water. Accordingly he decided that an immediate advance was necessary.

Sir Ian Hamilton set his men the task of clearing the comparatively low ground at the tip of the peninsula—a distance of about two miles from the extreme southwestern point of the land. He drew a straight line from the position held by the South Wales Borderers near the ruined De Tott's Battery to Y Beach. After some hard fighting this was accomplished with the exception of the extreme left wing, which got only as far as Y 2 Beach, where the Turks were in force.

On the following day, April 27th, despite the fact that his forces were almost exhausted, Sir Ian Hamilton called upon them for a supreme effort. He intended, he said, to capture the Village of Krithia and, from that point, carry Achi Baba, the first main objective in the campaign to open the Narrows.

The advance was ordered for eight o'clock in the morning. The Twenty-ninth Division, under Major General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was to move on Krithia, the French force was to

move along the right flank of the Twenty-ninth to the Kereves Dere, which ran from the base of Achi Baba, and there await the capture of Krithia and the assault upon the main height.

The leading units of the Twenty-ninth Division advanced almost without opposition for a couple of miles, but was then heavily attacked by the enemy. Despite all further attempts the British troops were able to make no further advance at this point and intrenched for the night. A little to the right, other units eventually got within three-quarters of a mile of Krithia, but finally were compelled to fall back in line with the force on its left. Still farther to the right the Eighty-eighth Brigade had been brought to a halt and found itself running short of ammunition.

The Eighty-sixth Brigade, which had been held in reserve, came into action shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon. It was ordered to move through the Eighty-eighth Brigade and carry Krithia. A few units got within sight of Krithia, but the main body of the Eighty-sixth Brigade was unable to force a way beyond the line reached by the Eighty-eighth.

The French, meanwhile, were having an equally hard time. At one time they were within a mile of Krithia, but ultimately they, in company with the whole allied line, had to give way before strong Turkish counterattacks. Masses of Turkish troops advanced against the British center and right and against the whole line of the French and drove them back with the bayonet. An almost successful attempt was made to pierce the allied line at the point where the French linked up with the British. The French gave way and uncovered the right flank of the Eighty-eighth Brigade. The Fourth Worcesters suffered cruelly and had it not been for the reenforcements of the Eighty-sixth Brigade a serious situation might have ensued.

In speaking of this critical moment Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently wrote:

"The men were exhausted and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transports available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing places."

The situation was now becoming serious and it became apparent that Krithia could not be carried. Accordingly, the allied forces were ordered to dig in as rapidly as possible and hold their ground at all costs. Thus ended the Battle of the Landings, extending over three days. The results obtained fell far short of expectations. Krithia and Achi Baba had not been carried, the Australians and New Zealanders had been unable to advance along the road to Maidos and, indeed, were hanging on to a thin strip of shore by their very teeth. It became more apparent with each new attempt that the difficulties before the attackers in the Gallipoli Peninsula were far beyond anything that had been conceived.

In speaking of his failure to reach Krithia, Sir Ian Hamilton said:

"Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men, artillery and munitions during the day, April 27, Krithia should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.

"Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose."

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## CHAPTER XIV

### KRITHIA AGAIN ATTACKED—HEROIC WORK OF "ANZACS"

ON April 28, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton decided to send reinforcements in force to Anzac Cove. Despite the constant landing of fresh troops there the Australians and New Zealanders, because of their heavy losses and the increasing pressure of the Turkish attacks, had been almost continually in the firing line.



They had been able to enjoy little or no rest or sleep, and things began to look serious. Accordingly four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent to General Birdwood. On the following day two more naval battalions were landed and as well a company of the Motor Maxim Section.

These fresh units moved into the Anzac trenches and held them against renewed Turkish attacks. Meanwhile the Australian and New Zealand battalions were being reorganized behind the line and after three and a half days' rest took their places again in the front-line trenches.

From the evening of the 27th of April until May 1 there was comparative quiet on what might be called the Krithia front, at the tip of the peninsula. Fresh forces were landed by the French and the English, the latter bringing into line the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade. Heavy artillery was brought ashore and moved up to positions inland, and the whole organization of the allied force was re-formed and strengthened.

At 10 p. m. on the evening of May 1 opened what is known as the first battle of Krithia. It was elaborately organized by the German staff of the Turkish forces and took the allied troops by surprise. Indeed, the first line of the attacking force, creeping up on its hands and knees, got into the trenches of the Eighty-sixth Brigade and bayoneting most of the defenders opened up what Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently described as "an ugly gap." Thanks to the fine conduct of some territorial units, however, the Turks were not able to press home this temporary advantage and the hole was soon closed.

Along the rest of the British front the attack of the Turks was not serious. Instead they concentrated on the left of the French line, held by a Senegalese brigade. After several attacks the African troops began to give way. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the two companies of the Worcesters moved across from the British right and saved the day. Some hours later, the extreme French right was hard pressed, and it was necessary to bring up a battalion of the Royal Naval Division from the reserves to strengthen it.

The following morning, the allied troops moved out of their trenches in a counterattack. It at first met with great success. As Sir Ian Hamilton wrote in his dispatch to London: "Had it not been for those inventions of the devil—machine guns and barbed wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Baba."

By 7.30 in the morning the British left had advanced more than 500 yards, while the center and the right and the French left had also registered promising advances. The rest of the French line, however, was held up by strong Turkish forces posted along the Kereves Dere and the more advanced sections of the British left came under heavy cross-fire. In the end it was necessary to relinquish all the ground gained and to retire to the original trenches.

Although the Turks made night attacks against the French line on May 2 and 3, 1915, and in the end inflicted such heavy losses that it was necessary to shorten the line held by General d'Amade's troops, it was not until May 6, 1915, that heavy fighting occurred again along the whole line. On May 5 the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Territorial Division, which had been training in Egypt, arrived and was placed in reserve, behind the British left.

At this time it was calculated that the British total losses, killed, wounded and missing since the initial operations of the landing, had been just short of 14,000 men. This of course did not include the sick who must have numbered 10,000 or the French losses, which were not revealed. These were heavy and serious and more than counterbalanced the reinforcements that had arrived.

Sir Ian Hamilton decided to make a fresh attempt against Krithia and Achi Baba on May 6, 1915. This battle was important because it marked the turning point in the character of the campaign carried on by the allied troops in Gallipoli. Although an advance was registered none of the main positions of the Ottoman troops were carried or even reached, and it became apparent that the task of reducing the Dardanelles was not one

likely to be solved by rush frontal attacks. Rather, as in other fields of the world war, the problem became one of siege tactics, and from the date of the end of this second battle of Krithia the operations in Gallipoli resolved themselves into variations of the methods that were being forced upon the troops of all the belligerent countries in Europe.

For his grand attack upon Krithia and Achi Baba, Sir Ian Hamilton brought down from Anzac Cove the Second Australian Infantry Brigade and the New Zealand Brigade. With two brigades of the Royal Naval Reserve he formed them into a reserve division. The Twenty-ninth Division held the British line, and was ordered forward about 11 a. m. of May 6, 1915, with orders to go as far as Krithia if possible, but at all events to seize as much of the ground around that point as possible. At the same time the French corps were to attempt to wrest from the Turks the crest above the Kereves Dere.

The advance was extremely slow. At the end of two hours the Twenty-ninth Division had progressed less than three hundred yards and had not yet come into touch with any of the main Turkish positions. Three hours more of desperate fighting showed many fluctuations but no more progress. Finally they were ordered to intrench where they were for the night.

The French had succeeded in reaching the crest aimed at, but found it by no means a comfortable position. They could not go forward and they dared not go back. Yet they were subject to a raking fire that cost them hundreds of casualties. Time and time again the Senegalese troops were sent against the Turkish trenches and machine gun positions, but each time they were beaten back with cruel losses. To make matters even worse, the French could not, in the heavy fire maintained by the Turks, intrench until after nightfall, and they had to spend hours in the exposed position.

The following morning May 7, 1915, the allied warships opened a furious bombardment of the ground around Krithia. Every few feet of the difficult country was searched out by the destroying lyddite of the Allies' shells, until it seemed that not a living creature could have survived. But when the Lancashire Fusiliers



Brigade moved out to the attack a few minutes later it soon became apparent that the naval bombardment had by no means exterminated or demoralized the Turks.

The British troops were greeted by a perfect hurricane of fire from rifles and machine guns. Hundreds of the men went down and, brave as the remainder were, they were compelled to abandon the attempt to cross the open ground that lay between the British front and Krithia. Some progress was made on the right, however, where a clump of fir trees which had been holding up the advance for some time was finally carried by the Fifth Royal Scots. Early in the afternoon the Turks recaptured the firs and such of the ground they had lost and shortly after four o'clock when Sir Ian Hamilton relieved the situation, the British were in the position of being absolutely "stuck." The British commander decided to make another desperate attempt, however, and called upon the French for cooperation. The whole allied line advanced to the attack just as evening was closing in but the Turks by this time had brought up some additional batteries and poured in on the French and the British a smothering fire of deadly shrapnel. So heavy was the punishment of the French that the line literally melted away and General d'Amade was compelled to throw his last reserve into the front line. At night-fall the allied attack subsided.

During the night, word came to Sir Ian Hamilton that heavy Turkish reinforcements were on their way and he decided to make one last attempt to carry Krithia and Achi Baba before they arrived in the morning. Accordingly, the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade which had been particularly roughly handled was withdrawn from the line, and their places taken by the New Zealand Brigade. After another naval bombardment the New Zealanders were ordered forward shortly after 10 a. m. of May 8, 1915. By 1.30 they were two hundred yards closer to Krithia than any allied troops had been up to that time. There, however, they were heavily checked. Other units were unable to advance, and the French sent word that they were unable to go any farther unless the British line could move.

There was a long pause. Finally word was passed along the line that the final desperate effort was to be made—namely to carry Krithia and Achi Baba by a combined bayonet attack. Every man in the line was ordered to fix bayonets and not to stop short of the objectives. At 5.30 in the afternoon came the order to advance, after a bombardment by the fleet. Almost immediately all central control was lost, and each unit was fighting desperately for itself in the hills and gullies of that difficult, almost uncharted, country. Not for many hours afterward, indeed, in some cases not for days, was it possible to piece the story together.

The New Zealand troops got well past the Turkish machine guns without discovering them, with the consequence that their supports were mown down by a hail of fire from unexpected quarters. Nevertheless, they got within a few yards of the Turkish trenches and proceeded to dig themselves in. The Second Australian Infantry Brigade actually won about 400 yards of ground and stuck to it with a tenacity warmly praised by Sir Ian Hamilton. To the left the Eighty-seventh Brigade had suffered terribly from machine-gun fire while the French had been severely handled. The French troops were steady enough, but the Senegalese broke in. At one point General d'Amade rallied the troops in person.

Nightfall came and still Krithia and Achi Baba were far away. Thus ended the second battle of Krithia, the supreme attempt of the allied troops to carry the Turkish positions by a maneuver battle. Some little ground had been gained, but the losses had been all out of proportion to the advantage wrested from the brave and tenacious Ottoman troops. The only consolation found in the situation by the higher commands was in the assurance that the enemy had suffered equally heavy losses, but as they were largely on the defensive this statement is open to a very large measure of doubt.

While all this fighting was going on at the tip of the peninsula, the Anzacs, or that part of them left on the cliffs overlooking the cove, were having a hard time to maintain their positions. The Turks were aware of the withdrawal of the two brigades

to assist in the second battle of Krithia, and they made a heavy demonstration to prevent the departure of any further troops. To understand how vital a matter this was one has only to read the dispatches of the period. Indeed, it has often since been pointed out by military writers that, had the troops landed from first to last at Anzac Cove been available at the tip of the peninsula, Krithia and Achi Baba would undoubtedly have been carried in the early days of the fighting, thus altering the whole course of the campaign. This dispersal of forces would appear to have been one of the major blunders of the Dardanelles campaign.

For five days, beginning May 6, 1915, the Anzacs were in almost constant action. The fortunes fluctuated, gains were made by both forces, but in the end, aside from heavy losses by both, there was practically no change in the relative positions. The allied troops still held a strip of land on the top of the cliffs, of a radius of about 1,100 yards. As illustrating the intense character of the combat at this period, it was calculated that during one bombardment no less than 1,400 Turkish shells fell on this small strip of land in one hour.

It has been said that the task of the Anzacs at this period was to keep open this door to the vitals of the Turkish army and to hold as many of the Turks as possible, and thus relieve the pressure on the Krithia front. It can be said with equal force that the task of the Turks arrayed against them was to hold as many of the Anzacs on this front as possible. Judged from these angles, both Turks and Britons were successful.

In the following week both the British and the French received substantial reinforcements. On May 14 General d'Amade, in command of the French forces at the Dardanelles, was relieved by General Gouraud, who, at the age of 47, was the youngest officer of his rank in the French army. He had enjoyed conspicuous success in northern France, and had been nicknamed by his soldiers, the "Lion of the Argonne." It was believed that his experience in the country of the Argonne and the style of fighting that had developed there would make him especially



valuable to Sir Ian Hamilton, who, of course, had had no previous experience with the new style of warfare.

On May 18, 1915, began the second battle of Anzac. Elaborate preparations were made by General Liman von Sanders, the German commander in chief of the Ottoman forces. Fully 30,000 troops are said to have been gathered for the attack upon the Colonial troops. The latter were fully prepared, warned of the concentration by the observers on the warships and the aerial scouts.

About midnight of that day the attack began. After a preliminary bombardment of the British positions, successive infantry attacks in massed formation were launched against the trenches. For six hours the battle waged, but the Anzacs' positions were not shaken. In the end the ground in front of the trenches was literally covered with the dead and wounded. An actual observer wrote of the scene:

"The ground presents an extraordinary sight when viewed through the trench periscopes. Two hundred yards away, and even closer in some places, are the Turkish trenches, and between them and our lines the dead lie in hundreds. There are groups of twenty or thirty massed together, as if for mutual protection, some lying on their faces, some killed in the act of firing; others hung up in the barbed wire. In one place a small group actually reached our parapet, and now lie dead on it, shot at point-blank range or bayoneted. Hundreds of others lie just outside their own trenches, where they were caught by rifle or shrapnel when trying to regain them. Hundreds of wounded must have perished between the lines."

There was a lull after this terrible slaughter, during which the Turks made unsuccessful overtures to obtain an armistice to bury their dead. On May 20, 1915, toward evening, the Turks again attacked, concentrating on Quinn's Point, a strong Anzac redoubt at the outer edge of the Australian trenches. No results were obtained and finally, out of sheer necessity for reasons of health, an opportunity was given the Turks to bury their slain.

There was some additional fighting on this line during the remaining days of May, but nothing of real importance occurred.

It was calculated, at the end of the month, that the total British losses, killed, wounded and missing and not including sick, was just short of 40,000 men. The figures for the sick were not given out, but reports made later make it tolerably certain that they must have numbered between 30,000 and 35,000 additional. The intensity of the struggle at the Dardanelles will be realized when it is pointed out that the total British casualties in the three years of the South African War were only 38,156.

During the last two weeks of May the British and French troops on the Krithia fronts made elaborate preparations for an attack upon the Turkish lines. Miners had been brought out from England and France, and mining and sapping had been conducted on a large scale. On June 4, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton ordered the attack. It was preceded by the usual heavy naval and artillery bombardment. Finally, at noon, the mines were exploded, and the troops advanced along the whole line with fixed bayonets.

It is calculated that the British had no less than 24,000 men on a front of less than 4,000 yards. Their attack was delivered with tremendous power and was brilliantly successful. At one point, however, where the French line linked up with the British, the Turks discovered a weak spot. By noon about a third of a mile had been gained over a front of four miles, but soon afterward the French began to weaken and subsequently were compelled to retreat. This exposed the right wing of the British, which was enfiladed by the Turkish riflemen and machine gun batteries and suffered terrible losses. The Collingwood battalion of the Royal Naval Reserve, according to Sir Ian Hamilton, having gone forward in support when the right wing was hard pressed, was practically wiped out.

The attack slackened in the afternoon and nightfall found almost all the gains of the morning lost to the heavy Turkish counterattacks. So exhausted were the British and French troops that it was impossible to renew the battle on the following day.

On June 21, 1915, the French force fought probably its most successful action since the landing. About noon of that day,

the Second Division stormed two lines of Turkish trenches and captured what had been called the "Haricot" redoubt, a strong Turkish position which had twice changed hands. On the right, the First Division was unable to make corresponding progress until General Gouraud made a last inspiring appeal. Before night the whole of the Turkish first line trenches above Kereves Dere were in the hands of the French troops. The cost had been terrible, no less than 2,500 soldiers of the Republic falling in the assault. More important still, General Gouraud was so seriously injured that he had to return to France. On the way his right arm was amputated. He was succeeded in command of the French Expeditionary force by General Bailloud.

A week of comparative inaction was followed by an action on the British right, which became known as the battle of the Gully Ravine. This was a successful attempt to capture the ground originally included in Sir Ian Hamilton's instructions for the second day of the Battle of the Landings, near Beach Y, where the Turks had maintained themselves in force, on June 28, by a strong British force, including the overworked Twenty-ninth Division, which at this time had but few of the officers who commanded at the landing on April 25, 1915, the 156th Brigade of the Lowland Division, and the Indian Brigade. Several of the Turkish trenches could be easily enfiladed from the sea and H.M.S. *Talbot*, guarded by a ring of destroyers against the German submarines which had given effective evidence of their presence in the Gulf of Saros, did terrible execution and played a large part in the success of the British attack.

By nightfall, five lines of Turkish trenches along the coast had been captured, 200 prisoners had been taken and several guns and much ammunition had fallen to the British troops. The Turks made counterattacks on the two succeeding nights but never regained the ground they had lost.

While this was going on, Enver Pasha directed in person a determined attack upon the troops at Anzac Cove. On the night of June 29, 1915, after artillery preparation, two unsuccessful attempts were made by the Ottoman troops to carry the British lines.



On July 4, 1915, the Turks launched another attack, starting from the neighborhood of Achi Baba, against the whole allied front, concentrating on the point where the French and British lines joined up. They had a momentary success when they penetrated into one of the British trenches, but in the end they were driven out.

On July 12, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton ordered an attack which won about 400 yards in the direction of Achi Baba, but at heavy loss to one of the Territorial Brigades, which broke through a couple of the Turkish trench lines, but was unable to establish a connection with the French on their right. Finally some local points and a few trenches were carried, but as the Turks had something like fifty miles of trenches in Gallipoli, it became apparent that at this rate the allied troops would be wiped out long before they came within sight of the Narrows.

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## CHAPTER XV

### RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS

THE Russo-Turkish campaign which had developed in Transcaucasia, the Caucasus and Persia at the beginning of 1915, proved to be little more than a futile dissipation of energy for the best part of a year. To Russia it was more of an inconvenience than otherwise, while for the Turks it was the only point besides Egypt where their geographical position permitted them to strike a blow against the enemies of Germany. Her two nearest neighbors—Greece and Bulgaria—were both neutral at the time. The most interesting feature of this campaign is the fact that it largely influenced the allied operations at the Dardanelles.

On August, 1915, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, published the following statement in an interview which appeared in the Russian press: "When Turkey declared war Russia turned to Great Britain with a request that she would divert a portion of the Turkish troops from the

Caucasus by means of a counterdemonstration at some other point. The operations at the Dardanelles were undertaken with a double object—on the one hand, of reducing the pressure of the Turks in the Caucasus, and, on the other, of opening the straits and so making it possible for Russia to export her grain and receive foreign products of which she stands in need.”

The Turkish offensive in the Caucasus, as we found in Volume II, began in the middle of December, 1914, and reached its farthest point toward the end of the year. Although it was subsequently broken by Russia, its renewal was expected when the weather became more favorable. That it was not renewed during the summer of 1915, and that Tiflis was in consequence relieved from further menace, was due entirely to the British attack on the Dardanelles, to which all available Turkish troops were immediately dispatched. Russia had her hands full enough at the time to maintain her long front of 900 miles—from the Baltic through the Polish salient and through the Carpathian line of Galicia. She could therefore ill afford to spare any considerable part of her forces for an extended Transcaucasian campaign.

Turkey's first plan of action in the Great War appears to have been an attempt to recover Ardahan and Kars, both of which places, as well as Batum, had been taken from Turkey and handed over to Russia by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. To forestall any such aspirations Russian troops had entered Asia Minor on November 4, 1914, and advanced for seventeen miles along the road to Erzerum in Armenia, and on November 8 they successfully resisted an attack by the Turks, armed with heavy German artillery, at Kuprikeui, from which place several mountain paths lead to Erzerum. Further attacks had also been made by the Turks during the rest of the month and in December likewise in the Euphrates Valley without any notable result, until they had reached Ardahan and Sarikamish in an attempt to regain Kars.

In a three days' battle with the Russians, January 1-4, 1915, they were driven back with enormous losses, the whole of one Turkish army corps (the Ninth) surrendering. (See Volume II,

Turkey in the War.) The Turks did not get within thirty miles of Kars. In numerical strength the Turks were estimated at three to one against the Russians. Fighting in the deep snow at altitudes of 8,000 to 10,000 feet in a severe winter is an enormously difficult undertaking for the attacking side, and it is evident that the Turkish forces suffered terrible hardships in their attempt to retain a footing on Russian territory.

At the end of January and the beginning of February furious fighting raged in the neighborhood of Sarikamish, when the Russians inflicted another defeat on the Turks. During a blinding snowstorm the former had crossed a mountain and, after heavy fighting, captured the commanding general and the staff of the Thirtieth Turkish Division and a large quantity of war material. The roaring of the wind was so great that the Russian approach could not be heard, while the thickly blowing snow rendered the troops invisible.

At the same time the Russian squadron bombarded the Turkish barracks at Trebizond and Rizah from the Black Sea, also sinking some Turkish sailing vessels used as transports. Under the superintendence of German engineers the Turks hurriedly set about constructing a branch railroad from Angora to Sivas, Asia Minor, intended to replace the Trebizond water route as a line of communication for the Turkish troops on the Caucasus front. Meanwhile another Russian column pushed out from Julfa along the Tabriz road to force battle upon the Turkish army invading the Persian province of Azerbaijan. The Turks advanced northward from Tabriz to Marand, where a stubborn battle was fought. They were commanded by Djevet Pasha, who was considered one of their best tacticians and most aggressive fighters, but after a series of unsuccessful frontal onslaughts his army broke in disorder, abandoning cannon, colors (standards), and all their dead and wounded. To the Russians the victory was more of political than military value, for it dealt a severe blow at Turkish and German influence in Persia.

On February 8, 1915, the Turkish cruiser *Midirli* (formerly the German warship *Breslau*) fired upon the Russian port of Jalta on the Crimean Peninsula, opposite Balaklava. The Rus-



sian fleet retaliated by again bombarding Trebizond on the other side of the Black Sea.

About February 20-21, 1915, several small engagements were fought in the vicinity of Chorokh, as a result of which the Turks were driven beyond the river.

On February 22, 1915, news came from Petrograd to the effect that the Turks had indulged in cruel atrocities during their occupation of Ardanuten in Transcaucasia, near the Armenian frontier. The Tiflis correspondent of the "Russkoye Slovo" (the "Russian Word") stated that at first the Turks confined themselves to pillage and killed only fifteen civilians, but that after December 30, 1914, when news of the Russian occupation of Ardahan was received, the local Mussulmans had organized a systematic massacre. A hundred and fifty Armenians were led out into the streets and killed.

Fifty Armenians were removed from prisons, stripped naked, and compelled to leap into the abyss of Jenemdere, the "Devil's Gap," until one victim carried a Turk with him, when the remainder were shot. At Tamvot 250 Armenians were massacred and the women carried into captivity. The Turks did not permit the burial of the corpses, which were left to be devoured by dogs till the arrival of the Russians. Again, it was reported from Urumiah, northwestern Persia, that prior to the evacuation of towns between Julfa and Tabriz the Turks and Kurds, who were retiring before the Russian advance, plundered and burned the villages and put to death some of the inhabitants. At Salnac, Pagaduk, and Sarna orders were said to have been given by the Turkish commissioner for the destruction of the towns. All the Armenian inhabitants of Antvat were collected and, according to this message, 600 males were put to death, and the women, after being compelled to embrace the Islamic faith, were divided into parties and sent to various interior towns.

On March 19, 1915, the Armenian Red Cross fund in London issued some details supplied by an Armenian doctor named Derderian, who testified that the whole plain of Alashgerd was virtually covered with the bodies of men, women, and children. When the Russian forces had retreated from this district the

Kurds fell upon the helpless people and shut them up in mosques. The men were killed and the women were carried away to the mountains. The Armenian Red Cross fund stated that there were 120,000 destitute Armenians in the Caucasus at that time.

As war in itself is not far removed from being a wholesale, organized atrocity on a large scale, it is always advisable to accept such accusations with extreme reserve and to consider the probability of their having been perpetrated. In the case of Turk and Kurd *versus* Armenian, however—and unfortunately—there is little reason to doubt even the most gruesome stories that could possibly be written. It is a feud as old as the hills, and no historic battle field of the world was ever so liberally drenched with human blood as the soil of Armenia.

Having expelled the Turks from the Transcaucasian region toward the end of February, 1915, the Russians again moved forward on the Asiatic front, sweeping aside, destroying and capturing detachments of Turks that opposed their advance.

By March 1, 1915, the Russians were approaching Oltichai along one of the main highroads toward Erzerum from the west. Another column advancing from the east encountered some Turks in the mountain passes south of Alashkort. These they defeated, capturing two guns. On February 28, 1915, the Russian troops operating in the coast region occupied the port of Khopa on the Black Sea, eighteen miles southwest of Batum. This port was of great military value to the Turks.

On March 3, 1915, the Russian Army of the Caucasus, driving the Turkish forces before it, had reached the River Khopachas, the estuary of the Chorokh in Armenia. This move severed the route of Turkish reenforcements and supplies from Constantinople to the Caucasian frontier through Khlopa, Turkish Armenia, thereby isolating a big portion of Turkish territory. From Batum Russian troops advanced near the Turkish border, the Turks opposing them step by step. Russian warships from the Black Sea sprayed their shells over the shore and cleared a fifteen-mile strip of coast of Turkish barracks and troops, successively cutting off several lines of their communications by sea until, after a three days' battle, the last route was effectively

closed. A number of Turkish coasting vessels, laden with ammunition and supplies, were also sunk.

According to an official Russian report issued on March 3, 1915, the number of Turkish prisoners who had passed through Pyatigorsk on their way to the interior of Russia (since Turkey entered the war) up to February 13, 1915, amounted to 527 officers and 49,000 men.

During February, 1915, the Turks had been nibbling at Egypt through the Sinai Peninsula. On the 25th of that month the allied squadrons had begun heavy firing on the Dardanelles. This decided the supreme Turkish war council early in March to recall most of the troops from Egypt and the Caucasus to defend the straits. By March 16, 1915, the Turks had lost so many important points in the Chorokh region that they completely abandoned to the Russians what positions they still held on the river.

On March 20, 1915, Petrograd announced that the Russian advance to the sea had deprived the enemy of all means of operating in the Transchorokh region or of transporting troops and munitions to Erzerum, and that the Turks had been put to flight near Olti. The road between Archava and Khopa, to the eastward, was strongly defended by the Turks in a series of stubbornly contested battles. The Russian advance created a panic throughout the Chorokh Valley; the inhabitants fled to the mountains, abandoning farms and villages. The mountain heights in the district of Ardanuch, however, were strongly fortified and still in Turkish possession. These fortifications had been built under German supervision, and the defense thereof was conducted by a German officer.

Hostilities were resumed in Persia during the last week in March, 1915, and on the 25th the Russians defeated the Turks in a violent, sanguinary battle at Atkudur, north of Bilman in northwestern Persia. The Turks were stated to have lost 12,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, as well as many guns. Preceding the Russian occupation of Salmac Plains in Azerbaijan province, northwest of Urumiah, hundreds of native Christians were rounded up by the Turks in the village of Haftdewan and massacred. Many of them were dragged out from the homes of



friendly Mohammedans, who tried to hide them. The Russians on entering the village found 720 bodies, mostly naked and mutilated. The recovery of bodies from wells, pools, and ditches, and their interment kept 300 men busy for three days. The wailing of women intensified the horror of the scene. Surviving widows who were able to identify the bodies of their husbands insisted upon digging graves and burying the bodies. "Some of the victims had been shot. In other cases they were bound to ladders, and their heads, protruding through, were hacked off. Eyes were gouged out and limbs chopped off."

Messages from Urumiah confirmed earlier reports that more than 800 persons had already been killed in the neighborhood, and that more than 2,000 had died of disease.

A dispatch from Tiflis, Transcaucasia, dated April 24, 1915, stated that refugees who had reached the Russian line reported that the massacre of Armenians was being continued on an even greater scale. All the inhabitants of ten villages near Van were stated to have been killed. On being advised of massacres at Erzerum, Berjan, and Zeitun, and of the conditions at Van, the Katolikos, head of the Armenian Church at Etchmiadzin, near Erivan, cabled to President Wilson an appeal to the people of the United States to act on behalf of the Armenians.

The village governments or relief committees had managed to issue eight pounds of flour to each refugee in six weeks. A journey through Salmac three weeks after the outrages revealed unmistakable signs of the slaughter. Pools of blood still marked the "execution" places in Haftdewan. The caps of thirty-six victims lay where a mud wall had been toppled over them. A young Armenian named Hackatur related the story of his escape from a well in which the bodies of the dead had been crammed. He had fallen with the others and was flung into the well, but he managed to wriggle through the bodies lying on top of him, and escaped at nightfall.

At the end of April, 1915, after a slight lull, fresh activity broke out again in various regions of the Caucasian front. The campaign had almost come to a standstill owing to typhus. On the average, 150 men succumbed daily. The epidemic raged for

a while under indescribably awful conditions. Every available doctor was hurried out, and several of them died of the disease. The Russians had cleared the Kurds out of the Alashkart valley and were now pushing forward in the direction of Olti. The fight for the valley centered on the possession of Klichgjaduk Pass, which would have been extremely useful to the Turks could they have held it securely for a few days to enable them to complete a junction with their separated forces. The Russians "lay low" in strongly protected positions. The Turks came on, first obviously for reconnaissance, and were easily repulsed without the Russians making much display of force. Whatever may be said of the Turkish soldier, he is at all times a brave and self-reliant fighter. They advanced to make the real attack, supported by some mountain guns. But the Russian artillery continued to lie silent, and the Turkish attack developed with misplaced confidence and swept boldly up to the line of the Russian wire entanglements. Only sixty yards separated the combatants when, suddenly, a perfect tornado of fire rattled out from the Russian intrenchments. Maxims, mountain guns and rifles poured a deadly shower of shells and bullets into the closely packed thousands of Turks. With extraordinary courage the Osmanli still rushed into the trap, uttering fierce shouts of "Allahoo Akbar!" The Russians then broke from cover and some terrible bayonet work completed the task of securing the pass for the Russians.

By May 10, 1915, the Turks had been driven back to the southwest, leaving a large quantity of tents and munitions behind them. Farther south, from Sarikamish, a number of insignificant conflicts were kept up. Turkish stragglers formed partnerships with local professionals and organized companies of banditti; the Russians were kept busy clearing out the villages where these bands had established their headquarters, driving them into the hills. To the southeast, the pursuit of Halil Bey's defeated army continued during the first week in May. The battle had begun at Hantahta, near Urumiah, on April 29, 1915. Both sides lost heavily. In the beginning the Russians had held the Turks at bay, but the latter received re-

enforcements and on April 30, 1915, the Russians had to withdraw from Dilman. They intrenched themselves at Magonzhio, the first village on the way to Khori, whence they battered the Turks with their heavy artillery until the arrival of Russian reinforcements.

On May 14, 1915, it was announced from Washington that replies were being prepared at the State Department to a flood of communications from various parts of the country urging that steps be taken to protect Christians in Armenia and other regions under Turkish control. Assurance was given that the Department was doing all in its power to aid the Armenians. Mr. Morgenthau, our Ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed to make representations to the Turkish Government. It was at his request that Turkish regular troops were sent to Urumiah, Persia, to keep order.

The Russian consul at that place reported on May 15, 1915, that 6,000 Armenians had been massacred at Van, which has been the scene of so many similar outrages during the last twenty years. On May 23, 1915, a detachment of Russian soldiers occupied the town of Van, in Asiatic Turkey, thus bringing the eagerly expected relief to the Armenians, who were besieged by the Turks—besieged in their own country by their own countrymen. Upon the arrival of the Russians the Turks retreated in the direction of Bitlis.

The Russian successes in the Van region included the occupation of Baslan; in the capture of Van itself they took twenty-six guns, a great quantity of war materials and provisions, as well as the Government Treasury. A considerable part of the town was destroyed by fire. All the foreigners residing there were reported as safe. By June 6, 1915, the Russians had the whole Van region and part of the Sanjak of Mush in their hands. They had practically annihilated Halil Bey's original corps and cleared the Turkish troops out for many miles around. A Turkish offensive in the Province of Azerbaijan ended in a complete breakdown. On their right wing the Russians occupied Turkish territory between the old frontier and the line of the rivers Chorokh and Tortun and the mountain range of



Tchakhir Baba. A violent counterattack made by the Turks at Zinatcher was repulsed. In the course of an engagement in the valley of Oltichai 200 Cossacks charged on horseback to the trenches, where they dismounted. Leaving their well-trained horses to look after themselves, the Cossacks dashed into the Turks and put them to the sword. Two days later a Turkish official report from Constantinople via wireless to Berlin and London very briefly announced: "On the Caucasian front we occupied enemy positions in the district of Olti, on the Russian border of Transcaucasia."

The operations in the Dardanelles apparently had but little effect on Turkish activity in the Caucasus, for by June 19, 1915, they had replaced the Ninth Army Corps which had been captured by the Russians at Sarikamish, and had also restored and supplied with ammunition the Tenth and Eleventh Corps, which were seriously reduced in numbers by fighting and disease. The main Turkish concentration was taking place about this time against Olti, Melo, and Kiskin, outside of which line the First and Sixth Corps and the remainder of Halil Bey's army were drawn up. Here the Turks undertook some cautious offensive maneuvers, besides attempting to prevent the Russians from outflanking Erzerum. Some of the Kurdish leaders who were responsible for the Armenian massacres in the Van district voluntarily surrendered to the Russians and were deported to the interior with their dependents.

On June 20, 1915, in a battle near Olti, fifty-five miles west of Kars, 200 Russians were killed and prisoners and war materials were taken. By June 24, 1915, the Russians had occupied Gob, a town twenty-five miles north of Lake Van. A general movement of Russian troops toward Bitlis, where the armies of two Turkish commanders were concentrated, pointed to a favorable situation in the Caucasus from the Russian standpoint. Gob and Bitlis are connected by several comparatively good roads. But matters now began to quiet down somewhat—activities on both sides decreased. Russian sentiment had grown strong in North and Central Persia, a fact accentuated by the spirit displayed among the Moslem sects. Various isolated

mountain tribes met the Russians with declarations of allegiance—obviously the safest policy to adopt with a powerful conqueror. Disease and famine stalked through the smoldering district of Van; only one doctor was available for 40,000 people—a large number of them in dire need of medical assistance.

In the first week of July, 1915, lively fighting was reported to have occurred north and south of Lake Van and south of Olti. A Turk force of 30,000 men, concentrated to the east of Bitlis, were being hard pressed by the Russians. Organized massacre of Armenians in Bitlis was regarded as an indication that the Turks intended to retreat from that point. They had also distributed 40,000 rifles among Kurds in the Mush Valley for use against Armenians.

Up to July 6, 1915, there had been only an artillery duel in the coast region, and a Russian motor boat sank a Turkish sailing vessel. South of the Kara Dag range a Russian detachment encountered a regiment of Turkish infantry with artillery, machine guns, and two squadrons of cavalry. The Turks were again reported as coming off second best with considerable damage inflicted upon them. A Turkish offensive west of Ahlavat also failed.

After the Russians penetrated to Mush (eighty-three miles south of Erzerum), and Plian, Halil Bey, commander of the Turkish forces in the Caucasus, reorganized his army, bringing its strength up to 90,000, including six divisions of infantry, one of cavalry, and a large body of Kurds. General Eudenitch, the Russian commander, thus found himself confronted with the alternative of hastily attempting to concentrate his forces in the face of a strong Turkish army, or to retreat and thus expose a large Armenian population to Turk and Kurdish revenge. The main Russian army withdrew along the right bank of the Euphrates, the Turks occupying the left bank, July 22-25, 1915, being held in partial check by rear-guard actions.

On August 1, 1915, Halil Bey's forces came into contact with a considerable body of Russians at Palantchen, on the left bank of the Euphrates, twelve miles southwest of Kara Kilissa. The Russians had taken positions on a line extending from the north-

east to the southwest from Darabi, six miles north of Kara Kilissa, to Djamschato, six miles southwest of the important Akhtunski Pass, covering the roads to Erivan, in Transcaucasia. In opposing this front the Turks exposed their communications, then 150 miles long, to attack from the direction of Sarikamish. The violent and picturesque fighting that developed during the first week of August will be described in the next volume.

The Turkish and Persian borders had meanwhile settled down to comparative quiet. Up to this stage the Russian commander had made no attempt to advance to Erzerum, though there were strong grounds for belief that the defenses of that fortress were by no means so strong as had been supposed or represented.

Russia was waiting her time in this theatre of war: her object was merely to hold the gate. She had just suffered severe reverses in Galicia and the Carpathians, and was now fighting desperately to avoid the great enveloping movement engineered by all the skill and weight of Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen on her own territory of Poland and Russia itself.



## PART III—THE WAR IN AFRICA

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### CHAPTER XVI

#### THE CAMEROONS

THE war in Africa smoldered and flamed during the second period from February to August, 1915. The fight for the colonial possessions became a struggle for existence.

During the spring of 1915 the fighting in the Cameroons was generally favorable to the allied arms. In April the advance of the French and British troops forced the Germans to transfer their seat of Government from Buëa to Yaunde. In this month, Colonel Mayer's French column succeeded in pushing its way over the River Kele, while about the same time a British detachment seized a bridge across Ngwa.

On May 11, 1915, the station of Escha was taken. The Germans who occupied a strong position at Njoke were driven out, and the place was occupied by the British on May 29, 1915.

In the hinterland, along the Sanga River, the French columns had met with continued success in harrying and driving out the enemy. The Germans displayed great bravery, and offered stubborn resistance, but were forced to fall back on fortified Monso. Here they held out for some days, when they were forced to capitulate, and considerable stores of guns and ammunition fell to the victors.

The French troops continued their successful drive by taking Assobam and Besam on June 25, 1915, and then occupied the important post of Lomji, in the capture of which, the Belgian soldiers furnished invaluable assistance, proving themselves to be skillful and fearless fighters.

What especially contributed to make the Allies' successes easier in this section of the war area was the revolt of the natives against their German masters. The Germans during their retreat had burned villages and destroyed a vast amount of property which so enraged the natives that many deserted. Having a perfect knowledge of the country it was easy for them to escape capture. It was stated that many hung around the German flanks and took revenge on their former masters by hindering their retreat and by occasionally sniping the German officers.

The natives of the Cameroons were not generally trusted by the Germans, and were forbidden to fish in the streams of the country, lest they should furnish information to the enemy.

Countercharges of British cruelty were brought at this time by certain German missionaries of the Basle Mission, on the Sanga River. It was claimed that British troops promised to reward natives for delivering Germans into their hands, and for killing them. A number of Germans, it was stated, had been cut to pieces, while others had been tortured and delivered to the British. It was charged against the French military authorities that German prisoners had been deported to French Dahomey where they were forced to labor under black overseers. These charges were denied by the accused in each instance.

During April and May, 1915, there was sharp fighting on the Nigeria frontier. The large native town of Gurin, just inside British territory, was attacked by a German force from Garua in April. The contingent numbered sixteen Europeans, and about 350 natives. It was equipped with some large guns and Maxims. For the defense of the town there was only a small garrison of forty native troops commanded by Lieutenant Pawle. For seven hours the garrison held off the enemy, when he was forced to retire. During the struggle Lieutenant Pawle, the gallant commander of the garrison, was killed. The news of this engagement was carried by native soldiers who escaped from Gurin, to Colonel F. G. Cunliffe at Yola, who immediately

set off with a detachment of the African Frontier Force, arriving on the scene of the siege the day following. After being joined by a body of French troops, he moved on to capture Garua where the British had met with disastrous defeat in August, 1914.

Since that time the four forts of the town had been greatly strengthened and every preparation was now made for a stout resistance. The British and French having intrenched themselves, the British guns began a vigorous bombardment of the forts. During the night sapping and mining went on steadily, enabling the British to move their trenches gradually nearer their objective.

The siege lasted from May 31 to June 10, 1915, when the forts surrendered. The allied troops entered Garua on June 11, taking over thirty-seven German, and 270 native prisoners, while great quantities of arms, ammunition and stores became their prizes. It was said that the garrisons of the forts might have held out much longer if they had not lost their nerve and become panic-stricken, which caused many desertions. It was a remarkable feature of this spirited struggle that the Allies did not lose a man.

Leaving Garua, the British and French troops now moved on Ngaundere, capital of the Adamawa District, which was taken with insignificant losses to the Allies on July 29, 1915. The retiring Germans were closely pursued to Tangere, which stands on a plateau nearly 4,000 feet high. This place was captured by the allied forces July 12, and attempts made by the Germans to regain it eleven days later were repulsed.

Early in August, 1915, the British captured Gaschaka and Koncha, when the heavy rains suspended for the time any further military operations. Meanwhile the French force had been working its way toward Yaunde, occupying the station of Dume on the way. The arrival of French troops at this town seems to have surprised and dismayed the Germans, who hastily abandoned several fortified places and destroyed their transport. They continued, however, to hold the hill above Dume for some time, but were driven out by a French detachment after



a short struggle. From Dume a French column was dispatched against Abong-Mbong.

At the beginning of the fall of 1915, the Germans still held Yaunde, and a district in the center of the country, but the Cameroons could no longer be considered a German possession.

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## CHAPTER XVII

### BRITISH CONQUEST OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA

OUR attention is now drawn to Southwest Africa. In the first week of February, 1915, the Germans made a determined effort to break through the encircling armies that were closing in on them. Kakamas on the Orange, where a British garrison was stationed to protect Schuit Drift, was fiercely attacked on February 5 by about 600 Germans, well equipped with Maxims and machine guns. They were beaten off after a short engagement with a loss of nine men killed, twenty-two wounded, and fifteen taken prisoners. On the Union side the casualties were one killed, and two wounded.

On February 22, 1915, General Botha's army being ready, he moved out of Swakopmund, and on the following day occupied the stations of Nonidas and Goanikontes, meeting with only slight resistance. Nearly a month was now spent in preparing for the advance on the capital, Windhoek. Careful reconnoitering of the enemy's positions was made, and an advanced base was established.

On the night of March 19, 1915, two mounted brigades left the post at Husab to clear the railway line. General Botha accompanied the first brigade, which was commanded by Colonel Brits, their object being Riet, an important place south of the railway, where it was known that the enemy was strongly prepared. Riet was of utmost importance to the Union force for it commanded the highway to Windhoek. It was planned that

while Colonel Brits's brigade attacked Riet the Bloemhof Commando was to execute a flank movement and seizing Schwarze Kopje to endeavor to cut off the enemy's retreat.

At daybreak on March 20, 1915, the brigade reached the German position. The right rested on the Swakop stream; the left on the foothills of Langer Heinrichberg, while the artillery was effectively placed so as to command the river and highway. Assisted by the guns of the Transvaal Horse Artillery a frontal attack was made, and the fighting became general. With varying fortunes it continued until the evening when the Germans were finally driven out and dispersed.

The second brigade commanded by Colonel Celliers had been directed to cut the railway line between Jakalswater and Sphinx. He was to attack the former place after blocking the way, in case any reinforcements should be sent by the enemy from Windhoek. Celliers succeeded in cutting the railway and seized a train containing supplies for the Germans, but his attack on Jakalswater was a failure, and the enemy made forty-three of his men prisoners.

General Botha was so confident of the ultimate success of his campaign, that he was not disposed to imperil his chances by any hasty operations, and so his progress toward Windhoek was at first necessarily slow. The nature of the country afforded the enemy many natural advantages and unfortunately the Union forces were not provided with aeroplanes, which would have proved invaluable in scouting.

Pforto, a station on the line where the Germans occupied a strong position, was surrounded by a column led by Colonel Alberts. The enemy had two large guns and a number of Maxims. A charge by the Union force and the effective work of their battery soon silenced the enemy's artillery. The Germans had lost twenty killed, of whom three were officers, when they surrendered unconditionally. There were 210 prisoners taken, four guns and a large quantity of ammunition.

General Botha was engaged in April and May, 1915, clearing the railway system of the enemy. To prevent any flank attacks it was necessary to hold the two main lines, which run from

Swakopmund north to Grootfontein, Tsumeb, and to Windhoek. This line being cleared for fifty miles, Colonel Skinner and the Kimberley Regiment were stationed at Trekopje, which became the Union railhead.

On April 26, 1915, about 700 Germans and a dozen guns vigorously assailed this encampment and for four hours the fight raged with varying consequences. The Germans under a withering fire from their batteries tried to surround the Union trenches to enfilade them, but were forced to retire, when they had got within 150 feet of their objective, leaving twenty-five killed and wounded behind them. The Union force lost eleven men, of whom three were officers, and forty wounded.

Meanwhile, the southern army was actively engaged. Sir Duncan Mackenzie's column had dispersed the Germans and taken some booty from one or two places near Luderitz Bay, and had seized many miles of railway. On February 22, 1915, his advance guard occupied Garub, a station seventy miles inland. Here a company of Union scouts pushed after the retiring Germans, and in a skirmish with mounted men protecting a troop train their leader was wounded. They were forced to retire, leaving one of their comrades a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. The British camp at Garub was also attacked by a hostile aeroplane which dropped hand grenades and shells, but there were no casualties.

Aus, an important station fifteen miles from Garub, was next occupied by Mackenzie. The place was evacuated without a struggle, but it showed that much work had been done to fortify it, and that the enemy had intended to resist. Owing to the rapid movements of the British force the Germans had abandoned everything, though several mines exploded when the town was occupied.

Turning now to the movements of General Smut's army in the south. Colonel Van der Venter, who commanded an important section of the army, crossed the Orange River and occupied a group of stations, including Nabas, Velloor, Ukamas, Jerusalem, and Heirachabis.



On the last day of March, 1915, Van der Venter's force was engaged in several skirmishes in which one man was killed and two wounded, while six of the enemy were killed and twenty-eight taken prisoners. At this price the stations of Platbeen and Geitsaud which yielded a great quantity of supplies and horses and live-stock were occupied.

On April 30, 1915, Van der Venter occupied Warmbad, the railway terminus, without opposition and pushing forward along the line his men entered Kabus, a station sixty-five miles to the north, two days later.

General Smut met Van der Venter at Kalkfontein on April 11, 1915, where plans were laid to drive the Germans from Karas Mountains where they occupied some strong positions. The enemy was attacked in three columns, advancing from different points. Finding themselves threatened on all sides, the Germans made no resistance and abandoned everything.

On April 17, 1915, Van der Venter entered Seeheim, the Germans fleeing in such hot haste that they could not stop to destroy the bridge over the Great Fish River. Colonel Berrange's force which had set out from Kimberley was now in touch with Van der Venter's column. At Hasnur near Rietfontein, Berrange took an intrenched position with slight losses and after frequent skirmishes and hard fighting joined Van der Venter's forces near Keetmanshoop, which surrendered to the combined forces April 20, 1915.

Sir Duncan Mackenzie's column left at Aus now struck out to the northeast with his mounted men and occupied the towns of Bethany and Berseba without meeting resistance and April 24, 1915, reached Aritetis on the railway, seventy miles north of Keetmanshoop, General Mackenzie could now act in conjunction with Van der Venter against the Germans retreating from Seeheim and Keetmanshoop. At Kabus, twenty miles north, in an indecisive engagement with the enemy, the Union forces lost twenty-two men taken prisoners, while the Germans numbering about 600, continued their retreat, their objective being Gibeon, where they hoped to entrain for the capital, Windhoek. General Mackenzie therefore sent a small party to destroy the railway

to the north of Gibeon, while the Ninth Brigade was to engage the enemy. This body was defeated by the Germans with severe loss. They took some seventy prisoners and forced the Ninth Brigade to fall back on the main body.

On the morning of April 28, 1915, Mackenzie led his whole force against the Germans in a dashing attack that drove them from the field, and his cavalry continued to pursue them over twenty miles of country. The rocky and irregular character of the ground in this neighborhood made it difficult for cavalry operations, and the Germans made good their escape. The British lost three officers and twenty men killed; the wounded numbered fifty-five, of whom eight were officers. Among the killed was Major J. H. Watt of the Natal Light Horse. The British captured from the enemy seven officers, and about 200 men. They also released seventy of their own soldiers who had been made prisoners by the Germans on the previous day.

The booty that fell to the victors included field guns and Maxims, transport wagons, and large numbers of live stock. It was at Gibeon, where this battle was fought, that Sir George Farrar was killed in a railroad accident on May 18, 1915. His important services in the Commissariat Department during the invasion of the colony had contributed to making the successes of the Union forces possible. His career had been full of adventure. He was sentenced to death for the part he had taken in the Jamieson raid, and had fought against the Boers in 1899-02.

While General Mackenzie was successfully operating around Gibeon, General Botha's troops were active in the north; but nothing of importance occurred until May 1, 1915, when Kubas was hurriedly evacuated by the Germans and occupied by General Brits. Here, it was discovered that the Germans had made elaborate preparations for resistance, but—became panic-stricken by the sudden and unexpected arrival of Union forces. Miles of intrenchments surrounded the place, and a hundred contact mines were discovered and removed. From this point Colonel Brits continued his advance, and encountered the enemy at Otyimbigue, sixty-one miles from the capital of Windhoek.

After a spirited skirmish the place was taken, the Germans losing twenty-eight men as prisoners. Continuing their victorious advance the Union forces captured Karibib, an important railroad junction, and Johann Albrechtshöhe and Wilhelmstal were next occupied.

With General Botha threatening the capital from the west, and all the colony south of Gibeon in British hands, the greatest difficulties in the way of the invaders had been successfully overcome, and the end seemed to be near.

On May 10, 1915, General Botha was informed that Windhoek, the capital, was prepared to surrender. He set out at once for the town in a motor car accompanied by a small escort, and arranged with the Burgomaster of Windhoek the terms of capitulation.

On May 12, 1915, General Myburgh and a detachment of Union forces entered the town which contained at the time about 3,000 Europeans and some 12,000 natives.

Before the courthouse, in the presence of the town officials, and Union officers and men, a proclamation by General Botha in Dutch, English, and German was read, which placed the conquered districts under martial law, and which further expressed the hope that there would be no attempts to resist the Union forces as they must prove futile. The great wireless station at the capital, which kept the colony in touch with Berlin, was found to be uninjured, and with its capture the Germans lost their last wireless station outside of Europe. Thousands of cases of ammunition and parts of guns were among the prizes taken, while on the railway a number of locomotives and quantities of rolling stock were seized.

It now became the immediate business of General Botha's army to deal with those German straggling forces which remained still under arms in the north. In a few days following the occupation of the capital, Colonel Mentz found part of the enemy at Seeis, and without losing a man took 252 prisoners and a great quantity of booty. General Botha meanwhile occupied Omaruru, a station on the railway, and in the same week took possession of Kalkfield which was strongly intrenched, but which



the Germans were compelled to abandon owing to Botha's adroit flanking movements. The Germans declining to make a stand, Botha's army swept victoriously onward.

In the last week in June, 1915, all the districts around Waterberg were cleared of the enemy. Leaving Okaputu in the evening of June 30, 1915, General Manie Botha with the Fifth Brigade got in touch with the Germans at dawn the next day near Osib, after a forced march of forty-two miles in sixteen hours. The Germans were driven off, and before nightfall Otavi was occupied. Here a good supply of water was found and as the country around is arid and like a desert, the loss of the town was a serious one to the enemy.

General Lukin with another brigade had set out from Omarasa at the same time as Manie Botha, and between them came General Botha and the Headquarters Staff.

The fight at Otavi was the last stand of importance made by the Germans. They had shown great bravery, but supplies were failing, they had been driven into the most inhospitable part of the colony, the natives were not always friendly, and during the first days of July, 1915, they made preparations to surrender.

The Union troops under General Myburgh, having left the railway, encountered a body of Germans sixteen miles south of Tsumeb and in the skirmish that followed lost one man and took eighty-six prisoners.

At Tsumeb, which Myburgh entered on July 8, 1915, some 600 more prisoners were taken, while he was able to release a number of Union comrades who had been left behind by the Germans in their hurried retreat. Colonel Brits had by this time reached the German port of Namutoni, where he took 150 prisoners, and released some Union captives, the last that remained in German hands.

Dr. Seitz, the Governor of German Southwest Africa, now opened communications with General Botha concerning a surrender, and received the Union officer's terms in the form of an ultimatum. Botha stated that he and his troops stood ready to fight, if need be, another battle, but his terms were accepted before the time limit he had fixed expired.



# CONQUEST OF GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA BY UNION TROOPS UNDER GENERAL BOTHA

At two o'clock in the morning of July 9, 1915, at a spot called Kilometre 500, General Botha, Dr. Seitz the Governor, and Colonel Francke, commander of the German troops in Southwest Africa, signed the terms of capitulation. All the Germans surrendered unconditionally. Officers were released on parole, and were free to live where they pleased in the country. The regular troops were permitted to retain their rifles, but no ammunition, and were interned for the remainder of the war in charge of one of their officers. The Landwehr and Landsturm of the reserve forces were permitted to retain their horses, but no arms, and were released on parole, and could return to their homes.

The formal surrender of the prisoners was held at Otavi, July 11, 1915, where General Lukin who was in charge of the details took over 204 officers, and 3,293 of other ranks; thirty-seven field guns and twenty-two machine guns. By the conquest of German Southwest Africa 322,450 square miles of territory, 113,670 more miles than all Germany, came under the British flag.

The suppression of the rebellion at home, and the invasion and conquest of this large territory had been accomplished by the Union forces with comparatively small loss of life considering the great number of engagements that were fought in a most difficult country for military operations. The best estimate gives 1,612 for both campaigns. The killed numbered 406, of whom ninety-six were killed in action by the Germans and ninety-eight by the rebels, fifty-eight died of wounds, and 153 by disease, accident, and other causes, and 606 were taken prisoners. The losses to the rebels were 190 killed and between 300 and 350 wounded. The Germans lost 103 killed, and 195 wounded. Before the surrender the Union forces held 890 German prisoners in Southwest Africa.

While it is true that the Union troops greatly outnumbered the Germans, General Botha's conquest of the colony was none the less a brilliant military achievement. The most dangerous foe that the Union soldiers encountered was not the Germans, but the deadly climate; the stretches of burning desert veld from



eighty to a hundred miles wide, that had to be crossed in a heat that rose at times to 120° Fahrenheit in the shadow of the tents. All the supplies, the provisions for the men, and much of the water for their consumption had to be brought from Cape Town. The care taken in the commissariat department, and especially in the water supply, in a country where the enemy had polluted the wells, accounted for the general good health of the invading army. That 30,000 men should have been able to fight in such a difficult country for five months at a cost of less than 2,000 casualties was an experience rare in military annals, and reflects lasting credit on General Botha who planned the entire invasion.

The Germans, outmatched and outnumbered, avoided engagements whenever possible, but offered a stubborn resistance and fought with great bravery when there was no alternative. Once the Union forces were ready to advance, their rapid movements and forced marches took the Germans by surprise in the midst of their preparations, and baffled and bewildered them. Cut off entirely from help from the outside, and running short of ammunition which could not be replaced, their struggle could only result in one conclusion.

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## CHAPTER XVIII

### OTHER AFRICAN OPERATIONS

THE fighting along the African coast during this period was minor but picturesque. On February 26, 1915, the British military authorities announced that the coast of German East Africa would be blockaded on February 28, four days being allowed for the departure of neutral vessels. Some minor successes, chiefly naval, were obtained by the British during the month of March, when they occupied Shirati on Lake Victoria Nyanza and established there a base for armed steamers.

It was here on March 6, 1915, that the *Muanza*, the only

German armed steamer that remained on the lake, was destroyed by the British steamer *Winifred*.

In April, 1915, Major General Tighe, who had won distinction in the Indian Service, was appointed to command the British troops in German East Africa. During this month there was some desultory fighting along the edges of Kilimanjaro, and repeated but ineffectual attempts were made to cut the Uganda Railway line; otherwise there were no hostile movements worthy of note in this region.

On March 9, 1915, a German column, marching along the Maru River to invade the Karungu district on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria Nyanza, was defeated and scattered, after a short engagement, by a force of British troops under Colonel Hickson.

Along the region between the Uganda Railroad and the German frontier there were frequent skirmishes during May between British patrols and German troops, in which the losses were trifling on either side. The German forces had been operating for some time from the fortified port of Bukoba, and it was important to the future movements of the British that the place should be destroyed. On June 20 an expedition was dispatched by steamer from the British port at Kisumu, 240 miles away on the eastern shore; at the same time it was planned that British troops on the Kagora River were to cross the thirty miles that divided them from the German fortified port.

On June 25, 1915, Brigadier General J. A. Stewart, commanding detachments of the First Loyal North Lancashires, King's African Rifles, and the Twenty-fifth Royal Fusiliers reached Bukoba. The port was attacked by land and water. The British were in superior numbers, having only about 400 against them, but the Germans fought intrepidly, and their Arab allies showed great bravery. The British success was not easily won. The Germans lost most of their artillery and there were heavy casualties. The wireless station was ruined, boats in the harbor were sunk or captured, and the destruction wrought by the British on the port was complete.

The capture of Bukoka was important to the British, for as

a direct result the Uganda borders were kept clear of the enemy for the greater part of the summer of 1915.

The German town of Sphynxhaven on the eastern shore of Lake Nyassa was attacked on May 30, 1915, by a British naval force under Lieutenant Commander Dennistoun, supported by field artillery and a landing party of King's African Rifles. During the sharp, short engagement that followed the place was bombarded from the water, the enemy was driven out, and great quantities of rifles, ammunition, and military stores fell to the British.

The climatic conditions in the low-lying Nyassaland and Uganda borders in the summertime caused the British soldiers more suffering and deaths than their enemies. Insect pests like the tsetse fly swarm around Lake Victoria Nyanza, while different fevers of peculiarly malignant varieties lie in wait to attack the European. There is the terrible sleeping sickness that spares neither white nor black race. The great lake cannot be bathed in without danger for its abounds in crocodiles and hippopotami.

Guerrilla warfare was kept up during most of the summer of 1915 along the northeastern borders of Rhodesia and in Nyassaland. On June 28 the Germans were driven off when they attacked in two bands on the Saisa River, near Abercorn. A month later, having gathered 2,000 men, they besieged the place for six days, when British reinforcements arriving they were driven off. During these skirmishes and engagements the Belgian troops were of great service to the British in defending the frontier between Lake Mweru and Lake Tanganyika, and especially the western shore of the latter lake.

It was in this summer of 1915, during the early days of July, that the German cruiser, the *Königsberg*, met her end. Late in October of 1914 she was in shelter at a point some distance up the Rufiji River, where the water was so shallow that a ship of ordinary draft could not approach. When the British discovered the location of the cruiser they sank a collier across the mouth of the river to prevent the German boat from reaching the sea. The *Königsberg*, surrounded by forests and thick



jungle growth, was exactly located by British aircraft. On July 4, 1914, Vice Admiral King Hall, commander in chief of the Cape station, entered the river with the monitors *Severn* and *Mersey* and opened fire.

The crew of the *Königsberg* had been active in fortifying their position during the time the cruiser had been sheltering in the river. They had established shore batteries with German thoroughness that commanded all the turnings of the river, and there were observation towers from which they could get the range of any vessel attacking. The British could not get a clear view of the enemy because of the dense jungle, but their aeroplanes were of great service in directing the action of the guns. There was never any doubt of what the ultimate fate of the *Königsberg* would be.

On July 4, 1915, the British bombarded the cruiser for six hours, when she was seen to be on fire. The attack for some reason was not renewed until July 11, 1915, when the cruiser was found to be completely destroyed, whether as the result of the British shells or because she was blown up by her own crew was not discovered at the time. The annals of naval warfare offer no more curious story than this of the German cruiser, which lay for so many months helpless in a jungle river, surrounded by steaming swamps, while far beyond lay the longed-for open sea.

## PART IV—WAR IN ARABIA, MESOPOTAMIA AND EGYPT

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### CHAPTER XIX

#### MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA

THE flames of war were sweeping across Mesopotamia and Arabia. In the last days of January, 1915, Lord Hardinge, Viceroy and Governor General of India, made a tour of the conquered territory around the Persian Gulf, and at Basra was received by the native community with an address of welcome, which expressed the hope of permanent British occupation.

Owing to the overflow of the Tigris and Euphrates in February and March, when the surrounding country is flooded, there was little fighting in those regions. But on March 3 the enemy appeared near Ahwaz, on the Karun River, where the British had a small garrison to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's pipe line.

A contingent sent out from the town to discover the strength of the Turkish force, located them at Ghadir. The enemy was found to be about 12,000 strong, having been joined by a body of tribesmen from Arabia and Persia. As the British troops only numbered 1,000 men, there was imminent danger of them being cut off, and a hurried retreat was ordered. The Turks seemed determined that their enemy should not escape them, and used every effort to prevent a successful retreat. There was much hand-to-hand fighting before the British could struggle back to Ahwaz. As the Turks did not continue to attack it was to be supposed that they had lost heavily. The Anglo-Indian force had lost about 200. The colonel of the

Seventh Rajputs was wounded, and four of their white officers were killed.


On this day, March 3, 1915, a body of British cavalry reconnoitering toward Nakaila, about twenty-five miles northwest of Basra, was attacked while on their way back to camp by some 1,500 mounted Turks. The British pretending to retire, maneuvered to lure them on to a position where they had concealed infantry with machine guns and artillery. The Turks, quite unsuspecting a ruse came on, were met by a withering fire from the guns that sent them shattered and broken flying back to Nakaila. In this little fight the British had four officers killed and several severely wounded.

Reenforcements had been sent from India in anticipation of the end of the flood season, and Ahwaz and Kurna were greatly strengthened. Lieutenant General Sir J. E. Nixon, K. C. B., accompanied the new troops, and on his arrival took command of the entire force of between 30,000 and 40,000 men.

The Turks, who had also been largely reenforced with soldiers probably from Bagdad, on April 11 attacked the three British positions at Kurna-Ahwaz and Shaiba, the last a fort protecting Basra. Kurna was bombarded for two days, with small result. A bridge across the Tigris was partly destroyed, but they inflicted no casualties. Guns from the shore and those in *H.M.S. Odin* did effective work in scattering such of the enemy as appeared in boats. At Ahwaz large bodies of hostile cavalry could be seen against the sky line surrounding the British positions, but they did not attack.

The main object of the Turks was evidently to capture Basra, their attempts on Kurna and Ahwaz being merely feints to keep the British occupied while they struck a real blow at Shaiba. On April 12, 1915, an action began that lasted three days—one of the most notable fights in the history of this campaign. The attacking force was estimated at between 18,000 and 22,000 men. Perhaps 11,000 were regular infantry and cavalry from Bagdad, and 12,000 irregular levies of Kurds and Arabs. The Turkish infantry after some irregular artillery fire, commanded by German officers, advanced in the early morning of the 12th





MESOPOTAMIA—THE BRITISH OPERATIONS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF

toward the south-southwest, and west of the British lines. For three hours they were pressing forward, and then when the artillery fire fell off began to dig themselves in. An attack from the south was made in the afternoon, but was beaten off by the British before making much progress. The Turks were busy during the night of the 12th keeping up a spirited fire from rifles and machine guns, and by morning were found to have occupied some houses on a rising ground to the north of the British position. An Anglo-Indian force easily dislodged them from this place, and a counterattack made by the Turks from the west was repulsed with a loss to them of several hundred prisoners. The British also captured eighteen officers and two guns.

The British had repulsed all attacks, but the most difficult part of their task now lay before them, for the Turks were strongly intrenched near Basra some four miles from the British lines. On April 14, 1915, the Anglo-Indian force moved from camp toward Zobeir to the south, and driving off the Turks from their advanced position found themselves in front of their main lines. Some 15,000 Turkish soldiers and six big guns occupied well-concealed trenches in a tamarisk wood. The Anglo-Indian troops began their advance toward the enemy at 11.30 in the morning, and continued for five hours across a bare plain under a fierce sun and a pitiless heat. Not an enemy could be sighted, but a continuous fire, too accurate to be pleasant to the advancing host, came from the concealed trenches. At about 4.30 p. m. the 117th Mahrattas and Dorsets had led the way into the trenches, and, the whole line uniting in a great charge, the Turks were driven out at the point of the bayonet and dispersed. The Anglo-Indian troops however had purchased their victory dearly. There were some 700 casualties. Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Rosher of the Dorsets, Lieutenant Colonel T. A. Britten of the 110th Mahrattas, and Major J. C. M. Wheeler of the Seventh Lancers were among the seventeen British officers killed.

The routed Turks had fled toward Nakaila, and were vigorously pursued by the victors. They tried to escape by land and water. A dozen boat loads of fugitives were overhauled or sunk. The Turks lost about 2,500, of whom 700 were prisoners in

# THE ALLIES

## ATTEMPT TO

# FORCE THE DARDANELLES

SMYRNA AND CONSTANTINOPLE • CAMPAIGN ON GALLIPOLI  
BATTLESHIP BOUVET • TORPEDO NETS • POISON GAS



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St. Sophia in Constantinople. When the city was taken by the Turks in 1453, the church became a mosque. If Turkey is conquered, St. Sophia will become again a cathedral





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
A view of Smyrna, the second seaport of Asiatic Turkey, taken through a loophole  
in the old fortifications that rise above the town



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The famous Galata bridge at Constantinople. This wonderfully located city was the objective of the costly French and British campaigns at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli





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**The hills of Gallipoli afforded the Turks a natural fortress against the invaders. In effecting a landing, the British lost 12,000 men in one day**





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
One of the British soldiers in the campaign of the Allies on Gallipoli is here taking a brief nap on a bed of live shells



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The French battleship "Bouvet" (right), which was sunk by fire from the Turkish forts in the early attempts of the French and English fleets to force the Dardanelles





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An Austrian battleship protected by a torpedo net to receive the force of the torpedo's explosion should the vessel be attacked by a submarine or a destroyer





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A cloud of poisonous gas released by Italian troops from tanks concealed in the thick

British hands. Great quantities of stores, ammunition and guns were also captured. The region around Basra was now cleared of Turkish soldiers for a distance of fifty miles.

On April 17 the Anglo-Indian cavalry occupied Nakaila. The rout of the Turks was complete, and it was said that in their retreat they were attacked by their former allies the Arabs, who turned on them as soon as the tide of battle went against them.

During the greater part of the month of May the British were occupied in clearing the territory of the Turks that remained. At Kurna and Ahwaz and their neighborhood the enemy had gathered in sufficient numbers to give some trouble. A British contingent was dispatched to drive them out of the Ahwaz locality, but the Kharked River was in flood, and severe sand storms hindered progress, so that before the Turkish camp could be reached the enemy had vacated Persian soil and fallen back to Amara.

General Gorringe, who commanded the British troops, now set about punishing those tribes which had been assisting the enemy. Some surrendered and gave up a number of rifles and arms. Others were disposed to show resistance, but the British easily defeated them, cleared out their strongholds, and destroyed some of their property.

On May 31, 1915, the Turks had become threatening in the vicinity of Kurna, and a British expedition consisting of soldiers and sailors set out at 1.30 a. m. to attack them. By wading and in boats the British surprised the enemy's position, two miles from the town, and soon silenced his guns by superior artillery work. The heights were won by midday, and the Turks took to flight, leaving three guns and about 250 prisoners behind them. They retreated to Amara as the force from Ahwaz had done. Their flight was so precipitate, that tents were left standing, as they took to mahalas and steamers on the river to escape. The British naval flotilla carrying General Townshend and Sir Percy Cox, Chief British Resident of the Gulf, was in pursuit of the fleeing Turks. Their gunboat *Marmaris* was sunk, and the transport *Masul* captured. Two lighters containing field guns,

mines, and military stores were also taken, and about 300 prisoners.

Amara, the important business town on the Tigris about sixty miles from Kurna to which the Turks had fled, surrendered to the British June 3, 1915, its garrison of 1,000 becoming prisoners of war. In the town and vicinity 80 officers and some 2,000 men were also captured, and large quantities of ammunition, 13 guns, 12 steel barges, and 4 river steamers.

The whole of the country between Amara and the sea was now in British hands, and the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia had been partly destroyed and so demoralized that it was unlikely that they would soon take the offensive again.

In the last weeks of July, 1915, they again became troublesome. On July 24 the British, under General Gorringe, advanced to attack Nasiriyeh. The town was shelled by gunboats, and after a prolonged struggle the enemy retired, and the British occupied the place on the following day. They had captured during the fight 1,000 prisoners and 13 guns, while the dead Turks numbered about 500. The British casualties were between 300 and 400. During this engagement the fiercest foe the British had to contend against was the excessive heat, which registered as high as 113, and caused great suffering and some deaths.

Along the Euphrates, between Sukh-es-Sheyukh and Nasiriyeh, operations now began that lasted for twenty days. The country around here is peculiarly difficult for military movements, presenting a network of marshes and canals. The Turks occupied intrenched positions at the entrance of Kut-el-Hai Channel on the main line of communication between the Tigris and Bagdad. A British force was dispatched from Kurna to attack these positions. The expedition was supported by extemporized gunboats, and took the waterway of the Euphrates and Hamar Lake. Their progress was fiercely opposed by the Turks, who hovered about their flanks. The river had overflowed its banks, and inundated the neighboring country so that marching was difficult. It was necessary to drag boats over the land in some places along the advance. But the British troops were success-



ful when reaching their objective. One regiment outflanked the enemy's gun position on the right bank, and during the engagement the Turks lost 7 officers and 83 regular troops and Arabs. The British casualties were 109. There were 25 killed.

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## CHAPTER XX

### SYRIA AND EGYPT

AFTER the declaration of war against Turkey, the allied war vessels were concentrated in the Levant and Red Sea to watch the coasts of southern Asia Minor, Syria, and Turkish Arabia. On the Syrian coast there was only one point where a naval force could effectively attack communications between Constantinople and the Turkish forces. This was the little town of Alexandretta, and the shore north to Payaz, a small village. The Turks, if they wished to reenforce their Syrian army must move their men, guns, and stores up a mountainous road over the Amanus from Baghche to Radju, or risk great losses by the coast route between Payaz and Alexandretta. The Turks took this chance, and were successful, for there was no allied warship in the Gulf of Alexandretta to oppose their progress. On December 17, 1914, H.M.S. *Doris*, a protected cruiser, appeared off Alexandretta and destroyed four bridges on the road and railway between that town and Payaz. The captain of the *Doris* sent an ultimatum to the Turkish commandant of Alexandretta demanding the surrender of the town, failing which he threatened bombardment of the place. To this the Turks paid no attention. A second ultimatum brought forth a telegraphic message from Djemal Pasha at Damascus, threatening to execute allied subjects interned in that city if any Ottoman non-combatants were killed at Alexandretta by the British guns. The captain of the *Doris* promptly replied that Djemal Pasha would be held responsible for the execution of allied subjects, if he dared to carry out what he proposed. Thanks to the influence

brought to bear on the Porte by the American Embassy at Constantinople, the Ottoman military authorities in Syria became more reasonable, and finally agreed to blow up the two railway engines at Alexandretta themselves, much of the war material having been removed from the town while negotiations were pending.

During the first three months of 1915 there was only one fight of any importance on the coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta. On February 6 a landing party from H.M.S. *Philomel* was subjected to heavy fire from a concealed trench where eighty Turks were located. Six of the British and New Zealanders who formed the crew of the *Philomel* were wounded, three mortally. The cruiser promptly avenged their death by steaming in and opening a point-blank fire on the trenches with her 4.7-inch guns. More than fifty of the Turks were killed or badly wounded, the high-explosive shells shattering some to pieces. After this salutary lesson the Turks at Alexandretta did not seek any further encounters with the sailors of allied war vessels.

The British cruisers were late in arriving in the Gulf of Alexandretta, and had lost some opportunities to injure the enemy by their delay, but now they did valiant duty in preventing the Turks from sending any number of men or stores to Aleppo for the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, or the Egyptian border by the coast route, which would greatly have facilitated their movements. They were forced, owing to the vigilance of British warships, to send their troops and munitions over the Giaur Dagħ by the pass called the Syrian Gates, between Cilicia and northern Syria, a rough, mountainous region, with bad roads, that made progress extremely difficult.

At the beginning of the allied operations against the Dardanelles, the observation of the Syrian coast was taken over entirely by the French fleet.

On April 19, 1915, the Turkish intrenchments at El Arish were bombarded by the French battleship *St. Louis*. The Turks had some fifteen or twenty field guns, and replied vigorously, but only one shell hit the battleship, which did no damage. The Turks suffered some losses. In the early part of May the big

camp at Gaza, where numbers of Ottoman soldiers were gathered to be reviewed by Djemal Pasha, was shelled by the *St. Louis*, when some fifty Turks were killed by French shrapnel, and perhaps as many more wounded.


On April 29, 1915, the cruiser *D'Entrecasteaux* worked effectively on the Cilician coast, shelling the trenches at Taruss, while her hydroplane, dropping a bomb on the railway tracks, blew up trucks laden with high explosives and wrecked the railway station. On May 10 the Turks at El Arish were again shelled by the guns of the *Jeanne D'Arc*.

On Ascension Day, Alexandretta was the scene of some spirited work, in which the cruiser *D'Estrées* played the leading part. M. de la Passadière, her commander, demanded of the Kaimakam that the German flag should be hauled down that was flying over the German Consulate. The Turkish commander sent no reply, and it was pretended that he was ill or absent. M. de la Passadière having fixed a time limit when the flag must be hauled down, cleared his decks for action and trained the ship's guns on the consulate building. At the expiration of the time limit he opened fire, and the consulate was reduced to ruins. The only casualties were three Turkish soldiers, who, in spite of warning, had remained near the building.

The captain of the *D'Estrées* on May 14, 1915, destroyed a petrol depot which might be used to supply hostile submarines, and which contained over 1,000 cases. A few days earlier a much larger depot containing some 20,000 cases at Makri on the southern coast of Cilicia had been destroyed by the cruiser *Jeanne D'Arc*.

Budrum on the southwest coast of Asia Minor in the Gulf of Halicarnassus was bombarded for a serious act of Turkish treachery. The captain of the *Dupleix* had sent two boat crews to parley with the authorities, when they were fired upon by armed Turkish civilians and some soldiers. About twenty French soldiers were killed or captured as a result of this treacherous act, concerning which the Ottoman authorities published a communiqué in which they described the incident as the repulse of a landing force. The French losses were quickly





THE TURKISH ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL

avenged, for the *Dupleix* at once began a bombardment of the Moslem quarter of the town, and continued firing for three hours during which great damage was done.

Armed Turkish inhabitants perpetrated a similar outrage on boat parties on May 18, 1915, at Banias, near Latakia; a tug and a boat belonging to the *D'Estrées* were fired on from roofs and landing places while chasing a merchantman belonging to the enemy that was seeking refuge in the port. As a punishment for the treachery of the civilians, who had posed as peaceable inhabitants until the French boats came into port, part of the town was destroyed by the shells of the *D'Estrées*.

In February, 1915, toward the close of the month, in the Red Sea, the French armored cruiser *Desaix* landed a reconnoitering party near Akaba, and found the Turks occupying a neighboring village. After receiving reinforcements from the cruiser, the French sailors drove out the fifty or sixty Turks hiding among the houses of the village, killing and wounding a dozen of them, their only casualty being one man, who was slightly wounded. The Red Sea was now patrolled by vessels of the Indian Marine, which were frequently successful in making captures, and in removing mines from the Gulf of Akaba.

On March 21, 1915, H.M.S. *Dufferin* at Mutweilah on coast of Midian, where an old Turkish fort is located, was the victim of the white-flag trick. Through this treacherous act one British sailor was killed, and an officer and nine other men were wounded. In the middle of May, H.M.S. *Northbrook* captured a dhow, having on board six German officers belonging to the merchant marine, and ten men who were trying to reach one of the Turkish Red Sea ports to the north. In these waters and in the Levant there were many incidents of this character, insignificant in themselves, but important in the aggregate, since they kept the enemy worried, and created a wholesome fear of allied vigilance.

In the last week of January, 1915, the three Turkish columns advancing on Egypt, the northern marching toward Kantara, the central and main advance headed for Ismailia, and the southern, whose objective was Suez, had been located, and

were under surveillance of allied aeroplanes. By January 26 advanced guards of the central and southern columns were discovered near the canal. The central column was at Moia Harab, and some thousand men were also discovered at Wadi Um Muksheib. The southern column was found to be located at Bir Mabeiuk. On this same date British troops engaged the northern Turkish column a few miles east of El Kantara, losing in the skirmish five men and one officer. It was now evident to the British that the Turks were about to begin the main attack on the canal. Consequently the Auckland and Canterbury Battalions were dispatched to Ismailia; the Otago and Wellington Battalions were sent to El Kubri, and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade was sent up by rail from Cairo.

While this was transpiring on land, H.M.S. *Ocean*, *Swiftsure*, *Clio*, and *Minerva* joined the French warship *D'Entrecasteaux* and H.M.S. *Hardinge* and two torpedo boats already stationed in the canal. For three or four days following there were numerous skirmishes between enemy outposts and British patrols, the most effective work being wrought by allied aeroplanes and hydroplanes, which dropped bombs on the Turks as they swept over them and killed many camels and men. Lieutenant Patridge of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers and a French pilot lost their machine outside the British lines through the engine breaking down, and on returning to camp at night were shot and killed by a British picket.

On February 1, 1915, Djemel Pasha's main force occupied Katayib el Kheil, some low hills east of the southern end of Lake Timsah. The Turkish commander had every reason to feel satisfied with the progress he made in bringing his army across the desert in good condition, and with only the loss of a few deserters from among the irregulars. As many Tripolitan, Algerian, and Indian pilgrims had been forced to join the army by the persuasion of the leaders of the irregular troops, the Turkish force had increased in numbers.

Djemel Pasha's plan was to attack the canal with the main force, made up of the Twenty-fifth Division, and all, or part of the Twenty-third Division, which were to force their way be-



tween Serapeum and Tussum, while his right wing by a feint attack was to hold the British force at the Ismailia Ferry bridge-head. El Kantara was to be attacked by the northern column, while at the same time to prevent reenforcements from arriving, a demonstration was to be made at Ferdan. The southern column was directed to carry out the same tactics at Kubri, near Suez, which, as was subsequently shown, they did most ineffectually.

In the morning of February 2, 1915, an Indian reconnoitering force met the Turks about four miles east of the Ismailia Ferry. In the desultory action that followed, the British troops tried ineffectually to draw the Turks within range of their main position, and a violent sand storm arising in the afternoon, the engagement ended. The Turks retired and intrenched themselves about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles southeast of the Ferry post. On this same afternoon the Twenty-fifth Division of the Turkish army had arrived at a point within four or five miles of the canal. Their scouts were already established on the eastern bank, which is backed by trees, brushwood, and sand hills, affording excellent cover for infantry. A narrow sandy beach, not more than 9 feet wide extends along the foot of the eastern bank. The Turkish advance was made after night had set in, the Twenty-fifth Division, with pontoon companies and engineers of the Fourth and Fifth Army Corps, being first to reach the canal. They brought with them some twenty pontoons, and five or six rafts constructed out of kerosene cans fastened in wooden frames.

The first comers were followed by a part of the Seventy-fifth Regiment, old fighters from Tripoli and the Balkans; "Holy Warriors" as the Arabs called them. About 3 a. m. they had gained the openings along the canal bank, the most northerly of which being within a few hundred yards of the Tussum bridge-head. The remainder of the Seventy-fifth Regiment covered them from the left. Toward Serapeum, some distance south, the Seventy-fourth Regiment was stationed.

The night was dark and thickly clouded, and from the silence on the western bank of the canal the Turks must have believed it to be unoccupied. That they were entirely confident of success

was shown in a letter afterward found on a dead Turkish officer and dated February 2. After describing the hard march across the desert, he concluded, "And to-morrow we shall be across the canal on our way to Cairo!" All that time the regimental preachers were hard at work trying to arouse the fanaticism of the Turkish soldiery against the British foe before the battle began. It was due to the noisy "Holy Warriors" who followed the Pontoon Companies to the water that the sentries of the Fifth Egyptian Field Battery of mountain guns and Maxims were warned of the near presence of the enemy. A Turkish prisoner said afterward that they knew nothing of this battery, which had been posted on the west bank of the canal to the south of Tussum. The Turks had heard nothing, and seen nothing, and it was a complete surprise when a Maxim began firing upon them when they were at the waterside.

The Turks crowded on the narrow strip of beach or in the gaps in the banks, and suffered heavily from the fire of this mountain battery. A number of their boats which left the shore were sunk. The Sixty-second Punjabis left their cover under a withering fire, and pluckily charged down the bank to repel the Turkish attempts to make a landing. Toward Tussum, farther south, a field battery belonging to the East Lancashire Division, supported by New Zealanders of the Canterbury Battalion, opened a rattling fire, to which the Turks immediately replied with machine guns and rifles. The small torpedo boat *O-43* with its crew of thirteen now took part in the fray by dashing up the canal and landing a few men and four officers at a point south of Tussum. This party, having gained the top of the east bank, stumbled unexpectedly upon a Turkish trench. Though fired upon at short range, they were able to get back to their boat without losing a man. Under a withering fire the little torpedo boat darted forward and enfiladed the eastern bank, doing considerable damage and destroying some pontoon boats which the enemy had prepared to launch.

At the first gray light of dawn the action became general, and fresh forces entered the conflict. The Turks on the eastern bank who had occupied the day line of the Tussum post now advanced,

protected by artillery, against the bridgehead, while the Serapeum post was assailed by another body of troops. On the canal and Lake Timsah the allied warships opened fire, and continued it for some time. From the slopes of Katayib el Kheil three batteries of Turkish field guns replied, doing considerable damage to every visible target. But they had not taken careful observations of the British positions, and the carefully masked Territorial battery between Tussum and Serapeum was not discovered. This battery, aided by the New Zealanders, almost silenced the Turkish fire from the eastern bank, and enabled them to attend to the reserves of the enemy now seen advancing on the desert to the east. Four of the Territorial gunners were wounded by the Turkish batteries. A pontoon which the Turks had pushed across the canal in the dark was sunk, but until day-break those who had engineered this work managed to keep afloat, and continued sniping with some damage to British artillery horses until they were rounded up and taken prisoners by some Indian cavalry.

The Indian troops now took the offensive, supported by the warships and mountain and field artillery. The Serapeum garrison, consisting of Ninety-second Punjabis and Rajputs, now cleared its front of the enemy who had been stopped three-quarters of a mile away. A counterattack made by the Sixty-second Punjabis of the Tussum garrison drove the Turks back. Two battalions of the Turkish Twenty-eighth Regiment now joined the fight, but the British artillery threw them into disorder, and by 3 p. m. of February 3, 1915, the Moslems were in retreat, leaving behind them a rear guard of a few hundred men hidden in the gaps among the brush along the eastern bank.

The warships on Lake Timsah had been in action since morning, and the sand hills near Ismailia were at first crowded by civilians and soldiers eager to witness the fight, until the Turkish guns to the east and southeast of the Ferry post drove them to cover.

About 11 a. m. an old unprotected Indian Marine transport, H.M.S. *Hardinge*, was struck by two 6-inch shells. One carried away the funnel and the other burst inboard doing much dam-



age. Two of the crew were killed and nine wounded. George Carew, the pilot, lost a leg, but continued on duty and helped to bring the injured vessel into Ismailia. The French coast guard battleship *Requin* came now under the Turkish fire, but her 10.8-inch guns soon silenced the enemy's batteries.

The morning of February 3, 1915, the Turks advanced on the Ismailia Ferry, then held by Sikhs, Punjabi Rifles, a battery of Indian mountain artillery and Australian engineers, digging shelter pits as they moved forward, covered by two field batteries. Their advance was stopped by the British guns when they had come within 1,000 yards of the outpost line. During the afternoon the Turks kept up some desultory firing that was ineffective; they also engaged in some reconnoitering of British positions during the dark night that followed, but when morning broke they had all disappeared.

Meanwhile, at El Kantara the struggle had reached much the same conclusion. The Indian troops had repelled an advance from the south, in which two Turkish regiments, the Eightieth and Eighty-first of the Twenty-seventh Division, were engaged. H.M.S. *Swiftsure*, which had taken the place of the disabled *Hardinge*, aided by Indian and Territorial artillery, did effective work in covering the British positions. The nature of the ground here was so marshy that in places the Turks sank to their waists in muddy ooze, and foredoomed their attack to failure. Again it was demonstrated that they are poor strategists and fail to make careful observations of the terrain before advancing to attack. At El Ferdan, where some Turks made a demonstration with a battery about this time, there were no losses, though the gunboat *Clio* was hit several times. At El Kantara, where a part of General Cox's brigade of Gurkhas, Sikhs, and Punjabis were engaged, there were thirty casualties.

Between Tussum and Serapeum there was some sniping during the late afternoon of February 3 from the east bank of the canal, during which a British sailor was killed on H.M.S. *Swiftsure*. The desultory firing continued during the night and through the early morning of February 4. A deplorable incident occurred this day in which a brave British officer and several of

his men were the victims of Turkish treachery. Several hundred Turks had been discovered by half a battalion of Ninety-second Punjabis sent out from Serapeum. In the encounter that followed, some of the Turks held up their hands as a sign of surrender, while others continued to fire. Captain Cochran of the Ninety-second company, who was advancing with his men to take the surrender, was killed. A few of his soldiers also fell, and some others were wounded. The British took a prompt and complete revenge for the loss of these men. After being reenforced by Indian troops they overpowered the enemy in a hand-to-hand struggle, in which a Turkish officer was killed by a British officer in a sword combat. The Turks had lost in this brisk engagement about 120 killed and wounded, and 6 officers and 25 men were captured with 3 Maxim guns.

The Turkish attempts at Suez on February 2, 1915, were insignificant, and did not cost the British the loss of a single man. By nightfall, just as their compatriots had done along other parts of the canal, the Turks fled in the direction of Nakhl, Djebel, Habeite, and Katia. On the afternoon of the 4th, when the fighting between Serapeum and Tussum was concluded, Indian cavalry and various patrols captured some men and war materials. At Ismailia preparations were under way to pursue the retreating Turks across the canal. This plan, for some reason, was subsequently abandoned.

During these various fights along the canal, the British had lost 115 killed and wounded, a small number considering the character of the ground and the very numerous attacks and skirmishes. Nine hundred Turks were buried or found drowned in the canal, 650 were taken prisoners, while it is estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 must have been wounded. The brunt of the struggle fell on the Indian troops, who, in general, fought with great bravery. There were some Australian and Egyptian troops engaged who proved themselves valuable auxiliaries.

In these engagements along the canal the Syrian Moslems displayed even greater bravery than the Turks, who were not lacking in intrepidity, though they showed poor judgment. They had much to learn in the way of taking cover, and would often

blindly advance over difficult ground that placed them at a disadvantage.

Djemal Pasha had evidently counted on an Egyptian rising, and perhaps a mutiny of the Indian Moslem troops, but he showed that he entirely misjudged their sentiments, as they displayed great bitterness toward the Turks during the fighting, and attacked them in a thoroughly vindictive spirit. If Djemal had not counted on help from these quarters he would probably not have attempted to break through the British positions covering a ninety-mile front with such a small force. It was estimated that he had about 25,000 men, but not more than half of these were brought into action at any given point where they might have achieved some success. The Turks had burned up some war material and left a few deserters behind them, but they had retreated in good order, and the British commanders had reason to believe that they should soon be heard from again, and that a main attack was contemplated.

On February 6, 1915, British aeroplane observers discovered that the Turks in front of the Tussum-Deversoir section had gathered at Djebel, Habeite, and were strongly reenforced. It appeared that Djemal was now preparing to attack in force. The British were quite ready for them, having been reenforced on February 3 and 4 by the Seventh and Eighth Australian battalions, a squadron of the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry, and the Herts, and Second County of London Yeomanry. But the British hopes of a decisive engagement were blighted by the general retirement of the Turkish army with their reenforcements.

They crossed the desert successfully, thanks to the organizing skill of Kress von Kressenstein and Roshan Bey, and set off for the Turkish base at Beersheba, spreading the news along the road that they had won a victory and would soon return to Egypt and achieve another, this by way of keeping the Syrians reassured that success was on the Moslem side.

In January, 1915, the commander of Turkish troops at Fort Nakhl, hearing that the Government quarantine station at Tor was undefended, sent a body of men under two German officers to



occupy the place. The raiders found on their arrival at Tor that about 200 Egyptian soldiers were in occupation and waited there until they received reinforcements, which brought their force up to 400 men. For the time they occupied a small village about five miles north of Tor, occasionally firing a shot at long range and sending arrogant messages to the Egyptians. On February 11 a detachment of Ghurkas embarked secretly from Suez, and advancing over the hills in the rear of the Turks, surprised their position on the following morning. In the encounter that followed the Turks were annihilated. Sixty lay dead on the field, and over a hundred, including a Turkish officer, were made prisoners. On the British side one Ghurka was killed and another wounded. It was a disappointment that the German officers and a few men had left the camp some days before for Abu Zenaima on the coast, where there was a British-owned manganese mine, which the raiders damaged as best they could, and then stealing some camels, departed for the fort at Nakhil.

The failure of the Turks to win any success at that canal, and their subsequent retreat, had a discouraging influence on the Bedouin levies, who had joined Djemal Pasha and Hilmi Bey, and they now chose the first opportunity to vanish with the new rifles that had been given to them.

For a month the Turks did nothing but keep the British troops occupied by petty raids and feint attacks, which were worrisome, but better than utter stagnation.

On March 22, 1915, a Turkish column with guns and cavalry appeared near the canal near El Kubri, and their advance guard of about 400 encountered a patrol of nine men under Havildar Subha Singh of the Fifty-sixth Punjab Rifles. The Havildar retired fighting courageously, holding the enemy back until he had got his men to safety, with a loss of two killed and three wounded. The Havildar, who was badly wounded himself, received the Indian Order of Merit and was promoted to Jemadar. He had inflicted on the enemy a loss of twelve men and fifteen wounded.

On March 23, 1915, General Sir G. J. Younghusband set out to attack the Turks who had been under the command of Colonel van

Trommer, but owing to delays they had had time to retreat toward Nakhel. In the pursuit that followed, their rear guard lost about forty men and some were taken prisoners. There were about a dozen British casualties.

On April 29, 1915, a raiding party with Maxims attacked a detachment of Bikanir Camel Corps and Egyptian sappers near Bir Mahadet, which resulted in the wounding of a British officer, and five killed and three wounded among the Egyptians and Bikaniris. A punitive expedition sent out to attack the raiders marched through the night to Bir Mahadet only to find that the Turks had fled. The British aeroplane soon after "spotted" the enemy near a well six miles north. The Patiala cavalry, who were leading, came up with the Turkish rear guard in the afternoon and charged. The Turks stampeded, except for a small group of Turkish soldiers led by a plucky Albanian officer, who held their ground and attacked from the flank the advancing British officers and Patiala cavalry. Two British officers and a native officer were killed or badly wounded in the subsequent charge. The Albanian, who had displayed such courage, proved to be a son of Djemal Pasha. He fell with seven lance thrusts, none of which however proved fatal, while all his men were killed or captured. The British had four or five times as many men as the escaping enemy, but they did not pursue.

In June, 1915, Colonel von Laufer and a mixed force attempted a feeble raid on the canal near El Kantara, but were driven off with some loss by the Yeomanry, who had done effective work in keeping the enemy away from the British lines. A mine having been found near the canal about this time, the Porte informed the neutral powers that the canal must be closed to navigation owing to the arbitrary conduct of the British in Egypt. But the Turks were not in a position to carry out their threats, owing to the vigorous attack on the Dardanelles. Troops were hurried from Syria to Constantinople, and by June 6 less than 25,000 Turkish troops remained in central and southern Syria and the Simai Peninsula. At Nakhel and El Arish there were left about 7,000 veteran desert fighters, but the British air scouts kept a watchful eye on the desert roads, and used bombs with such

effect that the Turks were kept in a constant state of apprehension by their attacks.

At Sharkieh, the eastern province of the Delta, there had been some uneasiness when the Turks made their unsuccessful strikes at the canal, but the population gave no trouble. At Alexandria and Cairo some few fanatics and ignorant people of the lower classes displayed some opposition to the Government. The sultan was fired on April 8, 1915, by a degenerate, Mohammed Khalil, a haberdasher of Masoura, the bullet missing the victim by only a few inches. Khalil was tried by court-martial and executed April 24. The attempt on Sultan Hussein's life had the effect of making him friends from among the disaffected in the higher classes who found it wise policy to express their horror of the attempted crime, and to proclaim their allegiance to the Government. On April 9 the sultan received a popular ovation while on his way to the mosque.

As a base for the allied Mediterranean expeditionary force, and as a training ground for Australian, Indian, and British troops, Egypt in 1915 was of the utmost military importance to the British Empire. From the great camps around Cairo and the canal, forces could be dispatched for service in Europe, Mesopotamia, and at the Dardanelles, while fresh contingents of soldiers were constantly arriving to take their places.

On July 5, 1915, a body of Turks and Arabs from Yemen in southwest Arabia made a threatening demonstration against Aden, the "Gibraltar of the East," on the Strait of Perim at the entrance to the Red Sea. They were equipped with some field guns and light artillery, and crossing the Aden hinterland near Lahej, forced the British to retire on Aden.

On July 29, 1915, Sheikh Othman, which had been abandoned by the British on their retreat on the 5th, was again occupied by them, and the Turks and Arabs were expelled. The British troops drove the enemy for five miles across the country, causing some casualties, when the Turks and their allies scattered and disappeared.



## PART V—WAR IN THE AIR

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### CHAPTER XXI

#### RAIDS OF THE AIRMEN

THE war in the air developed into a reign of terror during the second half of the first year of the world catastrophe. While the armies on the land were locked in terrific conflict, and the navies were sweeping the seas, the huge ships of the air were hovering over cities with a desperate resolve to win on all sides. By degrees the pilots of the various nations learned to work in squadrons. The tactics of the air began to be developed and opposing aerial fleets maneuvered much as did the warships. Long raids by fifty or more machines were reported, tons of bombs being released upon cities hundreds of miles from the battle line.

The German ambition to shell London was realized, and the east coast of England grew accustomed to raids. The spirit of the British never faltered. Perhaps it was best typified in the admonition of a Yarmouth minister following a disastrous Zeppelin visit, who said: "It is our privilege, we who live on the east coast, to be on the firing line, and we should steel ourselves to face the position with brave hearts."

Casualties grew in all quarters. French cities were the greatest sufferers, although French airmen performed prodigies of valor in defending the capital and in attacks upon German defensive positions. But the stealthy Zeppelin took heavy toll on many occasions. It was shown that there was no really adequate defense against sudden attack from the air. Constant watchfulness and patrolling machines might be eluded at night and death rained upon the sleeping city beneath.

The spring of 1915 found the air service of every army primed for a dash. The cold months were spent in repairing, reorganizing and extending aerial squadrons. Everything awaited the advent of good weather conditions.

During February, 1915, the hand of tragedy fell upon the German air service. Two Zeppelins and another large aircraft were wrecked within a couple of days.

In a storm over the North Sea on February 16, 1915, a Zeppelin fought heroically. Contrary air currents compelled the Zeppelin commander to maneuver over a wide zone in an effort to reach land. Caught in the gale the big dirigible was at the mercy of the elements. Snow, sleet, and fog enveloped it and added to its peril. The craft caught in the February storm, fought a losing battle for twenty-four hours and finally made a landing on Fanoe Island, in Danish territory. The officers and men were interned, several of whom were suffering from exposure in an acute form and nearly all of them with frostbitten hands and feet.

Another Zeppelin was lost in this same February storm. It is presumed that the two started on a raiding trip against England and were caught in the storm before reaching their destination. Details of the second Zeppelin's fate never have been told. It fell into the sea, where parts of the wreckage were found by Dutch fishermen. All on board lost their lives. The third airship wrecked that month was of another type than the Zeppelin. It foundered off the west coast of Jutland and four of its crew were killed. The others escaped, but the airship was a total loss.

This trio of accidents shocked the German official world to its depths and had a chilling effect upon the aerial branch of its military organization for some weeks. The Zeppelins remained at home until the return of better weather. England, for a time, was practically freed from the new menace.

It was not accident alone, nor an adverse fortune, which caused the loss of the three airships. The position of the British Isles, on the edge of the Atlantic, enabled British weather forecasters to tell with almost unfailing exactness when a storm was to be expected. The French also had an excellent service in this

direction. Realizing that bad weather was the worst foe of the Zeppelin, aside from its own inherent clumsiness, the two governments agreed to suppress publication of weather reports, thereby keeping from the Germans information of a vital character. The German Government maintained a skilled weather department, but the geographical location of the country is such that its forecasters could not foretell with the same accuracy the conditions on the Atlantic. The shrewd step of the French and British therefore resulted in the destruction of three dirigibles in a single month, a much higher average than all the efforts of land guns and aviators had been able to achieve.

February, 1915, was a bleak, drear month. Aviators of all the armies made daily scouting trips, but wasted little time in attacking each other. Few raids of importance took place on any of the fronts. But British airmen descended upon German positions in Belgium on several occasions. Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Blankenberghe received their attention in a half dozen visits between February 5 and 20.

On February 16, 1915, a large fleet of aeroplanes, mostly British, swept along the Flanders coast, attacking defensive positions wherever sighted. At the same time, French airmen shelled the aeroplane center at Ghisteltes, preventing the Germans from sending a squadron against the other flotilla.

Paris, Dunkirk, and Calais glimpsed an occasional enemy aeroplane, but they were bent on watching troop movements and only a few stray bombs were dropped. The inactivity of the armies, burrowed in their winter quarters, was reflected in the air.

It was announced by the French Foreign Office that from the beginning of hostilities up to February 1, 1915, French aircraft had made 10,000 reconnaissances, covering a total of more than 1,250,000 miles. This represented 18,000 hours spent in the air.

Antwerp, which had surrendered to the Germans, was visited by British flyers on March 7, 1915. They bombarded the submarine plant at Hoboken, a suburb. The plant at this point had been quickly developed by the conquerors and the harbor served as a refuge for many undersea boats. Numerous attacks on ships off the Dutch mainland persuaded the British authorities that a



blow at Hoboken would be a telling stroke against German submarines, and so the event proved. Several craft were sunk or badly damaged. Bombs set fire to the submarine works and much havoc was wrought among the material stored there. A number of employees were injured. The Antwerp populace cheered the airmen on their trip across the city and back to the British lines, for which a fine was imposed upon the city.

During March, 1915, there was some activity in the East, where Zeppelins shelled Warsaw in Poland, killing fifty persons and causing many fires. One of the raiders was brought down on March 18, and her crew captured. The Russian service suffered losses, Berlin announcing the capture of six aeroplanes in a single week. One of these was of the Sikorsky type, a giant battle plane carrying a half dozen men.

Shortly after one o'clock on the morning of March 21, 1915, two Zeppelins appeared above Paris. Four of the raiders started from the German lines originally, but two were forced to turn back. They were first seen above Compiègne, north of which the German lines came nearest to Paris. The news was flashed ahead. The French airmen rose to meet them. Two of the Zeppelins eluded the patrol. Their coming was expected and when they approached the city searchlights picked them up and kept the raiders in view as they maneuvered above the French capital. The French defenders and the Zeppelin commanders met in a bold battle in the air. The Zeppelins kept up a running fight with pursuing aeroplanes while dropping bombs. They sailed across Mt. Valérien, one of the most powerful Paris forts, dropping missiles which did little harm. A searchlight from the Eiffel Tower kept them in full view. They were forced to move rapidly. Finally they swung in a big arc toward Versailles, and then turned suddenly and sailed for the heart of the city. Twenty-five bombs were dropped. Eight persons were struck and a number of fires started.

The Parisians flocked to the streets and watched the strange combat with rapt interest. Although the raiders had come before, the spectacle had not lost its fascination. Even though the authorities issued strict orders and troops tried to drive the

throngs indoors, Parisians persisted in risking life and limb to see the Zeppelins battle in the night skies. Upon this occasion the battle aloft lasted until after four o'clock in the morning, or more than three hours.

On the same night, March 21, 1915, three bombs were thrown upon Villers-Cotterets, fifteen miles southwest of Soissons. There was small damage and no casualties. But the two raids emphasized that a few weeks more would see intensive resumption of war in the air.

French aviators shelled Bazincourt, Briey, Brimont, and Vailly on March 22, 1915. At Briey, the station was damaged and the railway line cut, two of the birdmen descending to within a few hundred yards of the track. Enemy batteries at Brimont suffered damage. The next day a German machine was shot down near Colmar, in Alsace, and its two occupants captured.

With the return of spring, 1915, came renewed activity among airmen on all fronts. The first day of April was marked by the loss of two German machines, one near Soissons and the other near Rheims. The first fell a victim to gunfire, both occupants being killed. The second, an Albatross model, was discovered prowling above Rheims. French pilots immediately gave chase and after a circuitous flight back and forth across the city, compelled the enemy machine to land. The pilot and observer were overpowered before they had time to set it afire, the usual procedure when captured.

A typical day of this season with the birdmen of France was April 2, 1915. A War Office report of that day tells of forty-three reconnoitering flights and twenty others for the purpose of attacking enemy positions or ascertaining the direction of gunfire. Bombs were dropped upon the hangars and aviation camp at Habsheim. The munition factories at Dietweiler, and the railway station in Walheim. The station at Bensdorf and the barracks at the same place were shelled from the air. Much damage was done.

Seven French aeroplanes flew over the Woevre region on this day, penetrating as far as Vigneulles, where the aerial observers discovered barracks covered with heavy corrugated iron. The machines descended in long spirals and dropped a number of

bombs, setting the barracks afire. Troops were seen rushing in all directions from the burning structures.

The aviation camp at Coucu-le-Château, north of Soissons, and the station at Comines, Belgium, were under fire from the air. In Champagne a quantity of shells were unloosed upon the station at Somme-Py and Dontrein, near Eacille and St. Etienne-sur-Suippe enemy bivouacs were bombarded. Other bivouacs at Basancourt and Pont Faverger were struck by arrows dropped from the skies.

These numerous raids and reconnaissances were repeated every day at many points. German airmen were not less active than those of the Allies. Neither side allowed a fine day to pass without watching the enemy from the air and striking him at such places and times as they could.

Early on the morning of April 13, 1915, a Zeppelin was discovered surveying allied gun positions near Ypres, in Belgium. The batteries immediately opened fire and several shells found their target, judging from the heavy list which the airship developed. It was seen to be in serious trouble as it made its escape. Amsterdam reported the following day that the craft fell near Thielt, a complete wreck. What became of the crew never was learned.

The raids on England were now resumed. On April 13, 1915, a Zeppelin visited Newcastle-on-Tyne and several near-by towns. Newcastle, a great naval station and manufacturing city, had been the objective of previous air attacks that brought forth little result. The Zeppelin commander, who directed the bombardment of the thirteenth, was well informed and proceeded straight to the arsenal and naval workshops. More than a dozen bombs fell. Strangely enough none of these caused material loss, and there were no casualties. Dwellings were set afire in other quarters of the city. The stir that followed brought England to the realization that better weather was dawning and with it an imminent peril. Efforts were redoubled to ward off aerial raiders.

A flotilla of Zeppelins shelled Blyth, Wallsend, and South Shields, on the northeastern coast of England on the night of April 14, 1915. This attack was directed primarily at the indus-



trial and shipping centers of Tyneside. Berlin claimed a distinct success, but the British denied that extensive harm had been done.

French airmen drove home an attack on April 15, 1915, that had important results. The station at Saint-Quentin was shelled from the air and upward of 150 freight cars and extensive freight sheds destroyed. Some of the cars contained benzol, the explosion of which spread burning liquid in every direction. Adjacent buildings were consumed by the spreading fire and it seemed that Saint-Quentin itself might go. Twenty-four German soldiers were killed and the fire burned from four o'clock in the afternoon until six the next morning, the explosion of shells being frequently heard. These facts were communicated to the French by spies and prisoners and thus written into the war's record.

Lowestoft and Maldon, only thirty miles from London, were the mark of bombs on the morning of April 16, 1915. The raiders arrived at Lowestoft about midnight and released three bombs, one of which killed two horses. A half hour later they appeared over Maldon, where six bombs were dropped. Several fires broke out. There was a panic when searchlights revealed one of the raiders still hovering above the city. But he apparently was merely bent on learning the extent of his success, as he passed on to Hebridge, two miles away, where a building was fired by a bursting shell.

Another German squadron of six craft was sighted at Ipswich, approaching from the direction of the channel. A few fires in Ipswich and two persons hurt at Southwold were the only evidences of the visit. This raid was made significant by the fact that the squadron paid small attention to towns in its route, proceeding to Henham Hall, residence of the Countess Stradbroke, near Southwold. It then was used as a hospital for wounded soldiers. A half dozen bombs fell in close proximity to the main building, but fortunately none of them struck their mark.

The evening of that day, April 26, 1915, the third raid on England in less than twenty-four hours took place. Canterbury, Sittingbourne, and Faversham were shelled, all three towns being within thirty miles of London. British machines drove the invaders off. About half past one of the next morning a Zeppelin

dropped seven bombs in the neighborhood of Colchester. It was evident from these frequent visitations that the German authorities were bent on reaching London itself. Nearly every raid brought the enemy craft nearer. The gain of almost a mile was made on each raid. The Germans were wary and evidently suspected that London's air defenses were adequate. The small towns which they shelled were of no importance whatever from a military standpoint, and such casualties as resulted were insignificant as compared to the death roll that London might be expected to yield.

A French squadron engaged in a raid of some consequence on April 16, 1915. Leopoldshoehe, east of Rurigue, fell a victim. Workshops, where shells were made, came in for a heavy aerial bombardment. Fire started which swept away several buildings. Equipment and supplies were smashed. Other bombs dropped on a powder magazine at Rothwell caused a second fire. The electric plant at Maixienes-les-Metz, ten miles north of Metz, which supplied the city with light and power, was rendered useless. Munition plants and the station in Metz itself suffered, and three German aeroplanes guarding the city were compelled to land under the guns of the fortress when the French squadron turned about. This dash was a profitable one for the French and showed a new organization that promised well for the future. Just how many machines took part was not learned, but there probably were forty or fifty. North of Ypres French gunners brought down a German aeroplane which fell behind the enemy's trenches, ablaze from end to end.

The Germans took similar toll. Several of their flyers shelled Amiens on April 17, 1915, dropping bombs which killed or wounded ten persons in the vicinity of the cathedral. The invaders sailed up in the night and descended to a point just above the city before dropping the first bomb. They were off in a couple of minutes, before pursuing machines could engage them.

All of these raids were more or less effective. At the time they attracted wide attention, but as the war wore on the world became accustomed to aerial attacks. The total of lives lost and the destruction caused never will be accurately known.

On April 21, 1915, came news of another trip to Warsaw by Zeppelins, a dozen persons being killed. Bombs fell in the center of the city and the post-office building was struck. A resumption of activity in that quarter was productive of raids, clashes in the air and Zeppelin alarms, such as were common in the western theatre, but on a lesser scale, as the Russians and Austrians possessed only a limited air equipment and the Germans were compelled to concentrate the bulk of their machines elsewhere.

In the southern war zone the aerial operations recommenced with April, 1915. The Austrians made several more or less futile attacks on Venice. Italian cities, especially Venice, Verona, and others near the border removed many of their art works to safe places, including stained-glass windows from cathedrals, canvases, and statuary. The base of the Campanile, Venice, and other historic edifices were protected with thousands of sand-bags. The famous horses brought from Constantinople were taken down. This denuding process robbed the ancient seat of Venetian power of its many splendors, but assured their preservation and future restoration.

The Austrian bombs started numerous fires, tore up a few streets, and caused some casualties. In turn, the Italians dashed across the Austrian lines and attacked supply bases, railway stations, and other vantage points in the same way that the Allies were harrowing the Germans on the western front. In this work the Italians made use to some extent of their dirigibles, a type smaller than the Zeppelin but highly efficient.

Thirty persons were killed or wounded in Calais on April 26, 1915, when a Zeppelin succeeded in reaching a point above one of the thickly populated sections of the city. The raid took place before midnight. The visitor was quickly driven away by a French machine, but not until the damage had been done. An orphanage was among the buildings struck, many of the victims being children. A fleet of aeroplanes visited Amiens at about the same hour, their efforts being directed to the bombardment of ammunition depots near that city. The invaders were driven off with small results to show for their work.



In a raid on April 28, 1915, upon Friedrichshafen, so often the mark of airmen, several airship sheds and a Zeppelin were damaged. A nearly simultaneous bombardment of Leopoldshoehe, Lörrach, and the station at Haltinge resulted in the destruction of train sheds and two locomotives. Forty-two members of the Landsturm were killed or wounded at Lörrach and two aeroplanes put out of commission, service being cut on the railway line. This was the official French version. Geneva gave a different and more vivid account. According to the Swiss, the French airmen visited Friedrichshafen twice within thirty-six hours, destroying five airships, setting fire to several buildings, and causing at least \$1,000,000 damage. The report said that they returned by way of Metz, dropping arrows and bombs, and wrecking the station at Lörrach.

The east coast of England was the victim of an air raid on April 30, 1915. Hostile aircraft were sighted over Ipswich, about sixty-five miles from London, shortly after midnight. The alarm was spread westward, whence the craft were bound. Five bombs fell upon Ipswich, but no one was killed. A few dwellings and commercial buildings were struck, fires starting which the local department soon controlled. Only a few minutes after the machines shelled Ipswich, they were seen to approach Bury St. Edmunds, fourteen miles to the northwest of Ipswich. Three bombs failed to produce casualties, but fires were started. Little damage resulted.

On the first day of May, 1915, announcement was made in Paris that experiments conducted at Issy les Molineaux over several months had brought about successful tests in firing a three-inch gun from an aeroplane. This had never been accomplished before, and had seemed a well-nigh impossible task. An entirely new piece was developed, firing a shell of about the same size as the regular 75-millimeter field gun. It was made lighter by half, with an effective range of 2,500 meters, considerably less than the standard gun.

French skill in designing weapons, always a trait of the race, was evidenced here. The heavy steel breechblock of the seventy-five was replaced by a wooden block. When fired the explosion

of the powder charge automatically blew the wooden breechblock backward, thus neutralizing the shock. But owing to the open breech much of the powder's driving force was lost. Nothing to equal the new arm had there been up to that time. The wooden breechblock completely did away with the heavy hydraulic recoil cylinders which were one of the distinguishing features of the seventy-five. These cylinders were esteemed by many authorities to be the finest in the world, absorbing maximum shock with a minimum of effort.

The coming of this new gun marked a big step forward in aerial war and gave the French machines so equipped a decided advantage. Its effect was to make the German flyers more wary, avoiding combat except when impossible to avoid the issue. But its use was confined to the larger machines as a rule, particularly the Voisin biplane, the machine gun being favored by many airmen because of its lightness and the ease with which it could be handled.

The beginning of May, 1915, found aerial warfare in full progress again. The British defense squadrons showed somewhat better generalship and it was not until the tenth of the month that Zeppelins obtained any appreciable advantage in that quarter. But two of the raiders evaded the patrols on the night of May 10, 1915, and dropped bombs upon Westcliff-on-Sea, near Southend, at the mouth of the Thames, a bare twenty-five miles from London. There were no fatalities, but a man and his wife were badly burned when their home caught fire from a bursting bomb. At Leigh, near Southend, several shops were burned. It was reported that four Zeppelins had been seen at Leigh, whereas Westcliff-on-Sea saw but two. If the larger number were correct it would indicate that the Germans were becoming more determined to reach London. One feature of the raid at Westcliff-on-Sea was that of sixty bombs dropped only a few struck in the town. Most of them fell on the beach and the sand neutralized any effects that the missiles might have had.

The Bull and George Hotel at Ramsgate was completely wrecked by bombs which struck it on the night of May 17, 1915. An in-

stance of the vagaries of explosives was furnished by this raid. One of the bombs which struck the hotel penetrated the roof and fell upon a bed on which a woman was sleeping. It wrecked the room and tore a great hole in the floor through which the bed and occupant fell to the cellar. The sleeper was badly hurt and the bed practically uninjured. Fires started by other bombs in Ramsgate soon were extinguished.

Advices from Rotterdam stated that during this raid a Zeppelin fell into the Gierlesche Woods, Belgium, two men being hurt. The cause of the airship's plight was unknown, but the damage made it necessary that the frame be taken apart and sent to Germany for repairs.

One of the oddest combats of the war was staged on this day—May 17, 1915. A Zeppelin, flying from the direction of the English coast, was sighted in the channel by a French torpedo boat. The craft was at a comparatively low altitude and furnished an excellent mark. Only a few shots had been fired when it was seen to be in distress. The Zeppelin made several frantic efforts to rise, then fell into the sea within four miles of Gravesline. It sank before aid could be given the crew.

May 17, 1915, was a bad day for Zeppelins. One of the dirigibles supposed to have attacked Ramsgate early that morning was discovered off Nieuport, Belgium, by a squadron of eight British naval machines which had made a sortie from Dunkirk. They surrounded the enemy craft and three of the pilots succeeded in approaching close to the Zeppelin. Four bombs were dropped upon the airship from a height of 200 feet. A column of smoke arose. The Zeppelin looked as though it would fall for a moment, but righted itself and mounted to an altitude of some 11,000 feet, finally eluding its pursuers.

Two Zeppelins and two Taubes were caught by daylight after a frustrated raid upon Calais on May 18, 1915. They were fired upon from many points. A battery at Gros Nez succeeded in hitting one of the dirigibles. The other craft of the flotilla stood by their injured fellow as long as they dared, but made off after a few minutes, as French machines were closing in from all sides. The injured Zeppelin dropped on the beach near Fort Mardick,



about two miles from Dunkirk. Forty men aboard were taken prisoners, including several officers.

Two women in Southend, England, met death on May 27, 1915, when Zeppelins visited that city. A child was badly injured. The lighting plant and several industrial establishments suffered damage. Repeated attacks on Southend had resulted in the installation of searchlights and the detailing of more aviators to guard its citizens. Neither availed to prevent the loss of life, but they did succeed in driving away the raiders after their first appearance.

Of all the raids carried out during the spring and summer of 1915, one of the most important was that upon Ludwigshafen, in Bavaria. Here the laboratories of the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik were located. This plant was said to produce two-thirds of the nitrates used in the production of ammunition for the German armies. Since the start of the war it had been the object of several attacks, none of which had noteworthy results.

But on the morning of May 26, 1915, eighteen French aeroplanes started at daybreak from a border stronghold and headed straight for Ludwigshafen. They had a supply of gasoline to last seven hours and rose to a height of 6,500 feet in order to escape detection. In this they did not succeed, but ran into several lively cannonades before reaching their destination. Once there, they circled above the big chemical works, dropping bomb after bomb. More than a ton of explosives were hurled upon the buildings in a quarter of an hour. Columns of smoke rose from the burning structures. Loud explosions issued from the smokestacks, sounding like the report of heavy guns. Workmen fled in all directions and the whole plant soon was wrapped in flames. The airmen lingered about for a short time, watching the results of their work. It became evident that the plant would be a total loss, and the flames spread to near-by buildings, for a time threatening a good part of the city.

Swiss reports of a few days later said that upward of a hundred workmen lost their lives, that scores were hurt and the property loss ran well into the millions. The blow was severe, the heaviest up to that time which German industries, far from

the battle front, had sustained. It revealed a new chapter of war in the air to communities which would be snugly secure under any other condition. On the return trip, ill fortune overtook the French flotilla. The machine of its commander found it necessary to make a landing. Chief of Squardon, De Goys, and Adjutant Bunau-Varilla were captured. They burned their aeroplane before being taken prisoners.

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## CHAPTER XXII

### ZEPPELINS ATTACK LONDON—BATTLES IN THE AIR

ENGLAND'S insularity disappeared on the night of May 31, 1915. The isolation by sea which had kept her immune from attack since the days of the Normans failed to save London from the Zeppelin. After ten months of war the British capital looked upon its dead for the first time. Four children, one woman, and one man were killed. An old apple woman died of fright. There were numerous fires, only three of which assumed serious proportions and these were extinguished by the fire department after a few hours.

London's initial glimpse of a Zeppelin was obtained about 11.30 p. m., when the theatre section was filled with homeward bound throngs. The lights attracted the raiders to this district, where a half dozen bombs were dropped. No sooner had the first of the missiles fallen than antiaircraft guns began to open a bombardment from many directions. Searchlights mounted at advantageous points threw their narrow pencils of light into the skies. The people in different sections of the city caught a fleeting glance of a huge airship that floated sullenly along, like some bird of prey from out of the past—a new pterodactyl that instead of seizing its victims dropped death upon them.

One shell fell in Trafalgar Square. The Zeppelins passed over the Houses of Parliament, Westminster, and other famous build-

ings, but apparently did not have their location well in mind as these noted monuments escaped harm.

But the Zeppelins had come. And they left scars which greeted Londoners the following morning to prove that the raid was not a bad dream which would disappear with the morning mists. In addition to the four persons killed, seventy others were injured, some of whom suffered the loss of limbs and other injuries that incapacitated them. Immediately there was a cry for revenge. Some of the newspapers advocated reprisals upon German cities. This the government refused to do and steadfastly adhered to a policy of war upon fortified places and armed men alone. Rioting took place in many districts where Germans were numerous. Shops and homes were looted. Every German who appeared in the streets, or any person who looked like one, was liable to attack. A number of aliens were badly handled. The public declared a spontaneous boycott upon every person having a name that seemed to be of German origin. There was a united movement to obtain some reparation for the Zeppelin raids. But the results were only trifling and the indignation died down with the passing days, British calmness soon succeeding the excitement of a moment.

Italian frontier towns became the goal of Austrian airmen on June 1, 1915. A half dozen persons were killed or injured and there was some property damaged. With warm weather and good flying conditions raids were in order every day.

On June 3, 1915, British aviators made a successful attack upon German airship sheds at Evere, Belgium. The same day French machines bombarded the headquarters of the crown prince in the Argonne, with what results never was definitely established, although there were reports that several high officers had been killed.

It was made known in London on June 3, 1915, that Great Britain and Germany had agreed to a plan for the protection of public buildings from air raids. According to this agreement hospitals, churches, museums, and similar buildings were to have large white crosses marked upon their roofs. Both governments pledged themselves to respect these crosses. Much



importance was attached to the idea at the time, but its effects were disappointing. The marks either were not readily perceivable from an aeroplane or the pilots did not trouble themselves too much about the crosses. Public buildings continued to suffer.

On the night of June 4, 1915, German dirigibles attacked towns at the mouth of the Humber, the port and shipping of Hardwich, in England. There were some casualties and considerable property loss, but the British Government would not make public the extent of the damage as the places attacked were of naval importance. Calais, on the French coast was raided the next day by two German airmen. There was one casualty. England's east coast was visited by Zeppelins on the night of June 6, 1915, twenty-four persons being killed and forty hurt. There was much damage, all details of which were suppressed.

Just after the break of day on June 7, 1915, a British monoplane was returning from a scouting trip over Belgium. At the same hour a Zeppelin flew homeward from the English coast. The two met between Ghent and Brussels. Four persons had been killed and forty injured during the night at Yarmouth and other near-by towns on the East channel coast. Raids had been frequent of late and the British pilot sensed the fact that this Zeppelin was one of the dreaded visitors. He was several miles away when the big aircraft hove into view. Uncertain for a few minutes how to proceed, he rose until he was two thousand feet above the Zeppelin. His maneuver was not appreciated at first, or the Zeppelin crew did not see him. There was no attempt either to flee or give battle.

But as the monoplane drew nearer it was sighted and a combat followed such as never was seen before. Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, a young Canadian who had not reached twenty-one years of age, matched his pygmy machine against the great aerial dreadnought. The fight started at a height of 6,000 feet. Lieutenant Warneford released his first bomb when about 1,000 feet above the Zeppelin. He saw it strike the airbag and disappear, followed by a puff of smoke. Because of the sectional arrangement this did not disable the airship. The

Lieutenant circled off and again approached the Zeppelin. Every gun was trained upon him that could be brought to bear. The wings of his machine were shattered many times, but he kept on fighting. When once more above the enemy craft, he released another bomb. It also struck the Zeppelin, but appeared to glance off.

The antagonists resorted to every conceivable ruse, one to escape, the other to bring down its quarry. All efforts of the Zeppelin commander to reach the height of his antagonist were defeated. His lone enemy kept above him. The battle varied from an altitude of 6,000 to 10,000 feet. Three other bombs struck the airship, and each time there was the telltale wisp of smoke.

The Zeppelin was mortally injured. Her commander turned to earth for refuge. Seeing this, Lieutenant Warneford came nearer. He had but one bomb left. Descending to within a few hundred feet of the airship, while its machine guns played upon him, he released this remaining bomb. It struck the Zeppelin amidship. There was a flash, a roar, and a great burst of smoke as the vanquished craft exploded and plunged nose downward. The rush of air caused by the explosion upset the equilibrium of the victorious machine, which dropped toward the ground and turned completely over before its pilot could regain control. The presence of mind which he showed at this juncture, was one of the most remarkable features of this remarkable conflict.

The young Canadian pilot righted his machine in time to see the Zeppelin end its career. Like a flaming comet it fell upon the convent of Le Grand Beguinage de Sainte Elizabeth, located in Mont Saint Amand, a suburb of Ghent. This convent was used as an orphanage. The burning airship set fire to several buildings, causing the death of two sisters and two children. The twenty-eight men aboard were killed. Accounts from Amsterdam a day or two later gave a vivid description of the charred remnants of the machine, the burned convent buildings, and the victims all piled together.

Lieutenant Warneford saw the Zeppelin fall and knew that its raiding days were over. Then he discovered that his own ma-

chine was in trouble. In another moment he realized the impossibility of returning to the British lines, and was compelled to volplane toward earth, cutting off his driving power. Descending in a soft field, he found that his motor was out of order. Thirty precious minutes were spent repairing the damage. It took him as long again to get his machine started, a task not often accomplished by one man. But he sailed serenely home and brought the news of his strange victory.

Within twenty-four hours Lieutenant Warneford was the hero of the world. His name and achievement had been flashed to the four corners of the earth. Every newspaper rang with acclaim for the boyish aviator who had shown that one man of skill and daring was a match for the huge Zeppelin. It was the old story of David and Goliath, of the Roman youth who bested the Gaul, of Drake's improvised fleet against the Armada. The lieutenant was called to London and presented with the Victoria Cross by King George, who thanked him in the name of the British Empire for adding another laurel to the long list of its honors. A day or two later President Poincaré received him in Paris and pinned the Legion of Honor cross upon his breast.

But this same week saw the climax of this war romance—a tragic ending to a war epic. Lieutenant Warneford was practicing with a new French machine at Versailles. He either lost control or the motor failed him. It dropped to earth, killing the pilot and an American newspaper correspondent who was in the observer's seat. This sudden end to a career so brilliant, the cutting off of a future so promising, cast a pall over the minds of both the French and British airmen. The body of Lieutenant Warneford lay in state at the French capital and afterward in London, where every honor was shown his memory.



## CHAPTER XXIII

## VENICE ATTACKED—OTHER RAIDS

BRITISH airmen visited Ghent on June 8, 1915, where several ammunition depots were fired. The railway station was hit and a number of German troops in a train standing there killed or hurt.

On June 9, 1915, Venice was shelled by Austrian aviators, bombs falling near St. Mark's and setting a number of fires. There were no casualties as far as known.

An Italian airship squadron raided Pola, the principal Austrian naval base, on June 14, 1915. Pola has one of the best harbors on the Adriatic and is an exceptionally strong position. It was from there that Austrian warships and aircraft made their attacks upon Italian and other allied shipping. The city had a big arsenal and miscellaneous war plants. The arsenal was struck by some of the bombs dropped during this raid, shipping in the harbor was bombarded, and one warship badly damaged. This was perhaps the most valuable accomplishment of the Italian air service in offensive actions up to that time. Contrary to what might be expected from the Latin temperament, Italy had confined herself to the use of aircraft for scouting purposes almost exclusively. The campaign in Tripoli had taught her their value, and she had not shown a disposition to bombard Austrian cities in reply to attacks upon her own people.

The visit of the Zeppelins to London had aroused not only the ire of Britain, but that of her French allies. It was decided to take reprisals. Forty-five French machines left the eastern border during the night of June 15, 1915, and set their journey toward Karlsruhe. Some of the craft were large battle planes; all of them had speed and carrying capacity. Approaching Karlsruhe they at first were taken for German machines, by reason of the location of Karlsruhe far from the front.

The squadron divided and approached the city from a half dozen different directions, dripping bombs as they came. One of

the largest chemical plants in Germany was set afire and burned to the ground. Both wings of the Margrave's Palace were struck and one of them practically ruined. In the opposite wing, which escaped with only slight damage, the Queen of Sweden, who is a German by birth, was sleeping. She was said to have missed death only by a few inches. Other titled persons in the palace had narrow escapes. A collection of art works was ruined. Despite the fire of antiaircraft guns the French machines hovered above the city and dropped bombs at will, again proving that there was no sufficient protection against air attacks except by flotillas of equal force.

Within a half hour flames started in many sections of the city. The chemical and other plants were burned. Karlsruhe's citizens were made to realize the losses which German airmen had inflicted upon the noncombatants of other countries. According to the best advices 112 persons were killed and upward of 300 wounded. The maximum number admitted by the Germans to have been injured was 19 killed and 14 wounded. But persons arriving in Geneva, for weeks after the raid, told of the wholesale destruction and large casualties. The victims were buried with honors, and the German Government issued a statement deploring the "senseless" attack. This was one of the few raids made by aviators of the allied powers in which the lives of non-combatants were lost. That it was a warning and not an adopted policy is indicated by the fact that it was not followed up with other raids.

Zeppelins were seen off the east coast of England about midnight on June 16, 1915. They left in their wake one of the longest casualty lists resulting from aerial raids upon England up to that time. South Shields was the principal sufferer. Sixteen persons were killed and forty injured. The Zeppelins devoted their attention to the big Armstrong works principally. Guns and munitions of almost every description were being made there, and the raid was planned to wreck the establishment. This attempt was partially successful, but the buildings destroyed soon were replaced and operations at the plant never ceased. The extent of the damage was kept secret, but the number

of victims again caused indignation throughout the British Empire.

One result of this raid was a demand in the House of Commons on June 24, 1915, that the public be informed as to defense measures against air raids. The Government had evaded the question at every opportunity, and up to that time kept discussion of the subject down to the minimum. But on this occasion the Commons were not to be easily disposed of, and insisted upon an answer. This was promised for a future day, but Home Secretary Brace announced that 24 men, 21 women, and 11 children had died as a result of attacks from the air since the war began. He said that 86 men, 35 women, and 17 children had been wounded. Of these a percentage died later. The secretary intimated that the Government was keeping a record of every pound's worth of damage and every person injured, with the expectation of making Germany reimburse.

The South Shields attack led to further expansion of the air service and redoubled measures to check the raiders. It seems likely that not a few aircraft have been captured about which the British Government made no report. What the motives for this secrecy are it would be hard to decide. But a guess may be hazarded that, as in the case of certain submarine crews, it is intended to charge some aviators and Zeppelin crews with murder after the war is over, and try them by due process of law. For a time the Government kept a number of men taken from submarines, known to have caused the loss of noncombatant lives, in close confinement. Germany retaliated upon army officers, and the British were compelled to retire from their position. It has been hinted that in the case of the Zeppelin raiders she had quietly locked up a number of them without announcing her purpose to the world.

The closing days of June, 1915, brought two raids on Paris. Taubes in one instance, and Zeppelins in another were held up by the air patrol and driven back, a few bombs being dropped on Saint Cloud. The work of the Paris defense forces was notably good during the summer of 1915, countless incursions being halted before the capital was reached.



What may have been intended as a raid equal to the Cuxhaven attack was attempted on July 4, 1915, but was foiled by the watchfulness of the Germans. Cruisers and destroyers approached German positions on an unnamed bay of the North Sea, and a squadron of British seaplanes rose from the vessels. German airmen promptly went aloft and drove off the invaders. The set-to took place near the island of Terschelling off the Netherlands. When convinced that the Germans were fully ready to meet them the British turned back and put out to the open sea. It was intimated from Berlin that a considerable naval force had been engaged on the British side. There was a good deal of mystery about the incident.

Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the British flying men during July, 1915, as concerns actual fighting, was the destruction of three Taubes at the mouth of the Thames. The invaders were sighted while still at sea and the word wirelessed ahead. Four British machines mounted to give battle, and after a stirring contest above the city brought down two of the Taubes. They were hit in midair, and one of them caught fire. The burning machine dropping headlong to earth furnished a spectacle that the watchers are not likely to forget. The third Taube was winged after a long flight seaward and sank beneath the waves, carrying down both occupants. This contest took place July 20, 1915, and followed several visits to England by Zeppelins, none of which had important results.

On July 21, 1915, French aviators made three conspicuous raids. A squadron of six machines descended upon Colmar in Alsace, dropping ninety-one shells upon the passenger and freight stations. Both broke into flames, and the former was almost wholly destroyed, tying up traffic on the line, the object of all attacks upon railroad stations, except at such times as troops were concentrated there or trains were standing on the tracks ready to load or unload soldiers.

The second raid of this day was especially interesting, because a dirigible and not an aeroplane was employed, the French seldom using the big craft so much favored by the Germans. Vigneulles and the Hatton Chattel in the St. Mihiel salient were

the objectives of the dirigible. A munition depot and the Vigneulles station were shelled successfully. The third air attack was made upon Challerange, near Vouziers, by four French aeroplanes. Forty-eight bombs were dropped on the station there, a junction point and one of the German lesser supply bases. The damage was reported to have halted reenforcements for a position nearby where the French took a trench section on this same day. Accepting the report as true, it exemplifies the unison of army units striving for the same purpose by remarkably different methods and weapons.

The French kept busy during this month of July, 1915, with raids upon Metz and intermediate positions. Metz is the first objective of what the French hope will be a march to the Rhine, and since the start of the war the Germans there have had no rest.

On July 28, 1915, Nancy was visited by a flock of Zeppelins and a number of bombs dropped which did considerable damage in that war-scarred city. Eleven or twelve persons were killed.

During the night of July 29-30, 1915, a French aviator shelled a plant in Dornach, Alsace, where asphyxiating gas was being made. Several of his bombs went home and a tremendous explosion took place that almost wrecked the machine. But the driver returned safely. An air squadron also visited Freiburg, so often the target of airmen, and released bombs upon the railway station.

French airmen were extremely active on July 29, 1915. One flotilla bombarded the railroad between Ypres and Roulers, near Passchendaele, tearing up the track for several hundred yards. German bivouacs in the region of Longueval, west of Combles, also were shelled from the air, and German organizations on the Brimont Hill, near Rheims, served as targets for French birdmen. A military station on the railway at Chattel was shelled, and the station at Burthecourt in Lorraine damaged. Forty-five French machines dropped 103 bombs on munition factories and adjoining buildings at Pechelbronn, near Wissemburg. The destruction was considerable. The station at Dettweiler was hit

by six bombs, and the same number fell upon an aviation shed there.

One of the most extensive series of raids by either the Allies or Germans since the beginning of the war took place on July 30, 1915. Wissemburg was raided by forty-five machines, probably the same squadron which shelled Pechelbronn the day before. This city sheltered a big petroleum works of immense value to the German army. It was set afire and at least a major part of the plant burned. The station at Chauny was shelled from the air, forty-four bombs released by ten machines. Chauny on the Oise, eighteen miles from Laon, also was used for concentration purposes, and furnished a prize mark for airmen. The War Office would not officially hazard a guess as to the damage wrought by the airmen's activities on the two days, but it must have amounted to several million dollars. The satisfaction of this loss was minimized for the French because one French city, held by the invader, was damaged.



## PART VI—POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WARRING COUNTRIES

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### CHAPTER XXIV

#### GREAT BRITAIN

THE wanton devastation of war laid its heavy hand on Europe during the second period of the terrible conflict—from February 1 to August 1, 1915. Political disruption and economic ruin threatened the belligerent nations. While the armies were locked in deadly determination on the battle fields, the scenes enacted in the secret chambers of government were even more crucial. Strong men sat at the tables of diplomacy and stayed the impending financial, economic, and political disasters with their genius. The complete story will be revealed in the years to come—probably after all the participants are dead—of how the genius of statecraft held the crumbling social structure from utter collapse while the Great War, like a gigantic Moloch, was devouring nearly \$50,000,000 in wealth and resources every twenty-four hours.

Let us first witness the scenes in Great Britain. The food situation was becoming critical. The Government turned its attention to a campaign against food supplies in Germany—the plan being to “starve out the Germans” and thus bring the war to an end.

On February 1, 1915, the British Government declared all shipments of foodstuffs to Germany as contraband. This was the answer to the German Government’s move to assume the disposition of all foodstuffs in the empire after February 1, 1915. The British Cabinet argued that from the standpoint in inter-

national law every food cargo to Germany was a war cargo and must be confiscated accordingly.

The rise in the prices of food had increased about 20 per cent by February 5, 1915. The greatest advances had been made in such prime necessities as sugar and eggs. These articles had more than doubled in price. Fish, a large food element in the dietary, had gone very high on account of the submarine warfare on the fishing fleets in the North Sea. Imported meat had advanced 15 to 20 per cent, while many middle-class families had cut their meat consumption by one-half.

On February 8, 1915, the House of Commons was called upon to provide the Government with what was called the "blank-check budget," the largest military budget in the history of England. The amount of actual money to be expended under this budget was represented by nominal or token figures. Not for two hundred years had the Government asked the House to give it a blank-check credit for any expenses. The vote was unanimous, granting supplies without limit for an army of 3,000,000 men, and to be accounted for when the war ended.

The problem of munitions began to worry Britain, and on February 9, 1915, it was announced that the Board of Trade had appointed Sir George Askwith, Sir Francis Hopwood, and Sir George Gibb to inquire into and report on the best steps to secure all the available productive power of the employees engaged in the engineering and shipbuilding establishments of the country, and to utilize them in the present emergency.

Canada, as a very important unit of the British Empire, was also to be made to feel the grip of the war-tax collector. On February 11, 1915, W. T. White, the Finance Minister, proclaimed a war-tax measure that brought the hand of the war deep into the pockets of the Dominion bank circulation. The business of loan and fire insurance companies were taxed. A stamp tax was put on checks, railway and steamship tickets, on telegraph and cable messages, and patent medicines. The customs tariff was raised, and the free list was wiped out.

Lloyd-George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, explained to the House of Commons on February 15, 1915, the arrangements that

he had been able to make in Paris with the Finance Ministers of France and Russia. He stated that for the year the aggregate expenditures of the Allies would not be far from \$10,000,000,000. The British Empire would spend considerably more than the other two great allies, probably from \$500,000,000 to \$750,000,000 more than the highest figures by the other great allies.

The failure to produce more munitions was ascribed to the prevalence of strikes and the temptation of drink. In a speech at Bangor on February 15, 1915, Lloyd-George said: "For one reason or another we are not getting all the assistance we have a right to expect from our works," and he added: "I say here solemnly that it is intolerable that the life of Britain should be imperiled for the matter of a farthing an hour, and drink is doing us more damage in the war than all the German submarines put together." Lord Kitchener mentioned the restrictions of the trade unions as another reason for inadequate output of munitions.

But there was another side to the high cost of living due to the war. On February 15, 1915, nearly everybody in Great Britain was at work or could get work and wages were rising. At the end of February unemployment among trade unionists amounted to only 1.6 per cent for the whole country. In the beginning of February the increase recorded by the Board of Trade amounted to \$89,445 per week or something like \$4,500,000 per year. The Board of Trade did not keep a record of wages paid outside of the regular trades; it was therefore estimated that the increase amounted to \$600,000 per week for the whole country. By April this increase in all lines of employment had amounted to \$667,685 per week, or nearly \$15,000,000 per year. In many lines the figures had jumped to \$942,225 per week, most of the increase being in the coal-mining industry. During the second six months of the war wages advanced \$1,970,000 per week, or \$10,000,000 per year. The greater part of this increase was paid in business and overtime work.

By the end of February, 1915, the British householder was paying ten shillings per ton more for coal than at the same time in the previous year. On February 25, 1915, a committee was ap-



pointed to inquire into the causes of the enormous rise in retail prices of coal sold for domestic use, especially to the poorer classes in the great centers of population. On April 1, 1915, this committee's report explained that the advance was partly due to a reduction in the output of coal, caused by the enlistment of large numbers of miners and a lack of shipping facilities. But the report added that coal was much too high and that the price should be regulated by the Government. The House of Parliament passed a measure regulating the price of coal, and placing an embargo on the shipping of coal to foreign countries outside of the allies of Great Britain.

Another factor that contributed to this appearance of national prosperity in England, during a war calling for an expenditure of \$15,000,000 per day, was the provision made for soldiers' dependents. On March 1, 1915, a law was passed allowing the wife of a soldier to receive 12s. 6d. per week with an additional sum for each child—5s. for the first, 3s. 6d. for the second, and 2s. for each succeeding child. Of this amount, 12s. 6d., the soldier provided 3s. 6d. from his pay. These allowances in the aggregate amounted to a large sum. In July, 1915, there were 850,000 married men in the army, and their wives were receiving \$5,000,000 per week. The war had actually brought fortune to the humble folks of Great Britain. They had more to eat and wear, and had a better time in the spring and summer of 1915 than they had ever had before.

The House of Commons unanimously voted on March 1, 1915, to appropriate for war expenditures, \$1,435,000,000, making the total vote for war expenditure to date \$3,235,000,000. The premier first asked for an appropriation of \$185,000,000 for the remainder of the period up to March 31, 1915. This was adopted without a dissenting vote. He then stated that the war expenditures were growing steadily, and that after April 1, 1915, they would probably average \$8,500,000 per day. He, therefore, asked for a second appropriation of \$1,250,000,000 subsequent to March 31, 1916.

The Defense of the Realm Act, passed at the outbreak of the war, authorized the Government to assume control over works

where war material was being manufactured. On March 9, 1915, Lloyd-George, on behalf of the Government, asked that the control of manufactories be extended to works capable of being used for such purpose. The power was unanimously granted, but Mr. Bonar Law described the "measure as the most drastic ever laid before Parliament."

The British Government in its blockade against Germany extended the articles of contraband by adding on March 12, 1915, the following articles to the absolute contraband list: Wood, woolen and worsted yarns, wool tops and nails, tin, chloride of tin, tin ore, castor oil, copper, iodine lubricants, hides, and all kinds of leather suitable for army purposes. Foodstuffs for animals were added to the list. The list included almost every article of food, metal or fiber or organic chemical essential to the making of war. But no neutral vessel was to be sunk or life forfeited, nor would cargoes be seized without payment.

On March 17, 1915, Lloyd-George informed a conference of labor leaders in London that the Government in taking charge of munition factories proposed to impose a limitation on the profits, and to ask the men to relax trade-union restrictions and put their whole strength in the work. But before doing this the chancellor suggested that a complete understanding was necessary between employers and workmen. He then proposed to the workmen that with a view of preventing a diminution of output by disputes no stoppage of work by strikes or lockout should take place on Government work. When a difficulty arose that could not be settled between employers and men, the matter should be referred to an imperial tribunal appointed by the Government on which labor should have equal representation with employers.

On March 29, 1915, Lloyd-George again warned the nation against the "lure of drink." He said that too many workmen were absenting themselves from their work in munition factories on account of drink, and this was responsible for a diminutive output. He favored very drastic measures to stop this loss of time, but none of his colleagues agreed with him. As will be seen later, this sturdy advocacy of abstinence from drink in carrying on war was later to bear fruit.

To encourage labor to become more patriotic in the war, Lord Derby announced on March 31, 1915, that the Government was planning to organize the dock workers of Liverpool under the name of the First Dock Battalion of the Liverpool Regiment. Plans were adopted to prevent further delays in handling war supplies. It had been made necessary by recent serious labor troubles on the Mersey. The battalion was made up of 2,000 union men who would be enlisted under military law, with army pay in addition to a guaranteed minimum wage of thirty-five shillings per week. Guarantees were given that the men would not be used in strike breaking. The men would voluntarily enlist to serve only at home.

In April and May, 1915, there was a sharp advance in the price of meat. Since the outbreak of the war the retail prices of food had risen 34 per cent. Beef and mutton had advanced 40 to 50 per cent, and fish 60 per cent. Bread in July, 1915, was nearly 40 per cent higher than a year before. The price of sugar had risen during the war period 68 per cent, and the supply was taken over by the Government. Tea rose 20 per cent, but that included the additional duty of 3d. per six pounds. Potatoes went up 19 per cent. The retail price of butter 19 per cent, and milk 11 per cent. It was stated that the cost of living in Great Britain at the end of one year of the war had increased about one-third, and there was an increase of about three shillings per week on an average in all wages. The increase in wages and the practical disappearance of all unemployment did not fully compensate for the advance in the cost of living. Coal, a very important element of life, was not included in the above calculation.

The Government on April 3, 1915, took possession of all motor-manufacturing plants in Scotland in accordance with the plan to accelerate the manufacture of all war material. These plants were at once set to work running night and day to furnish motor lorries for the transport department.

On April 15, 1915, an important committee under the chairmanship of Lloyd-George was completed to organize and speed up the supply of ammunition. The War Office appointed a committee, headed by Lord Kitchener, to cooperate with Lloyd-



George's committee; the latter informed these committees on April 24, 1915, that as much ammunition had been expended in the battle of Neuve Chapelle as in the whole Boer War; that the character of the ammunition had to be changed in the middle of the war; and that to secure supplies, subcontracts were given 3,000 firms. When it was found that they could not keep up the supplies the Government arranged to take over all the works suitable for the manufacture of munitions. As a result there had been a great increase in the output. If they took the figures 20 as representing the amount of artillery ammunition manufactured in August, 1914, it had risen to 388 in March, 1915. Lloyd-George added that Great Britain was supplying her allies with ammunition.

Up to April 13, 1915, more than 33,000 women had registered for special war service. The formation of Lord Derby's Dockers Battalion at Liverpool put an end to a serious strike of dock hands there on April 10, 1915. For some days this strike threatened to disorganize all shipping from the biggest port, next to London, in the United Kingdom, and seriously upset the plans of the War Office and the Office of Admiralty. The appearance of this uniformed battalion of dockers under Government direction turned the tide.

On April 15, 1915, the Government issued a circular announcing that in all departments of the British Government service employment was for the first time thrown open to women. All Government departments were urged to displace men employees of military age with women whenever possible, and it offered to obtain women substitutes for various clerical and other places.

Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, announced in the House of Commons on May 4, 1915, that the British Government had requisitioned the entire supplies of meat from Australia and New Zealand. That part of these supplies that would not be needed for the army would be sold to the civilian population of England in order to keep down prices.

After the sinking of the *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, a number of English peers, among them the Duke of Marlborough, Lord Rosebery, Lord Crewe, and Lord Landsdowne, representing the

English peers belonging to the Order of the Garter, petitioned King George to strike the names of the kaiser, the crown prince, and other German and Austrian royalties from the roll, intimating to his majesty that if this were not done all English K. G.'s would resign.

Sir Edgar Speyer resigned as a privy councillor on May 17, 1915, and asked that his baronetcy be revoked, declaring that because charges of disloyalty and treachery had been brought against him in the press and elsewhere, he felt it due his honor as a loyal British subject to retire from all public positions. Sir Edgar was born in Germany. A baronet cannot divest himself of his title, and King George having refused to revoke Sir Edgar's title, he left England for America on May 26, 1915. Sir Ernest Cassel, another Englishman born in Germany and a member of the Privy Council, published in the newspapers of May 19, 1915, a strong avowal of his patriotism for England, feeling that his silence might be misunderstood.

In the first six months of the war the great problem for Britain was the making of an army. But this problem had not been fully solved when another problem—the furnishing of the army with sufficient munitions—arose. During February, March, and April, 1915, Lloyd-George and Lord Kitchener had been, as was noted above, sounding the alarm on all occasions. But it was the news of May and June, 1915, from the trenches in France which the censor let slip into the press that was stirring up the cabinet and the country more than all the speeches on drink, strikes, and trade unions. An instance of this occurred on May 9, 1915, when the British troops made an attack upon Aubers Ridge, which resulted in failure and heavy loss. The long list of the casualties was published in the papers of May 14, 1915. The "Times" printed a dispatch from its correspondent in northern France, saying the attack failed because of want of a supply of high explosives. Five days later the "Times" said: "Men died in heaps upon Aubers Ridge because ten days ago the field guns were short, and gravely short, of high explosives."

This report came at a time when a radical divergence of opinions had arisen between Mr. Winston Churchill, the First

Lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, at the Admiralty Office, over the course of events at the Dardanelles. On Saturday, May 15, 1915, Admiral Fisher called on the prime minister in his office in Downing Street, tendered his resignation and convinced him that a change in the personnel of the cabinet had become absolutely necessary for a more efficient conduct of the war. On the following day, May 16, 1915, he decided to ask the leaders of the other political party to unite with him in forming a Coalition Government to carry on the war. In doing this, the unwritten British constitution did not oblige him to consult his colleagues, all of whom he asked on Monday, May 17, 1915, to tender him their resignations.

On May 18, 1915, the prime minister wrote to Mr. Bonar Law, the opposition leader, asking him and those associated with him "to join forces with us in a combined administration," and telling him that he also intended to ask the leaders of the Irish and Labor parties to participate. The prime minister gave his reason for taking this step in the following words: "After long and careful consideration, I have definitely come to the conclusion that the conduct of the war to a successful and decisive issue cannot be effectively carried on except by a cabinet which represents all parties of the state. Their common action," he added, "should be exclusively directed to the issues of the war."

Mr. Bonar Law accepted the invitation in the following words: "The considerations to which you refer have been present to the mind of Lord Landsdowne and myself. We have now communicated your views and gave invitations to our colleagues, and we shall be glad to cooperate with you in your endeavor to form a National Government."

On May 19, 1915, the prime minister announced in the House of Commons that the Coalition Government was in process of formation, but the prime minister and the secretary of state for foreign affairs in the old cabinet would retain their places in the new cabinet, that there would be no change in policy in the prosecution of the war to a successful termination, and that any reconstruction of the cabinet would be for the war and not after.

In the new cabinet, Mr Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and Lord



Kitchener retained their respective places as Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Secretary of State for War. Lloyd-George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, resigned his place to Mr. Reginald McKenna, and a new cabinet position of Minister of Munitions was created for him. Mr. A. J. Balfour took Mr. Churchill's place at the Admiralty Office. Mr. Bonar Law became Secretary of the Colonies, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain became Secretary for India. These were the more important positions in the new Government. Mr. John Redmond, the Irish home-rule leader, was offered a place; he declined it, but decided to give the new Government the support he had given the old one.

The new cabinet contained twenty-two members, two more than the old one, and the opinion of the British press and public was that it was too big and unwieldy, and would spend too much time in discussion for an efficient war cabinet. Besides it contained only one soldier, Lord Kitchener. All of its other members were civilians.

Thus out of the munitions crisis had sprung this Coalition Government for Great Britain on May 25, 1915. The novel feature of it was the new position, the ministry of munitions, to which Lloyd-George was appointed. A bill establishing the new ministry became a law on June 9, 1915. But the new minister had not waited for the passage of this law before getting to work. After organizing his department he made a tour around the country. At Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, and elsewhere he preached from the same text. "The war was a war of munitions. We were short of munitions and we could only hope for victory by turning out more and more munitions. For this we required all the industry, all the labor, and all the strength, power, and resources of every one to the utmost."

On May 23, 1915, Lloyd-George was back in Parliament introducing his bill for increasing the output of munitions. This, called the Munitions of War Act, provided "for furthering the efficient manufacture, transport, and supply of munitions for the present war and purposes incidental thereto." The task involved was a big one.

In the midst of this coalition cabinet making, there arose a newspaper controversy over Lord Kitchener. The "Times" and the "Daily Mail" attacked the competency of the war minister in very fierce language. This attack provoked an upheaval of popular sentiment in favor of Lord Kitchener. The members of the Stock Exchange held an excited meeting, and publicly burned copies of the "Times" and the "Daily Mail" in the street. The next day the "Daily Mail" returned to the attack in this language: "Our men, as we have high authority for saying, are being killed and wounded largely, but not entirely, because we have the wrong kind of shell." The next day King Albert of the Belgians conferred on Lord Kitchener the Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold, the highest in Belgium.

On June 15, 1915, the House of Commons voted another war credit of \$1,250,000,000, making with the previous sums \$4,310,000,000 already allowed for war purposes. Premier Asquith told the House that the country was then spending \$15,000,000 per day for the war. This great increase of expenditure was due to the extension of the area of the war and Britain's new allies.

On June 21, 1915, the House voted to authorize an indefinite war loan not to exceed \$5,000,000,000. On June 14 the House had authorized the second war loan of \$1,000,000,000, the first war loan of \$1,500,000,000 having been authorized in November, 1914. The indefinite loan included and had increased the second war loan from \$1,000,000,000 to \$5,000,000,000. The whole amount issued bore 4½ per cent, and was sold at par, and was redeemable in thirty years. The terms of the loan created great surprise everywhere. This great loan following the second loan was not so soon expected. Special interest attached to the arrangement whereby it was made possible for the public to purchase five shillings' worth of this loan at post offices, trade unions, etc. These five-shilling vouchers were made negotiable, and could be sold at any time. They bore interest at 5 per cent per annum, payable monthly. This interest was made subject to the income tax. The London "Statist" estimated in this connection that the revenue from taxation would yield about

\$20,000,000 per week, but the country was expending for war for itself and its allies and for other purposes the sum of \$102,500,000 per week, therefore it must borrow \$82,500,000 per week to make up the deficit.

Lloyd-George, the Minister of Munitions, in explaining his munition measure in the House of Commons on June 23, 1915, said the bill made strikes and lockouts illegal; provided for compulsory arbitration; gave power to fine "slackers"; limited the profits of employers, and created a volunteer army of workers pledged to go whenever they were wanted. The minister of munitions gave British trade unionists seven days in which to make good the promise of their leaders that the men would rally to the factories in sufficient number to produce a maximum supply of munitions of war. The union representations engaged 180 town halls as recruiting offices. There would be no age limit to the men enrolled. They would not wear uniforms, but would have to give their full time to the work, and they would receive a certificate attesting that they were working for king and country.

The trade-union leaders on June 26, 1915, issued a manifesto to their fellow unionists. They said: "We are faced with great responsibility, and at the same time are presented with a magnificent opportunity. We are called upon to assist in saving our nation and its allies who are fighting for civilization and international law, as against barbarism and brute force."

After directing attention to the serious shortage of munitions in the British and Russian armies, the manifesto appealed to "every skilled workman of the engineering and allied trades, who is not at present engaged upon war work, enroll himself as a volunteer in the hour of need, demonstrate to his comrade in the trenches and to the whole world that British trade unionism stands for all that is best in national life, national freedom, and in national security." The manifesto was signed by Arthur Henderson, chairman of the Labor party in the House of Commons and other labor leaders.

On June 30, 1915, Lloyd-George's seven days of grace to trade unionists—to make good their pledge that they prove they were



able to supply the needed munitions workers without recourse to compulsion—expired. The enrollments were highly satisfactory.

Under the Defense of the Realm Act a board was set up on July 1, 1915, and to it was entrusted the duty of controlling the sale of intoxicating liquors in the munitions transport and camp areas. By proclamation it could prohibit in whole or in part the sale of drink in any area, and restrictions were applied to important areas in England. In Scotland two large areas were proclaimed. The hours for selling liquor were restricted to four and a half per week. These measures at once increased the output in munitions and stimulated recruiting.

The total subscription to the war loan amounted to \$3,000,000,000 on July 13, 1915, according to a statement of Reginald McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the House of Commons. This was far and away the largest amount of money that had ever been subscribed on a single loan in the history of the world, and the subscriptions had come from nearly 1,000,000 persons.

Another vote of credit of \$750,000,000 was given in the House of Commons on July 20, 1915. This made the grand total for the war since the first vote of credit on August 5, 1914, \$5,060,000,000. This last vote would tide the country over the period of the Parliamentary recess.

An invention board composed of scientists was organized on July 4, 1915, with Lord Fisher as chairman to combat German ingenuity in warfare. After upward of a fortnight's work the 600 bureaus which were opened when the Minister of Munitions, Lloyd-George, gave labor the opportunity voluntarily to enroll as munition operators, closed July 12, 1915, with a total registration of 90,000 men. Registrations thereafter were carried out through the labor exchanges.

The woman's parade since the outbreak of the war was held in London on July 17, 1915, under the direction of the Woman's Social and Political Union, of which Mrs. Emeline Pankhurst was the leader. This parade was held in celebration of the promise of Mr. Lloyd-George, the Minister of Munitions, to receive a delegation of women anxious to serve the country as shell makers and in other capacities.

Sixteen national munition factories had been set up in England, and after consultation with the French ministry ten more were established according to an announcement made by the minister of munitions in the House of Commons on July 28, 1915. The minister then said the output of shells would be doubled in a few weeks. Thus we may see that the domestic problems in Great Britain were fully as important as the situations of the armies on the battle fields.

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## CHAPTER XXV

### GERMANY

WHAT are the like conditions as we turn toward Germany. The supreme question in Germany at the beginning of the second six months of the war was how to increase and conserve the food supply to make it last till the new harvest on August 1, 1915. The price of bread had risen from week to week, and had so alarmed the Imperial Government that on February 1, 1915, it instituted a practical state monopoly of breadstuffs by commandeering the remaining grain supply in order to put a peremptory stop to "bread rising" on the part of speculating farmers and millers. The monopoly was enforced by means of two separate agencies—a semiofficial "War Grain Company," which was clothed with arbitrary, confiscating, price-regulating and policing powers over grain stores, and by the establishment of bread rations, whereby the public could obtain bread only on presentation of "bread cards." The daily allowance per person was at first fixed at 225 grammes (nearly 8 ounces). Later on the allotment was decreased to 200 grammes (about  $6\frac{3}{4}$  ounces). Local communities were furnished breadstuffs by a war-grain company on the population basis, and charged with the duty of distributing it to the people at so much per capita, children receiving less than adults.

Never was a system more rigidly enforced. People at restaurants and cafés could be served with bread only upon showing bread cards, and even strangers were required after the first two or three meals to furnish cards. It was on February 23, 1915, that the "bread-ticket" system went into effect throughout the empire. On that morning every German received a ticket entitling him to his supply. All members of the imperial household were included in the distribution. The Government knew to an ounce how much bread the people now ate daily. The allied hotels association and restaurants of Berlin began charging for bread.

In the meantime the German Government presented figures to show that the country was enjoying a healthy financial condition. Especially was this true of the Prussian budget for 1915, according to figures given out on February 4, which showed ordinary receipts of \$1,188,500,000 and ordinary expenditures of \$1,130,750,000. But there had been a heavy slump in income-tax receipts in Prussia for the fiscal year amounting to \$10,000,000. Expenditures on railroads for the year had decreased \$13,500,000.

By March 10, 1915, the Imperial Government had such a strong grip on the bread situation that it was announced with confidence that the country with simplicity could live on till harvest days in the summer of 1915. But there was discovered a shortage of wheaten flour, and the Government took drastic measures now to make it last. Bakers and householders were required to mix a large percentage of rye flour with wheaten flour. This measure was carried even further, requiring bakers and householders to mix potato meal with wheaten and rye flour in the baking of bread, rolls, and even pastry, and any infraction of this rule was punishable by a heavy fine and imprisonment.

But the Germans found that the available stores were fast vanishing, owing to the necessity of using potatoes as fodder for pigs, Russian fodder imports being no longer available. On March 12, 1915, an Imperial Potato Distributing Bureau was organized in Berlin, and went to work on the basis of a national census of stock on hand. Prices were arbitrarily fixed, confiscation was legalized, and retail dealers were instructed to peddle



out their supplies on a fixed per capita scale. It was eventually learned that there were more potatoes on hand than at first calculated, and while state control of them was not relinquished, regulations for distribution and prices were gradually relaxed.

But even in February and March, 1915, Germany was actually worse off for meat than for breadstuffs and potatoes. As late as June 1, 1915, economists were predicting that only by a miracle could the country be saved from a "meat famine." The Government had in January, 1915, required local communities of over 5,000 inhabitants to purchase and store preserved and smoked meats to the extent of \$3.75 per head of the population, but this had not made the meat situation secure. In February and March, 1915, no fresh meat was reaching the market. That which had been already slaughtered was being doled out on some more or less rigid ration system to butchers and customers under the demand, and the prices were correspondingly high.

The Government realized with all its stringent regulations of food distribution that the reasons must be made to stare the people in the face on all sides. In all hotels, restaurants and cafés, in all public buildings and offices, and in all railway trains and street cars the following notice with ten food commandments appeared on March 1, 1915: "Germany is Standing Against a World of Enemies Who Would Destroy Her."

"I. They will not succeed in defeating our glorious troops, but they wish to storm us out like a besieged fortress. They will also fail in that because we have enough breadstuffs in the country to nourish our population till the next harvest, but nothing must be wasted. II. Breadstuffs must not be used as fodder. III. Therefore, be economical with bread in order that our foes may be confounded. IV. Respect the daily bread, then will we have it always, may the war last ever so long. V. Teach these maxims also to thy children. VI. Do not despise even a single piece of bread because it is no longer fresh. VII. Do not cut off a slice more than thou needest to eat. Think always of our soldiers who, in some far-off, exposed position, would rejoice to have the bread which thou wasted. VIII. Eat war bread. It is recognizable by the letter 'K.' It satisfies and

nourishes as thoroughly as any other kind. If all eat it, we do not need to be anxious as to whether we shall always have bread. IX. Whoever first peels potatoes before cooking them wastes much. Therefore, cook potatoes with the jackets on. Thou savest thereby. X. Leavings of potatoes, meat, vegetables, etc., which thou canst not use, throw not away, but collect them as fodder for cattle. Such leavings will be gladly called for by the farmers."

The prices of food on May 1, 1915, in Berlin were 65 per cent higher than they were in July, 1914. The most marked advances were in the prices of beef, bacon, mutton, pork, and lentils, which had more than doubled in price. Potatoes, rye bread and rye flour had declined slightly in price.

Vice Chancellor Delbrück, German Minister of the Interior, in addressing the Budget Committee of the Interior, May 14, 1915, said: "Wheat for bread for the current year is not only sufficient, but there is a greater reserve than was anticipated. Even unforeseen eventualities, such as fire or a delay in the harvest would not embarrass us. Concerning potatoes, all statistics are wrong. The stores are so great that there is no question of a potato famine. Pig breeding should not be further restricted. The manufacture of smoked-meat products should not be further continued." From January 1, 1915, to the above date Germany had slaughtered 14,000,000 pigs to save her potatoes and grain.

On May 29, 1915, the Berlin authorities to still further prevent the waste of food supplies authorized the following new rules for restaurants to become effective June 1, 1915:

First: Table d'hôte meals are abolished; in the future only special orders will be filled. Second: The larger use of vegetables and restricted use of meat must be encouraged. Third: Less roast meat and more boiled meat must be offered. Fourth: The use of fat must be decreased. Fifth: The use of potatoes must be limited to the lowest degree possible; only boiled and fried potatoes may be served. Furthermore, the police will introduce new regulations for the serving of meals, and they will forbid the presence in restaurants of neutral papers not friendly to Germany.

Herr Delbrück on June 5, 1915, informed the Prussian Diet that the food problem had been solved, and that a considerable surplus would be carried over into the coming harvest year. An inventory of the supplies of flour showed a surplus of 6,965,929 double hundredweights. Potato statistics of May 15, 1915, were similarly favorable, the supply being on a level with that of normal times. On the same day the Prussian Minister of Agriculture informed the Diet that German troops had planted 80 per cent of the arable land of the occupied territory in Belgium and France with grain and potatoes. He also stated that a great deal of the arid land in Germany never before exploited for agriculture was then under cultivation, and that the problem of agricultural labor had been solved by sending to the fields Germany's 1,700,000 war prisoners.

The military authorities of Bavaria on July 7, 1915, issued an ordinance providing for a maximum of one year's imprisonment for dealers charging excessive prices for articles of daily consumption, including food and heating and lighting substances. A similar penalty would be inflicted on those withholding stocks from sale in order to produce higher prices, and on retailers refusing to sell to intending purchasers.

On July 24, 1915, the Federal Council of the Empire issued an order regulating prices for necessities of life, especially grain and fodder. Corn prices remained at about the same figure as heretofore. The price of rye was fixed at \$55 per ton for the Berlin district; at \$54.10 for the eastern district, and \$57.20 for the western district. The price of wheat at \$65 per ton, and beginning with a certain date, the price of wheat was to increase biweekly 33 1-3 cents per ton. Barley and oats were sold at a uniform price throughout the empire, and these prices remained below the average 1914 figures. An Imperial Fodder Board was also provided for, whose duties should be to provide all classes of cattle, swine, and fowl raisers with oats, barley and molasses substitutes.

German efficiency and economic resourcefulness in meeting grave problems made itself evident throughout the spring and summer of 1915. She was often perplexed, but proved herself



resourceful in finding those other necessities to conduct the war, such as copper, petroleum, cotton, and rubber. With the assumption of the regulation and distribution of foodstuffs on February 1, 1915, the Imperial Government issued an order directing that all stocks of copper, lead, tin, nickel, antimony, and aluminum be reserved for the use of the army. The German Empire is extremely poor in copper, not having enough of the ore available to supply one-twentieth of the country's normal needs in time of fever. At that time both the Teutonic empires had been cut off from the Galician mines by the Russian invasion, as well as from the oil fields of that district. The conserving of these metals solely for the army was taken in anticipation of British tightening of her blockade and the extension of her contraband policy. But when Galicia was reconquered, to supply the market again, a great deal of copper was commandeered from German factions and households.

Cotton was the raw material which gave Germany most concern. She imported \$100,000,000 worth from the United States annually. The British Government had excluded cotton from the contraband list, and Germany was able through neutral sources to get much cotton, but not enough for the greatly increased needs of her army. In May the German Government restricted the use of cotton for strictly commercial purposes, and a "War Cotton Committee" was appointed, headed by the president of a leading cotton-spinners federation. So scarce was cotton that on June 30, 1915, the military commandant of the province of Branderberry, in which Berlin is situated, issued an order, effective August 1, prohibiting the manufacture of fabrics wholly or chiefly cotton for nearly all ordinary purposes, such as articles of clothing, bed sheets, pillow slips, and tablecloths.

Germany's success in financing the war in the second six months surprised the world hardly less than the ability she demonstrated in feeding herself. Dr. Karl Helfferich, the Chancellor of the Imperial Treasury, submitted his budget report on March 10, 1915. The budget balanced at \$3,250,000,000, four times greater than any estimate ever before presented. Dr. Helfferich asked the Reichstag for a further war credit of

\$2,500,000,000 to insure financing the war until the late autumn. There was no need to impose new taxes, he said, for the Government was financing the war requirements exclusively by loans and note issues. The demands of the empire on the Imperial Bank he said, had again approached the culminating point, but the bank would be relieved by the second war loan which was now being offered to the public.

The first and second war loans aggregated the huge sum of \$3,625,000,000. This sum the chancellor estimated would tide the country through a year of the war or up to August 1, 1915. On April 16, 1915, it was announced in Berlin that \$1,510,000,000 or 67 per cent of the total amount of the second war loan had been paid into the Treasury. The small subscriptions of \$250 each, and amounting to \$840,000,000 or 37 per cent of the loan, had been paid in less than forty days after the loan had been offered to the public. The Imperial Treasury officials were very proud of this "magnificent showing" of the German public. The second loan had been issued at 5½ per cent, but no mention was made as to how the script was to be redeemed by the Government. That, said Dr. Helfferich, was a matter to be determined after the war.

That Germany was financially solid eleven months after the war, it was pointed out by German newspapers that the Imperial Bank on July 1, 1915, contained \$600,000,000 in gold. How much paper money was in circulation in the country was not stated, but the "Frankfurter Zeitung," the empire's leading commercial organ, said that the "German financial system rested not on any tangible security, but on confidence. Germany expected to win the war and make her enemies pay the piper."

The war had its full share of social reprisals. When the kaiser learned that King George had expelled him from the Order of the Garter he deprived the king and other British royalties on May 16, 1915, of the Order of the Black Eagle.

In June, 1915, many of the German people had evidently become desirous of peace, and there was some surprise that no evidence of this feeling was to be found in any of the enemy countries. The official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" de-

clared on June 24, 1915, that notwithstanding reports to the contrary, during the whole war no hostile government had approached Germany directly or indirectly with peace offers.

Herr Braun, a Socialist deputy, made a speech in the Prussian Diet on June 25, 1915, in which he said: "It would be a calamity for Germany to carry out the annexation ideas recommended by certain interested groups. Such a policy is rejected by the Socialist party. The German people want no conquest, but peace without humiliation or violence." The next day the "Vorwaerts" of Berlin, the chief organ of the Socialist-Democratic party, published a full-page article by direction of the Managing Committee of the party, calling for a "peace which would make possible friendship with neighboring nations." For this publication the paper was suppressed.

Reviewing the war at the end of a year on July 31, 1915, the Berlin papers pointed out that not only all the territories of the Central Empire were practically free from the invaders, but the German armies occupied nearly 20,000 square miles in France and Belgium, and over 60,000 square miles in Russian territory.

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## CHAPTER XXVI

### R U S S I A

WE will now look upon the domestic situation in Russia during the second six months of the war. Russia, like England, had a grave munitions problem to contend with, but with this difference: Russia was without England's industrial organization and skilled workmen. She had neither the plants nor the engineers through whom she could for a long time hope to manufacture sufficient war material for her huge army. She must buy the great bulk of this material from abroad. The Dardanelles and the Baltic were closed to her, and during the winter months her needs could be met from abroad over only the long, single-track Siberian railway to the East.



During the summer of 1915 her only other channel for receiving goods from abroad was the Arctic port of Archangel. It was because of the great pressure of Government shipping on this port that the Russian Minister of Commerce announced on May 15, 1915, that no private cargoes would be handled there in the immediate future. All the facilities of the port would be required for Government services for the months of June, July, and August, 1915.

On June 3, 1915, the Russian Government began the construction of a railroad to cost \$8,500,000 from Kandalaska in the province of Archangel across the Kola Peninsula to the port of Kola on the Arctic Ocean. This new line would connect the Arctic with the railroad system of Russia, and give another outlet to a Russian seaport in the north. The port of Archangel is over 300 miles farther south than Kola. This enterprise was wholly due to the war, and showed the great necessity for Russia to get better facilities even to the Arctic Sea.

On June 30, 1915, a board of munitions was formed in Petrograd with unlimited power and authority to spend money. The board was headed by the minister of war. Its membership was made up of the president of the Duma, four members of the Imperial Council, and four representatives of industry and commerce. It was responsible only to the czar, who in giving the order for its creation announced his intentions to continue the war to a victorious conclusion, and summoned all Russians to devote themselves to the task.

Russia was fortunate on February 1, 1915, in having a reserve of over \$800,000,000 of gold in her Government bank. She possessed more gold than any of the other warring nations, and on that date had \$300,000,000 more than had Germany. Because of her inability to export her vast stores of raw material to her neighbors, her ruble exchange sank frightfully in the spring and summer months on the London and New York markets, but she could reach back and bolster up her paper rubles with her huge pile of gold.

But a government is financially strong or weak as its people are prosperous, or the reverse. Russia was never so prosperous

in all her past as she became after the beginning of the war, if her increased thrift and deposits in savings banks are to be taken as evidence. Among the nations of Europe the Russian people were notorious for the want of thrift. But prohibition and the war changed these conditions according to the report on April 3, 1915, of the American Consul, North Winship, at Petrograd. In 1913, the Russian people had only \$17,500,000 in all their savings banks. In 1914 they had \$43,260,000 on deposit. In December, 1913, they deposited \$361,000; in December, 1914, they deposited \$14,087,000; the first two weeks in January, 1914, they deposited \$155,000; the first two weeks in January, 1915, \$7,880,000. It was estimated that the deposits for January, 1915, were at least \$15,000,000, and the deposits for the second six months of the war were at least \$100,000,000 or more than \$200,000,000 for the year 1915.


In accounting for this remarkable increase of savings deposits, the consul mentioned the following causes: The prohibition of the sale of vodka (among the poor) the stoppage of importation of foreign articles of luxury; the curtailment in private entertaining as well as the restaurant and cabaret business; the severe retrenchment in the imperial theatres; the reduction in the size of families on account of absence due to army service; the employment of women who are not usually wage earners in hospital work; charity funds collected in advance for the relief of soldier's families of the great numbers of reserve officers.

In all Government institutions and most large private firms and companies men called to the colors as reserve officers received half their regular salaries; paid directly to their wives. The wives of reserve officers employed by the Government also received 15 cents per day (called "dinner money") and a rent allowance. These sums, combined with the regular pay received by the husband according to his rank, increase the family budget, after doubling it over its normal figure. Sick and wounded officers also received special allowances if they needed other medical attendance than that offered in the regular hospitals.

Russia financed the war by the issue of short loans, Treasury bills, and a loan redeemable in forty-nine years. She consider-

AIR RAIDERS  
AND VIEWS IN  
EAST AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA

SEAPLANES AND ZEPPELINS · A GUN AT THE MOMENT OF  
FIRE · AUSTRALIAN TROOPS · EAST AFRICAN TRENCHES



Debris scattering at the moment the shell rushes through the air. The gun is fired by British sailors intrenched ashore somewhere in the Near East






Copyright, Underwood & Underwood

While the sailors are embarking, a seaplane is being swung aboard this battleship, which is provided with a landing platform for these scouts of the air



Copyright, Feature Photo Service

German soldiers operating a powerful searchlight on the coast of Flanders.  
The light has a radius of eight miles



Copyright, American Press Association

A stern view of the French dirigible "Speiss," showing its elevators and rudders.  
Th's airship somewhat resembles a German Zeppelin





Copyright Underwood & Underwood

The crater made by the explosion of a French mine under the German lines, showing the debris of the shattered trenches





Copyright, Brown Bros.

The metal framework of a Zeppelin. When a dirigible is wrecked in the air, its gas flashes into flame, and only a shapeless mass of metal remains when the airship reaches the ground





Copyright, Underwood & Underwood

Australian troops, the volunteers from New South Wales, passing through Martin Place, Sydney on their way to embark for the Dardanelles





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German soldiers intrenched in German East Africa, awaiting the invasion of the colony by the South African forces under General Smuts





Copyright, American Press Association

The eyes of the fleet—a British naval hydroaeroplane alighting on the water. The aviation service is now an indispensable arm of the navy

ably increased taxation, for she had to make up a deficit of \$500,000,000, caused by the prohibition in the trade of vodka.

On May 12, 1915, the Government instructed the Minister of Finance to issue a second internal loan of \$500,000,000. These two internal loans aggregated \$1,000,000,000, and were run for forty-nine years. The second loan was taken up within a month, and the bulk of it was subscribed by the Russian people.

On July 3, 1915, the finance minister was instructed to make two issues of Treasury obligations of \$250,000,000 each. The issues to be in the shape of 5 per cent short-term notes, free of income tax. The issues were to be made in denominations of \$50 upward. This low denomination was planned to make the loan popular, and it was quickly floated. The issue was to run for six months, beginning July 3, 1915.

When the first six months of the war ended the Duma was closing its short term at Petrograd in the midst of an agitation for the extension of popular rights that never would have been permitted except for the war. The war had given strength and a new life to two powerful organizations among the people. The Territorial Assembly League and the League of Cities. The leagues had put into the mouths of the people in 1915 the shiboleth: "The Russian people in this war are fighting for their own liberty as well as for the liberty of Europe."

The Russian Government in its determination to show Poland that the czar spoke in good faith when he promised through the Grand Duke Nicholas to give the Poles autonomy, promulgated on April 7, 1915, a law for local municipal self-government for all Polish towns.

The language question was settled by requiring that all correspondence with state departments outside of Poland must be written in Russian. Replies addressed to Polish municipal departments in Russia must be in Russian. Municipal placards and notifications must be in both languages. Debates might be in either language, but must be explained to any member who did not understand the language. Minutes of meetings must be in both languages and any case of disputed interpretation must be explained in Russian. The Municipal Government

granted was equivalent to that enjoyed in Russian towns. Particular care had been taken to give the Jewish population of Poland which was larger than to be found anywhere else in the world, some degree of representation.

On June 25, 1915, the Russian Council of Ministers decided to appoint a commission composed of six Russians and six Poles under the presidency of Premier Goremykin, to deal with the preliminaries necessary to carrying into effect autonomy for Poland, which was proclaimed by Grand Duke Nicholas on August 14, 1914.

In May and June, 1915, there was a very large number of war refugees in the Warsaw district, the greater part of these by far were Jews. These refugees were receiving about \$500,000 per month from a Jewish Central Committee in Warsaw and from local committees in Galicia and other parts of Poland. Much of the money was being contributed from America.

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## CHAPTER XXVII

### FRANCE

THE political and economic situation in France from February to August, 1915, was met with determination and genius. The great economic fact that stared France in the face was that 5,250,000 acres or 3.7 per cent of the area of the republic comprising more than one-seventh of its agricultural and industrial wealth was still in the hands of the enemy. It was valued at nearly \$3,000,000,000. Because of this fact the Government was obliged to continue to support a host of refugees and it felt itself bound to compensate many of those who had lost their property through the invasion. Moreover, the farmers were compelled to reduce their acreage at a time above all others when every acre was needed.

The following events show how economically serious the invasion was to the republic. On February 3, 1915, \$60,000,000



were appropriated by a decree, to be applied to individual indemnities for damages to property caused by the German occupation. The French Government was held to have adapted the principle of such indemnities, though heretofore no law authorized them. In June, 1914, when there was no thought of war this question of indemnity for destruction of property through invasion came up in a bill before the Chambers, but action on it was postponed, but now the Chambers were moved to make the bill a law.

On February 6, 1915, 2,116,000 persons made application to the Government for aid. Through the months of February, March and April, 1915, the Government supported on an average 1,857,000 persons with a daily allowance of \$780,000. The war had reduced nearly one-twentieth of the population to a condition of subsistence on public charity. A very large percentage of this number was made up of refugees from the invaded territory.

The Ministry of Agriculture reported that France had less corn, fodder, beets, sugar beets and potatoes under cultivation on June 1, 1915, than June 1, 1914, notwithstanding the fact that immense areas of idle land had been put under the plow in 1915. The acres in grape cultivation had fallen off tremendously, for the German army held one of the chief wine districts of France.

Although all the seaports had remained open, a report on February 3, 1915, showed that both imports and exports had for the first six months of the war fallen off from 75 to 100 per cent. France's foreign trade had dropped off a billion dollars within these months. The parcel post business had declined from \$113,200,000 in 1913 to \$69,400,000 in 1914 and the country's foreign trade had lost \$796,670,418 in six months of the war and there was a decrease of 11,358 vessels of 13,140,176 tons in the arrivals and departures from ports during that period.

But the war had even more noticeably affected the birth rate of the country than it had its industry and finance. Before the war there was a daily average of 1,000 births. According to a report issued on July 1, 1915, the birth rate had fallen to 700 per day in January and February, 1915. In the week from June 6 to 12, 1915, there were only 356 births in the entire country. The death toll in battle during all these weeks of the

second six months of the war far exceeded the births. This fact affected the future man power of France more than it did any of the other belligerent countries.

Toward the latter end of the first year of the war industry and trade began to improve. On March 12, 1915, according to a statement by M. Ribot, the Minister of Finance, the war had been financed partly by treasury bonds, \$775,000,000 of which had been issued. These bonds were rapidly taken up and distributed through all classes, and for them the peasant and the small tradesman brought out his stack of gold from the stocking foot. On March 9, 1915, the Government extended the moratorium to June 30th. This extension, it was believed, was sufficient to protect the credit of the country.

Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on March 18, 1915, on the proposal to increase the Treasury Bonds to \$900,000,000, M. Ribot, Minister of Finance, said: "At the end of 1914 the monthly expenses were \$200,000,000. The expenditures during the first months of 1915 have been \$250,000,000 to \$260,000,000 per month, rather nearer the latter figure." In analyzing the Treasury operations in 1914, M. Ribot said that the Government had asked for \$720,000,000 of the Bank of France and \$240,000,000 by public subscriptions, while in 1915 the Bank of France had supplied about \$200,000,000 and the country had furnished \$500,000,000. The National Defense Bonds, he said, had yielded \$772,000,000 up to March 12, 1915.

The French Senate on March 30, 1915, passed the bill from the Chamber of Deputies providing for the advancing to Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, as friends of the Allies the sum of \$270,000,000. This was according to arrangement made by the Finance Ministers of Great Britain, France and Russia in their recent meeting in Paris.

The Minister of Finance (Ribot) asked Parliament on May 19, 1915, to vote a war credit of \$220,000,000 being an additional appropriation for the second six months of the war. The appropriation was granted, bringing the total votes of credit for this period of war up to \$1,700,000,000. On June 3, 1915, he asked for a provisional appropriation of \$1,120,000,000. This ap-

appropriation was intended for the third quarter of 1915, the months of July, August and September. The Chamber of Deputies voted this credit on June 25, by 402 to 1. Including the appropriation already made the total for the thirteen months of the war up to September 3, 1915, amounted to \$4,800,000,000.

The Bank of France was compelled on July 6, 1915, to appoint six receiving tellers to take in gold offered in Exchange for notes in consequence of the invitation to the public to turn in its private hoards of gold so as to strengthen the national reserve. The certificates given for the gold were inscribed to the effect that the exchange was made for "national defense." Paper due the Bank of France to the amount of \$446,600,000 was taken up although the moratorium was still in force. These facts demonstrated, said one deputy, that the French people would sacrifice every franc they possessed in the war.

A decree was published on July 8, 1915, prohibiting the export of gold save by the Bank of France, as it had been found that gold which had been exported had not been destined always for a neutral country in settlement of accounts.

The war had restrained the tendency to drink in all the belligerent countries and in France, only less than in Russia. The manufacture and sale of absinthe had been legally prohibited during the first months of the year 1915, and on March 14, 1915, the general commanding the Fifth Army issued orders that troops would be allowed no more alcohol than that which was distributed as rations. Soldiers were forbidden to buy alcoholized liquors or to procure or accept them. They might buy hygienic drinks at wine shops between noon and two o'clock and again between the hours of five and seven o'clock under the supervision of noncommissioned officers. Civilians providing alcohol to soldiers would be expelled to the interior of the country. Wine dealers who sold alcohol to soldiers would have their establishments closed up on the second offense.

General Gallieni, the Military Governor of Paris, extended this rule by issuing an order on July 16, 1915, forbidding the purchase by or sale to soldiers or officers of whatever grade in the intrenched camp of Paris of any alcoholic liquors whatever.



Offenders would be cited to appear before police courts and military tribunals and liquor dealers violating this order would be punished by a temporary suspension of their license on the first offense and the revoking of their license on the second offense.

After the first weeks of the war the munitions problem was never a serious one in France. On July 1, 1915, M. Albert Thomas was appointed Minister of Munitions and he came to London and held a number of important conferences with Lloyd-George, the British Minister of Munitions, and Lord Kitchener. On July 1, 1915, M. Millerand, Minister of War, in reply to a reported interview with Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria that 50 per cent of the shells fired by the French army were manufactured in the United States, said: "Neither now nor at any time since the beginning of the war has the French artillery made use of any shells manufactured in the United States."

The Chamber of Deputies on July 22, 1915, passed a measure requiring the declaration of all metal lathes, hydraulic presses, and steam hammers of a weight of more than two tons. The law was termed the "mobilization of industrial resources." Its aim was to insure the maximum productive efficiency of materials of war, to organize systematically the immense number of plants which had proffered for the manufacture of munitions and to bring about a reduction of foreign purchases.

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## CHAPTER XXVIII

### AUSTRIA - HUNGARY — ITALY

THE pressure of war fell heavily on Austria-Hungary. In the spring of the second six months this nation was suffering the humiliation of defeat on the battle fields of Galicia and Serbia, the presence of cholera in many of her military hospitals, and the pangs of hunger in the homes of her large peasant classes. The people were laboring under the indignation that their em-

pire and armies had been betrayed to the enemy. The armies had lost astonishingly large numbers of killed, wounded, and prisoners in most of their big battles. In Vienna and Budapest, the word "treason" was on the lips of many persons high in government circles.

But more people were troubled with the almost omnipresent specter of starvation in the first year of the war than with anything else. Austria-Hungary, like Germany, was shut in from the outside world and could trade with no one but her northern ally and Italy directly. Everything imported was extremely high. The Dual Monarchy lacked her northern neighbor's efficiency for organizing the conservation and distribution of food-stuffs. The war speculator had gotten a firm grip on the nation's throat in dealing in many lines of provisions, especially in meats and vegetables.

The Government fixed a maximum price for grain, flour, and meal, and in February, March, and April, 1915, bread, though high, was not absolutely scarce. The people were eating much of the same sort of "war bread"—made of wheat, rye, and potato flour, as they were eating in Germany, but not under as rigid Government supervision. In the Dual Monarchy wheat sold on February 1, 1915, at \$2.50 per bushel and flour at seven and one half cents per pound.

But in May, 1915, the Dual Monarchy was threatened by a meat famine. May 19 was the first "meatless day" in Vienna, when according to the new Government regulation, beef, veal, and pork could not be offered for sale. The regulation applied to two days per week, Tuesday and Friday, and on other days the Government limited householders in their purchases to about one-third of their usual purchases in normal times. The country was eating very little meat and most of that was a poor quality of horse meat.

Hungary had her worst days in June, 1915. On June 24 the prices of all provisions soared, and potatoes, flour, and meat quadrupled in price. Dispatches from Budapest on that day described the city as not only threatened with famine, but in the grip of a panic. Everybody was talking "peace with Russia" at

almost any price, and the Government had to restrain the emotions of the people and especially the press. The situation was evidently exaggerated as subsequent events proved.

On this same June day in 1915, representatives of towns all over the empire gathered in Vienna and one of the impressive scenes was a procession of thousands of "starving women" marching through the streets to the ministry of agriculture. This melancholy procession was more a protest of the poor against the speculator than anything else. It was even more impressive than the thousands of wounded soldiers on the streets of the capital begging for small coins. Many of these soldiers wore cotton strings around their waists instead of leather, for leather was even scarcer in Austria than food, and the soldiers had sold their leather cartridge belts for food.

Outside of Vienna and Budapest the empire had provided no military hospitals. The enormous numbers of wounded soldiers of Galicia and Serbia had been huddled together in cars and brought to Vienna, in many instances in unsanitary conditions which had bred cholera. In April, May, and June, 1915, there were many cases of cholera in these overcrowded hospitals in Vienna. In spite of the well-known medical science of this city the plague threatened to spread among civilians.

On April 26, 1915, Field Marshal Moritz von Auffenberg, ex-war Minister and Chief of Staff of Austria, was arrested after evidence connecting him with a gigantic espionage plot with Russia had been gathered against him by Austrian secret service men. A search of Von Auffenberg's residence disclosed documentary evidence pointing to him as the central figure in a plot to sell Austrian and German military secrets to the Russian general staff for the sum of \$1,500,000. These secrets, it was said, would have been of inestimable value to the Russians in the campaign in East Prussia and Galicia. The German authorities demanded Von Auffenberg's surrender and he was confined in the fortress at Spandau. He had been chief of staff from 1909 to 1911, when he became war minister. It was while he held the latter office that he was said to have entered into negotiations with Russia. At the beginning of the war, he was given the com-



mand of an army corps and won the important victory of Kamarow for which the Emperor Francis Joseph made him a baron and conferred on him the title of "Von Kamarow."

On May 1, 1915, Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, made an important visit to German headquarters. His object was to persuade Germany to cooperate more closely in the war with the interests of the Dual Monarchy. For such cooperation Germany demanded that the Dual Monarchy must take orders from her general staff. Austria had not taken her advice from the German Foreign office, else Italy would not have entered the war against her, said the Germans. So when Italy drew her sword, Baron Burian who had handled the diplomatic negotiations on Austria's part, having failed as it was considered, handed his resignation on May 24, 1915, to the Emperor Francis Joseph. Baron Burian had threatened to resign the week before, objecting to German control of Austrian affairs. Count Tisza tried to persuade the emperor to accept the baron's resignation, but the emperor was not moved to do so.

On July 7, 1915, Austria made a second war loan of \$500,000,000, and on July 9, arrangements were made to float in Germany a loan of \$125,000,000.

On July 24, 1915, the Government undertook in earnest to crush the provision speculators by confiscating the 1915 vegetable crop, including peas, beans, and lentils. All existing supplies of the 1914 vegetable crop were seized and sold under Government supervision.

The greatest event in the month of May, 1915, as we have seen in preceding chapters, was the entrance into the war of Italy, on the side of the Triple Entente, forming the Quadruple Entente. This event took place on May 23, 1915, the Italian Foreign Office handing a passport to Baron von Machio, the Austrian Ambassador to Italy at 11 a. m. on that day.

Upon the news that Italy had declared war against Austria-Hungary there was bitter denunciation of Italy throughout both Germany and Austria-Hungary. For a fortnight at least, Italy was more hated than England, the "enemy among enemies," and there was great rejoicing in the allied countries.

On May 24, 1915, Italy subscribed her adhesion to the agreement of England, France, and Russia that she would not sign a separate peace. She also on that date addressed to the neutral governments of the world a lengthy communication explaining her reason for declaring war on Austria.

King Victor Emmanuel assumed supreme command of the army and navy and left incognito for the front on May 25, 1915. The Duke of Genoa (Prince Thomas of Savoy) was appointed lieutenant general of the kingdom, discharging the duties of the state in the name of the king, but submitting all questions of grave importance to his majesty.

Italy also joined in the financial arrangements entered into by Great Britain, France, and Russia at the conference of their finance ministers in Paris in February, 1915. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Reginald McKenna, met the Italian Minister of the Treasury on June 4, 1915, at Nice, where the two governments agreed to cooperate in the use of their financial resources in the same ungrudging spirit as in the employment of their naval and military forces.

Italy was compelled at the very outset of the war to issue a national loan to get money. On June 28, 1915, a loan, amount not stated, redeemable, in twenty-five years with interest at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, tax free, was issued at 95 or 93 per cent for holders of securities of the preceding national loan.

The Socialists in Italy proved as decided for the war as they had in France or in Germany. The Italian Government announced with pleasure on July 11, 1915, that the Socialists' leaders had offered their services to prevent labor trouble.

At this early stage of the war for Italy, she took the precaution to use compulsory measures in increasing the output of ammunition and war material. Private munition factories were put under military control as soon as the circumstances demanded.

## CHAPTER XXIX

## BELGIUM — TURKEY

LET us now turn toward "war-ruined" Belgium. Here we see a nation struggling for mere existence. The devastation of Belgium was complete. War had done its worst. Of the 7,000,000 population at the beginning of the war, only some 600,000, according to the report February 15, 1915, of the Rockefeller Foundation Fund Commission sent to study conditions in Belgium, were left or had remained in the country. All the rest had perished or fled. Over 1,000,000 had gone to Holland; a large number had found refuge in Switzerland, and other great numbers had found shelter in France. Over 100,000 had been received in England, and there had been a considerable immigration to the United States and Canada. Practically all Belgians of means had fled, taking with them all their transportable property. That report further stated that the "Germans had requisitioned all grain, foodstuffs, cattle, and horses in all towns and villages, also stocks of cotton, wool, raw material as well as manufactured articles." It added: "In the course of our travels through Belgium, we have seen no cattle, horses, or pigs."

Discussing the depletion of the population the report stated: "Essentially the problem is not one of repair, but of liberation. If the paralyzing restrictions imposed by the war were removed to-day, the country would rebound from its helpless inertia tomorrow, resume most of its normal occupations, and soon be able to feed, clothe, and shelter its own sufferers." Of the 150,000 buildings of all sorts standing in the kingdom at the beginning of the war, more than 40,000 had been destroyed by the war. Two of the richest provinces, East and West Flanders, were wholly within the active war zone. Many of the peasants had butchered their cattle and sold them for half their value, fearing the invader would seize them, and with the same fear much of their household goods had been sold to usurers and speculators.



On February 22, 1915, the British Foreign Office directed a letter to Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman of the American Belgium Relief Committee, declining to give a direct subsidy to the Commission for relief in Belgium. The Foreign Office stated that it had taken this course because Germany had refused to put a stop to cash requisitions in Belgium.

A report from Antwerp on March 1, 1915, and published in the press of all neutral countries, stated that \$17,000,000 worth of goods had been seized in that city by the Germans since the beginning of their occupation and 80 per cent of these goods were not paid for and were not needed for the army, but consisted largely of such articles as ivory, typewriters and toys and were shipped to Germany. Germany was then collecting from Belgium a war tax of \$8,000,000 per month.

A statement was issued on March 15, 1915, in the London and Paris papers that a civic survey of the destroyed towns in Belgium had been secretly made by agents of the Belgian Government under the supervision of British and Belgian art societies. This, it was said, was the only work done up to that date to rebuild these cities and there was no intention to break ground or lay a stone or brick till the invader had been expelled from the country. It was stated that any work done before that event, which the Belgians confidently believed would not be long off, would run the risk of being thrown away. These civic surveys were planned with a new and a far more beautiful Belgium in view than the Belgium of August 1, 1914. The railroad station at Louvain was being rebuilt under German supervision, but not even a shelter in the city of Malines that was destroyed in capturing Antwerp had been erected.

By May 1, 1915, there was considerable improvement in the Belgian situation according to German reports. Four-fifths of the inhabitants, many of whom had returned to the country, had received employment. The other fifth was in a pitiable condition. One of the chief troubles was that the very large number given work at Antwerp could not be provided for, for Antwerp was commercially and financially a dead city. Not a ship came up the

river. The rich Belgians had taken from Antwerp almost everything the city possessed but its site and houses.

On May 9, 1915, the German administration began to grapple earnestly with three great evils that the war had inflicted upon the Belgians: prostitution, infant mortality, and tuberculosis. To handle the first of these it appointed what it called a "moral police force." The task of this moral reform was herculean because of the vast number of unemployed factory girls left in the destroyed and dead towns and the great number of soldiers in Belgium. The only real remedy for this evil was employment and that even the Germans could not furnish. But this moral police force did much to alleviate the evil by restraint. The other two plagues, infant mortality and tuberculosis, were tackled by the German Red Cross, which in a very short time achieved a decided improvement.

The German authorities had been considering for some time how to induce or compel the rich Belgians who had fled the country to return. On May 10, 1915, Governor General von Bissing decided to impose a heavy special tax on the property remaining of all such Belgians. They would be compelled to return or their property, principally immovable, would be confiscated by the tax collector. But up to the end of July 31, 1915, this tax had not returned many of these refugees to their fatherland.

The Bryce committee report on "Outrages alleged to have been committed by German troops during the war" was submitted to the British Government on May 12, 1915. The report concluded from the evidence submitted that it was proved:

First: That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organized massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.

Second: That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated and children murdered.

Third: That looting, house burning and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German army, that elaborate provision had been made for

systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burning and destruction were done frequently when no military necessity could be alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorization.

Fourth: That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield to advancing forces exposed to fire; to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the white flag.

The German Government published a "White Book" on May 24, 1915, concerning "the warfare, the civilian population of Belgium, and hostilities, which included the shooting of troops, the throwing of boiling water, the maiming of the wounded and the assassination of officers in their quarters at night." The time of these occurrences and the names of witnesses were given. It alleged that all classes of the population, including clergymen, women, and children, participated in the aggression and that all the German measures at Louvain and other Belgian towns were only for the purpose of suppressing these attacks. The "White Book" declared that the Belgian Official Report was "untrustworthy, because the Government of Belgium was unable to examine the evidence."

The German administration on May 30, 1915, took steps to repair the serious losses in horses and cattle that the war had inflicted upon the country. The Belgian horses were noted among European horses for their beauty, strength and other excellent qualities. The Germans had seized many of them for their cavalry mounts and the scarcity had become a serious handicap to the efficiency of the German occupation of Belgium. Accordingly, five veterinary surgical hospitals were established in different parts of the kingdom and a great testing laboratory was founded in Brussels for testing the blood diseases of horses. Cattle breeding was also being taken care of in a scientific way and the slaughter of cattle for beef beyond a certain prescribed limit, was forbidden. Another fact the Germans pointed to, was that the Belgian newspapers were allowed to appear "under certain necessary restrictions." No German press had been set up



in Belgium, the neighboring German press being sufficient for all German needs.

A report sent out from Berlin on June 13, 1915, revealed that a German court-martial had condemned to death eleven spies arrested at Maestrecht, and on June 17 eight of the condemned were executed. The three others asked for a pardon, and a decision in their case was pending. They all were charged with having communicated to the enemy information regarding the movement of German troops on the Belgian railways. It was further stated in the Berlin report that no person would hereafter be executed for espionage in Belgium unless the sentence was first indorsed by Emperor William. The kaiser is said to have sent a message of regret to Liege for the shooting of the eight citizens. "The message calmed the population and probably prevented a bloody outbreak, as the citizens were ready to revolt."

The German administration had in the first six months of the war taken over the Belgian banking system. On July 10, 1915, a special railroad board was established, and an economic committee was appointed to make practical suggestion to the governor general on imports and exports, employment, customs, tariff, railroad traffic, supply of raw material, and commercial markets.

On July 15, 1915, the governor general issued a decree that all Belgian crops, from the moment of being reaped, were to be reserved for the civilian population. The seizure was to prevent grain speculation. Prices were to be forced up and the grain was to be justly distributed among the population.

Governor General von Bissing issued an open letter to the Belgian people on July 27, 1915. He told them that, by virtue of the Hague Convention, he was administering the country, and that his administration was dictated by obligations to international law, so that not only the occupier but the occupied land might benefit by the new régime. He acknowledged that the object of his efforts was recognized by not a few mayors, clergymen, farmers, and townsmen. He deplored that many openly or secretly resisted his measures.

"Many seem," he wrote, "to be under the delusion that it is patriotic or manly to oppose the decrees of the occupying powers. The idea is widely current that all who support the German administration lack in patriotic courage or have broken their pledge. He who aids and furthers the German administration does not aid the occupying power, but in the first place his Belgian fatherland. He who offers opposition does not harm the German Empire, but exclusively his own country. Such a resistance is neither manly nor patriotic. I expect nobody to turn from his ideals or to drop his convictions hypocritically. But I expect everybody to recognize the actual state of affairs—to recognize that I and my administration, according to military and international law, have the lawful right and duty to administer the law with the cooperation of its authorities, as well as spiritual and political leaders. However, it is an urgent necessity that those who command influence should exercise it in a practical manner. I respect every religion, political and national creed, and welcome every honest cooperation, no matter who offers it. But my duty compels me to show no consideration to those who resist and who overtly and covertly disturb the public order and peace, or who endeavor to prevent the restoration and quiet development of public life. Without respect of person, I shall perform the task laid upon me, and take those to account who oppose me by word and action. I shall remove them from any public office which they hold."

On July 31, 1915, the governor general issued a budget report on the finances of the country. The expenditures in round numbers since the German occupation on August 15, 1914, amounted to \$39,000,000 and the revenue footed up \$35,000,000, leaving a deficit of \$4,000,000 which had to be made up.

One governmental institution in Belgium the Germans in the first year of their administration did not touch—that was the judiciary. On July 31, 1915, Belgian judges in the civil courts were still passing sentence on their fellow countrymen and even on Germans who had violated the Belgian laws. This was regarded by Belgians as a tribute to the purity of their courts,

and it had no little influence in reconciling the people to the hard lot of the conquered.

A glance at Turkey is now necessary. Turkey was the least articulate of all the nations in the war. The true economic situation in Constantinople and the empire from October 31, 1914, to July 31, 1915, is the usual story of the wanton waste of war. In May, 1914, according to the report of Mr. G. B. Ravondal, the American Consul General at Constantinople, "Turkey's economic outlook was never brighter, when a large Government loan had been negotiated in Paris. This was a construction loan to build a network of railways and highways. Numerous concessions for public utilities for better communication and transportation, such as railways, roads, electric tramways, and ports had been granted to or applied for by French, English, Belgian, German, and Austrian capitalists."

But with the coming of war in August, 1914, all this work was indefinitely postponed, and, according to press reports on October 31, 1914, when Turkey entered the war, all the funds for internal improvements were diverted to pressing military and naval needs. Turkey's normal annual imports amounted to \$200,000,000 and her exports \$150,000,000. During the first six months of the war her imports dropped off \$26,530,034 and her exports \$13,864,832. In December and January, 1914-15, her imports reached only \$1,000,000 per month and her exports \$1,225,000.

On February 20, 1915, when the Dardanelles and the port of Smyrna were closed by the allied fleets, Turkey's foreign commerce practically ceased to be. The Government had seized all the wool in the empire, and the big rug trade at Smyrna was dead. The big silk industries at Brusa and at Beirut were forced to close down, and there were no ships to transport Turkish nuts and fruits to the neutral countries, and no open railways to take Turkish sausage cases to Germany and Austria.

On March 14, 1915, the newspapers reported Constantinople in the "pinch of the war famine," but as long as the Turks could get tobacco they could fight on, and they had tobacco. Up to July 31, 1915, the Government had been able to spend \$250,-



000,000, borrowed from Germany. During the spring and summer of 1915 only reports of soaring food prices, mutterings and small bread riots in different parts of the country reached the outside world.

The situation in Serbia and the Balkans has been discussed in detail in a separate chapter in this volume.

## PART VII—UNITED STATES AND THE WAR

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### CHAPTER XXX

#### FINANCIAL AND SHIPPING CHAOS— PEACE EFFORTS

THE position of the American people in the Great War is one of the most interesting chapters in this historical narrative of world events. It interlocks so vitally into the future of the American nation that it will be profitable at this time to consider the relations between the United States and the belligerent powers in complete detail day by day during the first year of the war.

The ominous rumblings in Europe preceding the outbreak of the great conflagration set in train by Austria declaring war on Serbia, July 28, 1914, found instant echoes in the United States. The country realized that it was not to be exempt from the effects of the upheaval. Geographically, it seemed on safe neutral ground, separated by 3,000 miles of water from the scene of the conflict, and providentially isolated. But the links of civilization, the facility of modern communications, the manifold affiliations of commerce and finance, and human ties of race and kindred—the strongest bond of all—too closely knit the two hemispheres. A shock in one had its inevitable vibration in the other. The European conflict quickly revealed that it was world-wide in its ramifications, and that the American continent, no less than the Orient and Antipodes, could not be immune from its effects.

As the war cloud grew darker in those fateful closing days of July, pandemonium seized the money markets of Europe. War's

accustomed precursors had broken loose—the offspring of the scared imaginations of nations fevered by futile parleys before a drop of blood had been shed. The frenzy spread over the Atlantic and plunged the New York Stock Exchange into the flood of selling orders that came with it. The tumult that arose there reflected the panic which beset the European marts. Europe was frantic in its efforts to convert every security it held into cash, and poured its demands over hard-pressed cables into the one available market. Rarely were such scenes witnessed on the Exchange floor as those which Austria's move on Serbia produced, presaging as it did the ranging of the Great Powers against one another. The Exchange was a seething mass of excited brokers and panting messengers plunging hither and thither. A dangerous decline of prices followed Europe's hysteric calls on American buyers. The day's transactions exceeded the 1,000,000-share mark and necessitated heavy gold shipments in payment.

In the Chicago wheat pit the commotion had no parallel since the market upheaval caused by the Spanish War. Transactions reached 100,000,000 bushels. In a single day farmers were said to be enriched during the short-lived advances by \$90,000,000. In the declines, which rapidly alternated with the advances in price, fortunes were lost in a few seconds. Winners and losers alike formed a howling mob in the pit.

The next day, July 29, 1914, the strain on the New York Exchange increased. The Exchanges at Montreal, Toronto, Vienna, Budapest, and Brussels closed, and London brokers were in a rout. These collapses made Wall Street more than ever the one broad market in the world for the liquidation of securities. It bore the heat and burden of the day without wavering, though symptoms of danger were not wanting.

The flutter caused by the first clash in Europe now extended to all the foreign army and navy reservists domiciled in the United States. Of these some 200,000 were subjects of Austria-Hungary. A partial mobilization was at once proclaimed by the Dual Monarchy, and reservists belonging to eight army corps residing in this country were called upon to rejoin their regiments by the



Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba. A number of editors of Slavic papers in New York made a counterblast to this call to the colors. They endeavored to discourage response by denouncing as traitors to the Slavonic idea all who, "from fear or without knowledge, joined the Austrian flag to fight against their own brethren." In the principal cities, however, hundreds of men of the mixed nationalities under Austrian rule flocked to the consulates to report their readiness to return. Presently they were to discover that there were no ships to transport them. The Austrian Embassy thereupon placed upon them the onus of returning home by the best means within their reach.

America abroad was already caught in the swirl of armies mobilizing. Midsummer of 1914 found the annual exodus of Americans to Europe at high tide, and thousands were scattered over the continent. As July neared its close the American season reached its zenith in Berlin. In Paris the hotels were crowded, largely with American travelers bound for the spas or mountains. They lingered in a false security, viewing the approaching shadow of war as a mirage of the press. Austria's thunderbolt caught them unawares. Thousands abandoned their projected trips eastward, though few were frightened enough to hurry homeward at once. Full realization of the real march of events came with the news, July 29, that at the famous Bohemian spa, Carlsbad, many Americans were trapped, communication by rail, telegraph, and telephone having been cut off. Reports that Marienbad and other spas were in a like plight followed. The news instantly produced a stampede to the American embassies for aid to facilitate a general flight home.

Government officials helplessly watched the gathering storm. President Wilson intimated, as the signs became all too certain Austria and Serbia were to fight, that he could see no way effectively to interpose to avert the storm's breaking. But ere the supreme crisis came he gave his countenance to an informal inquiry by Secretary Bryan, through the American embassies, as to whether the nations in contention would accept the services of the United States if offered, as a disinterested nation, in the interests of peace. Such a proposal of mediation was provided for

by the Hague Treaty for the settlement of international disputes. The offer was refused, but its importance lay in the fact that it was made.

By July 31, 1914, war's specter had stretched over all the countries of the Triple Alliance and Entente. Europe's financial paroxysm reached the expected débâcle, engulfing New York in the collapse. Two days before, the St. Petersburg, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Frankfort Exchanges had closed. London, Paris, and Berlin followed suit from sheer exhaustion.

After surviving successive shocks, which reached a climax with the doubling of the Bank of England rate to 8 per cent, the New York Exchange, July 31, closed its doors for the first time in forty years. The market was overwhelmed with selling orders and almost bare of buyers. The governors acted to protect the solvency of hundreds of firms, and the harassed brokers who crowded the floor when the decision was announced cheered it in an enthusiasm of relief. Stock prices had descended to a level the like of which had not been reached since the October panic of 1907.

There was danger of a disastrous collapse if the Stock Exchange continued to absorb all the foreign offerings. The strength of the country's finances had been clearly shown. American buyers had been taking the shares of European sellers in large numbers and giving up gold to be exported without any sign of weakness in the money market or the slightest indication of a demoralization of credit. But this absorption of all that frightened Europe was eager to offer could not continue for many days without causing a decline in purely domestic securities that would precipitate a disaster at home. In a single week Europe took gold in payment of securities amounting to \$53,000,000. The Stock Exchange by closing checked this outflow.

The suspension of other local exchanges followed. The news was flashed all over the country, whereupon the exchanges at Boston, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Detroit, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Columbus, Washington, and San Francisco immediately voted to suspend business. Before the day was over, all the stock exchanges in the country had

ceased trading. Only two marts, the Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Produce Exchange—both trading in food-stuffs in great demand on account of the war—continued open.

Concern regarding the adequacy of the gold supply, in view of the heavy shipments to Europe, came in the wake of this cessation of business. The Treasury Department, through John Burke, the United States Treasurer, had assured the country that the Government stood ready to meet any demand for gold the war situation had created. He reported a stock of \$1,280,000,000 in gold and bullion in the Treasury vaults. Denver had \$400,000,000, Philadelphia nearly as much, and treasure of similar bulk was distributed in New York, San Francisco, and elsewhere.

Secretary McAdoo at once approached Congress July 31, 1914, for additional legislation to abate needless fears. Thus early did the war call for action by the National Legislature before the legions of Europe were in battle formation. With little debate and without a dissenting voice, it amended the Federal Reserve Act to enable the use by the banks of \$500,000,000 additional national bank currency which had lain stored, ready for circulation, as an untouched reserve in the Treasury vaults. Concurrently the New York banks adapted the existing machinery to the new circulation. The use of clearing-house certificates by the New York banks was also adopted as a customary expedient followed in times of impending crises. These steps were taken in view of the gold-export movement, which, if continued on a large scale, might be a drain upon the gold reserves. They were precautionary measures taken for their reassuring effect, not as an immediate need.

The reverberations of Europe's convulsion, which American financial strength had thus withstood, smote the ocean gateways of the country's commerce, and there its effects were not so readily met and remedied. An unseen cordon suddenly stretched the length of the Atlantic seaboard. Shipping held its breath. Countless craft for distant ports, laden with argosies of American produce or handicraft, ready to clear, their bows pointed seaward, kept their berths. War's heralds not only hovered in the



air; mariners saw its cannon already trained on their ships on the horizon. The maritime pulse halted on every water front. Unsuspecting craft which had sailed in a deceptive calm caught the breath of war before they had been long out of sight of land, and swiftly turned their head to port. The German transatlantic companies canceled the sailings, July 31, 1914, of their great liners, and those at sea within reach, the *President Grant* and others, rushed back to safety on receiving a wireless call. The menace to these vessels was compelling enough, for British cruisers from their Canadian or West Indian naval bases were already suspected of being on the alert in North American waters, eagerly waiting for the signal from Whitehall. The sailing of British and French liners was interrupted, but only momentarily. Several held their berths; others resumed on curtailed schedules, with protecting cruisers in the offing.

A call came from Great Britain, August 2, 1914, to her naval reservists to rejoin her fleet; German conscriptionists, flourishing under the Stars and Stripes, were also summoned to their Fatherland, but did not get beyond their consulates; Frenchmen, Belgians, and Serbs, too, heeded their country's voice and flocked to their banners.

Labor sounded its clarion in protest as this tramp of men, going to swell the ranks of Europe's warriors, was heard on American soil. The Central Federated Union issued, August 3, 1914, an antiwar manifesto to the labor organizations of the country, invoking their aid to prevail on the European unions to dissuade their multitudes of workers from fighting.

Canada was astir. New England and the Northwestern States felt the ferment of their neighbor in her breathless activities to aid the mother country. Quebec and Montreal were placed, August 3, 1914, in the hands of the military. For the first time in her history Montreal was a closed port.

In New York Harbor a peaceful passenger vessel slipped from her pier, August 3, 1914, under the cloak of night and ran up the ensign of war. Eluding the vigilance of customs officials, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, a German liner, in a new coat of gray war paint, glided down the Hudson and through the Narrows to

the open sea with her lights out, guns secreted in her hold, and laden with coal and food supplies supposedly for the German cruisers *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden*, and *Strassburg*, recently stationed at Vera Cruz and the West Indies. The owners said she had been ordered to sail to a German port to be used for military purposes. She was one of a number of other German liners laid up in Hoboken since the war cloud appeared. Later she was heard of as an auxiliary cruiser raiding British shipping.

The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was hardly well out to sea in defiance of danger when another German liner, the *Kronprinzessin Cecile* crept into Bar Harbor, Me., August 4, 1914, with \$10,000,000 specie on board, a refugee from the foe. She had sailed from New York, July 28, 1914, with her treasure, bound for Bremen, before the trumpet of war had sounded in Europe. While steaming some 880 miles out from New York, the antennæ at her wireless staff caught a pressing message from Bremen warning her to flee to the safety of American waters. The vessel turned and retraced her course with all speed. For her all waters were dangerous outside the three-mile limit of the United States coast, with an unseen foe prowling beyond the horizon. Impenetrable curtains of fog aided her. For three days and a half, wrapped in a haze, she zigzagged from the accustomed channels of ocean traffic, evading cruisers that never appeared ready to jettison her \$10,000,000 treasure immediately should an enemy ship hove in view. She reached safety not a moment too soon, for the same day Great Britain declared war on Germany.

Five of the European powers had now unsheathed the sword. President Wilson issued, August 4, 1914, a proclamation declaring the country's neutrality in the conflict in conformity with custom. This action was followed by measures compelling neutrality observance along the coasts. The navy was active in preventing the shipment of coal and naval stores from American ports for transfer to belligerent vessels on the high seas. The clearance papers of all ships were subjected to a rigid scrutiny, and naval patrols were established in the principal harbors to forbid the departure of uncleared vessels.

The next day another pronouncement came from the White House enforcing neutral obligations on the conduct of all radio stations within the jurisdiction of the United States. Wireless telegraphy being a new device adaptable to war purposes, the United States encountered a novel condition in proscribing its use. The President's proclamation forbade the stations to transmit or receive messages of an unneutral nature, or to render any other unneutral service to the belligerents during the continuation of hostilities. The Navy Department, which was charged with the duty of enforcing this edict, instructed its harbor patrols along the coast to prevent the passage of ship-to-shore messages of the character prohibited, or vice versa. The radio apparatus on some ships were confiscated; others were sealed. On the high-powered land stations all code and cipher messages were subjected to a rigorous naval censorship. German interests, which controlled two stations, one at Tuckerton, N. J., the other at Sayville, Long Island, complained that cable communications controlled by Great Britain ought to be similarly restricted. Germany suffered under a disadvantage by this censorship, because Great Britain, having cut the German cable, compelled her to depend for communication with the United States on her Tuckerton and Sayville stations.

The United States made a final effort, August 5, 1914, to mediate in the interests of peace. The previous overture was merely an informal suggestion which the American diplomatists in Europe were asked to convey unofficially to the various chancelleries by way of sounding them as to their receptive attitude toward mediation. President Wilson now officially sent a cable message to the crowned heads of Great Britain, Germany, Austria, and Russia—King George, Emperor William, Emperor Francis Joseph, and Czar Nicholas—and to M. Poincaré, President of France, couched in these terms:

"As official head of one of the powers signatory to the Hague Conference, I feel it to be my privilege and my duty, under Article III of that convention, to say in a spirit of most earnest friendship that I should welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace, either now or at any other



time that might be thought more suitable as an occasion to serve you and all concerned in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and happiness."

Formal acknowledgments from the five powers were the only fruit of this appeal. Its sole result was to place the President on record as a willing peacemaker.

All diplomatic intercourse between the belligerents being now at an end, the American embassies and legations attached to their respective capitals undertook to act as caretakers of their interests in the countries with which they were at war. Our diplomatists, though laden with burdens enough of their own, shouldered others. Austrian and German interests in Great Britain were taken in charge by Ambassador Page. The Petrograd Embassy attended to the affairs of the two first-named countries in Russia. In Berlin Ambassador Gerard represented Great Britain, Japan, and Serbia. Mr. Penfield watched the interests of France, Great Britain, and Japan in Vienna. In Belgium Minister Brand Whitlock took charge of the interests of Germany, Austria, Great Britain, Serbia, and Japan. In Japan Ambassador Guthrie represented Germany and Austria.

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## CHAPTER XXXI

### PLIGHT OF AMERICANS ABROAD—BELLIGERENTS' APPEAL TO UNITED STATES

THE London, Berlin, and Paris Embassies were harassed to an unmeasured degree in their herculean efforts to relieve the difficulties of the thousands of Americans stranded in the war zone. Mobilization had captured all arteries of communication; transports had ceased to ply; banks refused to cash drafts, travelers' checks, or letters of credit. Many Americans were penniless; all were panic-stricken. Reports of their plight reached the United States in those convulsing early days of August, 1914, and munificent funds were at once raised for their relief. Congress,

at the request of President Wilson, appropriated \$250,000 to aid those Americans who were stranded, and \$2,500,000 for tourists embarrassed through the choking of banking channels. New York financiers also collected a fund in gold exceeding \$5,000,000 to assist tourists who held letters of credit for large sums. A United States warship—the *Tennessee*—sailed on August 6 bearing this argosy of \$8,000,000 to alleviate the predicament of the distressed Americans for lack of safer transportation.

Stray Americans reaching London from Holland, France, Belgium, and Germany told of helpless compatriots swamped in the indescribable commotion; of refugees escaping from the war zone bereft of everything but the clothes they wore; of weeping women and frantic men besieging the embassies for money; of detentions at frontiers, where many were searched and subjected to indignities, some being arrested as spies. In the wild scramble to flee from Paris, distraught Americans packed a couple of cattle trains bound for Havre; among them were millionaires and their families, who contentedly lay on the straw-covered floors, grateful for any means of getting out of the vortex. Ambassador Herrick estimated that some 20,000 Americans were trapped in Paris when mobilization convulsed the city. The railroads stopped selling tickets, and the Government requisitioned every automobile for army purposes. The war, in fact, had first been brought home to Americans who were not at home.

Reservists of the powers who had free access over the ocean continued to leave the United States in large numbers. The embarkation of a number of French reservists was the occasion for a protest to the Government by Austria-Hungary, August 8, 1914. The facilities reservists of the Allies had for leaving the country, in contrast with the inability of Teutons to rejoin their colors through the crippling of their shipping, provided the ground for complaint. Austria contended that the United States was violating its neutrality in permitting the Allies' reservists to sail when those of the Central Powers could not. Secretary Bryan answered that the Government had no power to impede individuals from leaving the United States to join armies abroad. The Secretary of State also ruled on the question incidentally

raised while reservists were streaming from American ports as to the right of foreign governments to call upon their nationals domiciled in the United States for war service. He held that the response must be viewed as purely voluntary; no man under the protection of the Stars and Stripes could be forced to join any foreign army.

An incident in New York Bay, August 9, 1914, illustrated the vigilance of the navy in its harbor patrol, instituted to safeguard the observance of neutrality regulations by ships. A Clyde liner, the *Pawnee*, attempted after dark to make her way out of the harbor with her lights out. The United States battleship *Florida*, which was at her anchorage off Staten Island, fired two shots over the vessel as a warning for her to stop. The *Pawnee* continued her course, whereupon the destroyer *Drayton*, one of the harbor patrols, pursued her, and after a chase overtook her and conducted the vessel back to port. After an examination the *Pawnee* was permitted to proceed.

The warring powers lost no time in protesting to neutral nations against their enemies' conduct of the war. England came first, August 11, 1914, with the complaint to the United States that Germany was planting mines in the North Sea, charging a violation of the Hague Treaty.

Commerce with Europe, except for the sailing of venturesome vessels here and there, was at a standstill owing to the war. The value of shipping marooned in American ports was estimated at no less a figure than \$700,000,000 by the "Wall Street Journal," while the New York "World" computed the curtailment on the tonnage-bearing American foreign commerce at 80 per cent. Only 8 per cent of this trade was carried by American vessels. Foreign ships, mostly British and German, carried the remaining 92 per cent, and the sailings of these were either canceled or greatly abridged. Advocates for the revival of the American merchant marine saw in this war condition an opportunity to restore the American flag on the seas. An emergency shipping bill was thereupon framed enabling foreign-built vessels debarred from plying their trade by the risks of war to sail under American registry. It removed all restrictions to their admis-



sion when owned by American citizens. The measure had a speedy passage through Congress, and President Wilson lost no time in signing it, August 18, 1914. Objectors to the bill contended that the acquisition of the ships in view, most of them under belligerent flags, would be an attempt at "whitewashing" them. They argued that their transfer to American ownership would be construed as a device to avert their capture, condemning a ship thus "whitewashed" as an outlaw and liable to confiscation. Another objection was that the remedy would only be temporary, and that with the restoration of peace the acquired vessels would revert to their original ownership. England, which had been jealously watching this legislation, intimated that she would not interfere with any German vessel changing to American registry if the transfer was a bona fide one. Domestic corporations owning fleets hitherto sailing under foreign flags placed their ships under American registry as soon as the bill became law.

An unrestrained expression of public sentiment regarding the war, strongly leaning toward the Triple Entente, caused President Wilson to make an appeal to the country, August 18, 1914, for the observance of a broad neutrality in its attitude toward the conflict. In the course of this appeal the President said:

"The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love for their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans, all bound in honor and affection to think first of all of her interests, may be divided into camps of hostile opinions, hot against one another, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seri-

ously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation, and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."

The country's neutrality in the war had been duly declared by the President's earlier proclamation. The Government's official attitude was thereby defined; but the country at large, with its polyglot population, and the tense racial sympathies of millions with one or other of the combatants, became unofficially unneutral in its views. Opinions on the war were sharply divided, and in the press and orally were outspoken and uncompromising. The war dominated business and society. Domestic events, which otherwise would have bulked large in the public mind, were lost sight of altogether. Hotel corridors, restaurants, clubs, saloons, street corners, and business houses employing large staffs of mixed races were scenes of heated dissensions. The police of many cities had their troubles in preserving order between the belligerents' sympathizers, and occasional riots broke out here and there. In public establishments the subject was eventually forbidden. "No war talk; we're neutral," was a frequent announcement to be seen. Only in the street, being common territory, could the dispute proceed undeterred. It is safe to say that no other world event gripped the attention of the American people to a like degree.

The Zeppelin raid on Antwerp, elsewhere recorded, was the subject, August 27, of a formal protest by Belgium to the United States.

Germany succeeded, August 30, in obtaining a relaxation of the American Government's censorship on wireless messages in code or cipher exchanges at Tuckerton or Sayville stations. The United States permitted them on condition that the naval censors were informed of their purport. This ruling was no sooner made than it was discovered that the Tuckerton station had been operating without a Federal license, whereupon the Government took it over. Germany thus had only the Sayville station as a medium for exchanging messages with this country. Meantime

the Marconi station at Siasconset, Mass., which had been in a controversy with the Government regarding the dispatch of a message to a British cruiser, endeavored to obtain an injunction against the Government's censorship of messages. While it was pending the Navy Department seized the station and closed it. The courts upheld the Government.

The war had scarcely been in progress a month when the Administration was beset with the problem of providing a remedy for the rapid fall in the revenue derived from the tariff on imported goods, due to the crippling of shipping. President Wilson sent a message to Congress, September 4, 1914, urging the imposition of war taxes to supply the deficit. There had already been a loss in Government receipts from this source since the war began approximating \$10,000,000. Sustained throughout the year, the Treasury Department estimated that this average would mean a curtailment in the national income exceeding \$100,000,000. The Democratic leaders in Congress proceeded to frame a bill in accordance with the President's request.

A personal message was received, September 7, by President Wilson from the German Emperor, complaining of the conduct of the war by France and Belgium. The Kaiser appealed to the President as "the most notable representative of the principles of humanity." He accused the French of using thousands of dum dum bullets at Longwy (where, he said, German troops had discovered them after its capture), and the Belgian Government of inciting the civil population to resist German troops, provoking the cruelties of guerrilla warfare, even by women and priests, on wounded soldiers, doctors, and nurses. The Kaiser defended the destruction of Louvain as necessary for the protection of his troops.

President Poincaré, in a cablegram to the President, September, 1914, indignantly denied that any dum dum bullets had been used by French troops. He made the counteraccusation that Germany had been using such bullets since the war's beginning, daily violating the laws of nations.

President Wilson, in answering the Kaiser's protest, said he had read it with the gravest interest and concern. He added:



"I am honored that you should have turned to me for an impartial judgment as the representative of a people truly disinterested as respects the present war, and truly desirous of knowing and accepting the truth.

"You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, I pray God very soon this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come, when I take it for granted the nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed, their consequences and their relative responsibility will be assessed.

"The nations of the world have fortunately by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass, the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter in such matters, will supply. It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which, like this, has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.

"I speak thus frankly, because I know that you will expect and wish me to do so as one friend speaks to another, and because I feel sure that such a reservation of judgment until the end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety, and in their true relations, will commend itself to you as a true expression of a sincere neutrality."

A war risk bureau was established, September 12, 1914, by the Department of State under authority of Congress. It provided insurance with an appropriation of \$5,000,000 to meet losses suffered by American ships which braved the war perils of the seas. Detentions, seizures, and confiscation of cargoes of vessels flying the Stars and Stripes by the belligerents' warships were an early result of the war, and immediate calls were made on the bureau. Later on these losses were to become the subject of an acute international dispute between the United States and Great Britain.

President Wilson received, September 16, 1914, a Belgian Royal Commission sent by King Albert to the United States on a special mission to lay before the Administration evidence of atrocities alleged to have been committed by German troops

when they invaded Belgium. Patiently the President listened to the long oral statement of the Envoy Extraordinary, Henry Carton de Wiart, who recited tales of massacre, pillage, attacks on women, burning and mutilation of victims, and vandalism at Louvain. The President's answer was brief, and chiefly emphasized the tribute Belgians paid him and the United States in submitting the charges to their judgment. The tenor of his remarks closely paraphrased his noncommittal message to the German Emperor in answer to the latter's accusations against France and Belgium.

France responded to the Kaiser's appeal to the President by submitting, September 25, 1914, a series of complaints against Germany before the State Department through Ambassador Jusserand. This protest accused Germany of systematic barbarities in her conduct of the war, the slaying of wounded, and cited specific violations of the rules of warfare. M. Jusserand said that the French Government did not protest with the view of demanding any action by the United States, but merely to report to this country, as a signatory to the Hague Conference, evidence of the manner in which Germany was acting under that agreement.

These protests typified the attitude of the warring powers toward the United States in the early stages of the war. While they had denied the American Government the rôle of peacemaker, the belligerents early manifested an eager desire to appeal to her as an arbiter to determine the righteousness of their cause in entering the war. A flood of official papers of various hues, issued from the European capitals, did not appear so much intended to enlighten their own people on the negotiations preceding the war as pleas of justification and bids for the sympathy of neutral powers, the United States foremost. The powers' embassies and publicists sought to eclipse one another in this endeavor. The American people, not of their own choice, were raised to the dignity of a final court of appeal. Before this tribunal protests, justifications and extenuations were submitted through the medium of the press, which the various belligerents' propagandists utilized as a vehicle for exploiting every angle of

the ante bellum negotiations to show that the other side was to blame.

Congress occupied itself with the War Tax Bill at length submitted by the Democratic leaders for immediate passage. The House duly adopted it September 25; it lingered in the Senate, a bone of contention, until October 18; then it was deadlocked in conference. Upon a final agreement it was signed October 22 by the President and became law. The measure underwent numerous changes during its vicissitudes in Congress. In its final shape it provided new taxation by making easily borne imports on diverse sections of the community so as to impose no strain on any single one. Existing taxes on wines, liquors, and tobacco, were increased. Bankers, brokers, and railroads were mulcted. New sources of income were found in slight taxes on telegraph and telephone messages, chewing gum, amusements, passage tickets to foreign ports, motor vehicle, marriage, and hunting licenses, parlor-car seats in trains, and sleeping berths. Promissory notes, deeds of conveyance and other documents became subject to a stamp tax. From these varied sources of new income a yield of \$107,000,000 was estimated.

The *Kronprinzessin Cecile*, interned in Bar Harbor, Me., for three months, after seeking a refuge there with \$10,000,000 specie on board at the beginning of the war, ventured out November 6 to new quarters in Boston Harbor. The sheltering wing of the American navy shielded her from capture by any British or French cruiser on the watch in the vicinity. Keeping within the three-mile limit most of the short voyage, the vessel safely reached her destination, but not without passing into the danger zone when her course veered at times some ten miles off the shore. Here the vigilance of a couple of destroyers, one leading, the other in her wake, assured her safety.



## CHAPTER XXXII

MUNITION ISSUE—PROTEST TO ENGLAND  
AGAINST CARGO SEIZURES

THE shipment of arms and munitions to the allied powers became a recurrent issue as the war pursued its pitiless course. American neutrality, from the standpoint of Teutonic sympathizers, was not being strictly observed by the Government in permitting these shipments without let or hindrance. As no German or Austrian steamers were available to transport such sinews of war to Central Powers, the advocates of a hard-and-fast neutrality held that, to balance this disadvantage Germany and Austria labored under, the United States ought to debar the allied powers from utilizing its factories as a source of supply. As a spokesman of this view Senator Hitchcock presented December 8, 1914, a bill before the Senate placing an embargo on such shipments. At this early stage of the war, though agents of the Allies were reported to be all over the country placing huge orders, these shipments had not reached any dimensions. They were surprising in their smallness. The Department of Commerce, at the request of Senator Hitchcock, reported to Congress that for the first three months of the war, they only represented a value of \$2,123,128. But most of this amount represented October shipments, showing that the expansion this trade duly reached had already begun.

The Administration discouraged any Congressional action of the character Senator Hitchcock proposed, and there was more than enough opposition in Congress to defeat such a measure. Nevertheless, that the Administration took a sensitive view of the country's neutrality obligations was shown in its attitude toward an order for the supply of submarines, valued at \$25,000,000, received by the Bethlehem Steel Company. Secretary Bryan apparently viewed the execution of such an order, which was supposedly from Great Britain, as contravening the spirit if not the letter of neutrality. A conference with Mr. C. M. Schwab, head

of the company, followed, the outcome of which was that the order was not proceeded with in the form originally contracted for, the company showing a desire only to act in the matter in harmony with the administration's attitude.

International law and custom clearly sanctioned freedom of trade with belligerents. The State Department, in answer to inquiries, said the right of an American citizen to supply a warring nation with articles of commerce was undoubted, whether such commodities were for war purposes or not. According to Jefferson and Olney, two authorities quoted when the question was raised, Americans were at liberty to sell arms and munitions to all comers so long as such equipment was employed in furtherance of a military expedition pursued beyond American shores.

The shipping situations still occupied the Government's attention. The passage of the ship registry bill had not resulted in any appreciable addition to foreign-built vessels sailing under American registry.

American capital hesitated to avail itself of the opportunity presented of creating an American fleet by acquiring foreign-built vessels which the war barred from plying under their own flags.

The administration thereupon considered the project of government-owned steamships, and prepared a bill authorizing the creation of a \$10,000,000 corporation, 51 per cent of whose stock should be owned by the Government for the purchase and operation of merchant vessels in the over-sea trade.

When the measure was presented to Congress (December 10), customs officials reported a freight congestion of foreign consignments, due to the lack of tonnage for shipping them to Europe and elsewhere. Only interned German vessels were available for sale under the bill. As their purchase would at once release a large amount of German capital, Great Britain stood ready to protest, and indicated her intention unofficially against their acquisition on the ground that the taking over by a neutral nation of vessels under the registry of a country at war contravened neutrality.

The bill caused a furore in Congress and strong opposition from many interests to the creation of a merchant marine in the form of a government-owned fleet. Shipowners saw in the plan a menace to private competition. The President was anxious to have the bill passed, and the Democratic leaders succeeded in forcing it through the House of Representatives. But the Senate's reception of the measure showed that it was doomed. Prolonged filibustering tactics by the opposition prevented agreement on the bill. Thus the establishment of an American merchant marine to fill the gap in ocean traffic caused by the war, beyond the facilities provided by the ship registry bill, seemed as far off as ever. In the midst of the struggle the President threatened to call an extra session if the bill was not passed, but the project, once pigeonholed, was not revived.

The question of seizures and detention by British warships of American commerce on the high seas, which had been smoldering since the war's beginning, now reached an acute stage. A note of protest couched in strong terms was dispatched by Secretary Bryan (December 28) to Ambassador Page in London for transmission to the British Foreign office. Mr. Bryan complained that Great Britain's policy toward neutral nations, and her treatment of cargoes consigned to neutral ports in the peaceful pursuit of commerce, exceeded the manifest necessities of a belligerent, and constituted an unreasonable restriction upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas as justified by international law. The note described Great Britain's attitude toward neutral cargoes as one of apparent indecision in the application of her own rules to neutral commerce, an attitude which had greatly perplexed American exporters. The situation was so serious, the note continued, as to require a candid statement from the American Government. It viewed with growing concern the large number of American vessels, destined to neutral ports in Europe, which had been seized on the high seas, taken to British ports, and detained there, sometimes for weeks. The note, with a significant emphasis, pointed out to his Majesty's Government that "the present condition of American trade with the neutral European countries is such that if it does not im-



prove it may arouse a feeling contrary to that which has so long existed between the American and British people."

"Already it has become more than a subject of public criticism and complaint," the note proceeded. "There is an increasing belief, doubtless not entirely unjustified, that the present British policy toward American trade is responsible for the depression in certain industries which depend upon European markets. The attention of the British Government is called to this possible result of their present policy to show how widespread is its effect upon the industrial life of the United States, and to emphasize the importance of removing this cause of complaint."

While Great Britain was considering its answer to this note, the contraband issue involved in the American protest loomed still larger on the international horizon owing to further interference with American shipping. A cargo of copper and brass sent from New York to Germany, reported to be disguised as "Christmas tree decorations," was seized January 1, 1915, at Copenhagen. The same fate befell the *Rotterdam*, January 3, from New York, with munitions aboard for Germany. The American ship *Denver*, carrying cotton from Norfolk, Va., to Germany, was detained January 6, 1915, at the Orkney Islands. Great Britain having declared cotton not contraband, a number of vessels with cotton cargoes had left southern ports for Germany the first week of the war, and the *Denver's* detention accordingly stirred the South.

A preliminary answer which Great Britain sent to the American note, January 7, was conciliatory in tone and recognized the friendly spirit in which the protest was prescribed. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, said that the British Government cordially concurred in the principle enunciated by the United States that a belligerent, in dealing with the trade between neutrals, should not interfere unless such interference was necessary to protect the belligerent's national safety, and then only to the extent to which this was necessary. "We shall endeavor to keep our action within the limits of this principle," Sir Edward Grey added, "on the understanding that it admits our right to interfere when such interference is not

with bona fide trade between the United States and another neutral country, but with trade in contraband destined for the enemies' country, and we are ready, whenever our action may unintentionally exceed this principle, to make redress."

The British note disputed the contention that American trade was suffering through British interference with American vessels. It quoted figures, to be amplified in a later note, showing that exports from New York to the Scandinavian countries for November, 1914, compared with the same month 1913, showed an enormous increase.

Sir Edward Grey pleaded that Great Britain was confronted with the growing danger that neutral countries contiguous to the enemy would become, on a scale unprecedented, a base of war supplies for the enemy, and a large increase in the imports of these countries since the war began revealed how strong that tendency was.

Great Britain sought to prevent Germany from obtaining food, raw material, and other necessary supplies. Thus she was bound to come into conflict with neutral powers sooner or later. Direct trade with Germany she could control absolutely by her undisputed sea power. Her difficulty was to control trade diverted to the enemy indirectly and through devious channels. This problem was centered on Holland and Italy, owing to their geographical position. Both countries are admirably situated to render invaluable service to Germany and Austria-Hungary, and both being neutral (Italy had not yet entered the war), shipments to them were legitimate on the surface. Transshipment was the problem that confronted Great Britain, as her power to starve the enemy ended with the sea, and transshipment was purely a land operation. In order to stop trade with the enemy via Holland and Italy, Great Britain contended that if the ultimate purpose of articles consigned to these countries was for feeding and arming the enemy they were seizable. Accordingly Great Britain asserted her right to seize shipments of foodstuffs and copper from the United States to Holland and Italy when suspicion warranted the belief that their ultimate destination was Germany or Austria, and their ultimate purpose

the feeding of soldiers and the manufacture of war munitions.

The contention of neutral countries was that the liability of a neutral ended with the port of first destination; that ultimate destination and ultimate purpose were possibilities too remote for consideration. The British Government claimed a right to seize foodstuffs and other conditional contraband consigned to Holland, and prevent that country from provisioning Germany through its "back door," if the amount shipped appeared larger than could be ordinarily utilized at or in the vicinity of the port to which the cargoes were consigned.

No sooner had the British reply been received than the issue became concentrated on the *Dacia*. This vessel had recently been transferred from German to American ownership under the facilities provided by the ship registry bill. She was laden with cotton at Galveston ostensibly for Holland. Great Britain advised Washington, January 7, 1915, that if the vessel sailed she would be seized. Neither Great Britain nor France was disposed to recognize the sale of a ship by enemies unless it had been regularly effected previous to the declaration of war or the commencement of hostilities. Great Britain by her warning indicated her doubt that the sale was bona fide. She refused the State Department's request that the *Dacia* be permitted to make one voyage on the ground that it might establish a precedent; and served notice, January 26, 1915, on the United States that the *Dacia* would be seized, intimating that as cotton was not contraband her cargo would not be confiscated. The *Dacia* sailed January 31, 1915, undeterred by the certainty of capture.

With the new year the Department of Commerce made its customary inventory of the country's annual gains and losses, and recorded the effect of the unprecedented conditions in 1914. It found that the European War had cost the United States \$382,831,172, due to the shrinkage in exports, up to December 1. This loss was shown by comparing the exports in the eleven months of 1913, ending with November, \$2,250,822,664, with those of the same period of 1914, when they had shrunk to \$1,867,991,492. The tide, however, turned with November, when there was a trade



balance in favor of the United States (that is, the excess of exports over imports) of \$69,411,271; for the eleven-month period it was \$193,372,036. The war had caught the country unprepared in that an enormous excess of imports had accumulated in the four months preceding its outbreak. Up to August, American merchants owed nearly \$40,000,000 to foreign manufacturers and producers.

Leading representatives of banking and business interests throughout the country reported in public utterances that the adverse effects of the war had abated and that readjustments to new conditions suddenly created were rapidly being made. But while curtailed exports and crippled shipping left their trail of misfortune, the country's vast resources and wealth seemed to be little affected fundamentally by international disturbances, whose effect at large was only indirect, though its seriousness could not be minimized. Merely to supply the ordinary needs of 100,000,000 people kept many a factory busy. Crops in 1914 had reached record figures, and crops are the backbone of American wealth. Nevertheless, the year was not only one of relative financial and business gloom, but was so even before the war threw a still darker cloud across the sky. The shipping difficulty was slowly remedied, but not until it had proved a great blow to the South. That section had a large cotton crop, two-thirds of which is sold abroad. In September, 1914, it exported \$6,000,000 worth against \$65,000,000 exported in 1913. Beyond this the direct effect of the cutting off of normal relations with Europe was relatively moderate, and any loss, except that to the South, was more than met by the steadily increasing export of munitions of war to the European nations, a movement which soon began after the first demoralization of ocean traffic had been adjusted.

For the first time in the history of the United States, the flow of immigration stopped and turned to emigration toward Europe. The war had checked it by more than 50 per cent. Only 680,000 aliens arrived in 1914, the Bureau of Immigration's figures revealed, as against 1,387,318 in 1913, and 1,026,360 in 1912. The emigration of laborers exceeded the immigration by 44,778. A feature of the reversed conditions was that in the six months of

1914, covering the war period, more English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, Russians, Germans, Austrians and Hungarians arrived than departed. The heaviest emigration was contributed by Italians, 87,000 of whom left the country, presumably due to the calling of Italian reservists to the colors. In marked contrast with previous years, immigration into the United States from Canada showed a relatively heavy increase, owing to war conditions, while the exodus into Canada from the United States was light.

Among the sweeping effects of the war on American conditions was the inflation of freight rates. A joint report presented by the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce to the Senate showed that ocean freight rates had increased 900 per cent, and even the extreme of 1,150 per cent, as compared with the rates current previous to the war. The 900 per cent expansion represented the increase of rates on wheat from New York to Rotterdam, on grain from Baltimore to European ports (not in Germany), and on cotton from Savannah to Bremen. The 1,150 per cent increase was on cotton freight from Galveston to Bremen. It was estimated that a continuation of such rates on exports at the level of December's shipments would cost American exporters \$216,224,400 above the usual cost, and that if a similar charge were laid on the imports the total cost to the United States for the year would be \$552,110,000 in addition to regular ocean freight rates.

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## CHAPTER XXXIII

### AMERICAN RIGHTS AND WAR-ZONE DECREE

THE progress of war in the second six months (from February 1 to August 1, 1915) drew the American people toward the vortex. The month of February brought the United States more than ever in conflict with the belligerents as the champion of neutral rights. The sweep of the war on the high seas, where American and other neutral interests were mostly jeopardized,

assumed a wider and more ruthless range. The efforts of the belligerents became concentrated upon dealing deathblows at the very fount of their enemy's vitality by aiming to throttle the main arteries of a people's subsistence, namely the channels of their food supplies.

The hand of the United States, already raised in protest to Great Britain against molesting American shipping in pursuit of her resolution to cut off Germany's over-sea trade in contraband, was again forced. The liberties of neutrals became challenged at their source, that is, the right of their ships to be on the high seas at all as peaceful traders during a war. The United States stoutly defended the privileges of neutrals, under international law and usage, to legitimate mercantile traffic on the world's waterways without their vessels being subject to unwarranted molestation and peril. Serious issues with Great Britain and Germany were the immediate fruit of the American protests.

Seeing her peril, Germany had placed all her foodstuffs under government supervision. Great Britain construed this action by Germany as establishing state control and disposal of all foodstuffs in the German Empire, including those imported from neutral countries, and hence foresaw a difficulty in distinguishing between necessities imported for Germany's civil population and those intended to provision her armies. The inevitable course was taken.

Great Britain on February 2, 1915, gave formal notice to the world that henceforth all shipments of foodstuffs consigned to Germany would be regarded as contraband and seized. Concurrent with this decision, an American vessel, the *Wilhelmina*, sailed for Germany with a food cargo on a voyage designed to test the British edict. It was the first overt consignment of foodstuffs intended apparently for consumption by German civilians. Great Britain promptly announced that the ship would not be permitted to proceed to her destination, and that her cargo would be seized and brought before a prize court. The threat was duly carried out.

The *Wilhelmina* case furnished a crux of the situation. Germany was convinced that Great Britain did not mean to dis-



tinguish between supplies destined for her civil population and those for her armies, and decided upon reprisals. Thereupon followed, on February 4, 1915, her epochal decree creating a war zone round the British Isles. She announced that after February 18, 1915, all enemy merchantmen encountered in British waters by German war vessels would be destroyed, even though it might not be possible to save their passengers and crews.

The decree was no less aimed at neutrals to prevent their ships from reaching British ports with supplies. It contained the warning that within the war zone neutral vessels would be exposed to danger owing to the alleged misuse of neutral flags by British vessels, sanctioned, Germany charged, by the British Government, and that by the hazards of naval warfare neutral shipping, consequently, could not always be spared from suffering from attacks intended for enemy ships. Germany utilized this stratagem of British vessels to escape capture as affording ground for warning neutral vessels to abstain from trading with British ports altogether.

The significance of the decree in its relation to neutrals was immediately recognized by President Wilson and his Cabinet. The occasion called on the United States to raise its voice again. Public sentiment saw in the decree an attempt to coerce, by terrorizing, further American trade with Great Britain and France, and shipping interests were disposed to ignore it. Neutrals, it was contended, were not bound to observe such a decree unless it was enforced by a real blockade, and this Germany had not naval facilities for effecting. The concern the decree created in the United States, however, produced an assurance from Berlin that there was no intention of sinking neutral ships, but repeated that they would be in imminent danger owing to the use of neutral flags by British vessels.

There was a disposition to discount Germany's emphasis on the British recourse to neutral flags as a mere device to scare peaceful shipping. Otherwise the inference was that because British ships used such flags, no neutral ensign, not even the Stars and Stripes, was a protection to any ship, a view which, at this stage, was unbelievable. But Germany's insistence upon regarding the

misuse of neutral flags as an essential element of her war-zone policy found almost immediate justification.

The Cunard liner, the *Lusitania*, on her eastward voyage from New York, raised on February 6, 1915, the American flag on entering the Irish Sea. The captain was said to have hoisted it to safeguard the Americans on board, and the passengers upheld his action. The British admiralty promptly denied the German assertion that the captain had acted upon Government instructions. Nevertheless, the employment of the Stars and Stripes as a war expedient by a great British liner made the incident an issue between the United States and Great Britain, though the practice was sanctioned by usage, and had been followed in the Civil War. It aroused Congress in both Houses, resulting on February 9, 1915, in the presentation of a bill of Representative Martins prohibiting as unlawful the raising of the American flag by foreign ships in foreign waters to disguise their nationality. The measure proposed to inflict fines of \$10,000 to \$100,000 for the offense, with confiscation of the vessel when it entered an American port.

The Administration did not countenance such legislation, taking the view that Congress could not control the use of the American flag by foreign ships in foreign waters. But the incident, related as it was to the German war-zone decree, precipitated American action, and produced on February 10, 1915, two imperative notes of warning to Great Britain and Germany respectively.

Both communications were direct and plain-spoken, but friendly in tone. In the note to Germany the United States viewed with the gravest concern the possibilities of the destruction of an American vessel on the high seas, and notified that it would regard such an occurrence "as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two Governments." The note contested the German view that British misuse of the American colors afforded ground for a plea of justification if American shipping suffered. "The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags," the note contended, "can

create no just presumption that all ships traversing the proscribed area are subject to the same suspicion." Summing up, the American note pointed to the consequences of an American vessel being destroyed under that presumption. "If such a deplorable situation should arise," it warned, "the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps that might be necessary to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged right on the high seas."

The American note to England protested against the use of the Stars and Stripes by the *Lusitania*, and was based on the assumption, in the absence of official knowledge to the contrary, that the act was sanctioned by the British Government. Without considering the legality or propriety of this deceptive use of the American colors by British craft on approaching home waters to escape an anticipated attack from German submarines, the United States called on Great Britain to restrain vessels of her nationality from using the flag in the area defined by the German war zone decree. "The practice would greatly endanger," the note continued, "the vessels of a friendly power navigating those waters, and would even seem to impose on the Government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force with that eventuality a constant menace." Great Britain was told that "the general misuse of a neutral flag jeopardizes the vessels of a neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by raising the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality, regardless of the flag which they carry."

Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office, in a public statement, defended the use of neutral flags by vessels of a country at war as a well-established practice of war. The only effect of the practice, in the British view, was to compel the enemy to follow the ordinary obligation of warfare and satisfy himself as to the



real nationality of the vessel and the character of its cargo before capturing her or taking her to a prize court.

In making an uncompromising assertion of American rights as embodied in the two notes, the Wilson Administration confronted a grave and crucial situation. American neutrality and the protection of the country's commerce had become entangled in the war reprisals of Great Britain and Germany. The only solution, in view of the fear later justified that Great Britain would not budge an inch from its announced policy, seemed to be to heed Germany's warning, and request American vessels to avoid the war zone. This surrender would mean severing all trade with the British Isles, and constitute an admission that Germany had a right to control the neutrals' freedom of the seas. Such was the outlook when Germany intimated on February 15, 1915, through her Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, that she would spare British shipping if Great Britain would permit food consignments to be delivered to German ports from the United States and elsewhere. This proposal later formed the basis of American mediation to prevail on the two combatants to abate the rigor of their drastic policies against one another.

Germany's official answer to the American note was issued on February 16, 1915. It contained a hint of which Count von Bernstorff's statement was plainly a forerunner, but inflamed rather than allayed American fears of complications. In spite of President Wilson's warning she flatly repudiated all responsibility for what might happen to neutral ships venturing into the dangerous area. An additional peril was threatened in her announcement that German mines would be laid in the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland. There was submitted another physical persuasive to neutrals to keep out of the war zone altogether, thus realizing Germany's design to stop neutral consignments from and reaching British ports. As an alternative, Germany suggested that American warships convoy American merchantmen in the war zone. In view of the fact that Germany did not want neutral vessels with supplies to Great Britain in those waters at all, this proposal was not regarded

as having been seriously made, and was not seriously received. As a means of safely getting food consignments from the United States to Germany—doubtless the real purpose of the proposal—it was dismissed as quixotic in view of American neutrality.

The German answer injected a new element into the issue by protesting against the shipment of arms and munitions from the United States to the allied powers. By implication Germany asked the United States how it could reasonably expect her to safeguard American shipping in dangerous waters when “a traffic in arms, estimated at many hundreds of millions, is being carried on between American firms and Germany’s foes?” Continuing her protest, the note proceeded: “The German Government cannot help pointing out that it feels itself to be severely prejudiced by the fact that neutrals, in safeguarding their rights to legitimate commerce with Germany according to international law, have up to the present achieved no, or only insignificant, results, while they are making an unlimited use of their right of carrying on contraband traffic with Great Britain and our other enemies.” Thereupon followed the declaration by Germany that she was determined to suppress, by all the means within her power, the importation of all war materials to Great Britain or to her allies, and that she took it for granted that neutral governments, which so far had taken no steps against the traffic in arms with Germany’s enemies, would not oppose the forcible suppression by Germany of this trade.

The only ameliorating feature of the German answer was a plea to the United States, none too definitely expressed, bearing upon Count von Bernstorff’s earlier intimation that if Great Britain, through the good offices of the United States, relaxed her embargo on food supplies to Germany, the latter would spare British shipping. The plea followed a reference to the measures Germany felt compelled to take “under the strongest necessity of national defense,” and was couched in these guarded terms:

“If the United States, in view of the weight which it is justified in throwing and able to throw into the scales of the fate of peoples, should succeed at the last moment in renewing the

grounds which make that procedure an obligatory duty for Germany, and if the American Government, in particular, should find a way to make the declaration of London respected—on behalf also of those powers which are fighting on Germany's side—and thereby make possible for Germany legitimate importation of the necessities of life and industrial raw material, then the German Government could not too highly appreciate such a service rendered in the interests of humane methods of warfare, and would gladly draw conclusions from the new situation."

The volume of diplomatic notes that the sea warfare had produced was now added to by a lengthy defense from Great Britain on February 18, 1915, of her interference with American shipping, which had occasioned the first American complaint. Sir Edward Grey's communication amplified a preliminary answer he had already made to this original American protest against unwarranted seizures and detentions of American shipping by Great Britain. The dispute had become overshadowed by the projection of more serious issues engendered by the blockade measures of Great Britain and Germany; but as the principle the United States espoused in its first complaint was also the basis of its later protests, namely, the inviolability of neutral rights on the high seas, the issue created by the seizures and detentions now became embraced in the larger questions the war-zone decrees involved.

Sir Edward Grey assured the United States that Great Britain had made every effort to be as lenient as possible in its attitude toward American and other neutral ships and cargoes. "It will be our endeavor," he wrote, "to avoid injury and loss to neutrals." A significant qualification accompanied this undertaking, i. e. "But the announcement of the German Government of their intention to sink merchant vessels and their cargoes without verification of their nationality and character, and without making any provision for the safety of noncombatants or giving them a chance to save their lives, has made it necessary for his Majesty's Government to consider what measures they should adopt to protect their interests. It is impossible for one belligerent to



depart from rules and precedents and for the other to remain bound by them."

The American note had complained that the American export trade was suffering from British interference. Sir Edward Grey had already disputed this contention, and now returned to the attack. If cotton, which was not (at this stage) contraband, be excluded, "the effect of the war has been, not to increase, but to practically arrest the decline of American exports, which was in progress earlier in the war." The general result was to show convincingly, he added, that the naval operations of Great Britain were not the cause of any diminution in the volume of American exports. The contrary was shown he indicated by quoting a circular of the Department of Commerce, issued January 23, which referred to "a marked improvement in the foreign trade of the United States."

The burden of the British defense was that this recovery was in part due to the elaborate machinery which, Sir Edward Grey said, had been devised to supply the German Empire with foodstuffs from abroad through neutral ports contiguous to Germany. "Under these circumstances," he warned, "it would be absurd to give a definite pledge that supplies (to Germany) should be given complete immunity by the simple expedient of dispatching them to an agent in a neutral port." The British Foreign Minister found ground for the suspicion that foodstuffs, imported by neutral countries adjacent to Germany, were being sent into Germany, citing evidence to show that heavy shipments of lard, bacon, canned beef, pickled pork, and foodstuffs had been made from the United States to Denmark, which shipments, he said, were much in excess of their normal volume. Finally Sir Edward Grey sought to vitiate the American complaint by submitting that it would not have been made if the condition of American foreign commerce had been more fully known to the Administration.

A defense of the use of the American flag by the *Lusitania* was the subject of the next British note sent on February 19, 1915, in answer to the American objection, previously stated, to its employment by British vessels. Great Britain pleaded that

in view of Germany's announced intention to sink British ships "on sight," she felt that the United States could not fairly ask her to order British vessels to forego the means, always hitherto permitted, of escaping not only capture, but sinking and destruction. The British Government had always granted (when a neutral) to other nations the right to use the British flag in such circumstances. The onus lay on the attacking ship, Great Britain maintained, to ascertain the true nationality of a merchant vessel before capturing or destroying it. The British conclusion was that that obligation fulfilled, the hoisting of a neutral flag on a British vessel could not possibly endanger neutral shipping.

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## CHAPTER XXXIV

### DEADLOCK ON WAR-ZONE DECREE

GERMANY'S war-zone decree had gone into effect. Great Britain faced it with an unrelenting composure in her determination to carry out her threatened embargo on direct or indirect consignments to Germany. No gleam of hope penetrated the darkened skies that she would relax her grip on her supremacy of the seas to provide a channel for neutral supplies of food to German civilians. Nevertheless the United States interposed as a mediator with informal proposals delicately submitted as a friend of the combatants, designed both to soften the ruthless temper with which they had launched retaliatory counterstrokes and to slacken their rigor.

The United States, in an identical memorandum to Great Britain and Germany on February 20, 1915, advanced several suggestions with a view to discovering a basis of understanding to free noncombatant trading ships from the dangers that encompassed them.

President Wilson disarmed possible resentment of these proposals by a conciliatory preamble declaring that the United States ventured to take a liberty which it was convinced would

be conceded to a sincere friend who was actuated by a desire to cause inconvenience to neither nation and possibly serve the common interests of humanity.

The American suggestions were: That Great Britain and Germany agree that isolated drifting mines be laid by neither belligerent; that anchored mines be laid exclusively for defensive purposes within gun range of harbors and be so constructed as to become harmless after breaking loose from their anchorages; that submarines of neither nation be employed to menace merchant vessels of any nationality except to carry out the right to intercept and search them; that mercantile ships of neither nation utilize neutral flags as a war ruse or to conceal their identity; that Great Britain agree that foodstuffs should not be placed on the list of absolute contraband; that she permit unmolested transit of such cargoes, either direct or through neutral ports, when addressed to agencies in Germany, who would be designated by the United States Government to receive such supplies and to deliver them to licensed German retailers for distribution exclusively to the civil population; and that Germany agree that foodstuffs from the United States or from any other neutral country be addressed to such agencies.

These recommendations were a response to the indirect plea Germany made to the United States in her note, previously quoted, and foreshadowed by Count von Bernstorff's informal offer. Germany wanted her ports kept open, and saw in the United States, as food supplier, an interested party who might prevail on England to ease her cordon subject to Germany conceding a *quid pro quo*, which was to modify or withdraw her war zone proclamation. The proposals regarding the food supplies amounted to American supervision at their destination, either by American consular officers or American organizations. Great Britain, with her mind made up, austere viewed Germany's successful overtures to the United States to act as an interceder, and was unready in her response, because she had none of the tenor desired.

Tension in Washington was suddenly created, even while this possible olive branch was in process of being tendered through



diplomatic channels. The first American victim fell, caught as an innocent wayfarer in the vortex of the sea warfare. The steamer *Evelyn*, bound from New York to Bremen with a cargo of cotton, struck a mine off Borkum Island, in the North Sea, and sank on February 21, 1915. Eight of her crew were lost. One of the crew, picked up by a German ship, had frozen to death before being rescued. The vessel had gone down outside the German war zone, though near the German coast. Her loss was plainly accidental, due to navigating in mine-strewn waters, and was not a direct outcome of Germany's blow at Great Britain. But it came at a critical moment, and sharply brought home to the United States the perils that lay in wait for its shipping in European waters.

Three days later another American vessel, the *Carib*, from Charlestown, was destroyed by a mine off the German coast, losing three of her crew. Germany officially blamed her commander for leaving the prescribed route. There was nothing for the United States to do but to bear with composure these fortuitous calamities to its shipping. But Washington could not repress a nervous anxiety regarding the outcome of its efforts to effect an amelioration of conditions of which the *Evelyn* and the *Carib* were victims. Public concern was voiced in Congress by debates on American maritime rights.

Germany did not delay in provisionally manifesting her general acquiescence in the American proposals. Her answer came on March 1, 1915, as Great Britain was hurling unmeasured defiance at her through Premier Asquith, who that day announced in the House of Commons the expected British embargo closing all sea trade to and from Germany.

In accepting the main American suggestions, Germany said they corresponded to her wishes that the naval war should be conducted according to rules which recognized the rights of neutrals as well as the laws of humanity. She was willing to discontinue the use of floating mines, but thought it impracticable to renounce anchored mines for defensive purposes. Submarines would only be employed according to general international rules, against mercantile vessels of whatever flag as

required for holdup and search. But it was insisted that enemy ships should not use neutral flags, nor be armed, and should abstain from offering violent resistance. While assenting to the American proposal for the regulation of German food supplies, Germany reverted to a sore subject in observing that the need of the steps proposed by the United States "would be substantially diminished if, as already pointed out in the note of February 16, 1915, means and ways could be found to exclude the exportation of war material from neutral to belligerent states on ships of whatsoever flag." But she declined to adopt a definite attitude on the proposals until Great Britain had done so.

Great Britain's real reply to the American proposal was embodied in an Anglo-French note sent to all the neutral powers announcing the cutting-off of Germany from all sea trade with the outside world. "That is our answer," declared Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, "to Germany's war zone order."

The Anglo-French note mystified the administration regarding the means the Allies would adopt to carry out their reprisals against Germany. President Wilson was indisposed to concede that the Allies were privileged to restrict American trade to and from Germany by recourse to a "paper blockade." He took the view that a real blockade must be enforced, of the kind heretofore recognized, namely, by a cordon of warships closely drawn round German ports. The Allies apparently planned to intercept ships suspected of bearing supplies to Germany at any point on the high seas, near to or distant from their suspected destination. The question developed further interchanges on the shipping impasse.

An unexpected step by the House of Representatives at this stage seemed, at first glance, to throw into sharp relief a phase of the international situation which had caused Germany grave concern. The question of an embargo on war munitions became injected into a resolution that the House passed March 3, 1915, amplifying the President's powers to enforce the neutrality laws. The Senate took such a serious view of the resolution that its Committee on Foreign Relations besought a conference with

the President. As the resolution had originated in the State Department, it was accepted as an Administrative measure demanding immediate action. The senators were assured that the measure was not too broad, and could not be interpreted as providing any embargo on the shipment of war supplies. The Senate nevertheless passed a substitute resolution eliminating such a construction being placed on its provisions. The resolution, which at once became a law with the President's signature, empowered the President virtually to adopt peaceful measures of reprisals against belligerents by prosecuting their agents who attempted to use American territory as a base for sending supplies to their warships. It authorized the President to intern ships suspected of acting as tenders for belligerent war vessels, to withhold clearance papers from them, and make such unneutral practices a penal offense.

The Anglo-French note proclaiming reprisals against Germany resulted on March 5, 1915, in an identical communication from the United States to Great Britain and France inquiring how the "blockade" of German ports was to be accomplished, how neutral-owned goods were to be treated when detained, how blockade rights were to be assumed without an actual blockade being enforced, and what radius the Allies' operations would embrace. While recognizing that changed conditions of warfare affected the customary methods of blockading an enemy's coast, the Administration considered the Allies' retaliatory measure against Germany incomplete and ineffective. The United States also submitted to Great Britain Germany's views on the American proposals for modifying her submarine warfare, if Great Britain raised the food embargo against Germany.

These mediatory proposals at length produced, March 13, 1915, a response from Great Britain: but as the reprisals against Germany had meantime been proclaimed, the act of doing so was a virtual refusal to consider the American suggestions without the formality of a note. Great Britain defended the reprisals, saying it was unable to perceive from the German answer to the American proposals that Germany was really pre-



pared to abandon the practice of sinking British merchant vessels by submarines; nor to abandon the use of mines for offensive purposes on the high seas as contrasted with the use of those for defense. The Allies' measures against Germany were held as justified by reason of Germany's "inhuman" conduct of the war in Belgium and France, her maltreatment of defenseless noncombatants and of British prisoners, and her bombardment of defenseless English coast towns. "I must emphasize," Sir Edward Grey wrote, "that this measure (the blockade of the German coast) is a natural and necessary consequence of the unprecedented method, repugnant to all law and morality, which Germany began to adopt at the outset of the war, and the facts of which have been constantly accumulating." He declared that the British fleet had instituted a blockade exclusively controlling, by cruiser cordon, all passage to and from Germany by sea. Great Britain's plea of justification for the blockade constituted a further rejection of the American proposals seeking its modification.

On the delicate question of neutral rights, the subject of the American inquiry of March 5, Sir Edward Grey in a further note, March 15, said the British Government had felt most reluctant, at the moment of initiating a policy of blockade, to exact from neutral ships all penalties attaching to a breach of blockade. But in its desire to relieve the burden which the existence of a state of war at sea inevitably imposed on neutral sea-borne commerce, the British Government declared its intention to refrain altogether from the exercise of the right to confiscate ships or cargoes, which belligerents had always claimed, in respect of breaches of blockade. Great Britain, Sir Edward Grey added, would limit its claim to the stopping of cargoes destined for or coming from the enemy's territory. France's reply was of a similar tenor. Both undertook to restrict the radius of operations to European and Mediterranean waters.

The British Order in Council, defining and putting into effect the policy of reprisals against Germany, notified the world on March 15, 1915, that the Allies would confiscate or requisition

the cargo of any merchant vessel if the cargo was made in Germany or was destined for Germany. The Order likewise restricted the trade of neutrals with one another. No neutral ships were to be sunk, nor lives forfeited, nor would neutral cargoes be seized without payment.

The United States declined to recede from its position. The Anglo-French defense of the naval procedure against Germany brought a rejoinder on March 30, 1915, insisting on the right of innocent shipments to be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral countries to belligerent territory without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic or breach of blockade, much less detention, requisition or confiscation. The United States indicated its readiness to admit that the old form of a "close blockade, with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports, is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make effective defense by submarines, mines and aircraft." But whatever form of effective blockade was established, it must conform to the spirit and rules of international law. For the United States to assume that Great Britain had any right to stop neutral shipment of noncontraband, bound through neutral countries for Germany, would amount to the assumption by the United States of an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain. For Great Britain to set up a claim of right to disregard neutral rights under international law would be for her to fling to the winds "the principles for which she has consistently and earnestly conceded in other times and circumstances." The American rejoinder, in making this stand, also pointed out that "if the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should prove to be, in fact, tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war sanctioned by enlightened nations, it cannot be supposed, and this government does not for a moment suppose, that his Majesty's Government would wish the same taint to attach to their own actions or would cite such illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on their part, insofar as they affect neutral rights."

Germany had appeared to recognize this determined effort to sustain the right of American sea commerce to unimpeded trade with German and neutral ports. But a flank criticism unexpectedly directed at the Administration by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, now conveyed the impression that Germany was skeptical of the sincerity of the American attitude.

In a note to the State Department the German Ambassador on April 4, 1915, complained of the inability of the United States to effect any change in the Allies' suppression of neutral trade with Germany after eight months of war. Such a delay, especially in safeguarding legitimate commerce in food-stuffs, the ambassador viewed as equivalent to failure. "It is therefore to be assumed," he commented, "that the United States Government has accepted England's violations of international law." It was not clear whether this view of the American championship of neutral rights was volunteered by the ambassador as a personal one or was sponsored by the German Government. It surprised the Administration, but the occasion for it became manifest as the ambassador's note proceeded to reflect on American neutrality by renewing the German complaint against continued American shipments of war munitions to the allied powers. The United States, he said, was the only country in a position to export war material. "In contradiction of the real spirit of neutrality," Count von Bernstorff continued, "an enormous new industry in war materials of every kind is being built up in the United States, inasmuch as not only the existing plants are kept busy and enlarged, but also new ones are being founded. In reality the United States is supplying only Germany's enemies, a fact which is in no way modified by the purely theoretical willingness to furnish Germany as well if it were possible." He alluded to the American Government's attitude toward the shipment of war materials to Mexico in the struggle between Carranza and Huerta. Then, he said, President Wilson maintained a true spirit of neutrality which, had it been applied to the European combatants, would have caused an embargo on war supplies to the Allies.



The State Department's answer to this criticism on April 2, 1915, contested the grounds on which it was apparently made. Count von Bernstorff was informed that his language was "susceptible of being considered as impugning the good faith of the United States in the performance of its duties as a neutral," and that he was "laboring under certain false impressions." He was reminded that the United States was not only not yielding its right as a neutral to any one of the belligerents, but had attempted to obtain from Great Britain and Germany certain concessions with regard to the measures those governments were taking for the interruption of trade on the high seas.

On the question of war munitions the State Department retorted that the German Ambassador seemed to be under the impression that it was within the choice of the United States Government, notwithstanding its professed neutrality, and its diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair attitude toward Germany. "The Government holds, as I believe your excellency is aware," remarked Secretary Bryan, "and as it is constrained to hold, in view of the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war, which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war, would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality, by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none of the circumstances urged by your excellency's memorandum alters the principle involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States." It was therefore out of the question for the United States, in honor bound by the view which it held, to consider such a course.

Momentous events were to interpose and retard the American efforts toward an amelioration of the harsh Anglo-German methods of sea war affecting the interests of neutrals. A reminder that a solution of the vital issues involved was as far

off as ever came on June 22, 1915, in a memorandum from Great Britain. This was evidently evoked by the last American note without being an answer to it. Great Britain found further occasion to iterate her plea of justification for the manner in which she had treated American commerce. The note's tenor was such that it would only be construed as emphasizing Great Britain's firm and undeviating resolution to pursue her course, afforded no indication of any intention to accept the principles of international law enunciated by President Wilson, nor any disposition to compromise on her blockade of the German sea trade, which began March 1, 1915. Her fiat had caused further detentions of American ships and cargoes. Transport to the United States was denied to goods bought in Germany after March 1, and shipped through a neutral port; to goods contracted for before that date, consigned from Rotterdam, a neutral port, which were approximately valued at \$50,000,000; to American cotton for Germany even if consigned to a neutral port, and to American noncontraband goods for Holland or any other neutral country contiguous to Germany. Cotton, hitherto noncontraband, was swept with all other commodities into the contraband list by the British blockade order. Three weeks after its operation Great Britain had acknowledged holding thirty-six neutral vessels carrying American goods, twenty-three of which were American cotton cargoes. In a spirit of leniency toward the South, Great Britain had made a special agreement with the cotton interests whereby such staple contracted for, and its freighters engaged before March 2, were to be allowed unimpeded transit, or bought at the contract price if stopped, provided the ship carrying it sailed before March 31, 1915. Cotton insured before March 2, and sailing not later than March 16, was similarly favored. But Great Britain had to be satisfied that such cargoes were not eventually destined for Germany. As the weeks passed and Great Britain retained her tightened grip on sea commerce, showing no perceptible slackening by her concessions on cotton, the Administration was harassed by indignant demands from American shippers to renew its protests to that country. But the tragedy of the *Lusitania* had in-

tervened and overwhelmed all other considerations, restraining the Administration from again calling Great Britain to account while the tense crisis with Germany lasted.

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## CHAPTER XXXV

### "LUSITANIA" — AMERICAN PROTEST

MORE than one event bodeful to Americans had gone before and cast its shadow across the pathway of the *Lusitania* ere she went to her doom on May 7, 1915. But not until that overwhelming tragedy shocked the world did these happenings acquire their real significance. Despite the implacable tone of the German communication to the United States, reflecting the bitter determination of the German Government to destroy the Allies' shipping within the war zone it had established round the British Isles without being overregardful whether neutrals suffered or not, it was inconceivable to Americans that Germany really meant to doom neutrals who ventured to travel on an enemy ship. The sinking of the *Lusitania* is fully described in the chapter on "Submarine Warfare." Here we will confine ourselves to the diplomatic complications.

President Wilson's warnings to Germany seemed to afford certain safeguards that Americans at least would be safe. Yet an American had lost his life in the destruction of a British ship, the *Falaba*, by a German submarine without warning, several weeks before the *Lusitania* was sunk. Later had appeared in the advertising columns of the American press what proved to be a harbinger of the fate which befell the great liner. The German Embassy, on the week preceding the *Lusitania's* sailing on her last voyage, published an official warning that transatlantic travelers who took passage on vessels of the Allied Powers did so at their own peril, as such vessels on entering British waters were liable to destruction. The advertisement bore the aspect of a mere official formality, and was so re-



garded to the extent to which it was noticed; but the event disclosed that Germany intended it to be the handwriting on the wall, to be heeded by traveling Americans if they valued their lives. It also served as a premonition that the American flag, to say nothing of American lives, was not to be held sacrosanct. An attack on May 1, 1915, on an American oil ship, the *Cushing*, by German aircraft in the North Sea, and the torpedoing of another American vessel, the *Gulflight*, May 3, by a German submarine off the Scilly Islands, when three of her crew were lost, demonstrated that Germany was bent on pursuing her course regardless of the perils she inflicted on neutrals. The attack made on the *Gulflight* deeply stirred Washington, and the Administration was about to raise a serious issue with Germany over that occurrence when the larger happening—the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* with 157 Americans numbered in the heavy toll of victims killed and drowned—stunned the country.

The afternoon of May 7, 1915, brought a report, brief and qualified, that the *Lusitania* had been sunk by a German submarine off the Old Head of Kinsale on the Irish coast. It was received lightly and with incredulity; but as further reports trickled through the cables telling of flotsam on the waters, of boatloads of survivors being picked up by rescuing craft rushed from Queenstown, the United States realized that a crisis had come in its relations with Germany.

The efforts of President Wilson to make clear to Germany, in unmistakable terms, the feeling with which the American people would regard any calamity to Americans caused by Germany's operation of her war-zone decree, had counted for naught. Rising popular wrath swelled and flowed to the portals of the White House in a deluge of telegrams. The President sought to allay impetuous judgments against Germany in a public statement on May 8, 1915, in which he told the country that he felt "the distress and gravity of the situation to the utmost;" that he was considering "very earnestly, but very calmly, the right course to pursue;" and that he knew the people wished and expected him "to act with deliberation as well as with fairness." Congressional opinion also counseled calmness.

The same day a defensive official statement was issued from Berlin, charging that the *Lusitania* "was naturally armed with guns, as were recently most of the English mercantile steamers," and that she had "large quantities of war material on board." The Wilhelmstrasse also pleaded that Americans had been repeatedly warned not to travel in the sea-war area, and that the German Ambassador at Washington had even cautioned them in a country-wide advertisement to that effect. Count von Bernstorff hastened to express to the State Department Germany's deep regrets for the loss of so many American lives. A denial promptly came from the British admiralty that the *Lusitania* was armed.

In solitude, aloof from his advisers, the President weighed the problem confronting the country. For two days he remained preoccupied, mostly alone in his study, immersed in deep thought, sometimes undisturbed for hours. Protests continued to pour into the White House while he was thus considering "the right course to pursue." Many called for the adoption of stern measures. Some from workingmen's organizations urged a declaration of war as the surest way to prevent further affronts to American dignity. Others demanded a severance of all diplomatic relations with Germany unless adequate reparation and an apology were made. Calmer advisers recommended a peaceful but firm course.

The prevailing view was that the action the United States would decide on involved the prestige of the country, in view of the many American victims lost on the *Lusitania*. The unmistakable terms of the American notes to Germany, implying a warning that definite action would follow any loss of American lives or ships in the submarine war, were recalled. "What will the United States do?" was significantly asked in England. The series of events embracing the sinking of the *William P. Frye*, the loss of an American when the *Falaba* was torpedoed, the torpedoing of the *Gulflight* without warning, and the dropping of airship bombs on the *Cushing*, raised the question whether these incidents formed a sequence suggesting a designed policy of hostility to the United States by Germany, or

# WAR EPISODES

ON THE

## MANY FRONTS AND AT SEA

REFUGEES • WINTER SHELTER • FOOD TRAIN • TRENCHES  
SHATTERED GUN • GAS MASKS • DESTROYER AND TORPEDO



Copyright, Underwood & Underwood

On the mountain frontiers, difficulties of transportation are extreme. Here Italian engineers are hoisting a heavy gun up a precipitous mountainside to a point of vantage





Copyright, Brown & Dawson

Peasants of Galicia, who fled from their homes because of the Russian invasion, are shown returning under an Austrian military escort



Copyright, Paul Thompson

This large tree provides a permanent German observation station, and the  
watcher has a most comfortable winter shelter at its base





An Austrian food train passing through a district that has been swept by invasion and distributing food and grain to the starving civilians






Copyright, Paul Thompson

These German soldiers have taken up their position in a house, and made a well-constructed trench through its floor





Copyright, Feature Photo Service

What is left of an English field gun hit by a German shell. The wheels on which the gun was transported were left intact



Copyright, Press Illustrating Co.

French soldiers prepared to stand a gas attack from the German lines. A subofficer is inspecting their masks to see that they are properly adjusted





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Drawn by Norman Wilkinson

This British destroyer is evading a German submarine's torpedo by the maneuver of  
a sudden change of course

whether they bore no such relation to each other and were merely casual.

The Cabinet met on May 11, 1915, in a grave spirit, and deliberated long. The paramount obligation was before it of determining the tenor of the firm representations that must be made to Germany, without involving the country in war, to placate national resentment over the *Lusitania's* destruction. It was felt that the United States was morally committed to the declaration contained in its note to Germany of February 10, 1915, that it “would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to strict accountability for such acts of their naval commanders, and to take any steps that may be necessary to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.” It was a warning that predicted hostile action; yet, as the country plainly did not want war, the Cabinet’s problem was to couch the firm representations to be made to Germany in terms which would furnish that country with no reasonable excuse for drawing the United States into hostilities with her. Demands that the Administration break off relations with Germany, or adopt measures of reprisal, such as seizing the German shipping marooned in American harbors, were set aside as signifying steps that would lead to war. The Cabinet viewed the problem from many angles, and its discussions took a wide range. The outcome was that the first move of a hostile nature must come from Germany if war was to result from Germany’s flouting of American sentiment in sinking the *Lusitania*.

Public feeling remained at high tension. The President was striving to keep it within the bounds that would protect him from being swept into taking drastic action against Germany, when Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, the reputed leader of the German propaganda in the United States, embarrassed the Administration by adding fuel to the flames in a public statement justifying the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Dr. Dernburg, who was a former colonial minister of the kaiser’s, had no official status in the United States. Hence the Administration hesitated to take any



steps to restrain the expression of such unwelcome views from an unofficial spokesman of the German Government, to avoid further aggravating racial feeling, already deeply stirred. Dr. Dernburg's activities on behalf of the German cause subsequently ceased. The Administration effected his return to Germany, obtaining safe conduct for him across the Atlantic from the Allied Powers.

After the Cabinet meeting the protest to Germany took final shape, and was dispatched on May 11, 1915, to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin for transmission. The note informed the kaiser's Government that recent acts of the German naval authorities in violation of American rights on the high seas had created a grave situation, which called for a clear and full understanding between the Governments of the United States and Germany. It cited the cases of the *Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulflight*, and *Lusitania* as constituting a series of events which the American Government had observed "with growing concern, distrust, and amazement." That these acts, "so absolutely contrary to the rules, practices, and the spirit of modern warfare," could have the sanction or countenance of the German Government the United States could not believe. It looked for action from the German Government which would correct the unfortunate impressions that had been created, and vindicate the position of that Government with regard to the sacred freedom of the seas. Germany's warning to neutrals to avoid the war zone was again repudiated as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American citizens, bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. The note repeated that the German Government would be held to a strict accountability for any infringement of these rights, and assumed that the German Government accepted the rule that the lives of non-combatants of whatever nationality could not lawfully be put in jeopardy.

The objection of the United States to the German methods of attack in sea warfare lay "in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity



which all modern opinion regards as imperative." The warning issued by the German Embassy to traveling Americans, cautioning them that if they took passage on ships of the Allied Powers they did so at their peril, was described in the American note as "a surprising irregularity." No warning that an unlawful and inhumane act would be committed, Germany was told, could possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation of that act, or an abatement of the responsibility for its commission.

The American Government concluded that German naval commanders, in committing these acts of lawlessness, did so under a misapprehension of the orders of the German Government. Hence it confidently expected that Germany would disavow the acts complained of, make adequate reparation, where reparation was possible, and take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so "obviously subversive of the principles of warfare." The German Government was looked to for "just, prompt, and enlightened action in this vital matter." Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in the case of neutral ships destroyed by mistake, while they might satisfy international obligations if no loss of life resulted, could not justify or excuse, in the American Government's view, a practice the natural and necessary effect of which was to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

"The Imperial German Government," the American note finally warned, "will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens, and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

The President's stand was upheld by the country. Senators voiced their approval, and governors pledged their States to support the American demands. The press greeted the protest as expressing the nation's mind firmly and courteously, and meeting the crisis effectively. Even German citizens approved, hopeful that a clash would be averted, but pledged their loyalty.

In full accord with the President's course, the country awaited Germany's answer. Confidence was the keynote in Washington.

Hopes of a satisfactory answer from Germany were heightened by a cessation of submarine activities pending the outcome.

These sanguine expectations were short-lived. The publication of the note in the German press on May 18, 1915, evoked an editorial outcry that it was pro-British, and that Germany must go her own way without submitting to American dictation. Several leading German newspapers joined in a fierce onslaught on the United States, urging that Germany refuse to yield to the American protest. They repeated that neutrals entering the war zone did so at their own peril. The Americans on board the *Lusitania*, they charged, "were shielding contraband goods with their person." The tone of the German press caused gloom in Washington, where it was credited with having governmental inspiration.

While Germany was framing her answer the American steamer *Nebraskan*, bound for Delaware Breakwater from Liverpool, was struck on May 26, 1915, by a torpedo off the Fastnet, Ireland. The attempt to sink her failed, and the ship returned to Liverpool. Coming in the midst of the crisis with Germany, the occurrence amazed Washington and darkened the prospect of an amicable settlement. But Germany at least made one amend. She disavowed, May 28, the attack on the *Gulflight* on the report of the submarine commander that the vessel had been torpedoed by mistake, and later apologized. This admission was followed by renewed warnings to American vessels, made in a memorandum to Ambassador Gerard, against traversing the area of maritime war incautiously, and advised that their neutral markings be clearly shown and illuminated at night.

The German answer on May 29, 1915, to the American demands arising from the sinking of the *Lusitania* bore out the unfavorable anticipations which the Berlin press comments had created. The German Government first sought "a common basis of fact" upon which both Governments could agree, in order to arrive at the clear and complete understanding demanded by the United States. Implying that the American Government had an incorrect knowledge of the vessel's actual status, the German answer said that the Administration had proceeded on

the assumption that the *Lusitania* could be regarded as an ordinary, unarmed merchantman. This, Germany charged, was not the case. On the contrary, the German note described the *Lusitania* as having been built with Government funds as an auxiliary cruiser, and entered expressly as such in the Navy List issued by the British admiralty. Here the now familiar complaint was repeated that all the more important British merchantmen had been equipped with cannon and ammunition and other weapons, and manned by proficient gunners. The *Lusitania*, the German answer asserted, had cannon on board, mounted and concealed below decks. Moreover, the British Government had secretly recommended its merchant vessels not only to seek protection under neutral flags and other distinguishing marks, but while thus disguised to attack German submarines by ramming, for which successful operation the British Government had offered and paid high rewards.

"In view of these facts, indubitably known to it," the note said that the German Government was unable to regard British merchantmen in the zone of naval operations as "undefended." German submarine commanders, consequently, were no longer able to observe the customary regulations of prize law, which they had before followed.

The German Government also charged that the *Lusitania* on its last voyage, as on earlier occasions, carried Canadian troops and war material, including 5,000 cases of ammunition, intended for the destruction of brave German soldiers. Hence the German Government believed "it was acting in justified self-defense in seeking, with all the means of warfare at its disposition, to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition intended for the enemy.

The *Lusitania's* owners, the Cunard Steamship Company, in the German view, were culpable in "attempting deliberately to use the lives of American citizens as a protection for the ammunition on board," and acted against the clear provision of the American law, which, the note said, expressly prohibited the carrying of passengers on ships bearing ammunition, and provided a penalty therefor. The company was therefore wantonly



guilty of causing the deaths of so many of the *Lusitania's* passengers.

The rapid sinking of the vessel Germany ascribed as primarily due to the explosion of the ammunition on board caused by a torpedo; otherwise the *Lusitania's* passengers would in all probability have been saved.

Having thus justified the vessel's destruction, Germany withheld a final decision on the American demands, pending the receipt of the United States Government's views on the aspects of the case Germany had presented. Meantime the German Government showed a readiness to utilize the *Lusitania* issue as an element in the further pursuit by the United States of its mediatory proposals as a basis for a *modus vivendi* for the further conduct of the maritime warfare between Great Britain and Germany. The United States was assured that having shown her readiness to enter into a discussion of these proposals, Germany had demonstrated her good intentions in ample fashion; but the realization of these proposals had been defeated by the attitude of the British Government. Arbitration was suggested for adjusting the cases of the *Cushing* and *Gulflight*, which had also figured in the American protest, and indemnification was promised if Germany was proved to be at fault.

The German answer, in brief, evaded the cardinal points raised by the American note, disclaimed all responsibility for the loss of the *Falaba* and the *Lusitania*, and ignored the question of the future safety of Americans traveling in the war zone.

Unconcealed dissatisfaction was manifested in Government circles at Germany's plea of justification. Her omission to discuss the reparation demanded in the American note, and her evasion of the request that guarantees be given that American lives and ships should not be endangered in the future, revived the crisis in the relations between the two countries.

National sentiment, as echoed by the press, viewed the note as a refusal to admit that the American demands were just; called it trifling, shifty, and offensive in spirit, a plea of confes-

sion and avoidance, and a virtual renewal of Germany's credentials to submarine commanders to slaughter noncombatants. That it failed to measure American feeling, mocked law, lacked even plausibility, contained falsehoods, gambled with neutral's friendship, and revealed that American tact had been wasted, were other expressions of the unfavorable views the German answer evoked. On the other hand, there were appeals for a suspension of judgment, the situation being regarded as affording no occasion for hysterics, and a general disposition was shown to trust the President.

A denial came from the Cunard Company that the *Lusitania* carried any war munitions that would explode by the impact of a torpedo. The ammunition she carried, the company said, consisted of 4,200 cases of cartridges for small arms, and 1,250 steel shrapnel cases, empty. The cartridges were classified as nonexplosive, being of low potency. The repeated charge that the *Lusitania* carried guns was again denied by the British Ambassador at Washington. The German Ambassador, however, sought to refute this denial by presenting to the State Department four affidavits, sworn to by Germans, who charged that they had seen guns on board. One of the affiants, Gustav Stahl, afterwards disappeared. The accusations fell to the ground upon his subsequent arrest and conviction for perjury.

Again the President and Cabinet met on June 1, 1915, in solemn deliberation. The outstanding issue was whether Germany intended to comply with the established requirement of international law that visitation and search shall be exercised before an unarmed vessel was sunk, and what steps she would take to protect American citizens and other noncombatants on vessels which offer no resistance when held up by German submarines or other vessels of war. The President later laid this demand before Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, informing him that the United States would insist on Germany acting upon the principle of “humanity first” in her conduct of the maritime war. Meantime numerous appeals came to the White House from American citizens of German birth and Ger-

man societies begging the Administration not to take any drastic action on the German answer.

The terms of the second American note were decided upon. They could not be other than a reaffirmation of the principles of the first note, and a repetition of the demands for a disavowal of the sinking of the *Lusitania* as unlawful, adequate reparation for the American lives lost, and in undertaking that attacks on unresisting noncombatants shall cease. The technicalities raised by Germany were to be swept aside as extraneous to the vital issues.

Far into the night did the President labor, framing a document for the final approval of his Cabinet. There was every promise of its speedy dispatch to Germany, the sentiment being that the time had passed for further parleying and delay. But the days wore on and the note appeared to make no headway toward taking final shape. Various explanations were given for the delay. Whatever the obstacle, it was not then disclosed. Whispers of dissensions in the Cabinet over the terms of the note were heard, and an unexpected event revealed that therein lay the explanation.

The sudden resignation on June 9, 1915, of the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, threw light on an internal Cabinet struggle that had been proceeding since the President first submitted his draft of the note for his colleagues' approval. Secretary Bryan declined to indorse it in its final form. Rather than sign it, as Secretary of State, he preferred to resign his office, in fairness, he said, "to the cause nearest my heart, prevention of war."

The President had resolved upon taking a firm stand in further communicating with Germany, and Secretary Bryan had failed to shake his determination. It transpired that Secretary Bryan had disapproved of the first note to Germany, though he had signed it, and favored Germany's plea for an inquiry into the "facts" concerning the *Lusitania* before the submission of any American demands, in conformity with the arbitration treaties he had made with other nations. His resignation recalled a speech he had made in May, 1913, before the



British delegates who visited the United States to arrange the Treaty of Ghent peace celebration.

"I made up my mind, before I accepted the office of Secretary of State," he then said, "that I would not take office if I thought there would be a war during my tenure." His withdrawal from the office, which he had decided upon in order not to embarrass the President, did not result in any modification in the note's terms. The final draft was immediately approved by the Cabinet. Mr. Bryan timed his resignation to take effect the moment the note was dispatched to signify his disapproval of it. In his letter to the President relinquishing the office he held, Mr. Bryan said that while President Wilson and he were alike desirous of reaching a peaceful solution of the problems arising out of the use of submarines against merchant vessels, "we find ourselves differing irreconcilably as to the methods which must be employed."

The note was transmitted to Berlin the day Mr. Bryan left the Cabinet. In the two days intervening before its publication on June 11, 1915, the country awaited the disclosure of its terms with keen and anxious interest. Mr. Bryan's resignation formed a dramatic interlude which more than hinted that a warlike attitude had been taken by the United States.

The country was agreeably reassured. Far from being couched in the peremptory terms of an ultimatum, the second American note, though firm, was polite and pacific, and was even milder in tone than the first note which ex-Secretary Bryan had signed. The country wondered what element it had originally contained, or retained, which occasioned the rupture between him and the President, and conflicted with Mr. Bryan's peace principles. There was a general agreement that it contained no threat of war, nor any bid for trouble, nor indicted Germany, but was rather a model of moderation, avoiding bluster or giving offense, and was even disappointing to jingoes.

Gratification was expressed by the United States to Germany that the latter recognized, in discussing the cases of the *Cushing* and *Gulflight*, the principle of the freedom of all parts of the

open sea to neutral ships, and Germany's readiness to acknowledge and meet any liability when attacks on neutral ships guiltless of any hostile act were established.

Germany had defended the sinking of the British ship *Falaba*, in which an American had lost his life, because, according to her submarine commander, she had attempted to escape capture and secure assistance. The American note expressed surprise at Germany's contention that such natural efforts at self-preservation altered the obligation of a naval officer to be regardful of the safety of the lives of those on board the vessel, although the *Falaba* had ceased her attempt to escape when torpedoed. Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit, the United States insisted, had ever been held to warrant the forfeiting of the lives of a vessel's passengers and crew. The American Government, however, did not understand that Germany in the *Falaba's* case was seeking to relieve herself of responsibility, but only to explain the circumstances which led her submarine commander to act as he did.

The note proceeded to clear the ground of technical issues regarding the status of the *Lusitania* raised by Germany, which were viewed by the Administration as not only baseless, but irrelevant and extraneous to the principles of which the United States sought Germany's acceptance. The American note denied the charges Germany had made that the *Lusitania* was equipped with masked guns, supplied with ammunition, manned by trained gunners, transporting troops from Canada, carried a cargo not permitted by American laws in a vessel also carrying passengers, and was virtually serving as an auxiliary cruiser of Great Britain. Germany was informed that the United States had official evidence refuting these allegations, which the kaiser's Government had feared had not been brought to the American Government's attention. Were such charges true, as the German note alleged, the United States Government would have been bound to take official cognizance of them in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power, and in enforcing its neutrality laws.

The American note said it was the Administration's duty to see that the *Lusitania* was not armed for offensive action, was not serving as a transport, did not carry a cargo prohibited by Federal statutes, and was not in fact a naval vessel of Great Britain. Otherwise the *Lusitania* would not have received clearance as a merchantman. The American Government, Germany was told, had performed the duty of enforcing its neutrality statutes through its regularly constituted officials. If the German Government had in its possession convincing evidence that American customs officials had not performed their duties with thoroughness, the American Government invited the production of that evidence for consideration. Germany, in brief, was called upon for proof of her charges. But, well founded or not, the American note brushed them aside as irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel. Here the United States set forth the vital principle underlying its protest:

"But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the case; principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly used for the conveyance of passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without as much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than a hundred American citizens were among those who perished, made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things, and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in



this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests.

"The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than the mere rights of property or privilege of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every government honors itself in respecting and which no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for such as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy."

It was upon this principle of humanity, as well as the law founded upon this principle, that the United States made its stand to Germany.

Again responsive to Germany's intimation that she was willing to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understanding with Great Britain, by which the character and conditions of the war upon the seas might be changed, the American Government renewed its assurances that it stood ready to act as a mediator, and invited the German Government to make use of its services. Meantime the United States confidently looked to see the "justice and humanity of the Government of Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been wronged, or their rights as neutrals invaded." The representations made in the first American note were earnestly and solemnly renewed. Again the United States declined to admit that the proclamation of a war zone, from which neutral ships were warned to keep away, could be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. Germany was called upon to adopt the measures necessary to put into practice those principles for the observance of which the United States contended in respect of the safeguarding of American lives. She was asked for assurances that this would be done.

Once more the country marked time while the note received the consideration of the German Government. There was a perceptible suspension of popular feeling against Germany as the hope grew that the renewed American protestations might induce Germany to recognize the expediency of altering her attitude.

The note's publication timed with a public statement which ex-Secretary Bryan addressed to German-Americans, urging them to help in maintaining peace between Germany and the United States. In this plea he threw further light on the differences which arose between him and the President regarding the *Lusitania* issue. The continued infringement by Great Britain of the rights of neutral commerce in her blockade of German and neutral ports was, in Mr. Bryan's view, a vital element to be weighed in conjunction with the American protest to Germany. President Wilson took the stand that the British and German issues must be handled separately, regarding the *Lusitania* case as too delicate and intricate to be complicated by a concurrent issue with Great Britain. Therefore he deferred sending a note of protest to Great Britain until the difficulty with Germany was either settled or had reached a less acute stage. Mr. Bryan told the German-Americans that he urged the President to send a note to Great Britain simultaneously with the note to Germany, "not because Germany had a right to ask for it, but because I was anxious to make it as easy as possible for Germany to accept the demands of the United States." In a further public statement Mr. Bryan said that the second American note to Germany had been "softened," but the modification in the final draft had not sufficed to keep him in office. He had insisted, he said, on a year's delay before making any demands on Germany.

The reception of the note in Germany was marked by a milder tone than the press had used, or had been permitted to use, since the *Lusitania* crisis arose. Its publication overshadowed the current war events. President Wilson's renewal of the American offer to mediate with a view to inducing Great Britain to relax her naval blockade of Germany was welcomed as affording a loophole through which food and cotton might be obtained from the outside world.

Germany's more conciliatory attitude, as reflected by its press, was in part ascribed to the presence in Berlin of Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhard, believed to be an emissary sent by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in Washington, to impress on the German Foreign Office the real temper of the American Government and people regarding the *Lusitania* case. There was an impression in Washington that Germany, through diplomatic channels, had been led to place an interpretation on the first American note other than its language plainly indicated. If this was the case Dr. Meyer-Gerhard was credited with having made endeavors to enlighten the German Government. Berlin dispatches chronicled him as reporting that American sentiment had been growing more favorable toward Germany, especially regarding an embargo on war munition shipments to the allied powers, but that a sweeping revulsion to hostile feeling came with the destruction of the *Lusitania*. Public opinion in the United States, was his reported warning to the German Foreign Office, would not brook unnecessary delay in answering the second American note, nor tolerate an answer which appeared to be evasive or failed to meet the issue squarely.

Dr. Meyer-Gerhard's mission to Berlin seemed to have a logical link, or at least one was seen, in an explanation ex-Secretary Bryan made on June 27, 1915, of a certain conversation he had with Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, regarding the first American note on the *Lusitania*. A circumstantial story was current that Mr. Bryan, before his resignation as Secretary of State, had told Dr. Dumba that the note need not be taken seriously by Germany, and that the strong language employed by President Wilson was only intended to appease the resentment aroused in the United States over the sinking of the liner. Mr. Bryan acknowledged discussing the *Lusitania* case with the Austrian Envoy, but did not disclose the nature of the conversation. What appeared plain was that Germany had not taken the first American note very seriously, and that she had acted accordingly on receiving from some quarter an interpretation of the note of a tenor similar to that of the statement attributed to her.



Mr. Bryan, feeling that he was impugned in the matter, volunteered the statement that he had reported to the President the essence of his conversation with Dr. Dumba, and that the President had approved what he had said. "When we learned that the conversation had been misinterpreted in Berlin," he continued, "I brought the matter to the attention of Ambassador Dumba, and secured from him a statement certifying to the correctness of the report of the conversation that I had made to the President. Ambassador Dumba's statement was sent to our Ambassador at Berlin, and Ambassador Dumba also telegraphed the German Government, affirming the correctness of my report of the interview and denying the construction that had been placed upon it." Mr. Bryan's explanation, it will be seen, was elusive in that it carefully abstained even hinting at what was actually said that caused confusion: so that what Germany learned, and what she misunderstood, is a state secret.

While Germany's answer to the second note was on the way, one charge she made against Great Britain in justifying her submarine methods was substantiated in the British House of Commons. Lord Robert Cecil, Parliamentary under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in answer to a question, said that merchantmen of a belligerent power were entitled by established usage to carry and use armaments in self-defense. Great Britain had communicated with several neutral governments at the outbreak of the war regarding the matter, he said, and several more had been approached since as circumstances required. British ships so armed, he added, had been trading regularly with various countries since an early stage of the war.

The United States was not one of the countries Great Britain had approached to ascertain whether it would object to British ships, armed for defense only, trading with American ports.

Germany's answer, on July 8, 1915, to the second American note did not differ in spirit or tenor from her preceding notes. It yielded nothing, and was, if anything, more evasive in attempting to divert the *Lusitania* issue to channels into which the United States could not enter. Beyond an academic re-

affirmation that Germany had always been governed by the principles of humanity in conducting maritime warfare, and inviting American cooperation in effecting the freedom of the seas, the note was largely an indictment of Great Britain for her embargo on German trade. "We have been obliged to adopt a submarine war," Germany pleaded, "to meet the declared intentions of our enemies and the method of warfare adopted by them in contravention of international law."

In defending her submarine warfare, Germany placed her own interpretation of the principles of humanity under which she professed to be governed. The American Government would appreciate, the reply said, that "in the fight for existence which has been forced upon Germany by its adversaries and announced by them, it is the sacred duty of the Imperial Government to do all within its power to protect and save the lives of German subjects. If the Imperial Government were derelict in these, its duties, it would be guilty before God and history of the violation of those principles of higher humanity which are the foundation of every national existence."

Blame for the loss of the *Lusitania* was laid on Great Britain. "The case of the *Lusitania* shows with horrible clearness," the reply continued, "to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of conducting war employed by our adversaries leads. In the most direct contravention of international law, all distinction between merchantmen and war vessels have been obliterated by the order to British merchantmen to arm themselves and to ram submarines and by the promise of rewards therefor; and neutrals who use merchantmen as travelers thereby have been exposed in an increasing degree to all the dangers of war. If the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the *Lusitania* had caused the crew and passengers to take to the boats before firing a torpedo, this would have meant the sure destruction of his own vessel. After an experience in sinking much smaller and less seaworthy vessels, it was to be expected that a mighty ship like the *Lusitania* would remain above water long enough, even after the torpedoing, to permit passengers to enter the ship's boats. Circumstances of

a very peculiar kind, especially the presence on board of large quantities of highly explosive materials, defeated this expectation. In addition, it may be pointed out that if the *Lusitania* had been spared, thousands of cases of munitions would have been sent to Germany's enemies and thereby thousands of German mothers and children robbed of breadwinners."

Germany now made three alternative proposals in order to safeguard the lives of American citizens on the high seas and to exclude any unforeseen dangers to American passenger ships, "made possible in view of the conduct of maritime war by Germany's adversaries." One was that German submarine commanders would be instructed to permit the free and safe passage of such passenger steamers when made recognizable by special markings, subject to their sailings being notified a reasonable time in advance and to the American Government guaranteeing that these vessels had no contraband on board, arrangements for the unhampered passage of such vessels to be agreed on by the naval authorities of both sides. The second proposal was the installation of a reasonable number of neutral vessels under the American flag to afford greater facilities for transatlantic travel to American citizens. By these additional ships, Germany urged, there would be no compelling necessity for American citizens to travel to Europe in enemy ships. "In particular," the German reply pointed out, "the Imperial Government is unable to admit that American citizens can protect any enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board." The third proposal was proffered in case the American Government could not acquire an adequate number of neutral passenger ships. In that event the Imperial Government was prepared to interpose no objection to the placing under the American flag by the American Government of four enemy passenger ships for passenger traffic between North America and England. Assurance of "free and safe" passage would then be accorded to such steamers. The German reply formally accepted President Wilson's offer to communicate and suggest proposals to Great Britain regarding an alteration in the prevailing methods of maritime war.



Germany's refusal to meet the demands of the United States produced a deadlock. Official Washington took a grave view of the situation without seeing any way out of the impasse except a resort to heroic measures, which the administration sought to avoid. No time was lost in sending a rejoinder, on July 21, 1915, not only declining to accept the proposals Germany made, but to recede from the position the United States had taken in demanding disavowal, and reparation for the destruction of the *Lusitania*, accompanied by guarantees for the discontinuance of unlawful attacks on unresisting merchantmen. The United States also refused to consider Germany's proposal for the "licensing" of ships for the safe conduct of American travelers and commerce on the sufferance of the belligerents. Germany's laborious arraignment of Great Britain as the chief culprit responsible for her disagreement with the United States was likewise rejected as having no vital relation to the American demands. British maritime policy, in the President's view, could not be permitted to complicate the direct issues with Germany.

The third American note informed the German Government that its reply was unsatisfactory in that it failed to meet the differences between the two governments, and indicated no way in which the accepted principles of law and humanity could be complied with in the grave matter in controversy. The German reply rather proposed, on the contrary, arrangements for a partial suspension of those principles, which virtually set them aside. The American rejoinder stood squarely upon the United States' interpretation of the principles of law and humanity set forth in previous communications to Germany in respect of her observance of her war zone decree and her use of submarines against merchantmen, and noted with satisfaction the German Government's recognition of their validity. Hence the issue between the two countries so far seemed to be recognition by Germany of certain principles without compliance. The United States restated its view of those principles which Germany had professed to recognize, namely: "The principle that the high seas are free, that the character and the cargo of a merchantman

must first be ascertained before she can lawfully be seized or destroyed, and that the lives of noncombatants may in no case be put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape after being summoned to submit to examination, for a belligerent act of retaliation is *per se* an act beyond the law, and the defense if an act of retaliation is an admission that it is illegal."

The United States regretted to find that the German Government regarded itself as in large degree exempt from the obligation to observe these principles, even where neutral vessels were concerned, because of the maritime policy and practice of Great Britain: "The Imperial German Government will readily understand that the Government of the United States cannot discuss the policy of the Government of Great Britain with regard to neutral trade except with that government itself, and that it must regard the conduct of other belligerent governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this government regards as grave and unjustifiable violation of the rights of American citizens by German naval commanders." The American rejoinder further condemned Germany's naval methods by declaring: "If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the practice be discontinued. If persisted in it would in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offense against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected."

While acknowledging that modern conditions had created radical alterations in the circumstances and methods of attack, the United States declined to consent to an abatement of any essential and fundamental right of its people because of a mere alteration of circumstances. "The rights of neutrals in time of war," the American note contended, "are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the circumstances to them."

Recent events, the American rejoinder pointed out, had demonstrated that it was possible and practicable to conduct Ger-

many's submarine operations in substantial accord with the accepted principles of regulated warfare: "The whole world had looked with interest and increasing satisfaction at the demonstration of that possibility by German naval commanders. It is manifestly possible, therefore, to lift the whole practice of submarine attack above the criticism which it has aroused, and remove the chief cause of offense."

The American Government thereupon repeated its demands to Germany: "In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it pleaded the right of retaliation in defense of its acts, and in view of the manifest possibility of conforming to the established rules of naval warfare, the Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the *Lusitania* or from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for the needless destruction of human life by an illegal act."

In declining to accept Germany's proposal that certain vessels be designated for transatlantic travel for American passengers and commerce, to have safe conduct on the seas, "now illegally proscribed," the United States submitted that any such agreement would by implication subject other vessels to illegal attack and would be a curtailment and therefore an abandonment of the principles for which the American Government contended," and which in times of calmer counsels every nation would concede as a matter of course.

A further response was made to Germany's repeated allusions to the need for cooperation in securing the "freedom of the seas." Germany was assured that both Governments were contending for this object, and the United States invited Germany's assistance for its realization. Echoing the German Government's hope that this object might in some measure be accomplished even before the war ended, the American note said: "It can be. The Government of the United States feels obliged to insist upon it, by whomsoever violated or ignored, in the protection of its own citizens, but is also deeply interested in seeing it



made practicable between the belligerents themselves, and holds itself ready at any time to act as the common friend who may be privileged to suggest a way.”

“In the meantime,” ran the final word of the United States, “the very value which this Government sets upon the long and unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation impels it to impress very solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of these rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as being deliberately unfriendly.”

At that stage the *Lusitania* issue rested as the end of the first year of the war approached, with the onus remaining in Germany to concede the American demands if the relations between the two countries were to resume their previous cordial character. The submarine warfare meantime caught another American victim in the steamer *Leelanaw*, bound for Belfast from Archangel with a cargo of flax, which was sunk on July 25, 1915, by a torpedo, off the northwest coast of Scotland. The crew were saved. Germany had declared flax contraband. Her willingness to make amends when such occurrences were shown to be due to error on her part was demonstrated in her admission of responsibility for the torpedoing of the *Nebraskan*, previously recorded. Germany duly expressed her regret for the act and her readiness to make reparation, saying that the attack “was not meant for the American flag, but is to be considered an unfortunate accident.”

Pending issues with Great Britain had not been overlooked despite the predominance of the *Lusitania* difficulty with Germany. An American protest had been lodged against the seizure by Great Britain of the American vessel *Neches*, which left Rotterdam with a cargo of Belgian goods. The United States had also served notice on Great Britain that the rights of Ameri-

can shippers in the adjudication of their seized cargoes before the British prize courts rested on international law, not on Orders in Council or municipal law. Secretary Lansing explained that the notice was more in the nature of a legal caveat generally conserving the rights of American citizens in pending cases.

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## CHAPTER XXXVI

### GERMAN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES—SINK- ING OF THE "W. P. FRYE"

GERMAN-American sentiment, inflamed from the outset of the war, had been early recognized by President Wilson as an element to be reckoned with in the interests of neutrality. Too deep to be repressed, it became the mainspring of various disturbing activities throughout the country, while the administration was contending with Great Britain and Germany for American rights abroad. The war's ramifications, in fact, had not only stirred the Government into exercising high and imperative functions in the realm of diplomacy, but had set in motion other governmental machinery to safeguard American rights at home. The neutrality laws, dormant from disuse in time of peace, had become vitalized, and officials intrusted with the duty of enforcing them were more than ever confronted with the difficult task of checking covert infractions.

The racial sympathies of German-Americans had been primarily moved by what they conceived to be the injustice of neutrality laws which permitted unrestricted exports of war munitions to the allied powers, while Germany was denied such serviceable supplies through her mercantile fleets being driven off the seas. The German Government in its official communications had virtually charged the Administration with showing discrimination against Germany; the German Embassy, German societies, and the German-American press had made a similar charge. The repeated answer of the State Department had been that it would

be an unneutral act for any country to amend its neutrality laws during the course of a war in order to forbid shipments of war supplies, particularly in the present case, when such an embargo would redound to the advantage of one side (the Central Powers), and to the disadvantage of the other (the Allied Powers).

Another source of unrest lay in the enforced domicile in the United States of German reservists, whom the Allies' warships prevented from joining their regiments. Eager to serve their fatherland, a number of them sought to leave the United States by means of forged American passports, some planning to reach England by this means to act as spies. Neutral ships were involved in the attempt to facilitate their passage. German shipping interests, unable to operate their fleets, endeavored to provision German cruisers in American waters and were prosecuted.

The war, indeed, through such subterranean channels, had obtained a certain foothold on American soil. But the ardent German patriots who thus aimed to strike a blow at their country's enemies without intending to show disrespect to the Stars and Stripes, found nevertheless that they were really contending against American law, and that their patriotic enterprise was therefore felonious in deed, though not in motive.

The restraints of neutrality had brought into being, with February, 1915, a league designated as organized for the establishment of "real American neutrality, and to uphold it free from commercial, financial, and political subservience of foreign powers." Four representatives of Congress supported the league at its initial meeting in Washington. Its platform demanded an American cable controlled by the United States Government, to insure "an independent news service"; a free and open sea for American commerce and unrestricted traffic in noncontraband goods as defined by law; the immediate enactment of legislation prohibiting the export of war munitions "as a strictly American policy"; the establishment of an American merchant marine; and pledged support only to candidates for public office, irrespective of party, who would place American interests above those of any other country, and aid in "eliminating all undue foreign influences from public life."



The project was viewed as a political organization formed to further pro-German aims and foment hostility to Great Britain under the guise of safeguarding American neutrality. It was inaugurated under the auspices of the German-American National Alliance, credited with representing a membership of 2,000,000, in cooperation with German-American societies and the editors of German-American newspapers.

Professor Kuno Francke, of Harvard, in declining to be associated with the project, expressed some views thereon which were interpreted as echoing those of the great majority of German-Americans who had abstained from political or unlawful activities on behalf of their fatherland. Writing to a member of Congress, Representative Bartholdt, of Missouri, a leading spirit of the organization, who had besought his cooperation, Professor Francke said: "My German sympathies cannot make me forget what seem to be my duties as an American citizen. I believe it would be against my duty as an American if I were to take part in a propaganda the purpose of which will be thought to force our Government into a hostile attitude toward England. Your circular letter speaks of 'England as America's archenemy.' It calls for a new 'Declaration of Independence,' which is to 'eliminate all undue English influences from our American life.' As a man of German blood I might welcome the help which would accrue to Germany by such a conflict between the United States and England. But as an American citizen I cannot possibly support a policy which would bring the terrors of war into our own country. What I feel bound to support as an American citizen is a policy which holds itself strictly within the now accepted rules of neutrality, although, to my regret, this policy, through circumstances over which the United States has not control, practically turns out to the advantage of England and to the detriment of Germany."

The German Embassy, in its periodic protests to the Administration on the munitions question, was thereby the most active channel through which the aims of the German-American advocates of "strict neutrality" were voiced. One complaint the embassy made was against the building of hydroaeroplanes by

American firms for Great Britain and Russia. Secretary Bryan informed Count von Bernstorff, February 1, 1915, that the State Department did not concur in his contention that such aircraft must be regarded as vessels of war whose delivery to belligerent states by neutrals should be stopped.

Individual zeal for the Teuton cause prompted one sympathizer named Werner Horn, supposed to be a German army officer, to attempt the destruction by dynamite, February 2, 1915, of the American-Canadian railroad bridge between Vanceboro, Me., and St. Croix, New Brunswick. The bridge was only slightly damaged on the Canadian side. On American territory some windows were broken in Vanceboro from the vibrations of the explosion. The occurrence, however, startled the American authorities, who feared that it might be a prelude to a campaign of violence by German sympathizers. Horn was arrested and sentenced to a brief jail term for defacing and injuring buildings in Vanceboro. Canada demanded his extradition on a charge of attempted destruction of human life. The case involved the question of whether Horn's act was merely a political offense. It left the jurisdiction of the Maine State authorities upon a federal grand jury in Boston indicting Horn, charging him with illegally exporting dynamite in interstate commerce. Horn sought release on the ground that he was a belligerent engaged in an act of war and was not amenable to the jurisdiction of American courts. Contesting his application for a writ of *habeas corpus*, the United States Government's attorneys contended that to grant the petition would mean that the United States had no rights which it could enforce as a neutral nation against a member of the German army. Horn's counsel argued that international law controlled the case, as the German Government, not the individual charged, was responsible for the offense. The case remained pending before the courts after Horn's petition had been denied.

Horn's attempt to destroy the St. Croix bridge duly became linked with a passport plot uncovered by a federal grand jury in New York City. Indictments were returned February 5, 1915, involving a number of Germans, charging conspiracy against the United States by fraudulently obtaining passports

from the State Department for aiding the safe passage of reservists to Germany and England. One of the accused, a German reservist named Stegler, later pleaded guilty and confessed. In doing so he charged that the passport plot had been participated in by Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché. Reservists, he said, had already been sent to England by means of bogus passports to serve as spies. One he named was C. H. Lody, reported as shot in the Tower of London for espionage. The same organization, said to be conducted by Captain Boy-Ed, which had instigated the passport plots, Stegler also charged, had sent Horn to blow up the St. Croix River bridge. The State Department called the attention of the German Government to the charges made against Captain Boy-Ed, who, as an attaché of the German Embassy, was exempt from prosecution. The German Embassy issued a statement ridiculing and denying Stegler's charges. Eight men were involved in the passport plots, all of whom were convicted. Four of the reservists, who were arrested on a Norwegian steamer by Government Secret Service agents, pleaded guilty, and were fined \$200 each. Stegler was sentenced to sixty days' imprisonment. Another man named Ruroede, who also pleaded guilty, received a three-year jail term; two others were sentenced to ten months' imprisonment each.

Ever on the alert to find *prima facie* grounds for lodging complaints that the neutrality laws were not being respected, the German Embassy objected, February 20, 1915, in a protest to the State Department, to the building of certain submarines by certain American firms, who it charged were sending component parts to Canada for the use of Great Britain. The Austrian Embassy made a similar complaint. Mr. Charles M. Schwab, who controlled one of the concerns named, the Bethlehem Steel Company and its affiliated plants, thereupon informed Secretary Bryan that the submarines being built at the Bethlehem plants were not for delivery to any of the belligerents during the period of the war. The State Department accepted Mr. Schwab's assurance. The Administration apparently had not changed the policy it had earlier acted upon against the shipment of sub-



marines or their component parts from the United States for the use of belligerents.

The broken German cable from the United States to Germany via the Azores was the subject of a plea by Germany to the Administration, February 27, 1915, asking it to obtain Great Britain's consent for its restoration. Germany proposed to repair and reopen the cable at its own expense, undertaking to restrict its use to communications between the United States and the American Embassy and consulates in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and to news sent to the American press, to be transmitted without censorship so long as it was not prejudicial to the German military plans. The State Department duly submitted the proposal to the British Ambassador on behalf of Germany. To renovate and restore the cable without Great Britain's consent would have been worse than useless, as Great Britain could readily cut the cable again after restoration. Germany's proposal ended where it began. Great Britain ignored it.

One of the principal German steamship companies, the Hamburg-American line, trading between New York and European ports in times of peace, became involved, March 1, 1915, in serious charges relating to violations of neutrality. A federal grand jury, after investigation, returned an indictment against five of its officials, one a director, Karl Buenz, charging infractions of the customs laws by preparing false clearance papers and false manifests in connection with vessels supposed to have been requisitioned to supply coal, fresh water and food supplies to German cruisers in the South Atlantic. The accused officials denied the charges, and the case waited on the Federal court calendar for due process of law.

A German converted cruiser, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, sought refuge, March 10, at Newport News, Virginia. Her arrival revealed that among her exploits as a sea raider of the allied powers' shipping in the Pacific and Atlantic was the destruction in the South Atlantic on January 28 of an American sailing vessel, the *William P. Frye*, bound from Seattle for Queenstown with 5,200 tons of wheat. This occurrence raised another ques-

tion with Germany. Meantime the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* ostensibly anchored for repairs and supplies, its commander, Captain Thierichens, saying he did not wish to intern the vessel. But the time limit the Government granted him in which to put to sea again duly expired, and the vessel did not leave, though pretentious preparations were made to do so. Four allied cruisers were said to be waiting outside the three-mile limit to seize her. The vessel was finally interned in the Norfolk Navy Yard at her captain's request. Up to the last moment he kept up an appearance of readiness to dash out; but he explained that failure of "expected relief" to arrive (a story was current that a German dreadnought was coming to the rescue) had compelled him to intern rather than "deliver the crew and ship to fruitless and certain destruction" by British and French warships waiting off the Virginia Capes.

The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich's* supposed plans to escape appeared to have inspired a special inspection by the port authorities of the German liners marooned in New York harbor lest similar designs should be on foot to enable them to slip out without proper clearance. The examination did not disclose any such intention. Nevertheless, while the excitement the *Eitel* had occasioned prevailed, naval activities were evidenced in reported movements of destroyers and other warships to reenforce the navy patrols outside New York and Boston harbors.

After the usual contentious negotiations, Germany admitted liability for the destruction of the *William P. Frye* and her cargo by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. The American Government had demanded indemnity for the vessel's full value, \$228,059.54, no representations having been made concerning the cargo, which had been sold en route and was British-owned at the time the *Frye* was sunk. The American contention was that the *Eitel's* captain was not justified in destroying the *Frye*, because it would not lawfully be condemned as a prize had the vessel been taken before a prize court, and that the cargo of wheat, being destined to a private firm in England, should not therefore have been considered contraband. While assuming liability, not only for the destruction of the *Frye*, but also for its cargo, under the

American treaty with Prussia of 1828, Germany insisted upon the case going before a German prize court to determine the ownership of both ship and cargo.

The German consul at Seattle, Washington, Walter Mueller, was arrested, March 18, 1915, charged with conspiracy against the United States. The complaint was to the effect that he attempted to acquire business secrets from a Seattle shipbuilding company by influencing its employees to reveal the contents of bills of lading, supposed to show shipments of parts of submarines to Canada. The German Embassy at once intervened, protesting that Mueller's arrest contravened treaty rights, and apparently these became involved in the case. The Seattle authorities thereupon dropped the charges for fear of embarrassing the Administration. Mueller was later transferred to Atlanta, Ga.

A contemplated credit of \$50,000,000 to France, under negotiation between American and French bankers elicited, March 31, the Administration's views regarding loans to belligerent nations. Secretary Bryan announced that the State Department interposed no objection to this credit being arranged. While the principle of providing American loans for the benefit of nations at war was not favored, the Government, he said, felt that it was not justified in raising objections to such loans already transacted which had come to its knowledge. The Government had neither approved nor disapproved them; it had simply taken no action and expressed no opinion. France had previously raised \$30,000,000, on one-year Treasury notes, from New York banks, as well as a bank credit of \$10,000,000. An endeavor was made to lend another \$30,000,000 to French banks, pledged by American securities held in France, but it was ascertained that enough of these were not available to cover the collateral. Later a further French credit of \$20,000,000 was made with the Morgan interests, to be solely used for commercial purposes, in the form of acceptances drawn by French bankers, and secured by French Treasury notes. These loan transactions were resorted to partly to offset the adverse effect upon French exchange war conditions had created, and to meet the enormous



expenditures made by France in the United States both for ordinary commercial and war purposes. Russia, early in the year, had negotiated a credit of \$25,000,000 with New York banks, the entire proceeds being reserved for the purchase of supplies for export, presumably war munitions. Germany had succeeded before the war's developments shut her off from financial relations with the United States, in securing a small loan of \$10,000,000 from Chicago bankers.

The International Mercantile Marine Company, known as the \$100,000,000 shipping combine organized by the late J. Pierpont Morgan, passed into the hands of a receivership, April 3, owing to the war. As a holding company it controlled the American line and the principal British Atlantic lines, among them the White Star, with the exception of the Cunard line. The war had forced the company to default on its bond interest amounting to \$3,300,000. In the last nine months the passenger traffic of the controlled companies had greatly declined. A number of the best-known liners had either been requisitioned by the British Government for transporting troops or as converted cruisers, or had been withdrawn from service altogether. The remaining vessels continued to be run under the direct operation of the subsidiary companies.

The recurrent agitation against the exportation of war munitions to the allied powers took the form, April 5, of an advertisement headed "An Appeal to the American People," which occupied full pages of numerous newspapers throughout the country. Its signatories were the editors and publishers of newspapers, printed in foreign languages and circulating among many races in the United States. The appeal was pitched in a high key of feeling and diction, and its conspicuous character attracted national attention. It had been made, its signatories said, "as the result of receiving hundreds of thousands of letters, cables and messages through various sources containing heart-broken appeals, prayers and pleas from the people of our mother countries." Manufacturers of powder, shrapnel and cartridges, and the workmen engaged in their plants, were entreated to cease making such war munitions "to destroy our brothers, widows,

our sisters and mothers, and orphan their children, as well as destroy forever the priceless possessions handed down by our ancestors." The appeal declared that "the honor of the American people, the integrity of the nation, the standing of our manufacturers and the patriotism and manhood of our workmen demand that the entire world be shown that money soaked with the blood of humanity cannot purchase these qualities. Our participation must stop now, and then our influence for justice and righteousness *can help end the war.*" Among the signatories over a hundred represented Italian newspapers, more than forty Jewish, and nearly as many Polish; Swedish, Slavic and Hungarian papers came next. It was significant of the diverse elements of the American population, if of nothing else, that the signatories included editors of newspapers in Ruthenian, Greek, Arabic, Syrian, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Finnish, Russian, Servian, Lettish, Bohemian, Flemish, Bulgarian and Danish. The newspapers which had hitherto urged an embargo on war shipments were those published in German. Not one of these was represented on the list of signatories. The appeal was not without its press critics, who questioned its being *bona fide*, and saw in the absence of German signatories a design to cloak any suspicion that the manifests might have been inspired by German-American interests. Spokesmen for the latter denied that it had such a genesis.

The question of American war shipments was discussed, May 4, in the British House of Commons and drew the statement from Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary, that "the United States has not at any time in the present war supplied any war material to the British Government." He added that it was entirely consistent for individual manufacturers of neutral states to supply such material to belligerents, and "they no doubt are being supplied in this way now."

In a memorial sent, May 16, to the German Emperor from Philadelphia, a number of prominent Americans petitioned him, in the name of humanity and as an act of clemency, to remit all war indemnities imposed on Belgian cities and provinces. Compliance with their appeal, they told the kaiser, would redound

to the benefit of Germany and create a favorable impression in the United States.

The attitude of German-Americans in case of war with Germany as a result of the *Lusitania* crisis was defined, May 16, by the "New Yorker Herold," a German newspaper, in response to a challenge made by the anti-German press. Denouncing any veiled suspicions regarding their attitude as unreasonable, the paper said: "To the German-American we want to say that it is absolutely logical that the native American exact the fullest measure of patriotic devotion you may be capable of. No nation will forget its claim on the loyalty of all of its citizens, as any other course would be suicidal. No silent or sullen acquiescence in the measures the nation takes through its chosen representatives will suffice. The response of the German-American must come from the whole heart and their support of the country must be without reserve, without qualification."

Italy having entered the war, President Wilson issued, May 25, a proclamation of neutrality cautioning American citizens that "the laws and treaties of the United States, without interfering with the free expressions of opinion and sympathy or with the commercial manufacture or sale of arms and munitions of war, nevertheless imposes upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the war."

In the inflamed condition of popular sentiment due to the *Lusitania* disaster, a German-American organization, the American Independence Union, appealed to President Wilson not to embroil the country with Germany. Its spokesman, former Congressman Bartholdt, told the President that while "an enormous pressure is being brought to bear upon him by the friends and advocates of the allied powers, there are from twenty to twenty-five millions of loyal citizens of the United States who are in sympathy with Germany and Austria-Hungary and profoundly convinced of their righteous cause." He charged that the American people, through British censorship and control of the cables, had been "studiously misinformed" and "maliciously influenced" regarding the events of the war.



Recruiting by British agents in California caused a Federal grand jury to determine, June 5, whether alleged enlistments of American youths constituted a breach of neutrality. It was charged that British agents were inducing cattlemen to fight for Great Britain. A number of recruits were detained in Chicago, but were later released. Nine men who enlisted under the British colors in San Francisco were prevented from sailing on arriving in New York City, and were returned to San Francisco to testify in an investigation involving a British agent, R. K. Blair, in a charge of violation of neutrality. The grand jury heard evidence that overtures had been made to American sailors and soldiers to desert the American service for the British army. The nine men intercepted said they were British subjects. Twenty indictments were returned by the grand jury. The British Ambassador, after conferring with Secretary Lansing in Washington, repudiated the responsibility of the British Government for the enlistments.

Great Britain later sought to learn of the American Government's view as to whether recruiting by British patriotic societies and other agencies in the United States contravened neutrality laws. It was pointed out that the practice of returning volunteers to England had prevailed since the war's outbreak. The British contention was that the Federal authorities were unjustly discriminating in interfering with the transportation of volunteers who were not actually enlisted on American soil, especially as no objection had been made to the calls to the colors by foreign consuls to reservists of other countries residing in the United States.

The British Ambassador laid emphasis on the fact that Great Britain had no reservists in the sense that Germany, France, Italy and other European countries had under their systems of conscription. The Department of Justice's action seemed to have been based on the United States criminal code, which prohibits the enlistment of "any person" in the United States to fight against the people of a friendly nation. No steps had been taken to interfere with volunteers returning to their country to rejoin the colors; the Federal authorities only

interposed to prevent organized efforts to induce a belligerent's nationals to return. Similar action was taken against Montenegrin agents who had assembled recruits for return to their own country.

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## CHAPTER XXXVII

### FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF GERMAN AGENTS

THE war munitions issue suddenly acquired a new and engrossing significance by the ventilation (June 8, 1915) of a German-American project to acquire, at a cost of many millions of dollars, the principal plants engaged in supplying the allied powers. The object of the scheme was to stem the flow of munitions going to Germany's enemies by cutting them off at the source. Though it never advanced beyond the stage of inception, the plan arrested the attention of the Federal authorities as a possible device to override the neutrality laws, and caught the public imagination, not because it was considered realizable, but because it should have been seriously broached. Three huge plants, operating night and day making small arms and small-arm ammunition for the Allies, an extensive shipbuilding concern, and the Bethlehem Steel Company, which was producing heavy projectiles, shrapnel and artillery, were named in the German-American plan to control the munitions output. As a sensational development of the war's effects on American domestic affairs, conjecture was inevitably busy in endeavoring to picture the feasible situation that its fruition would create. The German owners of the plants, it was anticipated, would refuse to carry out unfulfilled contracts; but the allied governments would insist upon the engagements the plants entered into with them being consummated, on the threat of laying charges of neutrality breaches before the Federal Government. The courts would also be invoked, and probably rule that the new owners could not default on legal contracts

previously entered into with Germany's enemies, while the Federal authorities would interpose and demand that the manufacture and delivery of supplies be continued in conformity with the neutrality laws. On this forecast of developments the German owners would be thwarted in realizing their object, and even be compulsory agents in aiding their fatherland's foes.

The initial sum needed to buy three of the firms was not fabulous; judged by the current market prices of their stocks, a controlling interest could theoretically be obtained, it was estimated, for less than \$35,000,000 by the purchase of 51 per cent of their stocks. But the new owners would be certain to face conflicts with the minority American shareholders in adopting a policy which meant a cessation of revenue. It was generally doubted, however, whether German interests could raise the necessary sum. Even if Germany had gold to spare from her treasury, she could not safely send it across the Atlantic. The alternative was floating a loan in the United States the success of which was problematical. The ambitious project, so far as it related to the Bethlehem Steel Company, was riddled by Charles M. Schwab—whose controlling interest in that concern was fixed at \$100,000,000—in a denial that he had any intention of selling. His denial dissipated surmises growing out of circumstantial rumors that he had been approached several times by German Government agents. A letter Mr. Schwab wrote to a French legislator, Senator Humbert, subsequently printed by the Paris "Journal," further disposed of the scheme in revealing that his sympathies were with France. That country, Mr. Schwab wrote, he had always found loyal and sympathetic to Americans, and he believed that the two republics should stand side by side in times like the present. "With that thought," he continued, "and with my great interest and love for France, permit me to say that the Bethlehem steel organization, or any industry with which I am associated, or business with which I have influence, shall be instructed to lend its best interests in serving France. I have reached a time of life when other motives play a more important part than mere commercialism."



The scrutiny of applications for the admission of foreign ships to American registry under the new law resulted, June 16, in the Government's refusal at first to admit eleven vessels, described as Danish, for which their new owners sought the protection of the American flag. It appeared that the ships were originally German, Norwegian, Greek, Dutch, and Swedish, and had been placed recently under the Danish flag, though their names did not appear in the Danish registry of ships nor in Lloyds. Not a dollar of American money, the Commissioner of Navigation said, had been involved in the purchases, which had covered a transaction of \$1,000,000. They had been acquired by a German shipowner through an agent for transfer to a newly formed concern called the American Transatlantic Steamship Company, which was represented as the owner of the vessels. Application for registration was not made direct to Washington. The bills of sale were signed abroad, and efforts were made to have the vessels transferred to the company by means of American consular certificates of registration.

A new turn was given to this circuitous transaction upon an investigation of its legal aspects by the Department of Commerce's solicitor. His opinion was that not only could a national of a belligerent country, in this case Germany, exercise ownership in a shipping corporation organized in the United States, but that in such a case there would be no law, Federal, State, or international, violated if a German subject owned all of the capital stock of the American corporation, except such as might be necessary for its American officials to hold to qualify for their office. The eleven ships were thereupon accepted for registration. The Government's earlier disapproval of the transaction had been governed by questions raised over the transfer of the *Dacia* (which was seized by a French cruiser) from German to American ownership. Great Britain and France had indicated that their fleets would respect such vessels if their transfer from enemy to American registration was *bona fide*, but would seize them if they suspected that German owners had sought the protection of the American flag merely as a disguise.

The effect of the new ship registry law up to June 30, 1915, the Department of Commerce reported, was that 149 foreign-built vessels, of a gross tonnage of 527,071, came under the American flag. Of these 99 were formerly in the British merchant marine, 30 in the German, and 9 in the Belgian. Of the German vessels transferred, twenty-five were owned by the German branch of the Standard Oil Company, and four others by the Hamburg-American Line, one of them the *Dacia* aforementioned, which was intercepted and taken before a French prize court on her first trip as an American with a cargo of cotton consigned to Germany.

The volume of war munitions exported in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, represented a value of \$350,000,000. This figure covered automobiles, aeroplanes, arms and ammunition, brass and copper shipments, manufactured and otherwise, firearms, horses and mules, but excluded foodstuffs, clothing, etc. The automobiles sent to the Allied Powers were valued at \$60,000,000; the aeroplanes exported numbered 752; 289,340 horses and 65,788 mules were sold, together representing a value of \$77,000,000. During ten months of the war, between August, 1914, and May 31, 1915, the Allied Powers had obtained firearms and ammunition valued at \$37,000,000 from the United States, thus divided: Cartridges, \$14,935,032; 2,427,393 pounds of gunpowder, \$1,348,856; other explosives, \$12,299,743; firearms, \$8,243,845.

Berlin furnished some figures, credited to the American Consul General at Hamburg, to show that German exports to the United States, notwithstanding the British blockade, had not entirely ceased. In the first six months of 1915, it was stated, goods were shipped to the United States and its possessions from Hamburg, Lübeck, and Kiel, of a value of \$1,153,000. In contrast, exports from the same German ports in the corresponding period of 1914 amounted to almost \$15,000,000.

The German agitation against the shipment of war munitions to the Allied Powers began to take a violent form. A midnight explosion in the Senate wing of the Capitol at Washington, July 2, 1915, revealed that a bomb had wrecked the reception room on the second floor. The deed was traced to a

former Cornell instructor in German, known as Frank Holt, who, the next morning, July 3, 1915, shot J. P. Morgan, head of the banking firm acting as agents for the Allies' war supplies, at the banker's home in Glen Cove, Long Island. Both deeds, Holt confessed to the New York police, were intended as protests against the further exportations of war munitions. He frankly owned that he had waited in Washington to hear the bomb explode, and then left on a midnight train for New York to attack Mr. Morgan. He had also written President Wilson, he said, that he had set the bomb in order to call attention "to the murders being done in Europe by American ammunition." Holt disclaimed any intention of shooting Mr. Morgan; he said he only wanted to frighten him into consenting to use his influence to have an embargo placed on the further manufacture of ammunition for the Allies, and to dissuade millionaires from financing war loans, in order to "relieve the American people from complicity in the deaths of thousands of our European brothers." Mr. Morgan's injuries were not vital, and he duly recovered. Holt was lodged in the Nassau County Jail at Mineola, Long Island, where he eluded justice by committing suicide three days after his arrest.

A trunk belonging to Holt was found in a room above a livery stable in New York City containing a large quantity of dynamite, with bomb containers, fuses, blasting caps, and other accessories of bomb manufacture. A portion of dynamite which Holt told a detective he had put on board a vessel that had left New York Harbor was identified with an explosion which occurred on July 7, 1915, on the Atlantic Transport liner *Minnehaha* in midocean. The explosion, which shook the ship from stem to stern, and caused a serious fire, was located in a hold adjoining another containing cordite and shells consigned to the Allies. The *Minnehaha* reversed her engines and made for Halifax with all speed, the fire meantime being kept under control. In a letter to his second wife, Holt had written: "A steamer leaving New York for Liverpool should sink, God willing, on the 7th." The *Minnehaha* explosion timed with this prediction without realizing it.



This revelation of the apparent use to which Holt put the dynamite he procured caused wireless messages to be sent to other liners at sea, warning their captains to search their cargoes for secret explosives. Reassuring answers came that no bombs had been found. The *Minnehaha* explosion, however, seemed to serve as a signal for an outbreak of mysterious fires on vessels loading war supplies at various wharves and piers on the New York water fronts, and at other ports, with the discovery of secret bombs among the cargoes of vessels already loaded and ready to sail. It was suspected that other German sympathizers, inspired by Holt, saw in the destruction of such shipping a new and effective means for embarrassing the Allies, as well as for terrorizing seamen from sailing on the vessels. The British Embassy complained to the State Department that German plots were being hatched to blow up British ships and other craft chartered for transporting war supplies. Other plots were also afoot, the embassy had learned, including plans to strike at Great Britain and her allies by wrecking railroad trains bearing volunteers for her army, and by fomenting strikes at American plants engaged in manufacturing munitions. A strike at the Remington arms factory in Bridgeport, Conn., was suspected of having such an origin, though it did not assume the serious proportions it threatened, and duly subsided without disturbing incidents. The Department of Justice took cognizance of the British complaints. Its agents, in cooperation with secret service officials, had meantime conducted a widespread investigation throughout the country on their own initiative. Several prosecutions had resulted, and suspected persons were watched. There was, however, a marked tendency, partly encouraged by the press, to attribute too readily to German activities unexplained fires and other mishaps on ships, which were just as conceivably due to other, probably accidental, causes.

Germany's only means of wireless communication with the United States—the radio station at Sayville, Long Island—was placed, July 8, 1915, under complete Government control. American naval officers took possession of the station for the remainder of the war. The other German wireless station at

Tuckerton, N. J., had been in the Government's hands since the autumn of 1914. The Sayville station, the Navy Department announced, had been taken over owing to the refusal of Secretary Redfield of the Department of Commerce to issue a license to its owners, who had been operating the plant under a temporary permit. Their application for a license had followed the installation of new and more powerful apparatus, so that long-distance messages could be more easily transmitted. The Government thereupon found it expedient to consider the status of the Sayville station, especially the bearing the operation of the new equipment might have on American neutrality, and the possibility of the enlarged facilities being used to send secret messages of an unneutral character, despite the vigilance of the navy censors already attached to the station. It was ascertained that a new corporation, known as the Atlantic Communication Company, had been formed to operate the enlarged equipment; that it was only nominally an American company, being really owned in Germany by two of the largest electrical concerns in that country; that it was virtually under the control of the German Government; and that the station's equipment, or part of it, was, until the Navy Department took complete possession, operated by German army or naval officers. The operation of the Sayville radio plant under these conditions, and the breaches of neutrality that might result, determined the Government to interpose and place the management of the station entirely in the hands of the Navy Department. The new equipment was installed for the transmission of messages to and from Sayville and Nauen and Eilvese, Germany.

German propaganda, so far fruitlessly exercised by its untiring advocates in various channels to stop the enormous traffic in war munitions for the allied powers, became focused, July 8, 1915, in a new quarter. A complaint was laid before the Federal Reserve Board to the effect that the Government, through the instrumentality of the board, was virtually sanctioning a violation of neutrality in permitting Federal reserve banks to be utilized to provide financial facilities for war munition contracts through J. P. Morgan & Co., the allied powers' fiscal agents in

the United States. The protest was specifically directed against the issue of Federal bank notes by any member bank of the Federal reserve system, when such notes were issued for the ultimate purpose of liquidating war contracts or for floating a loan to aid one or other of the allied powers. Official permission for the issue of such notes, according to the German charge, contravened the spirit and terms of Article 6 of The Hague Treaty of 1907, which article reads:

“The supply in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral power to a belligerent power, of warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden.”

This effort to bring Federal control of banks into the neutrality issue, arising from the indirect relations of the banks with war contracts through the Morgan firm, was made by a new German organization called the Labor National Peace Council, whose spokesman, described as its chief counsel, was H. Robert Fowler, a former Congressman of Illinois. In furtherance of a “conspiracy,” Mr. Fowler charged, American representations were made to the allied Governments as early as August, 1914, proposing that if they would employ J. P. Morgan & Co. as their fiscal agents, that firm would assist them in obtaining credits in the United States amounting to \$500,000,000. These credits, Mr. Fowler said, were to be based on and secured by obligations entered into by one or other of the allied powers, or by securities of American Federal, State, or municipal governments, or of railroads or industrial corporations. The money thereby raised by the transaction was to be applied by the Morgan firm in financing contracts placed with American firms for various war supplies, including ammunition, metals, horses, mules, clothing, grain, and other foodstuffs, submarines, aeroplanes, etc. The American proposals being accepted, Mr. Fowler submitted, the Morgan firm arranged with various leading member banks of the Federal reserve system throughout the country for certain loans, discounts, and advances, amounting to \$200,000,000, and was contemplating obtaining another loan from these banks of \$300,000,000 for war purposes. The Federal Reserve Board was asked to exercise caution to prevent what the German complaint



described as the consummation of banking operations which would involve the United States Government in unneutral acts.

The Government felt obliged to take cognizance, July 28, of charges submitted in evidence brought against German spies on trial in England that the German spy organization was conducting in Antwerp what was virtually a factory, fully equipped, for producing forged American passports, purporting to have been issued in the United States. Though evidence had been accumulating pointing to the repeated misuse of bogus passports by German spies, the State Department hesitated to raise such a delicate question with a friendly government; but the proofs of such a fraud had developed so publicly that no other course was open but to invite the German Government to repudiate or disavow responsibility for the actions of its alleged agents.

The series of events recounted in the foregoing chapters, at times closely crowding on one another, at others befalling simultaneously, will readily show the important part the United States played as a bystander in the Great War, and how manifold were its effects upon American interests at home and abroad. They reveal that the United States, like Europe, had its crises, and that while they lasted American peace hung by a thread. Only by calm and heroic measures was the United States able to preserve its neutrality under unexampled conditions. Confronted with no less difficulties in protecting the rights of American citizens on the seas, its efforts were not so successful in this endeavor in the face of a naval warfare whose participants flung to the winds all precedents and usages of war under the stress of arbitrary conditions imposed by modern navalism. The United States stood alone in the peculiar character of the difficulties it had to meet as a neutral; but it was not alone as a neutral sufferer from the war. The other neutral nations had their sheaf of troubles, which were doubly hard to bear by most of them through their proximity to the countries at war. These we will now proceed to chronicle.

## CHRONOLOGY OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR, 1914

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- June 28. Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, assassinated by a pan-Slavic patriot in Sarajevo, Bosnia.
- July 23. Austria sends an ultimatum to Serbia, demanding punishment of the duke's assassins and the curtailment of anti-Austrian propaganda; Austria demands right to have representatives engaged in the work of investigation.
- July 24. Russia joins Serbia in asking for delay; Austria refuses to give it.
- July 25. Austrian ultimatum expires; Serbia apologizes and grants all demands except that Austria have representatives engaged in the work of investigation.
- July 27. Austria announces dissatisfaction with Serbian reply; Russia announces she will not permit invasion of Serbian territory; Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, proposes mediation between Austria and Serbia by conference of ambassadors in London; France and Italy accept proposal; Austria and Germany refuse it.
- July 28. Austria declares war on Serbia.
- July 29. Russian Czar issues imperial ukase calling all reservists to the colors.
- July 30. Germany asks Russia to cease mobilizing troops and to give an answer within twenty-four hours.
- July 31. Germany proclaims martial law throughout the German Empire; Russia pays no attention to Germany's note on mobilization.
- August 1. Germany declares war on Russia; France issues order of mobilization.
- August 2. German troops invade the Duchy of Luxemburg, en route for France.
- August 3. Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium, demanding free passage of troops en route for France; Belgium refuses, declares martial law in force; martial law declared in France; Italy ends the Triple Alliance by declaring neutrality.
- August 4. England sends ultimatum to Germany, demanding reply by midnight as to whether Belgian neutrality will be respected; England issues order of mobilization; at midnight Germany and England exchange declarations of war.
- August 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
- August 8. Portugal announces intention to support England.
- August 9. Serbia declares war on Germany.
- August 10. France declares war on Austria.
- August 12. Montenegro declares war on Austria.
- August 13. England and Austria exchange declarations of war.
- August 15. Japan sends ultimatum to Germany.

## THE WAR ON THE WESTERN FRONTS

## I. THE ARMIES MOVE

- August 3. German troops enter Belgium.  
August 5. Germans attack defenses of Liege and are repulsed.  
August 7. German troops take part of the defenses at Liege, the remaining forts hold out; French troops enter Alsace.  
August 8. First British troops reach France.  
August 11. Germans begin advance through Belgium; skirmish at Landen.  
August 12. Battle of Haelen, first in Belgium.  
August 13. French troops in Alsace begin attack at Mülhausen.  
August 14. Belgian and German troops fight at Diest; French troops enter Belgium at Charleroi, en route to Gembloux.  
August 15. French advance into Lorraine begins; Belgians and Germans battle at Tirlemont.  
August 17. Belgian capital moves to Brussels.

## II. IN BELGIUM

- August 3. First German troops enter Belgian territory at Verviers.  
August 4. Germans attack forts at Liege.  
August 6. First two forts at Liege fall into German hands.  
August 7. Belgian soldiers at Liege withdraw and join Belgian field army; Germans take the town of Liege, though not all of the forts.  
August 8. First contingent of British Expeditionary Force lands in France.  
August 11. Germans take Landen and occupy positions on the Ourthe.  
August 12. Germans take Huy, engage Belgians in skirmishes at Haelen, Diest, and Tirlemont.  
August 14. French troops march into Belgium.  
August 15. French, British, and Belgian troops effect juncture; the left wing of the allied line is attacked by the Germans.  
August 17. Brussels approached by the Germans; the Belgian Government withdraws to Antwerp.  
August 19. Germans take Louvain; German army approaches Antwerp.  
August 20. Brussels falls into German hands; Allies attacked at Namur and Mons.  
August 21. Liege taxed \$10,000,000; Brussels taxed \$40,000,000 by Germany; attack on forts at Namur begins.  
August 22. Germans approach Lille; German center attacks Allies at Charleroi.  
August 23. Namur falls into German hands; way to France via Meuse Valley now open to the Germans.  
August 24. Allies beaten at Mons and Charleroi; the "Great Retreat" toward Paris by British and French armies begins.  
August 25. Unsuccessful sortie by Belgian army at Antwerp; Antwerp bombarded by a Zeppelin.  
August 26. The Great Retreat continues; Allies fall back toward St. Quentin.  
August 27. Louvain destroyed by Germans; last forts at Namur surrender.



- September 4. Indecisive battles at Alost and Termonde.
- September 5. Ghent falls into German hands; Belgians flood region south of Malines by opening dikes.
- September 8. German troops approach Antwerp.
- September 10. Dikes opened by Belgians to prevent march of Germans on Antwerp.
- September 13. Germans take Termonde.
- September 20. Siege of Antwerp begins.
- September 28. German 42-centimeter guns begin to bombard Antwerp.
- September 29. First defenses of Antwerp fall.
- October 5. British marines arrive at Antwerp to aid defense.
- October 9. Germans take Antwerp; Belgian defenders escape.
- October 14. Allies' troops enter Ypres.
- October 15. Germans move toward Ostend.
- October 18. Ostend taken by Germans; attempt by Germans to cross Yser River fails.
- October 19. British fleet bombards German intrenchments near Channel coast of Belgium.
- October 21. Germans attack Allies at Nieupoort and Dixmude.
- October 25. Allies driven from positions defending Yser River; Germans succeed in crossing it.
- October 27. Battle at Yser River.
- October 31. Beginning of operations at Ypres.
- November 2. Germans tax Brussels \$9,000,000.
- November 8. German attacks at Ypres resumed; unsuccessful.
- November 11. Dixmude taken by German troops.
- November 16. Opening of dikes halts German advance on Belgian coast.
- November 22. Germans bombard Ypres.
- November 23. Bombardment of Ypres followed by infantry attacks.
- November 24. Pitched battle at Ypres develops.
- November 28. Zeebrugge, maintained as naval base by Germans, bombarded by British warships.
- November 29. Slight gains by Allies at Ypres.
- December 8. German attacks at Ypres Canal resumed.
- December 11. Pitched battle develops between Ypres and La Bassée.
- December 12. Allies hold Yser River, preventing Germans from crossing.
- December 17. Allies gain in Ypres fighting, occupy Westende.
- December 20. Germans forced out of Dixmude.

### III. FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS

- August 3. Skirmish at Petit Croix.
- August 7. French troops enter Alsace-Lorraine, skirmishes at Vic and Petit Vic.
- August 8. Altkirch taken and Mülhausen occupied by French troops.
- August 10. Belgian and French armies effect junction near Luxemburg frontier.
- August 11. Germans halt French advance into Alsace at Neubreisach; French evacuate Mülhausen.
- August 12. Allies' line, consisting of French, British, and Belgian troops, solidified from Brussels to Neubreisach.
- August 15. Operations in the Vosges begin; French troops hold Saales.
- August 16. French force the German defenders back to Saarburg.

- August 17. Saarburg entered by French troops via Nancy; Metz and Strassburg threatened by the invading French armies.
- August 20. Mülhausen again taken by French troops.
- August 21. German defense stiffens; French invaders driven out of Lorraine.
- August 21. Germans take Lunéville; French then evacuate Mülhausen.
- August 22. French troops in the Vosges retreat to fortified positions.
- August 25. Germans victorious at Charleville; passage down the Meuse now open to them.
- August 26. The Great Retreat of the allied armies continues; they fall back from Cambrai to Le Cateau.
- August 27. Longwy falls into German hands.
- August 27. Germans victorious against the British at St. Quentin.
- August 28. British troops at St. Quentin reenforced by French troops withdrawn from Alsace.
- August 29. The Germans threaten Paris; French evacuate Boulogne.
- August 30. La Fère taken by German troops.
- August 31. The Great Retreat continues; Paris prepares for a siege.
- September 1. German troops reach Senlis, twenty-five miles from Paris.
- September 3. Von Kluck, with infantry, reaches Senlis; French capital moved from Paris to Bordeaux.
- September 4. Amiens falls into German hands.
- September 4. Von Kluck starts turning movement, moving toward region east of Paris and reaching the Marne River; German troops under Von Bülow leave Soissons and start south.
- September 5. German troops cross the Marne; the Great Retreat ends.
- September 6. Certain outposts guarding Paris fall before attacks by German cavalry.
- September 6. Rheims falls into German hands.
- September 6. Allies repulse German attacks at La Fère, Vitry-le-François, and Champenoise; Von Kluck's army is threatened.
- September 7. Allies attack German center and right; Von Kluck and Von Bülow begin retreat.
- September 8. Allies cross the Marne; Von Kluck retires toward Soissons.
- September 10. German left also retreats.
- September 10. French troops enter Upper Alsace.
- September 11. Germans retreat all along their line; French capture Lunéville.
- September 12. German retreat continues; Allies take Soissons.
- September 13. Germans continue retreat and evacuate Amiens.
- September 13. Battle of the Marne ends; Allies victorious.
- September 14. The Germans, under the crown prince, attack the fortifications about Verdun.
- September 15. Rheims retaken by Allies' troops.
- September 17. Retreat of German left and right wings continues; fighting along the whole distance between the rivers Meuse and Oise; the battle of the Aisne begins.
- September 18-20. Battle of the Aisne continues.
- September 20. Rheims bombarded by the Germans.
- September 22. Battle of the Aisne resumed; Von Kluck forced to retreat.
- September 27. Von Kluck's army threatened by Allies' turning movement.
- September 29. German wings withdraw toward center.

- October 1. Allies' battle line holds from Valenciennes to a point near the juncture of the rivers Oise and Aisne, east along the bank of the latter and southeast along the line of the River Meuse to Toule.
- October 3. Battle of the Aisne ends.
- October 5. Von Kluck saves his army from flanking movement of Allies.
- October 10. Antwerp falls; further attempts to outflank Von Kluck thereafter hopeless; the opposing armies settle down to trench fighting.
- October 13. Rheims occupied by the Germans.
- October 14. Saarburg occupied by the French.
- October 14-December 16. Intermittent fighting along the entire western front.
- December 17. Battle develops near La Bassée.
- December 18-31. Intermittent fighting along entire western front.

## WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONTS

### I. RUSSO-GERMAN FIGHTING

- August 6. Small Russian detachment repulsed at Soldau in Prussian territory.
- August 16. Russians win small skirmishes at Prussian frontier.
- August 17. Prussian territory entered at Eydtkuhnen.
- August 19. Germans take Mława.
- August 20. Gumbinnen falls into Russian hands.
- August 24. Most of Eastern Prussia taken by the Russian armies; siege of Königsberg begins.
- August 25. Russians reach and occupy Nordenburg, Sensburg, and Bischofsburg.
- August 27. Russians take Tilsit.
- August 28. Russians reach Allenstein.
- August 30. Von Hindenburg, German commander, defeats Rennenkampf. Russian commander, near Ortelsburg, threatening Königsberg.
- August 30. Thorn and Graudenz bombarded by the Russians.
- September 2. Germans advance into Russian Poland, reaching Łódź.
- September 3. Russian repulse German troops which make sortie from Königsberg.
- September 20. Von Hindenburg starts counteroffensive against Russian Poland.
- September 23. Russians forced to retreat before German armies in Prussia.
- September 23. Germans enter Russian territory at Kalisz.
- September 24. Germans make unsuccessful attempt to invade Russia from the sea; landing operations checked at Windau.
- September 25. Battle at Subir; Von Hindenburg defeated by Rennenkampf.
- September 27. Battle of Grodno begins.
- September 28. Von Hindenburg withdraws from Russian Poland; another German army approaches Ossowicz and begins to bombard it.
- September 29. Ossowicz holds out against German attacks.
- September 30. Russians keep German armies from crossing River Niemen, near Grodno; Augustowo retaken by Russians after three days' battle.



- October 1. German army, which attempts to cross the Niemen, withdraws.
- October 2. Second attempt to land troops near Windau repulsed.
- October 2. Raigrod, Kalvaria, and Mariampol taken by the Russians.
- October 3. Russians start to cross the Niemen.
- October 4. Fighting near the fortress on the Danzig-Thorn line starts.
- October 6. Russians force the Germans to leave positions near Wierzbolo and Lyck.
- October 7. Teutonic forces become solidified along the Silesian frontier.
- October 7. Ossowetz successfully withstands German bombardment, which ceases.
- October 7. Von Hindenburg defeated in first operations of the battle of Vistula.
- October 9. Russians attempt invasion of East Prussia; send troops from Lomza to Lyck.
- October 11. Lyck again held by Russians.
- October 11. Second phase of the battle of Vistula starts.
- October 11. German armies withdraw from position threatening Warsaw.
- October 16. Germans stop retreat near Warsaw and give battle thirty miles from that city.
- October 18. Battle of Vistula continues.
- October 19. Germans make unsuccessful and costly attempt to cross the Vistula River.
- October 22. Russians start to move from Warsaw to Przemyśl.
- October 25. Battle of Yedlinsko develops.
- October 28. Germans retreat from region near Warsaw.
- October 30. German armies in Poland withdrawn; sent to Silesian border.
- November 1. Retreating Germans pursued from the Vistula to the Silesian border by the Russian forces.
- November 3. Mława captured by the Russians.
- November 8. Battle of Vistula continues; Russians enter Prussia.
- November 9. Soldau taken by the Russians.
- November 12. Rennenkampf captures Johannsburg.
- November 13. Battle of the Mazurian Lakes begins.
- November 17. Second battle at Vistula begins.
- November 22. German operations against Warsaw begin.
- November 23. Gumbinnen taken by the Russians.
- December 10. Operations against Warsaw continue; Germans take Przasmyśl.
- December 16. Russians driven from positions on the Vistula.
- December 19. Hindenburg's army takes up positions on the Bzura River.
- December 22. Operations against Warsaw continue; Germans in East Prussia retreat, pursued by Russian army of invasion.
- December 30. Russians drive Germans from the Bzura.

## II. RUSSO-AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS

- August 11. Miechow, Russian Poland, captured by Austrians; Zalocze, Galicia, occupied by Russians.
- August 19. Russians begin advance on Czernovitz.
- August 28. Russian advance on Lemberg begins.
- September 2. Battle for Lemberg ends; Russians victorious.
- September 6. Russians occupy important passes in the Carpathian Mountains.

- September 7. Austrian armies between Vistula and Bug rivers withdraw.
- September 7. Russian advance on Przemyśl begins.
- September 7. Russians appoint governor general for captured Galicia.
- September 8. Teutonic Allies before Lublin defeated; Russians take Nikolaieff.
- September 10. Austrians begin to withdraw from Cracow.
- September 11. Tomaszow falls into Russian hands.
- September 12. Oploe and Turobin, Russian Poland, taken by the Russians.
- September 16. Russian advance on Przemyśl continues.
- September 17. Outer defenses of Przemyśl attacked by Russians.
- September 18. Russian troops approach Przemyśl from the west; cross the River San.
- September 20. Defenses at Jaroslav attacked by the Russians.
- September 20. Russians bombard Przemyśl.
- September 21. Part of fortifications at Jaroslav fall.
- September 22. Russians take Jaroslav.
- September 22. Bombardment of Przemyśl continues; Russian advance on Cracow continues.
- September 25. Outer defenses of Przemyśl fall.
- September 29. Defenses at Tarnow impede Russian advance on Cracow.
- October 1. Russian troops cross the Carpathians; Natiago Valley invested.
- October 3. Russians cross Carpathians at Rodna Pass and move into Transylvania.
- October 29. Russians victorious at Tarnow.
- October 30. Czernovitz falls into Russian hands.
- November 6. Russians capture Jaroslav.
- November 10. Cracow approached by Russian troops.
- November 11. Outer defenses of Cracow attacked by Russians.
- November 12. Bombardment of Przemyśl continues.
- November 16. Siege of Cracow by Russians begins.
- November 29. Russians take Czernovitz.
- December 3. Cracow bombarded.
- December 22. Russians push Austrian troops in the Carpathians back to Latorcza and Ungh valleys.
- December 23. Siege of Cracow halted.
- December 30. Russians victorious in Galicia.

### III. SERBO-AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS

- July 27. Austrian troops enter Serbian territory.
- July 28. Bridge approach to Belgrade, across Save River, destroyed by Serbians.
- July 28. Austrian troops enter Belgrade.
- August 3. Austrians bombard Belgrade.
- August 5. Bombardment of Belgrade continues.
- August 15. Sabac falls into Austrian hands.
- August 21. Serbians victorious at battle of Jardar.
- August 24. Invading Austrian army driven back.
- September 6. Serbian troops enter Austrian territory; march on Vichegrad begins.
- September 7. Serbian troops cross the Save into Slavonia.
- September 8-9. Battle of the Drina River; Serbians victorious.
- September 11. March on Sarajevo by Serbians and Montenegrins begins.

- September 14. Vichegrad falls into Serbian hands.
- September 16. Jabuka falls into hands of Montenegrins.
- September 17. Serbians withdraw from Semlin.
- September 17. Antivari bombarded by Austrian fleet.
- September 22. Belgrade still holds out against Austrians; bombardment continued.
- September 24. Montak taken by Montenegrins.
- September 26. French fleet bombards defenses of Cattaro.
- September 27. Serbo-Montenegrin troops approach Sarajevo.
- November 15. Valievo taken by the Austrians.
- November 18. Bombardment of Belgrade resumed.
- November 29. Suvotor taken by the Austrians.
- December 2. Siege of Belgrade ends. Austrian troops enter.
- December 14. Austrians driven out of Belgrade; forced across the Drina.
- December 20. Serbo-Montenegrin troops begin invasion of Bosnia.
- December 29. Serbian troops reach Semlin and cross the Save River.

## THE WAR ON THE SEAS

- July 29. British high seas fleet sails under sealed orders.
- August 4. *Kronprinzessin Cecilie* ends voyage on high seas by seeking safety at Bar Harbor, Me.
- August 5. Cables cut at Azores by British.
- August 5. Mine-layer *Königin Luise* sunk by H.M.S. *Amphion*.
- August 6. *Amphion* sunk by mine.
- August 9. *Goeben* and *Breslau* reach Turkey safely.
- August 10. British cruiser *Birmingham* sinks German submarine *U-15*.
- August 12. *Goeben* and *Breslau* become units in Turkish navy.
- August 16. Austrian cruiser *Zenta* sunk by French fleet at Antivari.
- August 27. Russian warships sink German cruiser *Magdeburg* in Gulf of Finland.
- August 28. Battle of the Bight of Helgoland; British victorious.
- September 6. British cruiser *Pathfinder* hits mine; sinks.
- September 8. British converted cruiser *Oceanic* sinks in North Sea.
- September 13. German cruiser *Hela* sunk by British submarine *E-9*.
- September 13. *Berwick*, British cruiser, sinks *Spreewald*, converted German cruiser.
- September 20. British converted cruiser *Carmania* battles with and sinks German converted cruiser *Cap Trafalgar*.
- September 20. German cruiser *Königsberg* attacks British cruiser *Pegasus* in Harbor of Zanzibar.
- September 22. German submarine *U-9* sinks British cruisers *Cressy*, *Aboukir*, and *Hogue* in North Sea.
- September 23. Russian cruiser *Bayan* sinks unidentified German cruiser in the Baltic Sea.
- October 15. German submarine *U-9* sinks British cruiser *Hawke*.
- October 17. Battle of British and German destroyers off Dutch coast; German destroyers *S-116*, *S-117*, and *S-119* sunk; British cruiser *Undaunted* damaged.
- October 27. British battleship *Audacious* sunk off Irish coast.
- October 29. German cruiser *Emden* sinks Russian cruiser *Jemtchug* in Penang Harbor.
- October 31. German submarine sinks British cruiser *Hermes*.



- November 3. Naval battle off Coronel; German victory; German warships *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, *Scharnhorst*, *Nürnberg*, and *Dresden* sink British cruisers *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*; *Glasgow* gets away safely.
- November 6. *Yorck*, German cruiser, hits mine and sinks in North Sea.
- November 10. Battle between Australian warship *Sydney* and German cruiser *Emden*, at Cocos Islands; *Emden* sunk.
- November 10. British cruiser *Chatham* chases German cruiser *Königsberg* up Rufiji River, Mafia Island, German East Africa.
- November 26. British battleship *Bulwark* blown up in the Thames.
- December 9. Battle off the Falkland Islands; British victory; *Scharnhorst*, *Leipzig*, and *Gneisenau* sunk; *Dresden* and *Nürnberg* escape.
- December 10. Dover attacked unsuccessfully by German submarines.
- December 14. British submarine *B-11* sinks Turkish battleship *Messudieh* inside the Dardanelles.
- December 16. German squadron raids and bombards British eastern coast; Scarborough, Whitby, and Hartlepool shelled heavily.

## POLITICAL EVENTS

### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

- August 12. War declared on England.
- August 12. War declared on France.
- August 25. War declared on Japan.
- August 30. War declared on Belgium.
- September 19. Recruits, formerly disqualified, and men under twenty, called to the colors.
- September 23. Cholera outbreak in the Austrian armies.
- October 13. Five generals dismissed.

### FRANCE

- July 31. Jaurés, prominent Socialist, shot.
- August 2. Thirty-day moratorium declared.
- August 5. War bills voted.
- August 25. Viviani Cabinet resigns; Delcassé heads new Cabinet.
- September 2. Bourse closes.
- September 2. Bordeaux becomes new capital when Paris is threatened.
- September 27. Moratorium extended for thirty days more.
- October 10. Last subscriptions to war loan of \$43,000,000 taken up.
- November 8. Sale of absinthe and other intoxicants restricted.
- November 30. Yellow book issued.
- December 7. Bourse reopens.
- December 11. Government returns to Paris.
- December 23. Largest money bill in history of the world, \$1,700,000,000, voted by the French legislature.

### GERMANY

- August 4. Reichstag votes bill of \$1,250,000,000.
- September 23. Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf and Cologne raided by British aviator

- September 28. "Vorwärts," Social Democratic newspaper suspends publication.  
October 6. General von Hindenburg replaced by General von Morgen.  
October 7. General von Moltke replaced by General von Stein.  
October 22. Prussian Diet meets; \$375,000,000 war bill voted.  
December 2. Second war session of the Reichstag begins; war bill of \$1,250,000,000 voted; Liebknecht, Socialist, only dissenter.  
December 13. Recruits of 1915 called to the colors.  
December 19. General von Falkenhayn made chief of staff.  
December 25. Cuxhaven raided by British fleet and aviators.

## GREAT BRITAIN

- July 31. Stock Exchange closes.  
August 3. Mr. John Burns resigns from the Cabinet.  
August 4. Parliament votes Emergency Bill; \$525,000,000.  
August 6. Parliament votes \$500,000,000 war loan.  
September 5. England, France, and Russia tighten bonds of Triple Entente by promising not to make separate peace agreements with the enemy.  
October 18. Anti-German rioting in London.  
October 29. Resignation of First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenburg, takes place.  
November 14. Field Marshal Roberts dies.  
November 16. War loan of \$1,125,000,000 voted by Parliament.

## JAPAN

- August 5. Premier announces Japan will stand by her ally, England; will defend oversea dominions of Britain.  
August 15. Ultimatum sent to Germany.  
August 23. Japan declares war on Germany.  
August 24. Attack on Tsing-tau starts.  
August 27. Operations against Kiao-chau start.  
September 9. War bill, \$26,500,000, voted.  
November 6. Tsing-tau falls.  
December 25. Parliament refuses to vote war budget; dissolved.

## RUSSIA

- August 15. Polish autonomy promised for Polish loyalty.  
September 1. St. Petersburg becomes Petrograd by Imperial Ukase.  
November 15. Prohibition goes into effect for entire Russian Empire.

## THE BALKANS AND TURKEY

- August 14. Balkan League reconstructed; Rumania announces neutrality.  
September 10. The Porte attempts to abrogate all treaties with foreign powers where such treaties limit its sovereignty.  
September 28. Dardanelles declared closed.  
October 10. King Charles of Rumania dies.  
October 30. Russia declares war on Turkey.

- October 31. Turkey annexes Egypt.
- November 5. Bulgaria announces neutrality.
- December 17. Egypt becomes British protectorate; acknowledged by France.
- December 30. Italian ultimatum received.

THE WAR OUTSIDE OF EUROPE

- August 22. Canadian Parliament votes \$50,000,000 war bill.
- August 25. British capture German Togoland.
- August 29. New Zealand contingent takes German Samoa.
- September 4. Indian troops start for the war.
- September 25. Australians take German New Guinea.
- September 27. First Australian troops depart for the war.
- October 13. Colonel Maritz leads revolt in Union of South Africa.
- October 30. Revolt in Union of South Africa ended.
- November 5. Persia announces neutrality.
- November 13. General Botha defeats rebels led by General De Wet in Orange Free State.
- December 1. General De Wet's force dispersed; he is taken prisoner.

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS IN TURKEY

- November 1. English, Russian, and French Embassies in Turkey close.
- November 2. Egypt put under martial law by Great Britain.
- November 2. Turkish Cabinet resigns.
- November 3. Dardanelles forts bombarded by allied fleet.
- November 4. Serbia declares war on Turkey.
- November 4. Dardanelles again bombarded.
- November 5. England declares war on Turkey; Cyprus becomes British possession.
- November 5. France declares war on Turkey.
- November 6. Russians march toward Erzerum; capture Krepekioi.
- November 9. Dardanelles again bombarded by allied fleets.
- November 16. Holy War declared throughout the Turkish Empire against Christians of allied nations.

THE WAR IN THE AIR

- August 10. French airmen shell Metz.
- August 20. Zeppelin destroyed by French aircraft guns near Epinal.
- August 25. Zeppelins shell Antwerp.
- September 1. Taubes fly over Paris and drop bombs.
- September 22. British airmen shell Dusseldorf.
- October 8. British aviators fly over Cologne and drop bombs.
- October 11. Taubes drop bombs on Paris, striking Notre Dame Cathedral.
- October 15. Air battle between French and German aviators.
- November 11. Kaiser Wilhelm narrowly escapes death from bombs dropped from British aeroplanes.
- November 21. British air squadron shells Friedrichshafen.
- December 25. Remarkable battle in the air between Zeppelins and British aeroplanes near Cuxhaven.



# CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR FOR THE YEAR 1915

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## THE WAR ON THE WESTERN FRONTS

### I. THE BELGO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

- January, 1915 to February, 1916. The opposing armies, in line from the Belgian coast to Alsace-Lorraine, remain in "deadlock" with intermittent fighting along this entire front.
- January 1. Flooded ground prevents German attack on St. Georges.  
January 2. The French make slightly successful attacks at Nieuport.  
January 6. The Germans attack St. Georges, unsuccessfully.  
January 7. Germans bombard Dixmude.  
January 16. Germans lose trenches in the coast Dunes.  
January 20. Germans attempt, unsuccessfully, to destroy bridge at mouth of the Yser River.  
January 24. Zillebeke bombarded by Germans.  
January 25. Germans driven off after attacking at Ypres.  
January 28. Allies attack and drive Germans back in the coast Dunes.  
February. Winter weather prevents activity on both sides in Belgium.  
March 15. Belgians attack and take some German trenches near Nieuport.  
April 20. British attack Germans at Hill No. 60 and take it.  
April 22. Germans attack British and cross Yser Canal.  
April 23. Germans press British back and take Lizerne.  
April 25. Germans reach St. Julien.  
April 26. Battle of St. Julien; neither side gains advantage; Germans continue to maintain position across Yser Canal.  
April 28. Germans cease attacks on British troops in Belgium.  
April 30. French artillery and infantry attacks gain trenches from Germans near Ypres.  
April 30. Zeebrugge, German naval base in Belgium, bombarded.  
June 9. Germans attack Belgians near Dixmude with gas bombs.  
June 10. British reenforce Belgians near Dixmude; attack Germans and drive them back across Yser Canal.  
July 9. Belgians check German attacks on the Yser River positions.  
July 31. 1915. After one year of warfare the armies in Belgium still continue in "deadlock."

### II. FRANCO-GERMAN CAMPAIGNS

- January 1. Fighting in the Argonne.  
January 2. French attack at Verdun and Grammercy; checked by Germans.  
January 3. Unsuccessful attack by the French in the Argonne; Altkirch bombarded by French aviators.

- January 4. French recapture Steinbach.
- January 5. French make unsuccessful effort to take Lille.
- January 6. French troops approach Altkirch, Alsace, after severe fighting.
- January 8. French attacks in Alsace, on the River Aisne and near Soissons bring slight gains; French attacks in Vosges and in the Argonne unsuccessful.
- January 9. Two days' battle at Perthes-les-Hurlus ends; French victorious.
- January 10. Germans recapture Steinbach.
- January 14-16. Battle of Soissons; Germans victorious; unable to advance.
- January 15. French driven across the River Aisne.
- January 16. French regain ground and take St. Paul.
- January 18. Fighting near Soissons ceases.
- January 25. British attacked at La Bassée; lose front-line trenches.
- January 29. Germans attack unsuccessfully along the River Aisne and near Soissons.
- January 30. French lose 200 yards of trenches in the Argonne.
- January 31. Severe fighting, with no decisive results, near La Bassée.
- February 2. German attacks near La Bassée repulsed.
- February 13. French take Hartmannsweilerkopf, Alsace.
- February 13-28. Winter weather prevents further activity on this front.
- March 10. Battle of Neuve Chapelle; British victorious.
- March 13. Germans make unsuccessful attempt to retake Neuve Chapelle.
- March 19. French defeat Germans in attacks near Hartmannsweilerkopf.
- March 28. French take top of Hartmannsweilerkopf.
- April 5. French attack near St. Mihiel.
- April 7-14. Indecisive fighting near Les Eparges.
- April 25. Germans recapture top of Hartmannsweilerkopf.
- April 27. French again recapture top of Hartmannsweilerkopf.
- April 30. Dunkirk shelled by heavy German artillery at eighteen miles' range.
- May. The "deadlock" on this front continues; no important changes in opposing lines since December, 1914.
- June 17. Sixteen days' fighting in the Labyrinth north of Arras ends with the French victorious.
- June 17. Rheims again bombarded by the Germans.
- June 21. French troops occupy the Labyrinth.
- June 22. Germans again bombard Dunkirk with long-range artillery.
- June 23. French capture Sondernach.
- June 26. Germans make unsuccessful attacks on French position in the Labyrinth.
- July 13. Battle of the Cemetery, near Souchez; Germans victorious.
- July 31, 1915. One year of warfare on this front ends with the armies in "deadlock" and no change in position since December, 1914.

## THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONTS

### I. RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGNS

- January 5. Russians start march against Mlawa.
- January 9. Germans begin march against Warsaw.
- January 11. Germans attack unsuccessfully near Skierniewice.
- January 11. Russians cross frozen Mazurian Lakes.

- January 14. Germans retreat from Serpez as a result of fighting along the Vistula.
- January 27. Russians again march toward Königsberg; cross River Inster.
- January 29. Russian army approaches Tilsit.
- January 30. Germans check Russian advance over Mazurian Lakes.
- February 12. Von Hindenburg defeats Russians near Lyck, after sending troops to the north and south of the Mazurian Lakes.
- February 14. Russians retreat to the River Niemen.
- February 26. Germans capture Przasnysz.
- February 28. Russians recapture Przasnysz.
- March 2. Germans attack fortifications at Ossowitz.
- March 2. Germans unsuccessfully attack Przasnysz.
- March 8-10. Battle of Pilica River.
- March 13. Russians forced to retire from Grodno.
- March 17. Third Russian advance into East Prussia starts; Memel taken.
- March 18. Germans bombard fortifications at Ossowitz.
- March 21. Germans retire beyond Tauroggen.
- March 22. German retreat near Tauroggen halts.
- March 23. Germans retake Memel.
- April 12-28. Germans bombard fortifications at Ossowitz.
- April 25. German advance against Russia near Baltic coast starts.
- May 8. Germans take Libau.
- July 14. Von Hindenburg takes Przasnysz.
- July 19. Germans continue advance on Warsaw; capture Ostrolenka.
- July 20. Russians make a stand; an attempt to drive Teutonic forces from region of Warsaw.
- July 20. Germans take Windau.
- July 23. Germans cross River Narew; approached River Bug.
- July 31. Austro-German armies take Lublin.
- July 31, 1915. One year of fighting in this theatre of the war ends with the German armies closing in on Warsaw.

## II. RUSSO-AUSTRIAN CAMPAIGNS

- January 1. Russian investment of Bukowina nears completion.
- January 1. Austrians take Uzsok Pass, Galicia.
- January 9. Russians take Borgo Pass, giving them egress to Transylvania.
- January 15. Russians take Kirilaba Pass.
- February 4. Austro-German troops drive Russians from Borgo and Kirilaba Passes.
- February 8. Battle of the Dukla Pass.
- February 17. Russian retreat across the Carpathians halts.
- February 18. Russians' retreat resumed; they abandon Czernowitz.
- March 2. The Russian retreat again halts; battle of Krazsna, Galicia, Russians victorious.
- March 6. Austrian armies abandon Czernowitz, Bukowina.
- March 14. Russians take Tarnowitz, Galicia.
- March 15. Russians commence attack on Przemyśl.
- March 19. Outpost of Przemyśl captured by Russians.
- March 21. Defenders of Przemyśl make an unsuccessful sortie.
- March 22. Defenders of Przemyśl surrender.
- March 23. Russians change name of Przemyśl to Peremyśl.



- April 6. Fighting in the Carpathians; Russians take Cisna.
- May 16. Austro-German armies drive Russians from the Carpathians after one month's severe fighting; Russian retreat starts.
- May 17. Russians cross the River San.
- June 3. Austrians recapture Przemyśl.
- June 21. Russians lose Rawa-Ruska.
- June 22. Russians abandon Lemberg.
- June 24-29. Battle of Halicz; Austro-German armies victorious.
- June 30. Austro-Germans take Tomaszow, Russian Poland.
- July 31, 1915. The first year of war ends with the Austrian armies in this theatre of war in position to cooperate with the German armies in an attack on Warsaw.

### III. AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS

- January 2. Belgrade bombarded by Austrian gunboats.
- January 4. Minor attack by Serbians against Austrian army near Belgrade.

### IV. ITALIAN-AUSTRIAN CAMPAIGNS

- May 23. First skirmish between Italian and Austrian troops; fight at Forcellini di Montozzo.
- May 24. Italian coast cities on the Adriatic bombarded by Austrian aviators and small warships.
- May 25. Italian offensive begins; troops near the Austrian border.
- May 28. Italians take Grado.
- May 29. Italians take Ala.
- May 31. Italians take forty small towns in the Ampezzo Valley.
- June 17. Italians take the heights of Plava.
- July. Intermittent fighting in this theatre of the war; the Italians hold all captured positions.

## THE WAR ON THE SEAS

### I. IN NORTHERN WATERS AND THE OUTER SEAS

- January 1. British battleship *Formidable* torpedoed off the Devonshire coast by German submarine.
- January 4. Mine sinks Swedish steamer *Carma*.
- January 7. Australian warship *Australia* sinks the German merchantman *Woermann* in the South Atlantic.
- January 24. Battle of the Dogger Bank; British fleet victorious; Germans lose the *Blücher*.
- February 1. British hospital ship *Asturias* attacked by German submarine.
- February 2. Great Britain declares that henceforth all shipments of food to Germany will be considered contraband.
- February 5. German admiralty announces that beginning February 18, 1915, the waters around the British Isles will be considered a war zone, and that neutral and well as belligerent merchantmen will be in danger there.
- February 18. German admiralty's war zone proclamation goes into effect.

- February 24. British armed merchantman *Clan McNaughton* reported missing.
- March 1. *Belgrove*, British collier sunk by German submarine in the British Channel.
- March 4. German submarine *U-29* sunk by British destroyers.
- March 9. German submarine sinks British merchantmen *Tangistan*, *Princess Victoria*, and *Blackwood*.
- March 10. German commerce raider *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* puts in at Newport News, Va.
- March 11. British auxiliary cruiser *Bayano* sunk by German submarine.
- March 12. British destroyer *Ariel* rams and sinks German submarine *U-12*.
- March 13. British collier *Invergyle* and Swedish merchantman *Haima* sunk by German submarine.
- March 14. German cruiser *Dresden* sunk by British warships *Glasgow* and *Kent*.
- March 15. Germany admiralty reports that the *U-29* has sunk the British merchantmen *Indian City*, *Headlands* and *Andalusian*.
- March 18. German submarine *U-28* takes Dutch steamers *Batavier V* and *Zaanstroom* to Zeebrugge.
- March 18. German submarines sink the *Glencartney*, *Hyndford*, *Blue-jacket*, *Fingal*, *Blonde*, and *Leeward*.
- March 18. German submarine *U-28* sinks Dutch steamer *Medea*.
- March 25. German submarine *U-29* is sunk by British; all aboard lost.
- March 30. German submarine sinks African liner *Falaba*; one American among those killed.
- March 31. German submarine sinks *Crown of Castile*.
- April Attacks on all merchantmen in the war zone continue.
- April 11. German commerce raider, converted cruiser *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, puts in at Newport News, Va.
- April 28. American ship *Cushing* attacked by German aviator in the war zone.
- May Attacks on all merchantmen in the war zone continue.
- May 1. British destroyer *Recruit* sunk by German submarine.
- May 1. American tank steamer *Gulflight* attacked in war zone.
- May 7. German submarine sinks liner *Lusitania*.
- May 25. American ship *Nebraskan* torpedoed in war zone.
- May 26. *Princess Irene*, merchantman in government service, blown up in Sheerness Harbor, England.
- June Attacks on all merchantmen in the war zone continue.
- June 7. Minor Russian and German fleets meet in the Gulf of Riga.
- June 10. British torpedo boats *Nos. 10* and *12* sink in the North Sea.
- June 17. German submarine *U-14* captured by the British.
- June 20. German submarine sinks British cruiser *Roxburgh*.
- July Attacks on all merchantmen in the war zone continue.
- July 1. German warships cover operations in attempted landing of troops at Russian port of Windau; attempt unsuccessful.
- July 2. German mine layer *Albatross* runs ashore in the Baltic to escape from Russian squadron.
- July 2. British submarine sinks German warship *Pommern* in Danzig Bay.

- July 9. Cunard liner *Orduna* attacked in the war zone.  
 July 21-29. Attacks on merchantmen in the war zone temporarily abate.

## II. IN SOUTHERN WATERS

- January 5. Reported damage to Austrian warships *Radetzke* and *Viribus Unitis* confirmed.  
 January 5. Allied fleet bombards the Dardanelles.  
 January 7. Turkish cruiser *Goeben* slightly damaged by hitting mine.  
 January 27. Russian squadron in the Black Sea pursues Turkish warships *Breslau* and *Medjidieh*.  
 February 20. The British battleship *Queen Elizabeth* bombards the Dardanelles.  
 February 26-28. Bombardment of the Dardanelles continued.  
 March 2. Allied fleet silences outer forts of the Dardanelles.  
 March 5. Allied fleet bombards forts in the Narrows at the Dardanelles.  
 March 18. The Great Attempt to force the Dardanelles with naval units begins; warships *Irresistible*, *Ocean*, *Bouvet*, disabled; the *Inflexible* and *Gaulois* sunk.  
 March 19. Allied fleet gives up attempt to storm the Dardanelles.  
 April 18. British submarine *E-15* beached and destroyed in the Dardanelles.  
 April 26. French cruiser *Leon Gambetta* torpedoed by Austrian submarine *U-5* in Strait of Otranto.  
 May 12. British battleship *Goliath* sunk by Turks in the Dardanelles.  
 May 24. Engagement between Austrian and Italian flotillas; Italians lose destroyer *Turbine*.  
 May 25. British battleship *Triumph* torpedoed in the Dardanelles.  
 May 27. British battleship *Majestic* torpedoed in the Dardanelles.  
 June 17. Italian submarine *Medusa* sunk by Austrian submarine.  
 July 1. French aviator sinks Austrian submarine *U-11* in the Adriatic.  
 July 6. Italy proclaims "war zone" in the Adriatic.  
 July 7. Italian cruiser *Amalfi* torpedoed and sunk in the Adriatic.  
 July 17. Italian armored cruiser *Giuseppe Garibaldi* torpedoed by Austrian submarine near Ragusa.  
 July 26. Italian naval force occupies Austrian island of Pelagosa.  
 July 26. French submarine *Mariotte* sunk by German submarine in the Dardanelles.  
 July 29. Minor Austrian naval force attempts to recapture Pelagosa.

## POLITICAL EVENTS

### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

- January 22. Austrian Ambassador leaves Berlin for Bucharest to influence Rumanian and Italian neutrality.  
 February 28. Austrian "Red Book" issued.  
 March 7. Previously exempt classes called to the colors.  
 May 22. The Landsturm called for military examination.



## BELGIUM

- March 3. The German Government completes arrangements for free passage of American relief ships for Belgium.
- May 12. Bryce report on atrocities in Belgium submitted to the British Parliament.
- May 24. Germany publishes "White Book" refuting charges in the Bryce report.

## FRANCE

- January 1. New Department (du Haut-Rhin) created out of territory taken from Germany since start of the war.
- January 12. French Parliament convenes.
- February 1. Copies of the Pope's "Peace Prayer" seized by Paris police.
- March 22. Beginning of the trial of F. Descleaux, charged with stealing military supplies.
- March 25. Descleaux convicted and sentenced for seven years.
- April 1. Moratorium extended to June 30, 1915.
- April 2. Bill calling 1917 recruits to the colors is passed.
- April 22. Twenty-nine generals retired.
- April 29. Descleaux case reaches Court of Cassation on appeal.
- June 3. War bill for \$1,120,000,000 introduced in Chamber of Deputies.

## GERMANY

- January 1. Liebknecht, Socialistic leader, sends appeal to labor leaders to call for peace.
- January 2. General von Falkenhayn resigns as Minister of War.
- January 3. General von Moltke made Chief of Supplementary Staff.
- January 26. Trading in wheat, flour and corn forbidden by Federal Council.
- February 1. By decree of Federal Council all private stocks of wheat, flour and corn are seized by the government at a fixed price; all metals reserved for military usage.
- February 19. Reply to American note of protest on the war zone published.
- February 26. Admiral von Ingenohl replaced by Admiral von Pohl as Chief of Admiralty Staff.
- February 27. Preliminary estimates on budget voted by the Federal Council; war bill of \$2,510,000,000 passed.
- March 20. Budget voted; only the Socialist Liebknecht dissents.
- March 25. Liebknecht mustered into the army to keep him from disturbing legislative action.

## GREAT BRITAIN

- January 4. Stock Exchange reopens.
- February 2. Parliament reassembles.
- February 8. The "blank check budget" introduced into Parliament.
- March 5. Sir Hedworth Meux replaces Vice Admiral Jellicoe as commander of the Home Fleet.

- May 10. Anti-German riots in London.
- May 15. Stated Parliamentary Election put off till end of the war.
- May 19. Reorganization of the Cabinet; members of the Opposition given portfolios.
- June 15. Commons votes war loan of \$1,125,000,000.
- June 29. Bill providing for National Register, first step toward conscription, passes first reading in House of Commons.
- July 20. War loan of \$750,000,000 introduced into Parliament.

RUSSIA

- January 2. The "Orange Book" issued.
- January 13. Government completes arrangements for \$25,000,000 loan in America.
- February 9. Duma meets for first time since August, 1914.
- May 12. Ministry of Finance issues notification of internal loan for \$500,000,000.
- June 10-11. Anti-German riots in Moscow.
- June 29. General Soukhomlinoff succeeded by General Polivanoff as Minister of War.
- June 30. Imperial Ukase creates Board of Munitions.
- July 28. Imperial Ukase calls boys twenty years old to the colors.

ITALY

- January 6. 300,000 men called to the colors.
- January 7. The Hodeida incident; Turkey given three days to apologize.
- February 7. The Hodeida incident closes.
- May 4. Italian Government officially denounces the Triple Alliance.
- May 13. Salandra Cabinet resigns.
- May 16. Salandra Cabinet retakes portfolios; Anti-German riots in Trieste.
- May 19. Railways put under the control of the military.
- May 20. The Government given "extraordinary powers" by the legislature.
- May 21. The "Green Book" issued.
- May 22. War declared on Austria.
- July 7. Munitions factories put under control of the military.

THE BALKANS

I. ALBANIA

- January 3. Rebels take Berat and attack Durazzo; Italian ships bombard the city.
- June 10. Serbian armies reach Remesi.
- June 27. Montenegrin army occupies Scutari.

II. BULGARIA

- January 9. Bulgarian army reservists abroad ordered to report to consuls.
- February 8. Bulgaria takes loan of \$30,000,000 from Teutonic Allies.

## III. GREECE

- March 6. Premier Venizelos and pro-Ally Cabinet resigns.  
March 9. Gounaris Cabinet takes portfolios.  
March 11. The legislature is adjourned for one month by royal decree.  
May 2. The legislature dissolved; new elections set for June 1.

## IV. RUMANIA

- January 8. Army of 750,000 men mobilized.  
March 7. Parliament votes \$40,000,000 for "extraordinary purposes."  
July 7. Austria-Hungary offers Rumania large part of Bukowina to enter the war on the side of the Teutonic Powers; offer to stand one month.

## V. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

- February 3. Three conspirators against late Austrian heir apparent executed.  
February 14. Antivari bombarded by Austrian fleet.  
March 5. Antivari again bombarded by Austrian fleet.

## THE WAR IN TURKEY AND THE NEAR EAST

## I. OPERATIONS AT THE DARDANELLES

- January 5. Naval attack by allied fleet begins.  
March 3. Allied troops landed on Gallipoli Peninsula.  
March 5. Allied fleet bombards Smyrna.  
March 19. Naval attack by Allies ends in failure.  
April 25. British oversea troops land at five points on Gallipoli Peninsula.  
April 30. British troops on Gallipoli Peninsula start toward the Dardanelles.  
May 13. Krithia captured by the Allies.  
May 28. Italian troops land at Rhodes.  
June 1-10-11. Allies bombard Turkish lines; take some trenches.  
July 13. Hard fighting on opposing line on Gallipoli Peninsula; inner forts at the Dardanelles bombarded.

## II. THE CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT

- January 26. The Turks attack defenders of the Suez Canal at El Kantara.  
February 2. Turks make unsuccessful attempt to cross the Canal at Toussoum.  
February 3. Second assignment of British oversea troops arrives in Egypt.  
February 4. Turks make second unsuccessful attempt to cross the canal.  
April 8. Attempt made on the life of the Khedive of Egypt.



### III. THE RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN

- January 1. Battle of Sari Kamish, Russian Armenia, Russians victorious.
- January 1. Turks capture Ardahan, Russian Armenia.
- January 2. Turks attack Russians at Saonjbulak, Persia.
- January 3. Battle of Baku; Turks badly defeated.
- January 6. Russians attack reenforced Turkish army.
- January 8. Turks drive Russians from Kotur, Persia.
- January 12. Turks take Tabriz, Persia.
- January 18. Turks take Ardanoutch.
- January 30. Russians recapture Tabriz.
- February 8. The *Breslau*, flying the Turkish flag, bombards the town of Yalta on the Black Sea.
- April 19. Russian flotilla bombards Turkish coast near Batum.
- April 22. Turkish army moved in Mesopotamia to bar British cooperation with the Russians by advancing from the head of the Persian Gulf.
- May 23. Russians enter Van, Asiatic Turkey.
- May 28. Russians take Uruniah, Persia.
- July 1. British force, operating against the Turks in Mesopotamia, ascends the Euphrates River as far as Nasiryeh.

### THE WAR OUTSIDE OF EUROPE

- January 5. British battleships bombard Dar-el-Salaam, capital of German East Africa.
- January 14. Second contingent sails from Australia.
- February 2. A German, Horn, attempts to blow up bridge at St. Croix, Canada.
- February 16. General De Wet's trial for treason starts at Bloemfontein, Union of South Africa.
- April 23. Blockade of the coast of German Cameroons begins.
- May 10. Anti-German riots in Victoria, Canada.
- May 12. Windhoek, capital of German Southwest Africa, captured.
- May 13-14. Anti-German riots in Cape Town, South Africa.
- June 22. General De Wet found guilty; sentenced to six years in prison and \$10,000 fine.
- July 8. German army in German Southwest Africa surrenders to General Botha.

### THE WAR IN THE AIR

- January 10. British headquarters at Dunkirk bombarded by German aviators.
- January 19. German airships bombard Sandringham, Yarmouth, and Norfolk, towns in England.
- January 21. Allied aviators bombard Krupp works at Essen, Germany.
- February 16. Forty allied aviators bombard Ostend, Middelkerke, Zeebrugge and Ghistelles, hitting guns, ships, and aerodromes.
- February 22. Calais bombarded by a Zeppelin.
- March 7. British aviators bombard Ostend.
- March 18. Calais visited by a Zeppelin.

- March 21. Paris bombarded by Zeppelins; slight damage reported.
- March 24. British aviators bombard Hoboken, Belgium, and damage German submarines in dry-dock there.
- March 27. French aviators bombard aerodromes at Frescati and barracks near Strassburg.
- April 7. Austrian aviators bombard Porgoritzza, Montenegro; twelve fatalities.
- April 15. French aviator bombards Freiburg; nine fatalities.
- April 15-16. Zeppelins make night raid on east coast towns of England; damage slight.
- April 16. Amiens bombarded by German aviator; seven fatalities.
- April 17. German aviators raid Kent, England, in daylight; driven off.
- April 18. French aviation officer, Garros, lands and is taken prisoner at Courtrai, Belgium.
- April 20. Bailystock, Russian Poland, bombarded by ten German aviators.
- April 20. Zeppelin bombards Oiechanow, Russia; damage considerable.
- April 30. Zeppelin bombards Ipswich, England; no fatalities.
- April 30. Allied aviators bombard Ostend and cities in southern Germany.
- May 7. Russian aviators make first aerial attack on Constantinople.
- May 10. Zeppelins make night raid on English towns in Essex.
- May 16. Zeppelin raids Calais; two fatalities.
- May 17. Zeppelins raid Ramsgate, England; damage slight.
- May 22. Paris bombarded by German aviators; no damage.
- May 24. Paris again visited by German aviators; no damage.
- May 26. East coast cities in England raided by Zeppelins; three fatalities.
- May 26. Aerodrome at Gontrode damaged by allied aviators.
- May 27. Ten French aviators bombard chemical factory at Ludwigshaven, Germany; damage slight.
- May 28. Venice bombarded by Austrian aviators; damage slight.
- May 28. Italian aviators bombard Trieste-Nabresina Railway.
- May 30. Austrian naval base at Pola raided by Italian dirigible.
- May 31. London, Ramsgate and towns in Kent, England, bombarded by Zeppelins; six fatalities; damage slight.
- June 1. East coast towns in Italy bombarded by Austrian aviators.
- June 3. Twenty-nine French aviators bombard headquarters of the German Crown Prince; damage slight.
- June 4. Zeppelins visit coast towns in England; damage slight.
- June 5. German aviator bombards Calais; one fatality.
- June 6. Zeppelins raid east coast towns in England; twenty-five fatalities.
- June 7. British Flight Lieutenant Warneford battles with a Zeppelin over Amansberg, near Ghent; drops bombs on the dirigible and wrecks it; crew of twenty-nine killed.
- June 8. Venice bombarded by Austrian aviator; no fatalities.
- June 8. Lieutenant Warneford receives Victoria Cross.
- June 10. Austrian aviators bombard Kragojevat; damage slight.
- June 13. Italian dirigible raids Austrian naval base at Pola.
- June 15. Twenty-three French aviators bombard German cities of Karlsruhe, Pfalsburg, and Saverne; eleven fatalities.
- June 16. Zeppelins raid British coast towns; sixteen fatalities.
- June 17. Lieutenant Warneford killed at Paris in exhibition flight.
- July 2. Austrian aviator bombards Cromons; two fatalities.
- July 27. Verona bombarded by Austrian aviator; no fatalities.





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